Chapter 7 Other treaties
Introduction
7.1
This chapter consider two types of treaty arrangements: the bilateral
nuclear arms control agreements between the US and Russia and nuclear weapon free
zones. While Australia is not party to most of these treaties, they are
significant mechanisms by which both disarmament and non-proliferation
objectives are being achieved.
Nuclear arms control agreements between the United States and Russia
Introduction
7.2
Since the early 1970s the United States and the Russian Federation (the
former Soviet Union) have concluded a series of treaties aimed at limiting or
reducing the size of their nuclear arsenals. These treaties have played a major
role in reducing the total number of deployed nuclear weapons in the world. In
July 2009 the US and Russia agreed to negotiate a new treaty to mandate further
reductions.[1]
7.3
This section of the chapter will give a brief history of nuclear arms
control agreements between the US and Russia, examine the significant role that
such agreements have made to nuclear disarmament and comment on the importance
of a new negotiated nuclear disarmament treaty between the US and Russia.
Background
7.4
Below is a brief chronology of nuclear disarmament treaties between the
US and Russia[2]:
n 1972: Parties
signed the Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I), which limited the number
of deployed US and Soviet nuclear-weapon delivery-vehicles (not including
strategic bombers) to 1,710 and 2,347 respectively.
In the same year, parties signed the Treaty
between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty),
which banned the development by either the US or the Soviet Union of a
nationwide strategic missile defence system.
Both of these Treaties entered into
force in 1972.
n 1979: Parties
signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
(SALT II), which limited the number of deployed US and Soviet nuclear weapon
delivery-vehicles (including strategic bombers) to 2,250 each. The US Senate
never considered the Treaty due to the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of
Afghanistan, and thus the Treaty never entered into force. However both
countries pledged to adhere to the terms of the Treaty.
n 1987: Parties
signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and
Shorter-range Missiles (INF Treaty), which obliged both parties to
eliminate all ground-based short-range and medium-range missiles. The INF
Treaty is of unlimited duration.
n 1988: The INF
Treaty entered into force.
n 1991: Parties
signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (START I), which limited the number of deployed nuclear
warheads for the first time. US and Russian arsenals were limited to 1,600
deployed delivery vehicles each and 6,000 deployed nuclear warheads each.
n 1993: The US
and the newly formed Russian Federation signed the Treaty between the United
States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reductions and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) which complemented, but
did not replace, START I. START II required the US and Russia to reduce the
number of nuclear warheads to between 3,000 and 3,500 by the year 2003, and
banned land-based missiles that carry more than one nuclear warhead.
n 1994: START I
entered into force.
n 1997: The US
and Russia agreed to negotiate a successor to START II that would reduce
deployed strategic warheads to between 2,000 and 2,500 each and, for the first
time, would mandate the destruction of warheads, rather than just their removal
from deployment. Negotiations of this agreement were intended to commence once
START II entered into force.
In the same year, the US and Russia
negotiated a Protocol to START II and amendments to the 1972 ABM Treaty. The
Protocol to START II extended the deadline for the dismantling of weapons from
2003 to 2007. The amendments to the ABM Treaty permitted the development and
use of ‘non-strategic’ missile defences to protect against short-range and
medium-range ballistic missiles in a limited theatre of war.
n 2000: Russia
ratified START II on the condition that the US ratify both the 1997 Protocol to
START II and the 1997 amendments to the ABM Treaty. The US Senate did not
approve these agreements.
n 2001: START I
reductions were completed.
n 2002: The US
withdrew from the ABM Treaty citing a need to develop a national missile
defence capability in order to combat the emerging threat of ‘rogue states’
with long-range ballistic missile capabilities. In response, Russia withdrew
from START II. These actions marked the end of both the ABM Treaty and START
II, which in turn ended the prospect of negotiation of a successor to START II.[3]
Following the end of START II, the US
and Russia negotiated the Treaty between the United States of America and
the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) which
requires parties to reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads to between
1,700 and 2,200 each by 2012. However, SORT differs from past nuclear
arms-reduction treaties in a number of ways and has been criticised for its
apparently lax approach.[4]
n 2003: SORT
entered into force.
n 2009: START I is
due to expire in December 2009.
The US and Russia agreed to begin
negotiations on a successor to START I which would limit delivery vehicles to
between 500 and 1,100 each and would limit the associated nuclear warheads to
between 1,500 and 1,675 each.[5]
Success of nuclear disarmament agreements between the US and Russia
7.5
Professor Joseph Camilleri argued that bilateral nuclear arms reduction
agreements between the US and Russia have been the single most effective method
of nuclear disarmament. It was noted that START I resulted in the destruction
of approximately 80 per cent of the strategic nuclear weapon stockpiles that were
in existence at the time of the Treaty’s negotiation.[6]
7.6
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade agreed that bilateral
disarmament treaties between the US and Russia have led to significant
reductions in nuclear weapon stockpiles, particularly through the START I
process, and argued that nuclear arms reductions between the two states will
continue. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Australian Safeguards
and Non-Proliferation Office anticipated that under the SORT agreement, US and
Russian nuclear arsenals will be reduced to one quarter and one third,
respectively, of levels that existed at the height of the Cold War.[7]
Deterioration of US-Russian cooperation
7.7
Despite the huge reductions in nuclear weapon stockpiles which have been
mandated by past disarmament agreements, the Committee was told that the
commitment of both the US and Russia to new nuclear-arms reductions has wavered
over the last decade.[8]
7.8
In particular, critics of SORT argued that the Treaty symbolised a
movement away from the enforceable bilateral arms reduction initiatives of the
past to a more flexible and less secure approach. Contributors argued that SORT
is deficient in a range of ways:
n unlike START II, SORT
does not regulate the deployment of multiple warheads on a single delivery
vehicle;
n SORT does not
establish a verification mechanism and instead relies on the verification
regime of START I (which expires in 2009);
n SORT does not define
which warheads are to be reduced thus permitting states to maintain unlimited
warheads in reserve for quick deployment; and
n the warhead limit
takes effect and expires on the same day, thus making any weapons reductions
reversible after 2012.[9]
7.9
Professor Camilleri argued that following the withdrawal of the US from
the ABM Treaty, Russia’s withdrawal from START II and the subsequent
negotiation of SORT, the cooperative approach to nuclear arms reductions
between the two countries seemed to have broken down.[10]
Importance of new agreement between the US and Russia
7.10
In July 2009, US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev signed a Joint Understanding on the negotiation of a successor treaty
to START I, which stated:
The President of the United States of America and the
President of the Russian Federation have decided on further reductions and
limitations of their nations’ strategic offensive arms and on concluding at an
early date a new legally binding agreement to replace the current START Treaty
…
The Presidents direct their negotiators to finish their work
on the treaty at an early date ...[11]
7.11
The Joint Understanding stated, amongst other things, that the Treaty
would contain:
A provision to the effect that each Party will reduce and
limit its strategic offensive arms so that seven years after entry into force
of the treaty and thereafter, the limits will be in the range of 500-1100 for
strategic delivery vehicles, and in the range of 1500-1675 for their associated
warheads.[12]
7.12
A number of contributors argued that a new bilateral nuclear arms
reduction treaty that mandates deep and transparent cuts between the US and
Russia would be key to re-establishing a cooperative approach on
non-proliferation and disarmament issues. It was argued that such a commitment
would help to build confidence between the US, Russia and other nuclear armed
states, and would add momentum to other areas of the nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament regime.[13]
7.13
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade told the Committee of the
positive effect that the commitment to a new disarmament treaty has already had
in the lead up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference:
One of the most encouraging developments on the disarmament
front for a long time … is the commitment of both the United States and Russia …
to negotiate a successor agreement to START before the end of this year.
Uncertainty had previously existed about whether the United States and Russia
would negotiate an agreement … . So [this commitment] has been … extremely
positive.
… It is fair to say that the commitment of the US and Russia
to a START successor is one of the reasons for [a] much more positive
atmosphere, because it reaffirms the commitment of both of them to continue to
make significant reductions in their weapons arsenals.[14]
7.14
During the Committee delegation’s visit to the United States, just days
after the July agreement was reached, it was evident that the commitment to a
successor agreement had been received optimistically. There was, however, some
disappointment about the agreed levels, which the delegation was informed
represented very little actual reduction.
7.15
The Committee considers that the negotiation of a treaty which mandates
deep, verifiable and irreversible cuts to US and Russian nuclear arsenals is a
key step towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. The Committee is of the view
that Australia should take any opportunity to encourage an early conclusion to
the negotiation of such a treaty, followed by its prompt ratification and entry
into force.
Recommendation 10 |
|
|
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government
encourage an early conclusion to the negotiation of a replacement nuclear
weapons reduction treaty by the United States and Russia, involving deep,
verifiable and irreversible cuts, followed by its prompt ratification and
entry into force.
|
Nuclear weapon free zones
Introduction
7.16
Article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
affirms the right of parties to conclude regional treaties that ban nuclear
weapons in their respective territories.[15] Since the negotiation of
the NPT, a number of such agreements have been negotiated in different regions
throughout the world. These multilateral regional treaties are commonly
referred to as nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs.)
7.17
This section of the chapter will examine the benefits of NWFZs, how
NWFZs can be strengthened and how NWFZs might be utilised to strengthen the
broader nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Finally, the
prospects of a NWFZ in the Middle East will be examined.
Background
7.18
A resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1975 defined a
NWFZ as a treaty-level agreement that ensures the total absence of nuclear
weapons in the zone, and establishes an international system to verify and
guarantee compliance with the Treaty’s obligations.[16]
7.19
This resolution also called on nuclear weapon states to refrain from
committing acts within the boundaries of a NWFZ that are prohibited to parties
of the respective treaty, and to refrain from the use or threat-of-use of
nuclear weapons against members of such zones.[17]
7.20
In accordance with this resolution, NWFZs generally prohibit the
testing, stationing, development, and use of nuclear weapons within a
designated territory. They also include protocols by which nuclear weapon
states can renounce the use and threat-of-use of nuclear weapons against states
included in the zone. In some cases, NWFZs may contain restrictions on the
trade of nuclear materials and technologies. While NWFZs share common characteristics,
it has been argued that the strength of NWFZs differs markedly among the
different zones.[18]
7.21
Currently, there are five specific NWFZs, with the latest zone in Africa
entering into force on 15 July 2009. Nuclear weapon free zones now cover the entire
Southern Hemisphere.[19] Figure 7.1 provides a
summary of the ratification status of the five currently negotiated NWFZ zones. Australia is a member of the South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, which is also known as the Treaty of Raratonga.[20]
7.22
Additionally, the Antarctic Treaty, which aims to guarantee that
Antarctica is solely used for peaceful purposes, effectively designates the
region as a NWFZ by prohibiting nuclear explosions, radioactive waste disposal
and military deployments on the Antarctic continent.[21]
7.23
States can also take unilateral action to ban nuclear weapons in their
territories. Austria and Mongolia implemented domestic legislation to declare
themselves as single-state NWFZs in 1999 and 2000 respectively, while New
Zealand and the Philippines have used domestic legislation to complement their
existing obligations under the Treaty of Raratonga.[22]
Benefits of NWFZs
7.24
Contributors to the inquiry argued that NWFZs are an integral part of
the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime and represent key building
blocks towards more comprehensive commitments.[23] It was argued that
NWFZs:
n build confidence
among nations;
n encourage the
negotiation of new NWFZ and other treaty initiatives;
n increase security
within the region;
n exert pressure on nuclear
weapon states; and
n provide a means to
implement stricter obligations than exist in other nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament initiatives.
7.25
Mr Nic Maclellan told the Committee that NWFZs are important confidence
building measures:
Nuclear weapon free zones operate at multiple levels—legal,
diplomatic and political—and it seems to me that is a very important element in
the package. [NWFZs are] legal treaties and verifiable instruments to enforce
nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, [and are] a political
process and a diplomatic process … about creating confidence building measures.[24]
Contributors asserted that NWFZs serve
to send a clear message to states outside of the zone regarding member countries’
commitments to non-proliferation. It was argued that this message increases
confidence in security at an international level.[25]
This increased confidence can also encourage other regions to conclude such
agreements. For example, it was argued that the establishment of the Treaty of
Raratonga in 1985 played a key role in stimulating the negotiation of the Southeast
Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty in 1995.[26]
7.26
Further, such agreements can be tailored to address the unique national
security needs of member countries within a certain region, which in turn
increases confidence among members.[27]
7.27
Advocates also suggested to the Committee that such zones can limit the
reach of nuclear weapon states and prevent them from carrying out
nuclear-weapon related activities in the region, such as nuclear-weapon
testing.[28]
7.28
The Committee was informed that NWFZs can provide a means to implement
stricter obligations on a regional level that may be a step ahead of other
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agreements. In particular, submitters
pointed to the provision under the Treaty of Raratonga which prohibits the
provision and acquisition by member countries of nuclear materials and
technologies, unless they are subject to IAEA safeguards agreements.[29]
Strengthening existing NWFZ
7.29
Contributors suggested to the Committee a range of ways in which
individual NWFZs could be strengthened with particular reference to the Treaty
of Raratonga and the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ).
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (Treaty of Raratonga)
7.30
Submitters to the inquiry argued that, while the Treaty of Raratonga has
made a positive contribution towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, there
remain a range of shortfalls with the Treaty. Submitters noted that the Treaty
of Raratonga does not:
n prevent the transit
of nuclear weapons or prevent the launch of nuclear weapons that are transiting
the region at targets beyond the zone;
n prevent the land
dumping of nuclear waste;
n prevent the
threat-of-use of nuclear weapons against members of the zone;
n include any
provisions to protect ‘whistleblowers’ who expose breaches of the Treaty;
n extend to northern
Pacific states such as the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands
and Palau; and
n does not, unlike
other NWFZs, create a separate enforcement organisation but relies on existing
regional bodies which may be unsuitable for the role.[30]
7.31
Associate Professor Michael Hamel-Green suggested that the Treaty of
Raratonga could be further strengthened through applying stronger verification
mechanisms and provisions against the theft of nuclear materials.[31]
7.32
The Committee was informed that, just as the negotiation of NWFZs
encourages the negotiation of new zones, the strengthening of the Treaty of
Raratonga could encourage other zones to make such improvements or even
encourage the negotiation of new NWFZs in other more volatile areas.[32]
7.33
Contributors to the inquiry argued that the weaknesses of the Treaty of
Raratonga could be addressed through convening a conference of Treaty of
Raratonga members by which the Treaty could be reviewed and amended. It was
noted that there is already provision in the Treaty of Raratonga for a
Consultative Committee to consider proposed amendments.[33]
7.34
Other participants questioned the utility of a review of the Treaty of
Raratonga. Ms Martine Letts argued that, while a review of the Treaty of
Raratonga could potentially improve and refine the provisions of the Treaty,
such a review at this stage may not be helpful to the broader nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Ms Letts argued that current
nuclear-security issues are subjects of global negotiation and that to focus on
the specifics of a regional agreement, such as the Treaty of Raratonga, may
only cause frustration.[34]
7.35
Another avenue suggested to the Committee for strengthening the Treaty
of Raratonga was to encourage the US to ratify the protocols of the Treaty. Mr
Maclellan argued that, when the protocols of the Treaty of Raratonga were first
open for signature in the 1980s, the US did not ratify due to concerns about
restrictions on its expanding deployment of cruise missiles, and the effect on
its northern Pacific territories. It was argued that the region has changed
substantially over the last two decades which, in addition to the momentum
brought about by the change in US administration, may make the US more open to
ratification.[35]
Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
7.36
Upon its implementation in 2006, a resolution welcoming the
establishment of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ) received
broad support in the UN General Assembly, however this resolution was opposed
by the US, UK and France, and Australia abstained from the vote.[36]
7.37
Associate Professor Hamel-Green argued that Western nuclear powers and
Australia have been hesitant to support the CANWFZ since it was established in
2006, and that the US, UK and France may not ratify the additional protocol of
the CANWFZ when it opens for signature. The Committee was told that these
concerns arise from Article 12 of the Treaty which states:
This Treaty does not affect the rights and obligations of the
Parties under other international treaties which they may have concluded prior
to the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.[37]
7.38
Associate Professor Hamel-Green told the Committee that Western nuclear
powers are concerned that this Article makes the CANWFZ subservient to the
previously negotiated Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO), a 2002 mutual defence treaty between Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It was suggested that Western nuclear
powers are concerned that Article 12 of the CANWFZ would permit some members to
call upon Russia’s nuclear capabilities, despite their obligations under the
CANWFZ. These nuclear powers may therefore be hesitant to ratify the additional
protocol of the Treaty.[38]
7.39
Associate Professor Hamel-Green considered that this interpretation of
Article 12 is unfounded. He argued that the subsequent and largely ignored
clause in Article 12 means that any military assistance provided under the CSTO
cannot include nuclear weapons. [39] He also informed the
Committee that there are many reasons to support the CANWFZ. He noted that
Central Asian states were extensively involved in the nuclear weapons programs
of the former Soviet Union, and that the region still possesses the technology,
resources and expertise to develop nuclear weapons. On this basis, he
considered that support for a NWFZ in the region is highly important.[40]
7.40
Associate Professor Hamel-Green also suggested that concerns about
Article 12 should not become an insurmountable obstacle to Western nuclear
powers supporting the CANWFZ. In his opinion, if concerns about the operation
of Article 12 persist, Western nuclear powers could make a reservation to that effect
and still ratify the additional protocol to the CANWFZ.[41]
7.41
It was also argued that Australia should encourage its Western allies to
support and ratify the additional protocol of the CANWFZ by signalling its own
support for the Treaty and providing technical assistance to the zone.[42]
Utilising existing NWFZ
7.42
A range of contributors to the inquiry suggested that the five current
NWFZs can be utilised to progress the broader nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament agenda.
7.43
A common proposal made to the Committee was that formal links be
established between all members of NWFZs. It was suggested that such a grouping
would comprise over half the membership of the UN and could be extremely
influential in advocating nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issues.[43]
7.44
The establishment of such a coalition would have a range of benefits
including:
n providing a forum
through which to coordinate and apply global political and diplomatic pressure
on nuclear-security issues;[44]
n strengthening current
NWFZs through the exchange of knowledge, experience and technical expertise;[45]
and
n providing an
alternative means to build momentum on nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament initiatives that do not rely on the nuclear weapon states.[46]
7.45
Submitters informed the Committee that moves to form such linkages had
been taken in the past. In 1996, 127 members of the UN General Assembly
supported a Brazilian resolution calling for, among other things, the
consolidation of NWFZs in the Southern Hemisphere. In 2005, Mexico hosted the
Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that establish Nuclear
Weapon Free Zones to discuss nuclear-security issues. [47]
7.46
Contributors suggested that Australia should host a conference of NWFZs
at which member countries could institutionalise the links between the zones,
coordinate their approaches on nuclear-security issues and advocate for full
recognition of a southern hemisphere NWFZ. Associate Professor Hamel-Green
argued that such a conference should be convened in the short term, before the
2010 NPT Review Conference.[48]
Recommendation 11 |
|
|
The Committee recommends that Australia play a leading role
in advocating for full recognition of a southern hemisphere nuclear weapons
free zone and in developing formal links between all members of nuclear
weapons free zones, and that the Australian Government raise the issue at the
2010 NPT Review Conference and consider hosting a conference on this issue.
|
A Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
7.47
During the inquiry the Committee received a range of evidence on the
benefits, barriers and prospects for a proposed NWFZ in the Middle East.
Background
7.48
In 1974, Iran and Egypt proposed to the UN General Assembly a
resolution, entitled Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the
region of the Middle East, which urged all relevant parties to take
measures towards the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. This
resolution has been adopted by the UN General Assembly every year since its
introduction. Additionally, parties to the 1995 NPT Review Conference adopted
the Resolution on the Middle East, which again called on all states in
the Middle East and all parties to the NPT to take practical steps towards the
establishment of a Middle East NWFZ. Despite these repeated calls, there has
been no tangible progress towards the establishment of such a treaty.[49]
Benefits of a NWFZ in the Middle East
7.49
A number of contributors to the inquiry argued that the negotiation of a
NWFZ in the Middle East is a necessary pre-condition for the global abolition
of nuclear weapons. It was argued that establishing such a zone would help to
achieve universal adherence to treaties such as the NPT, would increase
confidence in the region and would help to address some of the key strategic
concerns when it comes to the abolition of nuclear weapons.[50]
7.50
Professor Camilleri argued that the only way to effectively curb
proliferation risks is to create conditions where nations are sufficiently
confident of their own security that they do not feel the need to pursue
nuclear weapons. Professor Camilleri stated that moving towards a NWFZ in the
Middle East would reduce the pressure on Iran and other states in the region to
pursue nuclear weapons.[51]
Barriers and steps towards a NWFZ in the Middle East
7.51
The Committee was told that the main obstacles to the negotiation of a
NWFZ in the Middle East are the poor relations and lack of confidence between
states in the region.
7.52
Associate Professor Hamel-Green told the Committee that one of the
fundamental barriers to the negotiation of a NWFZ in the Middle East is the
lack of a peace agreement among states in the region:
Israel said that it will not negotiate [a NWFZ] until there
is a peace settlement with its neighbours. Unfortunately the Arab states have
taken the diametrically opposite position of saying that they will not consider
resolving those issues unless something is done in terms of Israel’s nuclear
capability. You have a deadlock there.[52]
7.53
Dr George Perkovich also stated that a major obstacle to the negotiation
of such a treaty is the current condition of relations among countries in the
region. Dr Perkovich argued that it would be imperative to have all states in
the region participate in such a treaty. He noted that some states do not
recognise Israel’s right to exist, and argued that these states would not
participate in any negotiations attended by Israel.[53]
7.54
Former US Senator Bob Graham saw that Iran’s apparent pursuit of nuclear
weapons makes the negotiation of a NWFZ in the Middle East even less likely.[54]
7.55
Dr Perkovich also pointed out to the Committee that, even if states
could be brought to the table, confidence between the states would be very low.
He considered that a major issue between the parties would be whether or not to
permit IAEA-monitored uranium enrichment in the region:
I think that in all likelihood in that region it would be a
question of States not willing to accept fissile material production under the
IAEA safeguards. I think they would actually want it to be a zone free of
fissile material production, period. Israel’s neighbours would not trust even
the IAEA to verify that Israel is operating a reactor but there is no secret
plutonium separation going on. And I do not think that Israel is that keen on
Iran, for example, continuing to enrich uranium with safeguards.[55]
7.56
It appears therefore that the following steps must precede the
negotiation of a NWFZ in the Middle East:
n states must recognise
each other’s sovereignty and normalise relations;
n Iran must permit
verification that it is not pursuing nuclear weapons; and
n states in the region
must be assured of nuclear fuel supplies in the absence of indigenous
enrichment facilities.
7.57
Associate Professor Hamel-Green and Dr Marianne Hanson told the
Committee that there have been a range of studies and conferences on the
feasibility of a NWFZ in the Middle East and on trust-building exercises in
conflict situations. They argued that through active diplomacy advocating a
phased approach, Australia can take a lead role in building confidence in the
Middle East with the aim of establishing a NWFZ.[56]
7.58
The issue of a Middle East NWFZ arose frequently during the Committee
delegation’s visit to Europe and the United States. It was clear to the
delegation that this issue is very closely linked with the 2010 NPT Review
Conference. The delegation was informed that many Middle Eastern countries are
becoming impatient with the lack of progress on this issue despite the
resolution at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. Egypt, in particular, was
identified as placing considerable importance on progress in 2010. It was
suggested to the delegation that the success of the Conference could hinge on a
strong reinforcement of this commitment and progress on the resolution, perhaps
in the form of establishing talks or an action plan.
7.59
This issue is important to a number of Middle Eastern states. The
prospects for a nuclear weapons free zone are also linked with Israel’s
non-participation in the NPT as well as ambiguities surrounding Iran’s nuclear
program. For example, in a working paper for the 2010 NPT Conference, the Group
of Arab States reiterated calls for Israel to accede to the NPT and place all
nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.[57]
While recognising the considerable
political and security issues to be addressed, the Committee considers that a
Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone would be an important step in addressing
both disarmament and non-proliferation challenges. The Committee considers that
the Australian Government should use its diplomatic relations with Israel to
pursue this issue.