Chapter 2 Audit Report No. 02 2010-11 Conduct by Infrastructure Australia
of the First National Infrastructure Audit and Development of the
Infrastructure Priority List
Introduction[1]
2.1
In May 2005, the then Shadow Minister for Industry, Infrastructure and
Industrial Relations announced the Australian Labor Party’s (ALP) intention, if
elected, to create a nationally led and coordinated authority, to be titled
Infrastructure Australia, to work with the States and Territories to identify
and achieve the most effective outcomes for nationally significant
infrastructure.[2]
2.2
Following the ALP’s election to Government, the Infrastructure Australia
Bill was introduced in the Parliament on 21 February 2008, passed both Houses
of Parliament in March 2008, and the Act commenced on 9 April 2008. The Infrastructure
Australia Act 2008 (the Infrastructure Australia Act) established
Infrastructure Australia and set out Infrastructure Australia’s functions.
Infrastructure Australia’s primary function under the Act is to provide advice
to the Minister, all levels of government, and investors and owners of
infrastructure on matters relating to infrastructure. Infrastructure Australia
was also given a number of additional functions, including:
- conducting audits to
determine the adequacy, capacity and condition of nationally significant
infrastructure, taking into account forecast growth; and
- developing lists (to
be known as Infrastructure Priority Lists) that prioritise Australia’s
infrastructure needs.
Governance arrangements
2.3
Under the Infrastructure Australia Act, the Infrastructure Australia
Council consists of a Chair and eleven other members. The Minister appoints the
Chair and the other members of the Council by written instrument made under the
Act.[3]
The Chair of the Infrastructure Australia Council, Sir Rod Eddington, was
announced by the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development
and Local Government on 26 February 2008. The other eleven members of the
Council were announced on 19 May 2008. The Infrastructure Australia Council has
the statutory role of providing advice to the Minister for Infrastructure,
Transport, Regional Development and Local Government (the Minister) on
infrastructure matters, including the development of priority lists.
2.4
The Infrastructure Coordinator (a statutory office holder also appointed
by the Minister under the Act) supports the Council in the performance of its
functions. The Infrastructure Coordinator is appointed by the Minister on a
full-time basis for a period not exceeding five years. The appointment of the
inaugural Infrastructure Coordinator, Mr Michael Deegan, was announced on 22
June 2008, with his role formally commencing on 1 July 2008.
2.5
The Office of the Infrastructure Coordinator supports the Infrastructure
Coordinator.[4] As well as a small number
of permanent staff members (16 as at October 2009, including four staff in the
Major Cities Unit) and secondees from State and Territory governments, a range
of external advisors are engaged as required.
2.6
Infrastructure Australia is a departmental body recognised in
legislation and is neither a prescribed agency under the Financial
Management and Accountability Act 1997 nor a statutory authority under the Commonwealth
Authorities and Companies Act 1997. Accordingly, the Office of the
Infrastructure Coordinator operates within the legal framework of the
Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local
Government (DITRDLG).[5] Specifically:
- staff are engaged
under the Public Services Act 1999, and are employees of DITRDLG; and
- financial reporting
is consolidated within the annual financial statements of DITRDLG.
2.7
The May 2008 Budget included $20 million over four years to fund the
Office of the Infrastructure Coordinator, with $0.5 million for 2007-08 and
$6.5 million in each of the remaining three years. A further $1.0 million per
annum was provided for the Major Cities Unit, located within the Office of the
Infrastructure Coordinator.[6] In announcing the
Infrastructure Australia funding, the Budget Papers stated that:
The Government will provide $20.0 million over four years to
establish Infrastructure Australia, a statutory advisory council with twelve
members drawn from industry and government, to work on developing long term
solutions for infrastructure bottlenecks and investment in the nation’s
transport, water, energy and communication assets.
Infrastructure Australia will conduct audits of nationally
significant infrastructure; develop an Infrastructure Priority List to guide
public and private investment; and provide advice on regulatory reforms that
can improve the utilisation of infrastructure networks. In developing the
Infrastructure Priority List, Infrastructure Australia will assess projects in
terms of specific goals, such as, meeting water and energy needs; traffic
congestion in our major cities; efficiently moving freight from regional areas
to our ports; and meeting the challenge of climate change.[7]
2.8
The May 2008 Budget Papers also included a statement focussing on the
scope for improved policy and institutional frameworks for infrastructure
investment, and investment in skills and training, as these were seen as areas
where there was significant scope to lift Australia’s productive capacity. Of
direct relevance to the work of Infrastructure Australia, in this statement,
the Government:
- recognised that,
where governments invest in infrastructure assets, it is essential that they
seek to achieve maximum economic and social benefits, determined through
rigorous cost-benefit analysis including evaluation and review;
- stated that only
public infrastructure projects which at least meet a minimum benchmark social
rate of return – determined through rigorous cost-benefit analysis, including evaluation
and review – should be funded, and relative social rates of return above the
minimum benchmark should be used to prioritise the funding of projects;
- committed to
efficient public infrastructure investment through the development of
coordinated, objective and transparent processes for decision-making based on
thorough and rigorous cost-benefit analysis. Key elements of such an approach
were seen as including decision-making based on rigorous cost-benefit analysis
to ensure the highest economic and social benefits to the nation over the
long-term and a commitment to transparency at all stages of the decision-making
process; and
- outlined that
Infrastructure Australia had been established to improve processes around the
assessment of infrastructure investment decisions. Specifically, the Budget
Papers stated that:
- To
improve processes around the assessment of infrastructure investment decisions,
the Australian Government established Infrastructure Australia to advise
governments on nationally significant infrastructure. Infrastructure
Australia’s advice will be based on rigorous analysis of the costs and benefits
of various infrastructure proposals. Infrastructure Australia will identify
strategic investment priorities and policy and regulatory reforms to facilitate
timely and coordinated delivery of infrastructure investments of national
importance between all levels of government and industry. Infrastructure
Australia’s immediate priority is to complete a National Infrastructure Audit
by the end of 2008, and develop an Infrastructure Priority List for COAG
consideration in March 2009. It is also to develop best practice guidelines for
Public Private Partnerships for COAG consideration by October 2008.[8]
2.9
Decisions about whether to invest in projects are taken by governments
and industry, having regard to the advice of Infrastructure Australia, amongst
others.
Conduct of the First National Infrastructure Audit and Development of the
First Infrastructure Priority List
2.10
The first Infrastructure Priority List was originally to be completed by
March 2009, for consideration by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG).[9]
It had been envisaged that development of the Priority List would be informed
by the outcomes of the first National Infrastructure Audit, due to be completed
by December 2008. However, following the onset of the global financial crisis,
COAG brought the timeframe for completion of the first Priority List forward to
December 2008, to be due at the same time as the completion of the first Audit.[10]
In bringing forward the due date for the first Priority List, COAG noted that
the Audit and Priority List were to be provided in the form of an ‘interim’
report. The original COAG deadline of March 2009 was retained for the
completion of a ‘final’ Priority List.
2.11
The truncation of an already tight timetable added to the challenges
faced by Infrastructure Australia in conducting the first National
Infrastructure Audit and in developing the first Infrastructure Priority List.
In particular:
- this was the first time
a non-sector specific list of priority infrastructure projects was to be
prepared at the Commonwealth level such that the List published in December
2008 included infrastructure projects in the transport, energy,
telecommunications, water and health sectors; and
- the Office of the
Infrastructure Coordinator was required to develop and implement its own
administrative arrangements and make the necessary staff and advisory
appointments for its operations concurrently with conducting the National
Infrastructure Audit, developing the Priority List and preparing and publishing
national Public Private Partnership Guidelines.
2.12
The COAG deadline of December 2008 was met, with advice on the Audit
results and a draft Interim Priority List being provided to the Minister on 5
December 2008. The Audit results and an Interim Priority List of 94 projects
were publicly released on 19 December 2008 in a report titled A Report to
the Council of Australian Governments. In respect to the Interim Priority
List of 94 projects, the report stated that:
In order to finalise the Infrastructure Priority List,
Infrastructure Australia proposes to:
- subject the data
underpinning the assessment of strategic fit to further detailed scrutiny;
- request the
development of comprehensive economic analysis of selected projects, where only
a rapid economic analysis is available at this stage;
- ask submitting
organisations to provide comprehensive economic analysis of specified projects
immediately, if currently available;
- request and
scrutinise the detailed demand modelling underpinning the projects; and
- subject the economic
modelling methodology to further scrutiny.[11]
2.13
A Final Priority List was released by the Minister on Tuesday 12 May
2009[12] within a document titled
National Infrastructure Priorities: Infrastructure for an economically,
socially and environmentally sustainable future. Specifically the document
stated that:
- nine ‘priority’
projects had been identified and should be considered for funding from the
Building Australia Fund (together with a tenth project, being the Ipswich
Motorway); and
- 28 ‘pipeline’
projects were considered to show potential but further project development and
analysis was required before Infrastructure Australia considered it would be
able to make a funding recommendation to the Australian Government.
2.14
A key aspect of the Infrastructure Australia analytical framework for
the Infrastructure Priority List was the development of a staged assessment
process to prioritise between investment proposals, drawing from international
and nationally-based practices and research. Of note was that the published
methodology outlined that objective cost-benefit analysis (through Benefit-Cost
Ratios or BCRs) would be used as the ‘primary driver’ of decision-making but
they were not the only consideration. Consistent with the published
methodology, a structured approach was planned by the Office of the
Infrastructure Coordinator to combine the economic appraisal of a project’s BCR
with its assessment of each candidate project’s ‘strategic fit’ in order to
identify those projects worthy of further consideration (at the Interim
Priority List stage) and, subsequently, to be included on the Final Priority
List.
The ANAO Audit
Audit objectives and scope[13]
2.15
In November 2008, the Infrastructure Coordinator wrote to the
Auditor-General inviting an independent assessment of the integrity and
robustness of the processes that had been adopted in:
- undertaking the first
National Infrastructure Audit; and
- developing the first
Infrastructure Priority List.
2.16
The Auditor-General agreed to this request as it was consistent with the
published audit strategy for the Infrastructure, Transport, Regional
Development and Local Government portfolio. The objective for the Australian
National Audit Office (ANAO) performance audit was to assess the effectiveness
of the conduct of the first National Infrastructure Audit and development of
the Infrastructure Priority List, with particular emphasis on:
- the submissions
process and the methodology used to assess submissions;
- the overall conduct
of the Audit process;
- the formulation of
the Interim and Final Infrastructure Priority Lists; and
- the provision of
advice and recommendations to the Government.
2.17
Audit work originally commenced in March 2009 but was put on hold in
late June 2009 in order to respond to a request from the then Prime Minister
for a performance audit of a range of matters relating to representations to
the Treasury regarding finance arrangements for car dealers. Audit work
re-commenced in August 2009.
Overall audit conclusion
2.18
The ANAO made the following overall audit conclusion:
Infrastructure Australia was established to improve the
quality of infrastructure planning and investment strategy, and to identify
those investments expected to make the biggest impact on Australia’s economic,
social and environmental goals for least cost to the taxpayer. Accordingly, it
is a goal of Infrastructure Australia that infrastructure funding decisions
will be taken following careful planning and rigorous assessments that are
based on sufficient evidence.
Consistent with sound practice, Infrastructure Australia
published guidance on its audit framework and on its prioritisation
methodology, although the prioritisation methodology was released relatively
late in the submissions process due to a range of demands on the Office at the
time.
The published National Infrastructure Audit framework was
sound. In conducting the Audit, the Office of the Infrastructure Coordinator
relied on a range of material, although the short time available to conduct the
Audit meant that most reliance was placed on submissions received from the
States and Territories. The Audit identified a range of ‘challenges’ at the
national and location-specific levels and Infrastructure Australia formulated
seven themes in response to these challenges.
Infrastructure Australia’s methodology provided a robust
framework for the development of the Interim and Final Infrastructure Priority
Lists. This was reinforced by the Office of the Infrastructure Coordinator taking
a rigorous approach to assessing candidate projects including by: scrutinising
the claims made by proponents in their submissions; seeking further information
where it was needed; and engaging advisers to assist it in deciding whether the
BCR submitted by the proponent could be relied upon, or required moderation.[14]
The Interim Priority List, published in December 2008,
comprised 94 projects. During November 2008, these 94 projects being
recommended by the Office of the Infrastructure Coordinator, with 28 projects
being recommended by the Office of the Infrastructure Coordinator as meriting
further consideration. Consistent with its statutory role, the Council (with
the support of the Infrastructure Coordinator) took a different perspective,
and included all 94 shortlisted projects on the Interim Priority List. This
decision, and its reasons, were not documented in the records of the relevant
Council meeting. In June 2010, the Chair of the Infrastructure Australia
Council informed ANAO that the Council and the Infrastructure Coordinator had
agreed that further information should be requested from all 94 projects to
allow for:
- additional evidence
to come forward before the original deadline for the completion of the Final
Priority List; and
- the Office of the Infrastructure
Coordinator’s assessment to be updated given the initial assessment by the
Office of the Infrastructure Coordinator reflected the available information
and time available for assessment.
Further
information was provided in respect to some projects, and some project
assessments were updated but, in the main, the December 2008 request to
proponents of all 94 projects on the Interim Priority List that they provide
further information was unsuccessful in significantly improving the information
available to inform the development of the Final Priority List.
...
The Final
Priority List was published in May 2009. It comprised:
- nine ‘priority’
projects that had been assessed as meeting the tests outlined in the published
Prioritisation Methodology, including having a BCR greater than 1 such that the
project offered net economic benefits; and
- 28 ‘pipeline’
projects, largely comprising projects which either had not submitted a BCR for
the Office of the Infrastructure Coordinator’s evaluation, or where the Office
of the Infrastructure Coordinator’s evaluation had identified shortcomings in
the BCR.[15]
2.19
The ANAO found that the nine priority projects had been selected using
the criteria in the published Prioritisation Methodology but that the 28
pipeline projects had not. In particular, the 28 pipeline projects had not
‘demonstrated their economic viability’ or ‘robust delivery mechanisms that
would ensure they could be successfully implemented’.[16]
Further, the ANAO found that ‘there was no clear record maintained of the
reasons’ for the Council’s decisions to include or exclude projects.[17]
2.20
The ANAO found that the approach taken to developing the Final Priority
List differed significantly from that taken to developing the Interim Priority
List. Although the Infrastructure Coordinator had proposed a similar process,
the Council itself took the lead in guiding the evaluation process. In
consequence no evaluation report recording the evaluation process was prepared
by the Infrastructure Coordiantor. Instead the minutes of Council meetings were
relied on to provide information regarding the decision making process and the
ANAO found that these were an inadequate record:
... the primary records of the development of the List were
the papers submitted to the Council meetings and the meeting Minutes. ...
However, Council meeting Minutes often did not record when it was decided to
include projects on the Final Priority List or why. Rather, the best record of
the evolving Final Priority List was the various drafts of the List circulated
to Council members prior to and following the meetings.[18]
2.21
The ANAO noted that once it has published its Priority List, the
Infrastructure Council ‘does not have a role to play in allocating funding for
infrastructure projects’.[19] Rather, this is the
responsibility of the Government and in this case the ANAO found that the
Government provided funding for seven of the priority projects and six of the
pipeline projects in the May 2009 Budget and funding for a further two pipeline
projects in the May 2010 Budget.[20]
2.22
The ANAO acknowledged that Infrastructure Australia has the
responsibility for ‘developing Lists that prioritise Australia’s infrastructure
needs’ and that that Council has the ‘capacity to look beyond the initial information
submitted to it by project proponents and assessments prepared for it by the
Office of the Infrastructure Coordinator’.[21]
2.23
However, the ANAO was critical of the departure from the criteria set
out in the published Prioritisation Methodology, particularly with regard to
the distinction between priority and pipeline projects.[22]
The ANAO advised that, in future, assessment criteria for both categories
should be clearly set out and the reasons for decisions documented:
Recognising the
value to long term infrastructure planning from the development and ongoing
update of a pipeline of nationally significant projects, there would be benefit
in Infrastructure Australia setting out its methodology more clearly to inform
project proponents and other stakeholders of its approach. In addition, there
would be benefit in better records being made of the reasons for Council
decisions on the composition of project Priority Lists given the significance
of the advice being provided and Infrastructure Australia’s goal of promoting
evidence-based public investment decisions.[23]
ANAO recommendations
Table 2.1 ANAO recommendations, Audit Report No. 02
2010-11
1.
|
ANAO recommends that Infrastructure Australia promote
greater transparency over the development of future Infrastructure Priority
Lists by maintaining records that clearly outline when decisions are taken to
include projects on the List, and the reasons for their inclusion.
Infrastructure Australia response: Agreed
|
2.
|
In light of the important role Infrastructure Australia
seeks to play in promoting best practice infrastructure planning and
decision-making, ANAO recommends that future prioritisation processes include
information in the published guidance on the different criteria that will be
applied to discriminate between priority projects that are ready to proceed
and those that exhibit potential but require further development before being
considered for possible funding.
Infrastructure Australia response: Agreed
|
3.
|
ANAO recommends that Infrastructure Australia, where
reporting the results of future infrastructure project prioritisation
processes, provide clear advice on:
(a) the relative
priority of projects recommended for funding consideration having regard to
the results of its appraisal of their economic merits and other factors taken
into account in the prioritisation process;
(b) the level and form
of Commonwealth funding it recommends for priority projects that are ready to
proceed, together with any conditions it suggests should be attached to this
funding; and
(c) any other projects
it would support being considered for planning and/or design work funding.
Infrastructure Australia response: Agreed to
part (a) and (c) and agreed with qualification with part (b). In respect to
part (b), Infrastructure Australia commented that:
While
we agree that making the case for public funding and its exact form is
important, the split between jurisdictions will be influenced by a wide
variety of factors. Funding is obviously a matter for the Government to
decide taking into account these factors in considering competing budget
priorities.
|
The Committee’s review
2.24
The Committee held a public hearing on Monday 21 March 2011, with the
following witnesses:
- Australian National
Audit Office (ANAO); and
- Infrastructure
Australia.
2.25
The Committee took evidence on the following issues:
- data collection;
- national strategic
focus;
- National Broadband
Network (NBN);
- feedback to
unsuccessful applicants;
- Benefit-Cost Ratio
(BCR);
- Indigenous participation;
and
- implementation of
ANAO recommendations.
Data collection
2.26
The ANAO found that Infrastructure Australia had not addressed COAG’s
objectives for the National Infrastructure Audit but instead had identified a
range of ‘challenges’.[24] Infrastructure Australia
advised the ANAO that there were a number of reasons for departing from the
original objectives of the National Infrastructure Audit including ‘considerable
gaps in the national systems for collecting, holding and analysing the data
used to inform infrastructure investment decisions’.[25]
2.27
The Committee asked Infrastructure Australia if any steps have been
taken to improve data collection so as to enable a more comprehensive approach
to auditing infrastructure across Australia. The agency informed the Committee
that the issue has been raised in a number of discussion papers:
The question of nationally consistent and relevant data for
port and for freight are raised in the national ports strategy and land freight
strategy discussion paper. The national ports strategy has a series of
recommendations regarding publication of data, including forecasts and
performance indicators. The land freight strategy discussion paper raised
similar matters regarding data and forecasts for the principal land freight
routes and nodes in Australia.[26]
National strategic focus
2.28
The Committee heard from the Infrastructure Coordinator, Mr Michael
Deegan, that Infrastructure Australia is focussed on developing an overall
national infrastructure strategy aimed at improving Australia’s economic
performance and productivity.[27] Mr Deegan told the
Committee that the audit review had assisted the agency to more clearly define
this aim and put in place a more appropriate assessment process for projects.[28]
This required a top-down national overview approach to the assessment of
projects instead of the bottom-up approach originally taken.[29]
He explained the benefits of the improvements:
With these sorts of issues, over the longer term we can stand
back and have a look at how these things might work, then determine which
projects are more important than others in terms of long-term economic
development, and then to the sorts of issues we have been discussing with the
Audit Office about the detail of how those projects may be assessed. I think
that the benefit of the process we have had is that we have collectively had a
chance to stand back from the process and think of the sorts of economic
development the country would be better assisted by.[30]
2.29
The Committee asked Infrastructure Australia what steps it has taken to
communicate this strategic overview to state, territory and local governments.
Infrastructure Australia told the Committee that all of its reports are
available on the agency’s website as well as being provided nationally,
including to parliaments. In addition the agency has:
... an extensive direct engagement with local and state
governments and particularly with industry, and we are seeking to build a
collaborative model with each of those players.[31]
2.30
The Infrastructure Coordinator provided a number of examples to
illustrate the type and level of communication strategies used to engage with
various levels of government. Speaking of the national port strategy, he
explained:
... we have had the 14 mayors from Townsville all the way up
that rail line to Mount Isa engaging in a process with us. They have understood
the value of that economic development for the nation and have taken very
seriously a master planning project for the next 30 years for the whole of that
supply chain, which they hope to conclude in the next nine months or so.[32]
2.31
The Committee asked if Infrastructure Australia was successfully
shifting the vision of local government authorities from their emphasis on road
development to a broader understanding of infrastructure development. The
agency told the Committee that local governments have responded well and do
understand the ‘need to think strategically at that higher level’.[33]
However, Infrastructure Australia acknowledged the difficulties inherent in
dealing with the variety of local government structures across the country.[34]
2.32
The Committee asked what steps Infrastructure Australia was taking to
ensure the sustainability of the overall infrastructure program. The agency
informed the Committee that it attempts to test the sustainability of all
projects, engaging with other relevant stakeholders and departments. The
Infrastructure Coordinator provided the example of the national port strategy:
Taking a broader view of, for example, our national port
strategy around the longer term impact of climate change, the sorts of changes
there might be as people like the Insurance Council and others are dealing with
ports, people’s housing, wind speeds, heat and those sorts of issues. So we
have a close relationship with the Department of Climate Change and we had an
officer from that department seconded to our organisation for a number of
months working with us on those issues.[35]
National Broadband Network
2.33
The Committee inquired, in light of the national focus of the agency,
whether or not Infrastructure Australia was involved in the oversight of the
Government’s National Broadband Network (NBN). Infrastructure Australia
acknowledged the importance of the infrastructure project but told the
Committee that it has ‘not been involved in any of the discussions around
cost-benefit analysis’ for the NBN.[36] Questioned further, the
agency maintained that it was a Government decision that Infrastructure
Australia should not be engaged in the project.[37]
2.34
As telecommunications is one of the key areas that Infrastructure
Australia is obligated to look at, the Committee asked why the agency had not
been asked to assess the NBN. Infrastructure Australia told the Committee that
the Government had ‘already created a process’ to deal with the NBN which did
not involve the agency.[38]
2.35
The Committee asked Infrastructure Australia if the agency would have
been able to contribute expertise to the cost-benefit analysis of the project.
Infrastructure Australia reiterated that there were adequate processes in place
to carry out this assessment and that the agency’s involvement would have
created ‘unnecessary duplication’.[39] Infrastructure Australia
added that it is only a small organisation and that its resources were fully
committed.[40]
Feedback to unsuccessful applicants
2.36
The Committee asked if Infrastructure Australia had provided feedback to
unsuccessful applicants. Infrastructure Australia told the Committee that the
agency had responded to proponents, explaining requirements for future
submissions. Although Infrastructure Australia admitted that some proponents
were disappointed in the results, the agency maintains that:
The latest release of our draft reports for the
Infrastructure Council back to proponents has meant a fair bit of honest
discussion about the sorts of conclusions we have drawn.[41]
Benefit-Cost Ratio
2.37
The ANAO found that the Prioritisation Methodology developed by
Infrastructure Australia to assess projects was based on good practice and
provided a ‘robust framework for the development of the first Infrastructure
Priority List’.[42] The ANAO noted that the
‘primary driver’ for assessment evaluation was through the use of the
Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR).[43] The Committee asked
Infrastructure Australia how the agency applied the cost-benefit analysis to
individual projects.
2.38
Infrastructure Australia referred the Committee to the revised Better
Infrastructure Decision Making Guidelines, implemented in October 2010, where
the process is explained:
The second stage – economic viability – seeks to establish
whether a proposal’s economic, social and environmental benefits outweigh its
costs to society, in a triple bottom line assessment. The bedrock of this
assessment is a traditional, and widely understood, monetised benefit-cost
assessment, complemented by qualitative assessment of impacts where
monetisation is not feasible.
In process terms, independent cost-benefit experts scrutinise
submissions to ensure they are robust and comparable, using a standardised
pro-forma of ‘issues for investigation’ prepared by Infrastructure Australia,
as well as bringing their own expertise to identify issues in any aspect of the
business case.[44]
2.39
While acknowledging that the reliance on assessment of the BCR was an
acceptable assessment tool for prioritisation of projects, the ANAO found that
there were considerable shortcomings in the quality of the BCRs submitted to
Infrastructure Australia.[45] The Committee asked
Infrastructure Australia if the revised guidelines had improved the process.
The Infrastructure Coordinator told the Committee that there have been
improvements:
... we have seen a number of jurisdictions put considerable
effort into improving their skills and analytical work, both at the strategic
level and then at the project level. Guidelines have been circulated and
commented upon by a number of proponents. Again, it is trying to keep the
balance between getting the right economic outcome and a process that local
councils and others can follow and implement without putting them to
unreasonable lengths.[46]
2.40
The Committee expressed concern that local government would not have ready
access to the expertise required to provide the detailed economic and
cost-benefit analysis requested. Infrastructure Australia admitted that this
had been an issue for some local government authorities but insisted that it
had not had a detrimental effect:
Where we believe there are projects of national economic
significance, we will assist them in getting material together or give them
advice as to particularly strong analysts that they might use. If it is a good
enough project they will find a way to do it.[47]
2.41
The Committee asked Infrastructure Australia if the emphasis on economic
analysis had precluded other considerations, particularly social outcomes. The
agency assured the Committee that other considerations were taken into account but
reiterated that the need for infrastructure development to fit into a national
framework was paramount:
Is it truly of national significance and will increase
Australia’s economic productivity? And in that process we look at the detail of
the cost-benefit analysis of particular projects. But as I indicated earlier,
we are keen to see that the projects fit together in a framework.[48]
2.42
Infrastructure Australia illustrated the type of broader factors that
were taken into consideration in addition to the cost-benefit analysis:
... if you are going to deal with Gold Coast transport
issues, how will the light rail hook into the heavy rail, how will that connect
into northern New South Wales, what are the issues around the airport, where is
that holistic view of what needs to happen at the Gold Coast, and how do those
sorts of opportunities then link into the major highway between Sydney and
Brisbane, the major rail route and the longer term inland rail connectivity?[49]
Indigenous participation
2.43
With regard to social outcomes, the Committee questioned Infrastructure
Australia on Indigenous participation in the project and what steps had been
taken to ensure equity for Indigenous communities. Infrastructure Australia
told the Committee that the agency had identified a number of issues facing
Indigenous community access to the program, particularly remote community
access.[50]
2.44
Infrastructure Australia has been working with the Coordinator-General
of Remote Indigenous Services and has received a joint submission from the
Western Australia, Northern Territory and Queensland governments addressing
road access to some of these communities.[51] To overcome some of
these issues the agency is in the process of developing a framework to assess
relevant applications:
We are currently developing a framework to try to deal with
those issues and the social equity side of that. There is a lot of work going
on, again as you would be aware, about the local town planning issues
associated with water quality, energy supply and local access. We are working
with a number of those communities and their state governments around the road
access at a regional level – they are quite difficult issues that are before
us.[52]
Implementation of ANAO recommendations
2.45
The ANAO was critical of the lack of evidence of the reasons for
decisions regarding the inclusion or exclusion of projects from the Final
Priority List. The ANAO recommended that record maintenance be improved to
ensure that these decisions are fully documented.[53]
The Committee asked Infrastructure Australia what steps had been taken to
implement this recommendation.
2.46
The agency told the Committee that, despite holding a different view on
the issue to the ANAO, Infrastructure Australia is addressing the
recommendation:
... we are making sure that the suggestions of the Audit
Office are included in our analysis and final reports. So we will comply with
that. There is a difference of view as to how much detail is required but we
are seeking to be transparent in our process.[54]
2.47
The Committee acknowledged that Infrastructure Australia had addressed
the recommendations of the audit report but asked if there were still
difficulties in the practical implementation of any of the recommendations. Although
Infrastructure Australia admitted that it had been a rigorous undertaking, the
agency claimed it had adopted and implemented the recommendations and confirmed
the exercise had resulted in a better performance for the agency.[55]
2.48
The Committee asked if the agency had taken any steps to improve its
processes beyond the requirements of the ANAO recommendations. The agency told
the Committee it had taken the opportunity to work with the ANAO to address a
number of smaller administrative issues that had been brought to the agency’s
attention. The Infrastructure Coordinator drew attention to the more comprehensive
feedback being provided to applicants:
We have, in this latest round of assessing projects,
circulated our draft advice and recommendations to each of the proponents so
that on this occasion they have an opportunity to respond and to consider the
sorts of issues that we have raised with them.[56]
Committee comment
2.49
The Committee understands the need for a focus on a national
infrastructure strategy and is satisfied that Infrastructure Australia is
communicating its strategy to relevant stakeholders, including state, territory
and local governments.
2.50
A number of Committee Members expressed concern regarding the lack of
involvement of Infrastructure Australia in the assessment and oversight of the
National Broadband Network project. Considering that the NBN is possibly
Australia’s largest current infrastructure project and that Infrastructure
Australia was set up to advise the Government on nationally significant
infrastructure projects, several Committee Members feel that it is necessary
for Infrastructure Australia to have the opportunity to consider the project.
2.51
While the Committee accepts the Auditor-General’s assurance that
Infrastructure Australia has implemented the ANAO recommendations, it remains
concerned that the decision making process is not as transparent as it should
be. In particular, the Committee disagrees with Infrastructure Australia’s
qualified answer to recommendation 3 (b) and suggests that it is within the
agency’s remit to provide clear advice on the level of funding and necessary
conditions it recommends for priority projects. Indeed the Committee believes
that best practice would suggest an obligation for Infrastructure Australia to
provide such information, especially given the strong statements related to
this point in the May 2008 Budget Statements.
2.52
The Committee is strongly concerned by the ANAO’s findings that the
published Prioritisation Methodology was not followed in all cases and that the
decisions on the composition of project priority lists taken by the
Infrastructure Australia Council were not transparent. The Committee notes that
although not formally obligated to do so the Council, and the Office of the
Infrastructure Coordinator, should have clearly documented the reasons for
decisions taken regarding the Priority List.
2.53
The Committee recognises the issues facing Indigenous communities
regarding access to the program and is concerned about the equity implications.
The Committee notes the cooperative approach being undertaken by Infrastructure
Australia to overcome some of these issues and encourages the agency to
complete the development of the Indigenous participation framework as soon as
possible.
Recommendation 1 |
|
The Committee recommends that in future Infrastructure
Australia provide clear and consistent advice on the level of funding and
necessary conditions it recommends for priority projects. |