Chapter 6 Nuclear Weapons Convention
Introduction
6.1
Some members of the international community argue that, in order to
provide a clear and feasible pathway to the universal abolition of nuclear
weapons, it is necessary to negotiate a new comprehensive multilateral treaty which
would cover all aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
regime. Such a treaty is widely referred to as a Nuclear Weapons Convention
(NWC).
6.2
This chapter will provide a summary of the arguments presented to the
Committee relating to the advantages, opportunities and barriers to a NWC, and
will look at the steps that can be taken to move towards the negotiation of a
NWC.
Background
6.3
The Hon Gareth Evans AO QC told the Committee that a NWC would be a new
agreement that encompasses the broad range of nuclear security mechanisms and
initiatives that currently exist:
… [a NWC] would have within its scope the whole content of
the NPT, plus the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, plus the fissile
material treaty, plus some additional verification strategies … which are
taking place outside any of these treaty frameworks. It would be a great global
catch-all, and we could start from the beginning.[1]
6.4
In 1997 Costa Rica submitted a model NWC to the United Nations (UN)
General Assembly. This model NWC was developed by a group of non-government
organisations comprised of the International Physicians for the Prevention of
Nuclear War, the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms and
the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation. An
updated version of this model NWC was jointly submitted to the UN General
Assembly by Costa Rica and Malaysia in 2007.[2]
6.5
This model NWC uses the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their
Destruction, also known as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), as a
template to construct a treaty banning an entire category of weapons. It also
draws on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s verification measures and the
UN Security Council. This model NWC outlines the rules, schedule and
verification mechanisms for prohibiting the development, testing, production,
stockpiling, transfer, use and threat-of-use of nuclear weapons. [3]
6.6
The model Convention also provides a phased approach by which nuclear
armed states would dismantle and destroy their nuclear arsenals under
international monitoring mechanisms. According
to the model, states would follow a process whereby weapons would be taken off
alert, removed from deployment and disabled. Nuclear weapons storage areas
would then be dismantled and fissile material would be placed under
international control.[4]
6.7
Since the submission of this model to the UN, the merits of a NWC have
been widely debated in international forums. The prospect of a NWC has been
well received by some governments and civil society organisations while others
have questioned the utility of such a treaty, including some key nuclear armed
states.[5]
6.8
In 2008, calls for the commencement of multilateral negotiations leading
to the early conclusion of a NWC received widespread support in the UN General
Assembly, however Australia did not voice support for negotiations to begin.[6]
6.9
The joint submission to the inquiry from the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade and Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office stated
the Government’s current position on the negotiation of a NWC:
Australia supports the exploration of possible legal
frameworks for the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons, including the
possibility of negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention. The negotiation of
such a convention is a long-term goal.[7]
Benefits of a Nuclear Weapons Convention
6.10
The Committee received a range of evidence on the benefits of a NWC. The
main advantages cited were:
n a NWC would
unequivocally declare abolition as the ultimate goal of the international
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime which would provide clarity
and momentum to nuclear security initiatives;
n a NWC would allow
disarmament and non-proliferation to proceed simultaneously;
n a NWC would engage
the nuclear armed states that are not party to the NPT;
n a NWC would fulfil
obligations under Article VI of the NPT; and
n a NWC could help to
de-legitimise nuclear weapons in domestic and international communities.
6.11
Contributors argued that a NWC would make clear to the international
community that the ultimate goal of the international nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament regime is the universal abolition of nuclear weapons. It was argued
that such a commitment would help to reinforce the currently existing treaty
framework and would provide a means by which disparate aspects of the
international nuclear security regime, such as nuclear weapons free zones
(NWFZs), the CTBT and a FMCT, could be coordinated in a formal process. [8]
6.12
Additionally, it was argued that the commitment to complete abolition
contained in a NWC could assist in circumventing persisting deadlocks in the
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, such as those around the CTBT
and a FMCT.[9]
6.13
Associate Professor Tilman Ruff told the Committee that the commitment
to abolish nuclear weapons, as contained in a NWC, would provide crucial moral
and political momentum:
… a [NWC] that clearly is aimed at zero is not just intellectually
but morally and politically compelling. It is probably the only thing that is
going to be sufficiently credible with the non-nuclear weapon states [for them]
to want to keep their side of the bargain … I think that is a really critical
point. Anything less … is simply not going to be politically compelling or
inspire people sufficiently to really have traction.[10]
6.14
Advocates of a NWC argued that such a treaty would bring together states
which may be divided over the issue of whether disarmament or non-proliferation
is the central issue of the international nuclear security regime.
‘Non-proliferation-first’ advocates focus on preventing the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. ‘Disarmament-first’ advocates are hesitant to support stronger
non-proliferation efforts unless genuine disarmament takes place. It was argued
that a NWC bridges this divide by simultaneously addressing non-proliferation
and disarmament.[11]
6.15
A NWC was also advocated as a means to bring states that are not party
to the NPT, such as India and Pakistan, into the nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament framework.[12]
6.16
Contributors argued that the negotiation of a NWC would fulfil
obligations under Article VI of the NPT, which requires states to pursue the
negotiation of a treaty on complete disarmament.[13]
6.17
The Committee was told that a NWC could play a role in changing societal
perceptions of nuclear weapons. A NWC which condemns nuclear weapons and
codifies their universal abolition could raise public awareness of the dangers
of nuclear weapons, and could have the medium-to-long-term effect of
de-legitimising nuclear weapons in both domestic and international communities.[14]
Opportunities for the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention in the
short term
6.18
Advocates of a NWC argued that there currently exist a number of
opportunities to gain support for, and begin the negotiation of, a NWC in the
short term. The Committee was informed that:
n an already-existing
model NWC provides an excellent starting point for negotiations;[15]
n the successful negotiations
of other weapon-abolition treaties provide a convenient template for the
negotiation of a NWC; and
n a NWC has been
endorsed by the United Nations, non-NPT states, parliaments and non-government
organisations (NGOs).
6.19
It was argued that a NWC may proceed in a similar way to other treaties
which seek to ban entire categories of weapons, such as the Convention on
Cluster Munitions, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their
Destruction (the APM Convention) and the CWC.[16]
6.20
Professor Joseph Camilleri submitted that the negotiation of both the Convention
on Cluster Munitions and the APM Convention shared common characteristics
which provide a plan of action for the successful negotiation of a NWC.[17]
6.21
Associate Professor Tilman Ruff noted that the negotiations of the Convention
on Cluster Munitions and the APM Convention were initiated outside of
official forums such as the UN and did not initially include the major players.
Associate Professor Ruff endorsed the view that the successful negotiations of
these treaties indicate an opportunity to negotiate a NWC through a similar
process.[18]
6.22
Submitters noted that there has been widespread support for a NWC in the
UN General Assembly. In 2008, 127 nations voted in support of a resolution
calling for the commencement of negotiations and the early conclusion of a NWC.[19]
Further, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon advocated a NWC in an October
2008 speech:
… NPT parties, in particular the nuclear weapons states, … could
consider negotiating a nuclear weapons convention, backed by a strong system of
verification, as has long been proposed at the United Nations.[20]
6.23
Contributors noted that India, Pakistan and China have all supported
calls for the negotiation of a NWC. It was argued that this presents a
significant opportunity to engage two nuclear armed states which are outside
the NPT framework, as well as a nuclear weapon state that is within the NPT
framework.[21]
6.24
Associate Professor Ruff noted that the prospect of a NWC has been
advocated in parliaments and parliamentary organisations around the world
including in the European Parliament and via the Parliamentarians for Nuclear
Non-proliferation and Disarmament.[22]
6.25
Contributors argued that the widespread support for a NWC in the
NGO-community provides another opportunity to build momentum for the
negotiation of such a treaty. Associate Professor Ruff informed the Committee
that there is ongoing support for a NWC from the Middle Power Initiative, a network
of non-government organisations that engages with middle-power governments on
nuclear security issues. Additionally, submissions to the inquiry noted the
support for a NWC from the Mayors for Peace organisation, which has a membership
of 2,963 cities across 134 countries.[23]
6.26
Former US Senator Bob Graham, Chair of the US Congressional Commission
for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism,
suggested that a global agreement with the ultimate aim of abolishing nuclear
weapons would gain extensive support:
I think a world policy that has [the abolition of all nuclear
weapons] as its objective and with a strategy of how to get to that objective
in steps, would have considerable and growing support around the world and in
the United States.[24]
6.27
Submitters to the inquiry suggested that, in light of these
opportunities, negotiations for a NWC should commence in the short term and
should be a policy priority for the Australian Government.[25]
Barriers to the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention
6.28
Throughout the course of the inquiry, other contributors argued that
there are significant barriers to the negotiation of a NWC. It was argued that:
n there are
insufficient verification and monitoring mechanisms to maintain a NWC;
n there are
insufficient mechanisms to enforce a NWC; and
n the diverse range of
political and strategic positions relating to nuclear weapons makes any sort of
agreement exceedingly difficult.
6.29
Ms Joan Rohlfing of the Nuclear Threat Initiative told the Committee
that one of the main barriers to a NWC is a lack of verification and monitoring
mechanisms. It was argued that for there to be any real confidence in a NWC, a
whole new system would be required to confidently verify the non-production of
fissile material, and to verify the dismantling and destruction of nuclear
weapon arsenals. Ms Rohlfing suggested that this system would have to be
established before a NWC could be successfully negotiated.[26]
6.30
Dr George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
argued that given the lack of verification and monitoring mechanisms, a NWC (if
negotiated in the short term) would rely heavily on its enforcement mechanisms
to deter states from breaching the terms of the treaty. It was argued that the
currently available enforcement mechanisms of the nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament regime are insufficient. In particular, Dr Perkovich pointed to the
lacklustre progress of the UN Security Council in addressing Iran’s suspected
nuclear-weapon ambitions, and Iran’s continued defiance of UN Security Council
resolutions. It was therefore argued that improved enforcement mechanisms would
have to be established before negotiations on a NWC could begin.[27]
6.31
Ms Martine Letts told the Committee that ‘one of the major obstacles of
getting to zero [nuclear weapons] is how people think about their security’. Ms
Letts argued that there is still a well-entrenched view within some states that
nuclear weapons are central to national security. It was argued that getting
these states to embrace abolition as the ultimate goal, as would be required
under a NWC, would be a major challenge.[28]
6.32
Mr Rory Medcalf argued that, in the past, weapon-abolition treaties such
as the CWC have been successfully negotiated because countries perceived that
they could rely on their nuclear weapon arsenals to counter any threats arising
from non-compliance to these other weapon-abolition treaties. Mr Medcalf
asserted that in the case of a treaty banning nuclear weapons, such as a NWC, states
would not have this fallback position, which in turn would be a major barrier
to the successful negotiation of a NWC.[29]
6.33
Some contributors to the inquiry, whilst supportive of such a treaty,
suggested that, given the significant barriers to the negotiation of a NWC,
such a treaty should be a long-term goal rather than an immediate policy
priority for Government.
6.34
Witnesses suggested that to pursue the negotiation of a NWC in the short
term would expend an enormous amount of political will and would distract from
more promising initiatives which are not subject to, and may in fact overcome,
those barriers mentioned above.[30]
6.35
Mr Gareth Evans told the Committee:
… the notion of even negotiating a starting point [on a NWC]
that enough countries are satisfied with to get out and seriously endorse will
be a labour of Hercules, extraordinarily time consuming, and there is a real
question about what the utility of that approach will be.[31]
6.36
The dominant view among these contributors was that Australia should
pursue the goal of the complete abolition of nuclear weapons in incremental
steps which build confidence between states, with a view towards a NWC once the
barriers to its negotiation have been overcome.[32]
6.37
Ms Joan Rohlfing endorsed this view:
… trying to negotiate such a treaty at this particular point
in time would expend enormous and precious political capital and not result in the
kind of urgent, near-term, concrete steps that we need to take to reach that
ultimate goal and to make progress towards that ultimate goal. So I would much
rather see the world community focused on trying to achieve the near-term
steps, developing consensus on those steps and a set of milestones that you can
measure progress against over the next decade rather than starting at the end
point.[33]
6.38
In light of the evidence presented in this section, the Committee is of
the view that a NWC would be a key piece of any international treaty framework
that bans nuclear weapons. The Committee considers that the negotiation of a NWC
should be pursued as an important goal of the international nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament regime.
Towards the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention
6.39
Throughout the course of the inquiry the Committee received a wide range
of proposals on how to progress towards the negotiation of a NWC. The majority
of these proposals refer to issues explored in other areas of this report
including:
n the need for improved
verification and monitoring technologies and processes;[34]
n pursuing incremental
steps such as the entry-into-force of the CTBT, the negotiation of an FMCT and
the de-alerting of weapons;[35]
n engaging with states through
alternative channels to progress disarmament issues, including through
supporting meetings of NWFZ states and regional forums;[36]
and
n ensuring the
Government has the appropriate diplomatic apparatus to thoroughly engage on
nuclear security issues.[37]
The Committee has examined these issues
in their respective sections of this report and has made recommendations on how
they can be addressed.
6.40
In terms of how these goals can be related to the negotiation of a NWC, the
Committee considers that Australia should make it clear to the international
community that it pursues all nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
measures with a view to the eventual negotiation and entry-into-force of a
universally adhered to treaty that achieves the complete abolition of nuclear
weapons.
6.41
Professor Joseph Camilleri outlined an immediate step that can be taken
by the Australian Government and the Australian Parliament to achieve this aim:
The first strategic step … is for the Australian Government
and Australian Parliament to [make] a clearly articulated statement that …
should … commit Australia to the eventual universal adoption of a legally
binding convention outlawing all nuclear weapons. This fundamental objective
should be articulated in a formal resolution of Parliament, at the UN General
Assembly and at all available formal and informal international, regional and
global gatherings, and with particular vigour at the 2010 NPT Review
Conference.[38]
6.42
The Committee considers that through supporting incremental steps that
improve nuclear security and by advocating the final vision of the complete
abolition of nuclear weapons, Australia can play a leading role in the
negotiation of a NWC.
Recommendation 8 |
|
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government make
clear in international fora its support for the adoption of a Nuclear Weapons
Convention.
|
Recommendation 9 |
|
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government
allocate research and consultation resources to the development of a Nuclear
Weapons Convention with a clear legal framework and enforceable verification.
|