Appendix F – Statement of Reasons – Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ)
Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ)
(Also
known as: Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Jhangvie, Laskar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkare
Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Jhangwi, Lashkar-i-Jhangwi, Jhangvi Army, Lashkar-e Jhangvi,
Lashkar Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Jhanvi, Lashkar-i-Jangvi, Lashkar e Jhangvi, Lashkar
Jangvi, Laskar e Jahangvi).
The following
information is based on publicly available details about Lashkar-e Jhangvi
(LeJ). These details have been corroborated by official reporting. ASIO
assesses the details set out below are accurate and reliable.
The LeJ is listed in
the UN 1267 Committee’s consolidated list and as a proscribed terrorist
organisation by the governments of the UK, the US, Canada and Pakistan.
Current status
of the LeJ
Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) is a
Sunni Deobandi Islamic terrorist group based primarily in Pakistan’s Punjab
region and the city of Karachi. The group was formed in 1996 by Akram Lahori,
Malik Ishaque, and Riaz Basra of the radical sectarian organisation, the
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), who accused the SSP’s leadership of deviating
from the ideals of its co-founder, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi.
Sectarian terrorist groups have
been responsible for over 4,000 deaths in Pakistan since the late 1980s, and
LeJ has established a reputation as the most violent Sunni extremist
organisation in the country, killing hundreds of Shias since its formation.
Among the Shias LeJ has targeted for killing have been doctors, lawyers,
teachers, politicians, lobbyists, and scholars. LeJ attacks have also targeted
Christians, including attacks on a Christian church and a Christian school in
Islamabad in 2002, and Iranian nationals in Pakistan, accusing the latter of
funding groups in Pakistan perceived as trying to establish Shia dominance.
While sectarian attacks remain
LeJ’s primary driving force, it has broadened its focus to target the Western
presence in Pakistan, such as the abduction and murder of US journalist Daniel
Pearl in Karachi in 2002, the car bomb attack on French nationals in Karachi in
May 2002, and car bombings outside the US Consulate in Karachi in June 2002 and
March 2006.
LeJ has also been involved in attacks on
Pakistani government targets, including two failed assassination attempts
against President Musharaff in 2003, and the failed assassination attempt
against former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007. LeJ chief Qari Zafar is
suspected of involvement in the September 2008 truck bombing of the Marriot
Hotel in Islamabad.
A large
portion of LeJ’s funding comes from wealthy supporters in Karachi. Additional
funding is derived from sources in Saudi Arabia, as well as from criminal
activities, such as protection rackets and extortion from both Shia and Sunni
banks and businesses.
Pakistani
government security crackdowns on sectarian groups have been only partially
successful, as fear of retaliation means that some judges are reluctant to hear
sectarian cases, and police officers investigating sectarian murders have been
killed. The large increase in the number of Deobandi madrassas (religious
schools) in Pakistan provides a pool of manpower from which LeJ can recruit.
LeJ operated major training camps in
Muridke and Kabirwal, Pakistan, and in Sarobi, Afghanistan. However, the camp
in Afghanistan was destroyed during the US invasion in 2001, and the camps in
Pakistan have reportedly been closed due to pressure from the police. LeJ has
reportedly been one of several terrorists groups that have set up eight
training camps in the Darra Adam Khel area of Pakistan’s North West Frontier
Province, and LeJ was described as the most active group in the area.
As part of the Sunni militant community,
LeJ can rely on the assistance of other Pakistani terrorist groups, such as
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Harakat ul-Mujahideen, Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami,
Jaish-e-Mohammad, all of which are members of Usama bin Laden’s International
Islamic Front.
LeJ also has an extremely close
relationship with the Afghan Taliban, having fought with them against the
Northern Alliance and participated in killings of Shias during the rule of the
Taliban in Afghanistan.
Objectives
LeJ’s
goals are to establish an Islamic Sunni state in Pakistan based on Sharia law,
through the use of violence if necessary; to have all Shias declared
non-believers; and to eliminate followers of other faiths, especially Jews,
Christians, and Hindus.
Leadership and membership
The
current leader of LeJ is reportedly Qari Zafar of Karachi, who also has links
to al-Qa’ida. He probably assumed the role in early 2007, following the 4
February 2007 arrest of former leader Rizwan Ahmad in Lahore on suspicion of
planning suicide attacks.
LeJ is estimated to have around 300
active members. It maintains a multi-cellular structure, made up of loosely
co-ordinated regional sub-units, further divided into several small cells of
five to eight members each that operate independently of one another.
Terrorist activities
Recent
events confirm LeJ’s continued existence and involvement in terrorist attacks
and planning for future attacks:
·
26 September
2008: three LeJ-trained terrorists were killed in a police raid. The police
also found bomb-making material and LeJ literature, as well as the body of a
Pakistani businessman who had been kidnapped and killed by the terrorists.
·
26 September
2008: LeJ member Raheemullah was arrested. He had been involved in past attacks
and had been planning attacks against police officers and Shias.
·
20 September
2008: suicide bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad; LeJ leader Qari Zafar
is suspected of involvement in the attack.
·
8 September
2008: LeJ member Zeeshan was arrested again. He had previously been arrested
for a 7 July 2008 bombing in Karachi, and is also suspected of involvement in
the Nishtar Park bombing in Karachi on 11 April 2006.
·
27 July 2008:
senior LeJ member Shafiqur Rehman was arrested in Quetta. He confessed to seven
assassinations in Quetta, and is suspected of involvement in over 100 cases of
sectarian terrorism.
·
20 June 2008:
two LeJ members were among five men arrested in Lahore who confessed to
planning suicide attacks in Lahore and other cities.
·
27 February
2008: three LeJ members were arrested for planning attacks on several important
political leaders in the district of Jhang.
·
26 February
2008: four LeJ members were arrested for planning attacks on political and
religious leaders and senior police officers in Lahore.
·
5 February
2008: LeJ member Fida Hussain, believed to have been involved in the suicide
bombing of a Pakistan Air Force bus in October 2007, was arrested in Lahore.
·
27 January
2008: a bombing near a mosque in Peshawar that killed a police chief and 14
others was attributed to LeJ.
·
17 January
2008: a suicide attack on a Shia mosque in Peshawar that killed 10 people was
attributed to the LeJ.
·
10 January
2008: 40 LeJ members were arrested in Lahore with several weapons recovered.
·
18 October
2007: attempted assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto; the
Mati-ur-Rehman group, which includes LeJ members, was suspected of involvement
in the attack.
·
16 June 2007:
Karachi police announced the arrest of two LeJ members suspected of involvement
in the Nishtar Park bombing on 11 April 2006.
·
24
February 2007: three would-be suicide bombers, travelling by bicycle, were
killed when a speed bump set off the explosives they were carrying. The bombers
were LeJ members attempting to attack a prayer meeting in Chechawatni, where a
large number of police officers were expected to be in attendance.
·
13
February 2007: two LeJ members were arrested in connection with several
attacks, including a raid on a Shia community centre in Rawalpindi in 2002 that
killed 15 people.
Conclusion
The Criminal Code
provides that for an organisation to be listed as a terrorist organisation, the
Attorney-General must be satisfied that:
|
(a) |
the organisation is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occured or will occur); or |
|
(b) |
the organisation advocates the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occured or will occur). |
On the basis of the
above information, ASIO assesses that Ansar al-Islam is directly engaged in
preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of terrorist acts. It
is considered that the acts attributable to Ansar al-Islam are terrorist acts as
they:
|
(i) |
are done with the intention of advancing a political cause, namely, creating an Islamic caliphate in Iraq; |
|
(ii) |
are intended to coerce or influence by intimidation the governments of foreign countries, including Iraq and Coalition countries, and/or intimidate a sections of the public; and |
|
(iii) |
constitute acts which cause serious physical harm to persons, including death, as well as serious damage to property. |
This
assessment is corroborated by information provided by reliable and credible
intelligence sources.