Chapter 4 Audit Report No. 10 2009-10 Processing of Incoming International
Air Passengers
Introduction[1]
4.1
The Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (Customs) plays an
important role in preventing the illegal movement of people and harmful goods
across Australia’s borders. The agency is required to process travellers
(passengers and crew members) entering and departing Australia by air or sea,
and identify persons of interest consistent with immigration, health, family
law, law enforcement, and national security requirements.
4.2
In December 2008, the Prime Minister announced that the then Australian
Customs Service would be re-named the Australian Customs Service and Border
Protection Service and that it would be given additional capabilities to
respond to people smuggling by boat. A number of activities associated with the
response to the increase in people smuggling by sea were transferred to Customs
from the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC).
4.3
Customs processes travellers at the primary line where, on behalf of
DIAC, it provides the primary immigration clearance function. There is a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Customs and DIAC for the provision of
these clearance services. DIAC undertakes secondary immigration clearance as
required.
4.4
Passenger volumes have been growing at major Australian international
airports.[2] In particular, Customs
experienced strong growth at Gold Coast and Darwin airports, where new services
to Asia were introduced, and at Perth.
4.5
In 2007, Customs reported 23.544 million incoming and outgoing
passengers (by air and sea) to Australia, and expected an increase to 34.152
million by 2015.[3] Visitor arrivals by air
are expected to grow on average by 4.9 per cent per annum. Notwithstanding the
impact of the current economic downturn, the number of international air
passengers entering Australia is estimated to increase from 22.9 million in
2005-06 to 29.9 million in 2011-12.
The Audit
Audit objective[4]
4.6
The objective of the audit was to assess Customs’ processing of incoming
international air passengers in the primary line, in particular the extent to
which: (a) systems and controls effectively support the referral of incoming
air passengers who pose a risk and those carrying prohibited items; (b) air
passengers presenting an immigration risk are processed appropriately; and (c)
Customs has arrangements in place to effectively promote co-operation and
information sharing with DIAC.
4.7
The audit focused on assessing Customs’ systems, controls and mechanisms
for information sharing and other arrangements in place to process incoming
international air passengers in the primary line. This audit is the first in a
planned program of audit work in passenger processing.
Overall audit conclusion
4.8
The ANAO made the following overall audit conclusion:
Customs is processing millions of passengers across the
border each year and carries out various functions on behalf of other agencies.
To fulfil its role, Customs needs to strike an appropriate balance between
facilitation and control in the movement of people and goods across the border.
In particular, the agency requires sufficient trained staff, supported by
effective processes and technology to select, search and examine those
movements posing the greatest threat to border controls.
Overall, the ANAO concluded that Customs’ management
arrangements in the processing of incoming international air passengers in the
primary line are broadly effective. Air passengers presenting an immigration
risk are processed appropriately. The routine for Customs officers undertaking
primary line activities has been specifically designed in conjunction with DIAC
to mitigate immigration risks at the border; and the routine was generally
adhered to. Nevertheless, performance of some aspects of the routine were not
consistently undertaken and cannot be clearly assessed or measured by Customs.
Customs’ IT systems and control arrangements provide
appropriate support to intercept incoming air passengers who pose a risk or may
carry prohibited items. However, IT incident and IT problem management could be
improved. Further, service times for IT incidents and problems should be
established and documented, especially for those with a significant business
impact.
Arrangements to share management information and promote
cooperation between Customs and DIAC are sound, but there was no clear evidence
of monitoring whether all the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) were being met
or not.
The ANAO has made four recommendations to strengthen Customs’
processing of incoming international air passengers. These recommendations are
directed to achieving: a consistent implementation and assessment of the
routine required in the primary line; an up-to-date disaster recovery plan; the
consistent recording and reporting of IT incidents and IT problems; and the
regular monitoring and reporting of KPIs set out in the MoU between Customs and
DIAC.[5]>
ANAO recommendations
Table 4.1 ANAO recommendations, Audit Report No. 10
2009-10
1.
|
The ANAO recommends that Customs and Border Protection
develops a means to:
·
assure itself that key aspects of the routine required of
Customs and Border Protection officers performing primary line functions are
consistently implemented across all international airports; and
·
measure and report the time taken to process passengers through
the primary line.
Customs and Border Protection response: Agreed
with qualification.
|
2.
|
The ANAO recommends that Customs and Border Protection
Passengers Division’s disaster recovery plan:
·
is up-to-date and reflects Customs and Border Protection’s
current IT business environment;
·
aligns with its current IT service provider’s disaster recovery
plan for Customs and Border Protection; and
·
has response times that have been tested, recorded, monitored,
and updated if necessary.
Customs and Border Protection response: Agreed.
|
3.
|
The ANAO recommends that Customs and Border Protection:
·
puts in place mechanisms so that the severity of IT incidents
and IT problems is rated consistently;
·
establishes acceptable service times for IT incidents and IT
problems;
·
monitors, tracks and links to specific recorded action times,
all IT incidents and IT problems; and
·
ascertains and reports in a consistent manner the (adverse) business
impact of IT problems.
Customs and Border Protection response: Agreed.
|
4.
|
The ANAO recommends that in relation to its Memorandum of
Understanding for the Provision of Clearance Services, that Customs and
Border Protection works with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship
to:
·
monitor and report against the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)
regularly; and
·
update the KPIs, if necessary.
Customs and Border Protection response: Agreed.
|
The Committee’s review
4.9
The Committee held a public hearing on Thursday 11 March 2010, with the
following witnesses:
- Australian National
Audit Office (ANAO); and
- Australian Customs
and Border Protection Service.
4.10
The Committee took evidence on the following issues:
- consistent
implementation of primary line routine;
- measuring passenger
queue and processing time;
- staff training and
development;
- Key Performance
Indicator (KPI) management;
- effectiveness of the
processing system;
- appropriate
processing of incoming passengers;
- reasons for referrals
- IT system breakdowns.
Consistent implementation of primary line routine
4.11
Customs, in association with DIAC, have specifically designed a routine
for primary line officers to mitigate risks with regard to incoming passengers.
The ANAO found that ‘although the routine was generally adhered to across the
airports, there were inconsistencies in conducting the specified routine’.[6]
While acknowledging that it was difficult to measure key steps in the routine,
the ANAO recommended that steps be taken to ensure the routine is implemented
consistently across all international airports.[7]
4.12
In their opening statement to the public inquiry, Customs assured the
Committee that steps had been taken to implement this recommendation.[8]
In collaboration with DIAC, Customs are ensuring that:
- practice statements …
and instructions and guidelines are reviewed and updated regularly and cleared
through relevant immigration policy areas before they are issued;
- Customs components of
the primary clearance course, which is delivered to our trainees, are reviewed
and updated on a regular basis;
- input is sought from
Immigration (on) immigration related policy matters; and
- Customs contributes
to Immigration reviews and updates of their component of the primary clearance
course.[9]
4.13
With regard to consistent implementation of the primary line routine,
Customs advised the ANAO that it was developing a ‘Quality Assurance Process’
designed to assist management to determine compliance or non-compliance with
the routine.[10] The Committee asked the
Department what progress had been made with the development and implementation
of the ‘Quality Assurance Process’ and whether or not it had improved
compliance.
4.14
Customs told the Committee that the ‘high-level details of a broader
quality assurance framework’ have been developed but that the ‘detail for
delivery and implementation’ have not yet been finalised.[11]
Customs added that, as part of this process:
... a national review has been conducted to assess which
operational practices should be subject to regular compliance measures. This
assessment included a recommendation to develop a nationally consistent
assessment and reporting process for key Airport Operations activities,
including primary processing.[12]
4.15
The ANAO also noted that at the time of the audit Customs was developing
a new Practice Statement Framework (PSF) to replace the existing Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs). The ANAO observed:
Once finalised and if implemented well, the new PSF will
assist Customs and Border Protection Passengers Division to perform their
functions efficiently and consistently across Australia’s international
airports.[13]
4.16
The Committee asked Customs if the new Framework had been implemented
and what results it had achieved. Customs informed the Committee that the PSF
has been implemented and that all staff now have internet access to the
Framework consisting of consistent policy and procedural documents.[14] Customs maintains:
Use of the framework is driving national consistency of
practices and procedures, and allowing details of the quality assurance
framework to be developed.[15]
Measuring passenger queue and processing time
4.17
Customs has developed an internal management standard of 45 seconds
based on the time passengers spend queuing for the primary line. Compliance
with this cycle processing time allows Customs to meet a processing
facilitation standard of clearing 95 per cent of passengers within 30 minutes
of them passing through the Entry Control Point (ECP). The ANAO found the 45
second measurement arbitrary, identified inconsistencies in the way the
measurement is determined and questioned its accuracy and usefulness.[16]
The ANAO recommended that Customs develop a more accurate means of measuring
and reporting the time taken to process passengers through the primary line.[17]
4.18
The Committee queried why Customs agreed to this recommendation with
qualifications. Customs explained to the Committee that, while it is actively
looking for a more accurate method to measure passenger queue and processing
time:
… the methodology that is the subject of this recommendation
was put in place primarily for the purpose of resource deployment. In that
sense it has been effective, and it will stay in place until we can find
another, more cost-effective and accurate means to measure queue time.[18]
Staff training and development
4.19
Overall the ANAO found the training being provided to primary line
officers was adequate but that, given the ‘complexities and resource
constraints at the airports’, training was not provided consistently across
airports.[19] The ANAO suggested that
a program of regular assessment of primary line officers be developed aligned
with refresher training courses.[20]
4.20
The Committee asked Customs if steps were being taken to implement such
a process. Customs informed the Committee that under current arrangements
‘assessment and coaching are provided to specific officers’ when performance
standards are not met.[21] It acknowledged that the
‘primary line assessment tool’ is used inconsistently across airports: some
airports use it to assess all staff annually before new performance agreements
are established whereas other airports use it only when concerns are raised
regarding an officer’s performance/capability.[22] Customs told the
Committee steps are being taken to develop a more consistent approach:
Work is progressing to update the primary line assessment
tool in line with current Instructions and Guidelines, determine a nationally
consistent regime for conducting this assessment and a recommendation for how
often refresher training should be conducted.[23]
4.21
The ANAO also found the training materials provided by Customs to be
‘appropriate and relevant’ but identified a lack of specific guidelines on the
parameters of the ‘power to question passengers’.[24]
Since the ANAO findings Customs has produced training modules on Questioning
Techniques and Elements and Standard Questions.[25]
4.22
The Committee asked Customs whether or not the new materials had been
distributed and used in training and was told the training materials have been
completed and are being delivered to all trainees. In addition, Customs told
the Committee that the whole training program has been revised and a number of
other modules now contain relevant material on questioning techniques.[26]
Key Performance Indicator (KPI) management
4.23
The ANAO found that, although Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) were in
place through the Memorandum of Understanding between Customs and DIAC, a
number of the KPIs were not being regularly monitored and reviewed.[27]
The ANAO recommended that Customs work with DIAC to update the KPIs and monitor
and report against the Indicators regularly.[28]
4.24
Customs told the Committee it is working with DIAC to prepare a report
that will assess the relevance of the current KPIs and data collection methods.[29]
With regard to the KPIs, Customs are working to determine:
- relevant performance
information targets;
- the usefulness of the
data pinpointing more systematic errors;
- a process for
addressing errors; and
- an appropriate
reporting and feedback mechanism.[30]
Effectiveness of the processing system
4.25
The Committee was particularly interested to know whether or not the
audit had shown if the systems and controls that Customs has in place
effectively support the referral of incoming air passengers who pose a risk to
Australia. The ANAO confirmed that the system is working effectively. During
the course of the audit the ANAO team had observed Customs officers performing
the primary clearance routine across four international airports: Sydney,
Melbourne, Perth and Darwin.[31] The ANAO assessed the
primary clearance process and the application of the process and found both
worked effectively.[32]
4.26
The Committee asked Customs how it measures the success of the system. Customs
told the Committee it measures its response to the alert system: whether it has
responded to the alert, if the response was appropriate and if any action taken
was appropriate.[33] Customs also looks at
the risk indicators it uses to identify people to be placed on the alert list
and whether or not those indicators are successfully picking up passengers or
crew who pose a risk.[34]
4.27
The Committee further inquired if there is any trend evident with regard
to improvement in the effectiveness of the system. Customs advised that the
trend is positive:
The ongoing trend now for some period of time is that we are
more successful proportionate to the number of baggage examinations we undertake
or the proportion of people we pick up at the primary line. So over a period of
time we examine fewer people with a higher success rate.[35]
Appropriate processing of incoming passengers
4.28
The Committee asked if the audit had determined that incoming passengers
were being processed appropriately. The ANAO was confident that passengers were
being processed appropriately and defined what it considered ‘appropriate’:
By appropriate … we were looking to see that the agency had
defined what the immigration risk was and had in place processes to identify
people of immigration risk and to tell their officers what to do when those
people present an immigration risk.[36]
Reasons for referrals
4.29
The Committee asked Customs for what reasons passengers and crew were
referred during 2007-09 and for the outcome of the referrals. Customs supplied
the Committee with the following table and indicated that, of these referrals,
1135 were refused entry into Australia. Customs informed the Committee that
health referrals are referred to Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service
and Customs does not record outcome details.
Table 4.2 Passenger referrals
Referral code |
Short meaning |
Movements |
P |
PAL possible match |
77058 |
D |
No Australian or New Zealand passport or no Australian
visa held |
69372 |
4 |
Manual (officer initiated) referral |
45065 |
T |
Bona-fides check |
30255 |
C |
No ETA/Visa record found |
23710 |
O |
Overstayer |
8956 |
F |
Australian visa held by New Zealand passport holder |
4173 |
V |
Visa ceased or cancelled |
4017 |
7 |
Holder of bridging visa “E” |
2900 |
A |
No record of Australian or New Zealand passport |
1707 |
Z |
Passport not in force/unacceptable/being processed |
1031 |
M |
Breach of condition 8504 |
750 |
W |
DAL document alert |
741 |
J |
Lawful until date (LUD) invalid |
700 |
R |
Visa evidence record not found/Stay period invalid |
364 |
Q |
Impound Australian passport |
362 |
L |
Passport lost or stolen |
81 |
I |
Person on Australian or New Zealand passport not matched |
54 |
H |
Other |
7 |
Source Customs
and Border Protection, submission no. 6
4.30
The Committee noted that there had been a large increase in the number
of incoming international crew in 2007-08 and asked for the cause. Customs identified
two reasons for the increase: more flights and vessels arriving in the country and
larger aircraft and cruise ships with larger crews.[37]
Health
4.31
The Committee expressed concern that the incoming passenger card only contained
questions regarding tuberculosis and yellow fever and not hepatitis B and C.
The Committee asked DIAC for clarification on how the health questions on the
incoming passenger card are determined. DIAC informed the Committee that the
Department of Health and Ageing is the policy setting agency and ‘provides DIAC
with those health concerns for action during VISA screening and border crossing’.[38]
With regard to hepatitis B and C, DIAC told the Committee:
DoHA do not consider hepatitis B and C as a public health
threat. The exception to this is that DoHA have agreed the need for screening
for hepatitis B and C in relation to the visa applications of health care
workers, working in exposure prone procedures in the health care sector. As
this is a very small cohort it is not believed warranted to ask this as a
routine question.[39]
IT system breakdowns
4.32
The ANAO noted the importance of a stable IT environment to the
effective operation of Customs’ primary line.[40] The ANAO found the IT
incident management process of Customs and Border Protection’s Passengers
Division to be sound but identified two areas that require improvement:
- recording IT problems
and their severity ratings as accurately as possible; and
- resolving the IT
problem over a reasonable period.[41]
4.33
The Committee was concerned that these difficulties may cause the IT
system to be down for periods of time, seriously compromise the system and allow
incoming passengers or crew who pose a risk to the Australian community to gain
entry into the country. The ANAO told the Committee that the only consequence
of the difficulties that it had observed was a delay in processing passengers.[42]
Customs confirmed that a breakdown in the IT system will cause delays but
assured the Committee that primary line officers would switch to manual
processing thus ensuring the integrity of the system:
It is not as though people can walk through the border with
no record. We would fall back to manual processing and there are well-drilled
protocols in place to deal with that.[43]
4.34
Customs identified the real risk when the IT systems are down as the
lack of access to the Passenger Analysis, Clearance and Evaluation (PACE) system.[44]
4.35
The Committee asked the Department to quantify the IT systems failure
rate, and the consequent lack of access to PACE, over the past three years and
indicate the number of passengers of interest who may not have been identified.
Customs explained that the audit figures were not indicative as the audit had
taken place during a transition period when it was moving from one service
provider to another and the system was down more often than normal.[45]
Customs provided the Committee with the following figures:
Table 4.3 IT failure incidents
Year |
Number of incidents |
Passengers who matched an alert and were not identified |
2007 |
2 |
1 |
2008 |
5 |
4 |
2009 |
7 |
13 |
2010 |
3 |
0 |
Source Customs
and Border Protection, submission no. 6
4.36
The Committee asked Customs for the duration of these outages. Customs told
the Committee that the incidents ranged from 15 minutes to nine hours, with the
average being 2½ hours.[46] The Committee asked for
an indication of the number of passengers that were manually processed by
primary line officers during these outages and Customs provided the following
figures for the period 1 January 2007 to 1 April 2010:
Table 4.4 Passengers processed manually during outages
Year |
Total air passengers at major airports |
Total manually processed |
During power outage |
Passengers who matched an alert and were not identified
as a result of a power outage |
2007 |
23 059 327 |
927 |
0 |
0 |
2008 |
23 816 540 |
2373 |
0 |
0 |
2009 |
24 651 340 |
5201 |
540 |
10 |
2010 |
6 678 961 |
153 |
65 |
0 |
Total |
78 206 078 |
8654 |
605 |
10 |
Source Customs
and Border Protection, submission no. 6
Conclusion
4.37
The Committee’s chief concern is the effectiveness of the primary line
system to ensure the referral of incoming air passengers and crew who pose a
risk to the Australian community. Although both the ANAO and Customs have
assured the Committee that the system is effective, the identified gaps in IT
incident and IT problem management are a cause for concern. The Committee urges
Customs to implement the ANAO Recommendation number 3 as soon as possible in
order to mitigate the risk posed by IT incidents and problems to Australia’s
border protection.
4.38
The Committee is aware that the ANAO has a series of audits planned to
examine the secondary phase of passenger processing and the role of the AQIS
and DIAC and will continue to monitor the processing of incoming international
passengers by the various agencies to ensure risks to Australian security are
minimised.