Chapter 6 Scope of statutory protection
Introduction
6.1
Research and anecdotal reports have shown that whistleblowing involves a
range of risks and unintended consequences. A formal protection mechanism for
people who make public interest disclosures will be an essential underpinning
of the new scheme.
6.2
In considering model public interest disclosure provisions, this chapter
examines the following:
n statutory protection
in current legislation;
n protection against
victimisation, discrimination, discipline or an employment sanction, civil or
equitable remedies including compensation;
n immunity
from criminal liability and from liability for civil penalties; and
n immunity from civil actions
such as defamation and breach of confidence.
Statutory protection in current legislation
6.3
Where there is no whistleblower protection, a person making a public
interest disclosure may be liable for criminal, civil and administrative
sanction and adverse treatment in the workplace. On the other hand, employers
are under a duty to provide a system of protection. Such a system includes
active steps to prevent or stop harassment and persecution and legal
protection, plus positive obligations placed on the employer.[1]
6.4
Currently in the Australian Government public sector, there is limited
whistleblower protection available through s. 16 of the Public Service Act
1999 and s. 16 of the Parliamentary Service Act 1999. The protection
available is protection against victimisation or discrimination of a person who
reports a breach of the Code of Conduct provisions of those Acts.[2]
6.5
Given the lack of protection for whistleblowers in the Australian
government public sector, a program of reform to provide protection has
received broad support in submissions to the Committee.
6.6
The Community and Public Sector Union submitted that the provision of
statutory protection for public sector whistleblowers is essential and long
overdue. The Union was of the view that, because of its limited scope, the
legislative protection in the Public Service Act 1999 does not ensure
that those individuals who make a disclosure are properly protected.[3]
6.7
In addition to the potential legal and administrative penalties a
whistleblower might face, adverse action may occur in the workplace including
dismissal, harassment and injury to individuals and independent contractors.[4]
6.8
Adverse treatment against an employee who has made a public interest
disclosure is likely to involve a series of events over time. Research shows
that reprisals might be officially sanctioned or they could be the result of an
individual or individuals acting without authority.[5]
6.9
The number of whistleblowers who report adverse treatment from
management or co‑workers as a result of their disclosures is between 20
and 30%, which represents a sizeable proportion of those who responded to the
WWTW surveys.[6]
6.10
The types of adverse treatment experienced by whistleblowers were
documented in the WWTW project report. Table 5.13 from that report is
reproduced below.
Table 6.1 Types of treatment and harm experienced by
whistleblowers
Type of bad
treatment and harma
|
All whistle
blowers
|
Whistle
blowers experiencing any harm
|
Case handlers
and managersb
|
Threats, intimidation, harassment or torment
|
43.1
|
63.9
|
59.1
|
Undermined authority
|
29.9
|
44.3
|
38.2
|
Heavily scrutinised work
|
29.2
|
43.3
|
40.0
|
Ostracism by colleagues
|
28.5
|
42.3
|
56.9
|
Questioning of motives for whistleblowing
|
25.0
|
37.1
|
53.8
|
Unsafe or humiliating work
|
21.5
|
32.0
|
14.2
|
Forced to work with wrongdoers
|
20.8
|
30.9
|
25.8
|
Financial loss
|
18.1
|
26.8
|
9.8
|
Essential resources withdrawn
|
17.4
|
25.8
|
12.4
|
Missed promotion
|
16.7
|
24.7
|
22.7
|
Poor performance report
|
16.7
|
24.7
|
30.7
|
Involuntary transfer
|
16.7
|
24.7
|
29.3
|
Reference denied or poor reference given
|
16.0
|
23.7
|
16.0
|
Training denied
|
15.3
|
22.7
|
20.4
|
Given little or no work
|
15.3
|
22.7
|
20.4
|
Overworked
|
13.9
|
20.6
|
15.6
|
Made to see psychiatrist or counsellor
|
13.2
|
19.6
|
26.2
|
Disciplinary action or prosecution
|
13.2
|
19.6
|
15.1
|
Forced to take leave
|
11.8
|
17.5
|
20.4
|
Harassment of friends, colleagues or family
|
11.1
|
16.5
|
13.8
|
Property destroyed, damaged or stolen
|
11.1
|
16.5
|
11.6
|
Lost entitlements
|
7.6
|
11.3
|
8.4
|
Sacked
|
5.6
|
8.2
|
5.3
|
Suspended
|
4.9
|
7.2
|
8.0
|
Demoted
|
3.5
|
5.2
|
6.7
|
Put on probation
|
3.5
|
5.2
|
4.9
|
Assault or physical harm
|
1.4
|
2.1
|
6.2
|
a Percentages
in columns total more than 100% owing to multiple outcomes being reported. See
the source document for a fuller description of the data.
b Percentages
in the column refer to case handlers and managers who reported direct
experiences of whistleblowers experiencing reprisals. See the source document
for more details.
Source Brown AJ (ed.) 2008, Whistleblowing in the Australian public sector: enhancing the theory and practice of internal witness management in public sector organisations, Australia and New Zealand School of Government, p 127.
6.11
The WWTW study noted that 65 percent of whistleblowers who reported adverse
treatment believed it was deliberate action by one or more levels of
management.[7]
Many submissions supported that finding. For example, Mr Smythe told the
Committee:
Managers go to inordinate lengths to protect themselves and
their colleagues regardless of the true intentions of the complainant, and even
if they act within the letter of the law they may not be acting in the spirit
of the law. Remembering that placing managers in positions of confidence only
serves to support the retaliation or to allow the best form of defence is
attack approach.[8]
6.12
The detriment caused by reprisals is usually of a type that falls short
of the legal thresholds required to prove criminal liability on the part of any
individual. The result is that it is unlikely that criminal sanction, alone, is
the appropriate strategy for reducing the risk of reprisal.[9]
6.13
Several submissions to the Committee referred to the problem of proving
that detrimental action had occurred. Dr Kathy Ahern told the Committee that while
a matter may appear ‘rational on the surface’, retribution can be subtle and
similar to workplace bullying. For example, people might be not copied into
emails for important meetings and then ‘told that they are too sensitive or
they are making too much out of it’.[10]
6.14
The Deputy New South Wales Ombudsman, Mr Chris Wheeler, observed that some
things, such as people being moved against their will or being transferred to a
lower paying position might be relatively easy to prove but detrimental action
can often be difficult to demonstrate:
… a lot of the things that are alleged to occur as
detrimental action leave no fingerprints. For example, ‘I was treated
differently to my colleagues. They got an opportunity to act up or they got
this or that, whereas my career has slowly but surely gone downhill. I cannot
point to anything that I could prove in a court or a tribunal, but the overall
issue is that it appears to me that I am being detrimentally treated because I
made my disclosure.’[11]
6.15
It was noted that despite there being a reverse onus of proof in New
South Wales—where an employer has to show that detrimental action was not the
result of a disclosure—the five cases that had been prosecuted had ‘failed on
evidentiary or technical grounds’.[12]
6.16
The WWTW team noted that the general lack of success in obtaining
compensation under state and territory laws can be blamed on a process that
would either require demonstrating detriment to a criminal standard of proof
or, in other circumstances, the behaviour giving rise to detriment not being
discernible from other behaviour.[13]
6.17
Dr Brown subsequently drew the attention of the Committee to what he
described as a ‘nationally significant’ case where the Ombudsman Victoria has
recommended that compensation be paid to a number of mistreated public sector
whistleblowers, rather than leaving them to exercise their right to initiate
civil action on their own behalf under the Whistleblowers Protection Act 2001
(Vic).[14]
6.18
The significance of the development in Victoria is that a Victorian legislative
provision provides for the Ombudsman to review how a person is treated and that
resulted in the Ombudsman substantiating a claim of detriment. The implication
being that authority to make a finding that has evidentiary value should be
given to a regulatory or oversight agency, as a more suitable arrangement for
whistleblower protection, than the legislation simply allowing self-help
through a private action in tort.
6.19
While aspects of protection can be designed into procedures such as
confidentiality, the two main forms of protection for those who make public
interest disclosures are the removal of the threat of legal consequences
arising from disclosure and workplace protection of people from reprisal or
adverse treatment for having made the disclosure.[15]
Statutory protection in the states and territories
6.20
In the Australian states and territories, public interest disclosure legislation
tends to protect whistleblowers through the following:
n relief from criminal liability
for breach of statutory secrecy provisions;
n relief from civil
liability for defamation or breach of confidence;
n protection against
disciplinary or other workplace sanctions, such as reduction in salary or reclassification
or termination of employment; and
n legal redress for any
detriment suffered as a result of making a disclosure.[16]
6.21
Section 23(1)(b) of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2003 (WA)
places a positive obligation on the principal executive officer of all public
authorities to provide protection from detrimental action or the threat of
detrimental action for any employee who makes an appropriate disclosure of
public interest information. This is regarded as ‘the benchmark’ in existing legislation.[17]
Scope of protection for the Australian Government public sector
6.22
Most submissions to the Committee recommended that protection be
provided against those matters listed in the terms of reference: victimisation;
discrimination; discipline or an employment sanction; civil or equitable remedies,
including compensation; and to include immunity from criminal liability and
from liability for civil penalties.[18]
6.23
A number of witnesses drew the Committee’s attention to the distinction
between the substance of a disclosure and the needs of a person making a disclosure,
including protection from adverse consequences. It was argued that each is a
discrete matter and should be handled through separate processes.[19]
6.24
The reasons for separating the substantive issue from personnel
management matters include: the need to develop and improve upon workplace
culture; the skill sets and authority required to resolve the substantive
issues will generally be different to those required to resolve workplace
issues at an agency level; and, with the exception of the APSC, the role of
oversight or integrity agencies likely to be involved does not include
management of workplace issues.
Protection against adverse action
6.25
It was submitted to the Committee that public interest disclosure legislation
should cover as many employment-like relationships as necessary to reflect the
ways in which government does business, and that volunteers and contractors could
be included.[20]
6.26
Victimisation, discrimination, discipline or employment sanctions are
adverse actions taken against an employee. Different forms of adverse action,
such as not accepting goods and services, could be taken by a principal against
a contractor.
6.27
Adverse action by an employer against an employee is described in the
Fair Work Bill 2008 as action to dismiss the employee, injure the employee in
his or her employment, altering the position of the employee to the employee’s
prejudice, or discriminating between the employee and other employees of the
employer.[21]
6.28
The Fair Work Bill 2008 describes adverse treatment in contractual
relationships as adverse action by the principal when the principal terminates
the contract, injures the independent contractor in relation to the terms and
conditions of the contract, alters the position of the independent contractor
to the independent contractor’s prejudice, refuses to make use of, or agree to
make use of, services offered by the independent contractor or refuses to
supply, or agree to supply, goods or services to the independent contractor.[22]
Existing remedies
6.29
The CPSU is of the view that the concept of 'prejudicial alteration', for
example through termination of a contract or refusal to re-engage under the Workplace
Relations Act 1996, would be an appropriate remedy for adverse action
because of a person having made a public interest disclosure.[23]
6.30
Where remedies are provided for in state and territory legislation,
there has been almost no success in obtaining a remedy. This is because the
laws, except for Queensland and Victoria, rely largely on self-help in civil
matters and, as the WWTW team noted, in Howard v State of Queensland, the
whistleblower’s entitlement to seek damages under s. 43 of the Whistleblower
Protection Act 1994 (Qld) still did not extend to an entitlement to
establish that the employer was vicariously liable for the detriment that the
whistleblower had suffered. [24]
6.31
When the Commonwealth is vicariously responsible for the tortious acts
of its employees, the matter is governed by ss. 56 and 64 of the Judiciary
Act 1903. The issue of employer responsibility for acts or omissions by
employees is not straight-forward and this may be a matter to be included in
legislation to ensure that there is no legislative gap.
6.32
In the Commonwealth setting, except for a very narrow range of
circumstances related to codes of conduct, there is no specific protection for
people making a public interest disclosure.
6.33
The Workplace Relations Act 1996 may have the effect of providing
limited protection against dismissal.[25] As the Workplace Relations
Act 1996 is directed at matters other than public interest disclosures,
protection from criminal and civil liabilities arising out of public interest
disclosures are not available under that Act and, as with some of the state and
territory legislation, protection only extends to complaints to the correct
body.[26]
Period of transition in legislation
6.34
The Committee’s reference for this inquiry predated by some five months
the introduction of a new workplace relations bill, the Fair Work Bill 2008, on
25 November 2008. The Committee’s public hearings took place up until 27 November 2008. The Bill has passed the House of Representatives and, at the time of
tabling this report, was being considered by a Senate committee.
6.35
The effect of the timing of this inquiry and the introduction of the new
legislation was that neither those making written submissions, nor those who
appeared as witnesses, had the opportunity to give evidence in the light of
what is proposed in the Fair Work Bill 2008.
6.36
As the Fair Work Bill 2008 is under consideration by Parliament, a
synopsis of the types of protective provisions contained in it is at Appendix D.
Those protective provisions cover adverse treatment in the workplace and are
not significantly different to the types of workplace protection that witnesses
before the Committee supported.
Proposals to the Committee on workplace protective measures
6.37
Witnesses recommended against providing unique legislative arrangements to
protect employees from adverse treatment in the workplace. Instead, they promoted
the use of industrial relations laws and processes, occupational health and
safety arrangements and personnel management practices for protection against
adverse treatment.
6.38
The preference for the use of existing industrial relations mechanisms
reflects the practice in the United Kingdom and Japan, where public interest
disclosure legislation has its genesis in workplace laws. By way of contrast
with the UK and Japan, the initiative for this inquiry arises from issues of
accountability and integrity in the public sector.
6.39
The thrust of the submissions received by the Committee was that
workplace protection under a disclosure scheme should be seen as a part of an
agency’s values and personnel and workplace activities.[27]
Nevertheless, there is an inevitable cross-over with workplace matters owing to
the potential for a whistleblower to be treated adversely in the workplace
despite the fact that an employer is required to promote and develop measures
to ensure employees' health, safety and welfare at work.[28]
6.40
Dr Brown wrote to the Committee subsequent to the publication of the
WWTW report to suggest that the interrelationship between whistleblower schemes
and an employer’s existing obligations be recognised as a part of normal
workplace practice because:
It is becoming clearer that these obligations are more akin
to employers' other responsibilities to ensure their organization functions in
a way which recognizes and protects the occupational health and safety
(OH&S) of employees, than has previously been recognized in research and
policy-making relating to whistleblowing.
I believe it may be very valuable for the Committee to note
in its report that there are important links - hitherto unappreciated - between
issues of whistleblower management and issues of OH&S.[29]
6.41
The CPSU submitted that, in addition to the judicial remedies that are
available, there should be remedies available through the existing mechanisms
to provide mediation and conciliation functions and dispute resolution so that
there is ‘not just a rush to judicial remedies’. [30]
This was supported by the Australian Council of Trade Unions.[31]
Typically, in a workplace setting, these functions are provided through industrial
relations mechanisms. [32]
6.42
The existing industrial relations mechanisms for dispute resolution
include courts, tribunals and the Workplace Ombudsman. There are no other
authorities equipped with relevant expertise and experience, and the Committee
has heard that it is preferable not to create new regulatory or oversight
bodies when existing ones are adequate to undertake the task.
6.43
The current Workplace Relations Act 1996 and the Fair Work Bill
are not well adapted to protecting persons who make disclosures. The Workplace
Ombudsman has described the limitations as to what he can investigate under the
Bill in the following terms:
Whilst the proposed workplace rights provisions may provide
more protection against reprisals taken against persons who make public
interest disclosures than the current freedom of association provisions, they
are not designed, or adequate, for this purpose. For example, workplace rights
arise out of workplace entitlements and complaints about an individual's own
employment. Matters of corruption, malpractice and the like may not fall into
this category if they do not relate to workplace entitlements or the whistleblower's
own employment.[33]
6.44
The Workplace Ombudsman’s concerns reflect earlier submissions about the
need to investigate issues such as corruption and maladministration in
isolation from issues of adverse treatment in the workplace and for those issues
to be regarded as matters related to employment. [34]
6.45
It would not be the intention of legislation to require that the
Workplace Ombudsman investigate matters of corruption, malpractice and the like
nor to provide the immunities from civil and criminal sanction that are
recommended in this report. The intention would be that making a public
interest disclosure is a workplace right for the purposes of workplace laws and
that complaints about an individual's own treatment in his or her employment,
arising as a result of making a public interest disclosure, would be referrable
to the Workplace Ombudsman.
6.46
The Department of Defence submitted that Defence personnel should be
covered by the statutory protections provided by a public interest disclosure
scheme but asked that the Committee take note of the particular arrangements
whereby Defence personnel are employed.[35] For example, conditions
of service are determined by the Minister under the Defence Act 1903 (Cth)
and, under s. 42A of the Naval Defence Act 1910 (Cth), an authorized
person determines conditions of employment.
6.47
Various other Acts provide for particular conditions of employment and
remuneration of office-holders and specialist categories of employees. These
arrangements may cut across a number of agencies, for example the Remuneration
Tribunal does not determine the entire range of employment provisions available
for office holders.[36]
6.48
It is relevant that other groups of employees may have particular
employment schemes that exclude them from having workplace relations problems
dealt with in courts and tribunals, for example volunteers. Nevertheless, this
would not prevent the Workplace Ombudsman investigating a claim of adverse
treatment. In that case, rather than using the workplace courts and tribunals,
resolution of any matter that arose might rely on the Workplace Ombudsman
providing an evidentiary certificate for use in other venues.
6.49
Dr Brown has suggested that the Committee consider the merit in
empowering a person who is investigating allegations of adverse treatment to
make a determination that the treatment took place and issue a certificate to
that effect.[37]
This could be useful where a person does not come under the jurisdiction of
workplace courts or tribunals and assist a person to seek redress through other
avenues.
Compensation for detriment
6.50
There are potentially many issues that would attract compensation
arising from adverse treatment in the workplace, including the need for remedies
connected with the termination of employment. There are matters related to rehabilitation
through occupational health and safety laws that might arise as a result of a
person making a public interest disclosure.
6.51
These issues support the position that standard workplace systems should
be used to manage an individual’s workplace difficulties should they arise
after making a disclosure.
6.52
The Committee heard that it would be preferable that, rather than focus
on compensation for detriment, disclosure legislation should support the ideas
of prevention and restitution. Whistleblowers Australia for example, commented
that most people do not look for compensation. ‘All they want to do is go back
to the position they were in without a loss and accept a really nice, genuine
apology’.[38]
6.53
Whistleblowers Australia proposed that should financial remedies and
compensation be proposed for reprisals against a public interest disclosure,
payment must rest with the relevant agency, but that the agency should reclaim
against those who carried out the reprisals or who failed to comply with
statutory duties.[39]
6.54
It was suggested that a scheme would have to build in special measures
for support and for compensation of people who suffer real injury such as
psychological distress.[40]
6.55
With the exception of New South Wales, state and territory legislation
allows a person suffering adverse treatment to sue for detriment in the Supreme
or District Court. The following table from the WWTW report sets out the
current arrangements.
Table 6.2 Civil, equitable and industrial remedies for
detriment
Legislation
|
Civil Action (Tort)
|
Equal opportunity/ anti-discrimination
|
Workplace relations law
|
Injunction relief
|
SA 1993
|
Yes
|
Equal Opportunity Act 1984
|
No
|
No
|
Qld 1994
|
Yes
|
Unfair treatment of Office
|
Industrial Relations Act 1998, unfair dismissal
|
Yes
|
NSW 1994
|
No (common law
only)
|
ACT 1994
|
Yes
|
No
|
No
|
Yes
|
Cth 1999
|
No
|
Victimisation or discrimination
|
No
|
No
|
Vic 2001
|
Yes
|
No
|
No
|
Yes
|
Tas 2002
|
Yes
|
No
|
No
|
Yes
|
WA 2003
|
Yes
|
Equal Opportunity Act 1984
|
No
|
No
|
Source
Brown,
AJ (ed.) 2008, Whistleblowing in the Australian public sector: enhancing the
theory and practice of internal witness management in public sector
organisations, Australia and New Zealand School of Government, p 272.
6.56
The majority of evidence received about rewards being paid to
whistleblowers related to qui tam schemes.[41] Those schemes are
discussed in Chapter 5 of this report. Otherwise, the distinction was drawn
between compensation which would restore a person to their previous position
and monetizing a whistleblowing scheme. A number of witnesses resisted that
idea on public policy grounds:
It is important that truth-telling not be monetized as a good
for which one is paid, but as a public service that is the duty of every
citizen.[42]
6.57
Mr Wheeler remarked that, a scheme should not provide compensation mechanisms
that allow a person to ‘take on an organisation or a colleague at a tribunal’
in the expectation that a person ‘might get some money at the end of the day’.[43]
6.58
Many submissions noted the damaging personal effects of adverse
treatment, including depressive illnesses.[44]
Any legislation that provides for compensation would not take away a personal
right to sue for damages in a situation where the detriment included an injury.
Immunity from criminal and civil liability
6.59
Evidence to the Committee indicated broad agreement that protection
under a public interest disclosure system should include providing protection
for individuals (and contractors) from administrative sanction and criminal and
civil liability.
6.60
There was broad agreement that there should be no sanction in the
legislation for a person making a public interest disclosure although there
should be no protection if the public interest disclosure was made knowingly to
be false or misleading.[45]
We do not suggest that there is a need for specific statutory
provisions within, say, public interest disclosure legislation which provide
sanctions against a vexatious whistleblower. We think the provisions of the
Public Service Act, where they apply, or the general law, where it applies,
provide a sufficient regime to deal with that sort of behaviour.[46]
6.61
Apart from disciplinary measures that could arise out of either common
law or equitable duties of an employee to an employer, a person or body
corporate is potentially exposed to detriment through action for:
n breach of the Crimes
Act 1914, Public Service Act 1999, or other agency legislation and regulations
and departmental instructions;
n breach of privacy
principles;
n breach of confidence;
n breach of a code of
conduct;
n criminal defamation;
n defamation; and
n injurious falsehood.
6.62
The range of relationships between agencies and their ‘employees’
includes conventional employer-employee arrangements, contractual arrangements
and volunteers among others. In addition, special provisions apply in defining
employee relationships for the purposes of particular legislation, for example
the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 and the
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991.[47]
6.63
Each employment-like relationship attracts different types of duties and
degrees of protection at common law and equity and there is no precision in how
the law works. For example, an employer may be vicariously liable for the
actions of an employee but when the actions of a contractor attract a
liability, the exact circumstances will determine who is liable.
6.64
At other times it is difficult to discern the exact nature of a
relationship because it turns on specific issues in the relationship, such as
the amount of control that is exercised, which is a matter of fact to be
decided judicially.[48]
6.65
The Chief Executive Officer of the Post Office Agents Association
(POAA), gave evidence that the organisation represents a group of people
providing an essential public service and that, although in a contractual
relationship with a government agency, they are doing almost identical work to
that being done by government employees.[49]
6.66
In the circumstances described by POAA, a contractor’s employee, who
makes a disclosure about his employer’s practices to Australia Post, could be
in breach of a common law or equitable obligation to his or her employer, yet
the matter may relate to an essential public service and be in the public
interest.
6.67
The Community and Public Sector Union described for the Committee the
arrangements for veterinary officers and meat inspectors who are engaged as
contractors and are at the front line of national biosecurity and the
multimillion dollar meat trade. The CPSU’s view was that it would be ‘inconceivable’
to exclude them from a protection scheme.[50]
6.68
Unlike the postal workers who are employed by a contractor, the veterinary
officers and meat inspectors are on individual contracts for programs, which is
an increasingly common means of delivering government services and yet another
employment-like arrangement.
6.69
The complex relationship issues have been handled in state legislation by
legislating liability away or for absolute privilege to apply. For example, the
Queensland Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 legislates away
liability for civil, criminal and administrative matters, provides a defence of
absolute privilege for defamation proceedings and makes specific provision for a
breach of confidence, breach of other laws and disciplinary matters, as set out
below:
Section 39 General limitation
(1) A person is not liable, civilly, criminally or under an
administrative process, for making a public interest disclosure.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1)—
(a) in a proceeding for defamation the person has a defence
of absolute privilege for publishing the disclosed information; and
(b) if the person would otherwise be required to maintain
confidentiality about the disclosed information under an Act, oath, rule of law
or practice—the person—
(i) does not contravene the Act, oath, rule of law or
practice for making the disclosure;
(ii) is not liable to disciplinary action for making the
disclosure.
6.70
The Queensland legislation covers the critical points raised in the
terms of reference, and it appears to cover employment and employment-like
relationships. For example, s. 39(2)(b)(i) would appear to cover situations
like the postal contractor’s employee bypassing his or her employer and making
a disclosure to Australia Post and, likewise, a contractor in possession of
in-confidence information going to an oversight agency.
6.71
The protection against liability for having made a disclosure does not
rule out the possibility of consequences arising from an offence or other
misconduct that is revealed when making a public interest disclosure. In those
circumstances other common law or Evidence Act 1995 safeguards would
apply to the treatment of that information.
6.72
That type of circumstance is covered in the Queensland Whistleblowers
Protection Act 1994 which makes it clear that a disclosure is not a means
of escaping an earlier liability so that criminality and misconduct cannot be
rewarded by making a disclosure. The Queensland provision is set out below.
Section 40 Liability of discloser unaffected
A person’s liability for the person’s own conduct is not
affected only because the person discloses it in a public interest disclosure.
6.73
A further view put to the Committee was that there should be no penalty
arising from a disclosure having not been upheld except in cases where a person
has knowingly provided false information.[51]
This matter is dealt with elsewhere in this report.
6.74
The Queensland legislation is one model for providing protection against
civil, criminal and administrative liability and by all categories of persons
eligible to make a report.
View of the Committee
6.75
The current scope of protection for people who make whistleblower
reports in accordance with s. 16 of the Public Service Act 1999 is
inadequate and discourages people from speaking out. People within the public
sector should have a right to raise their concerns about wrongdoing within the
sector without fear of reprisal. The public sector should aim to prevent victimisation,
discrimination, discipline or employment sanction from occurring in the first
place. The next chapter discusses relevant procedures that aim to achieve that
goal.
6.76
Where reprisal occurs, mechanisms should be available to protect an
individual and to compensate for real detriment suffered by a person making the
disclosure.
6.77
The Committee considers that a reliance on workplace legislation for
dispute resolution is the most appropriate approach and should be a principle
for developing public interest disclosure legislation.
6.78
In the Commonwealth setting there are relevant workplace laws and
agencies with expertise to manage workplace disputes including those that
equate to detrimental or adverse treatment in the workplace. Legislative
linkages should be created between public interest disclosure legislation and
workplace laws by defining the entitlement to make a public interest disclosure
as a workplace right. This would allow any adverse treatment in the workplace
to be a matter referable to the Workplace Ombudsman in the same manner as any
other workplace dispute.
Recommendation 13
|
6.79
|
The Committee recommends that the Public Interest Disclosure
Bill define the right to make a disclosure as a workplace right and enable
any matter of adverse treatment in the workplace to be referred to the Commonwealth
Workplace Ombudsman for resolution as a workplace relations issue.
|
6.80
The Committee considers that protections for those who make a public
interest disclosure should include immunity from criminal liability and from
liability for civil penalties and immunity from civil actions such as
defamation and breach of confidence.
Recommendation 14
|
6.81
|
The Committee recommends that the protections provided under
the Public Interest Disclosure Bill include immunity from criminal liability,
from liability for civil penalties, from civil actions such as defamation and
breach of confidence, and from administrative sanction.
|
6.82
The following chapter provides a discussion of other aspects of
protection that concern the administration of a public interest disclosure
system and the responsibilities of agencies.