Chapter 1 Social Security Legislation Amendment
(Job Seeker Compliance) Bill 2011
Referral of inquiry
1.1
The Social Security Legislation Amendment (Job Seeker Compliance) Bill
2011 (hereafter referred to as ‘the Bill’) was referred by the House Selection
Committee to the House Standing Committee on Education and Employment on 24
March 2011 for inquiry and report.
1.2
This is the second bill referred to the Committee under the new
arrangements adopted on 23 September 2010 for the 43rd Parliament, which
provide for the Selection Committee, under Standing Orders 143 and 222, to
refer a bill to a committee for an advisory report.
The Bill
1.3
The Bill amends the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth)
to provide that social security payment for job seekers will be suspended when
they fail to attend appointments with employment service providers.
1.4
A copy of the Bill is provided in Appendix A.
Outline of the Bill
1.5
The general outline is copied below:
This Bill implements the Government’s election commitment to
introduce tougher rules for job seekers, which was announced on 11 August 2010
as part of the “Modernising Australia’s Welfare System” policy statement.
The amendments in this Bill will enhance the current job
seeker compliance framework by providing additional incentives for job seekers
to engage with their employment services providers and to participate fully in
activities designed to improve their employment prospects.
This Bill will introduce suspension of payment for job
seekers following an initial failure to attend an appointment or, in some
circumstances, an activity such as training or Work for the Dole. As soon as
the job seeker agrees to attend this appointment, their payment will be
restored with full back payment. All job seekers will be required to attend a
rescheduled appointment, regardless of their reason for missing the first
appointment. If the job seeker attends the rescheduled appointment, they will
not be penalised.
If the job seeker does not attend the rescheduled
appointment, payment will again be suspended but this time, if they do not have
a reasonable excuse for missing the appointment, they will incur a reconnection
failure and lose payment for each day from the second missed appointment until
they do attend a rescheduled appointment. That is, there will be no back
payment for this period.
The reconnection penalty will be deducted from the payment
for the period in which the job seeker was notified of the failure. This will
ensure that the impact of the penalty is more immediate and will provide a more
direct deterrent than under current legislation, which requires that the
penalty amount be deducted from a later instalment period.
Reasonable excuse provisions will also be tightened so that,
even if a job seeker has a reasonable excuse on the day for not attending an
appointment or activity, it will not be accepted if they could have given
advance notice that they couldn’t attend but didn’t do so. [1]
Background
1.6
The Bill was introduced and the second reading moved by the Minister for
Employment Participation and Childcare, the Hon. Kate Ellis MP, on 23 March
2011. The Minister explained that the Bill delivers on the Government’s
election commitment to modernise Australia’s welfare system.
1.7
A copy of the Minister’s second reading speech is available on the
Committee’s website.
1.8
In her second reading speech on the Bill, the Minister explained why the
Bill was being introduced and the proposed effect of the Bill:
For many years the
rate at which job seekers attend appointments with employment service providers
has been around 55 per cent. While some job seekers may unavoidably need to
miss an appointment because they are genuinely sick, start a job at short
notice or have other valid reasons, I believe that attendance at appointments –
appointments designed to help job seekers get into work - can and must
improve. That is why we made an election commitment to strengthen the
compliance system.[2]
1.9
The Minister added that the Bill is not targeted at punishing
Australians who have a valid reason for missing their appointments with
employment service providers. Rather, its purpose is to encourage job seekers
to actively engage in work experience activities in order to enable them to
obtain the skills and experience they need to find a job:
Suspension is not
about punishing job seekers for punishment’s sake. The job seeker is either
paid back in full or payment resumes when they do what is required of them.
But these changes
will give the job seeker no choice but to re-engage with employment services
and be serious about finding work- if they want to receive income support.
...All Australians
on income support should have the opportunity of work – but with opportunity
comes responsibility – and with this bill we are going to expect that people
meet those responsibilities.[3]
Conduct of the Inquiry
1.10
A media release announcing the inquiry and inviting written submissions
was disseminated on 25 March 2011. A range of stakeholders, including
government departments, job service providers, peak welfare bodies, and
consumer rights organisations, were also invited directly to make a submission
to the inquiry.
1.11
The Committee received sixteen submissions to the inquiry. Submissions
and exhibits are listed at Appendix B.
1.12
The Committee held two public hearings in Melbourne on 13 April 2011 and
in Canberra on 18 April 2011. The list of hearings and witnesses is at Appendix
C.
1.13
The text of the Bill comprises the inquiry terms of reference.
Scope of the Inquiry
1.14
The Committee considers it important to confine the scope of this
inquiry to the terms of reference, as outlined above.
1.15
Many witnesses, and submissions received by the Committee, discussed
broad problems with social security legislation and the welfare and employment
services systems.
1.16
Although the Committee considers these to be important issues worthy of
discussion, it is beyond the scope of this inquiry to consider them. As such,
the Committee has only considered those issues raised that directly relate to
the Bill.
Main Issues
1.17
Several issues arose in evidence received by the Committee, both in
public hearings and written submissions, in relation to the measures proposed
by the Bill.
Communication, Guidance and Training
1.18
The Committee received a considerable amount of evidence indicating that
there are serious concerns held by many stakeholders in relation to the complex
and confusing nature of the employment services system and the social security
system as a whole.
1.19
A common and recurring theme across much of the evidence was the impact
that the complexity of the compliance system, and the resulting lack of
understanding of the implications of non-compliance, may have on job seekers
and, indeed, employment service providers (ESPs) and Centrelink staff.
1.20
Professor Julian Disney, Chair of the Independent Review of the Impacts
of the new Job Seeker Compliance Framework (the Independent Review), stated:
[t]he system was extraordinarily complex. I think all three
of us [members of the Independent Review], including two of us with a lot of
experience over the years in different programs, were quite amazed at the
complexity of the scheme...[w]e found that really quite remarkable and a major
problem.[4]
1.21
Two distinct issues arose in relation to communication and the
implementation of the measures proposed by the Bill.
1.22
Firstly, there appear to be serious issues in relation to the
communication of compliance requirements, and indeed the compliance and
employment services regimes generally, to job seekers. Secondly, numerous
stakeholders raised concerns as to a lack of understanding of compliance
requirements and the compliance regime amongst ESPs and Centrelink staff.
Communication with Job Seekers
1.23
The National Welfare Rights Network (NWRN) queried whether job seekers
will be able to understand how the new system proposed by the Bill will work
and what their obligations will be under it. [5]
1.24
Similarly, Mission Australia indicated that ‘the compliance framework
remains excessively complex’[6] and concerns were raised
by Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS):
...many job seekers do not comprehend the value and
importance of ... interviews [with their employment service
providers]...because they do not understand complex systems, especially people
who are new to the system.’[7]
1.25
Jobs Australia, in their research with the Nous Group, found the
following:
[a] lot of the front-line workers in the system...report that
people just do not understand it, especially people who are new to the
system...people who are new to the system or people who do not have much
experience of it are...overwhelmed and confused.[8]
1.26
ACOSS further raised the issue of lower literacy levels amongst many job
seekers participating in Job Services Australia [(JSA) programs and the
difficulties faced by people who speak English as their second language,
including many Indigenous job seekers:
A little over half of participants in JSA have less than year
12 education, and they are dealing with very complex systems, so that is a part
of the problem. Secondly, many people have English as a second language,
including many Indigenous people, and interpreters are not always provided. The
form of communication is also important. People often do not respond well to
letters about appointments if they have low literacy levels, so that needs to
be backed up by other means of communication. [9]
1.27
Concerns relating to language issues experienced by Indigenous
Australians, particularly for those in remote communities, were echoed by the
Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Office, who indicated that there is a ‘need for
greater use of Indigenous language interpreters for service delivery to remote
and regional Indigenous customers.’[10]
1.28
Communication of the measures proposed by the Bill is the key to the successful
implementation of those measures. As indicated by Mission Australia, the first
thing to consider is, ‘how to communicate with the job seeker.’ The next step
is, ‘doubling that communication...so that they absolutely understand it.’[11]
1.29
The measures and obligations imposed by the Bill must be consistently
and effectively communicated to job seekers in order for the Bill to have its
intended effect. Already, the Committee has received evidence indicating that
there is confusion in relation to the way in which the measures proposed by the
Bill will be implemented, particularly around the application and lifting of
payment suspensions and the rescheduling of appointments.
1.30
For example, there appear to be different interpretations of what will
happen to a job seeker following their first missed appointment, if the job seeker
does not have a vulnerability indicator. The Department of Education,
Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) clarified that, ‘all the job-seeker
needs to do is to indicate an agreement to attend that next appointment and
then the suspension is immediately lifted,’[12] with full back pay.
1.31
The nature of this requirement is not immediately clear from the text of
the Bill; however, it is clarified in Minister Ellis’ second reading speech.[13]
The confusion around this issue, along with other aspects of the Bill, emphasises
the importance of adequate communication and explanation to job seekers.
1.32
DEEWR has indicated that they will work very closely with Centrelink and
ESPs, ‘to ensure that job seekers at all relevant contact points with
Centrelink or...[employment service] providers are very clearly given the
message about the new changes and what that means to them, particularly with
regard to the requirement to give prior notice should they be unable to attend
an appointment or activity on a day.’[14]
1.33
DEEWR will also ‘be taking advantage of Centrelink’s regular personal
contact interviews with every job seeker so that they can explain the
circumstances or the changed arrangements to them. That will usually be a
face-to-face conversation with the job seeker.’[15]
1.34
The Committee considers that face-to-face communication of the changes
to job seekers is a valuable method of ensuring that job seekers understand
their obligations under the measures proposed by the Bill.
1.35
DEEWR noted:
‘[t]here is material that is published on the Centrelink
website about the compliance framework, and that will be updated. The formal
notifications with job seekers to advise them of appointments and of compliance
issues will be updated with the formal arrangements so that we meet the legislative
requirements in that way.’[16]
1.36
The Committee considers it crucial for DEEWR and the Department of Human
Services (DHS) to provide plain-English explanations of the measures proposed
by the Bill, and how they differ from current arrangements, to every job seeker
who may be affected by the changes. Job seekers should be clearly and
repeatedly informed of their obligations under the proposed system.
1.37
To this end, it would be valuable to develop a brief, plain-English
explanation of the changes proposed by the Bill, in the context of the current
compliance regime.
1.38
In order to ensure that all job seekers have access to a plain-English
explanation of the new compliance regime proposed by the Bill, the document could
be made available on the Centrelink website in an easy to find location and
also in hard copy form at the offices of Centrelink and ESPs. Furthermore, the
document could be attached to formal notifications sent to job seekers and to
employment pathway plans.
1.39
Such documents could also be provided to Centrelink employees in order
to ensure that consistent and easy to understand guidance is available to job
seekers when they are contacted by Centrelink staff.
1.40
The Committee considers it crucial to ensure that adequate translations
of the plain-English document into other languages, including Indigenous
languages, are made available and that translators are available to discuss the
measures proposed by the Bill in a clear and concise manner for those who speak
English as a second language or may be experiencing literacy difficulties.
1.41
In addition, the Committee heard from numerous stakeholders that the
levels of disengagement amongst young people are disproportionately high. The Independent
Review found that 47 per cent of people who miss appointments are young people.[17]
As such, it is important to ensure that any communication strategies in place
can be targeted to young people in order to foster reengagement and strong
communication ties.
1.42
The Committee notes that DHS already utilise a multi-faceted communication
system including letters, email, telephone calls and SMS, to contact job
seekers[18] and would consider it
valuable to extend that system to directly target young people.
Recommendation 1 |
|
The Committee recommends that a
brief, plain-English explanation of the proposed changes, and the obligations
that will stem from them, be produced and made available to all job seekers as
soon as practicable. |
Guidance and Training
1.43
The Committee understands that many elements of the administration of
the proposed compliance regime will be codified in guidance material, which is
designed to be read with the Bill. This guidance material will provide, amongst
other things, information around elements of the Bill that incorporate a
discretionary aspect, including the meaning of ‘reasonable excuse’ and, ‘the
sorts of matters which might be regarded as special circumstances.’[19]
1.44
DEEWR advised that specific guidance for Centrelink staff would be
provided in, ‘Centrelink’s internal guidance to its decision makers in its
reference material...’[20]
1.45
On this point, DHS stated:
We do have a comprehensive communication strategy and we will
be updating all of our communication products. We develop scripts for our staff
so they have got a set of words to use when we have any new initiative. We have
drafted some words for staff to use for this. That will be one of the key
messages in the first couple of months of the new arrangements.[21]
1.46
In relation to some of the discretionary elements of the measures
proposed by the Bill, DEEWR has indicated that decisions as to whether an
excuse can be deemed ‘reasonable’ and whether circumstances will be considered
‘special’ are ‘judgment based’ issues.[22]
1.47
The Committee also received evidence from DEEWR suggesting that
decisions in relation to whether participation reports lead to the recording of
a participation failure would, to some extent, come down to the discretion of
Centrelink employees:
Following the second missed appointment—and, indeed, any
circumstance where a provider submits a participation report to Centrelink,
Centrelink makes a determination whether a participation failure should be
applied or not.[23]
1.48
On this point, DHS stated:
We are still working with the Department of Education,
Employment and Workplace Relations on the finer aspects of the policy. There
are still a number of aspects where we have not worked through all the detail,
and that is certainly one of them. It comes down to the discretion of the individual
staff member and how much guidance we give them in situations like that...[24]
1.49
As well as the apparent discretion given to Centrelink employees in
relation to the aspects of the Bill discussed above, ESPs will have the
discretion to determine whether or not they submit a participation report to
Centrelink when a job seeker misses an appointment.
1.50
DEEWR explained:
If the provider determines that at a particular point in time
they do not want to submit a PR [participation report] or have the suspension
occurring for job seekers, they can still use the other tools available to
them...They do not have to move immediately to submitting a participation
report...[25]
1.51
Clearly, the potential impact that the decision of an individual staff
member at Centrelink or employed by an ESP may have on whether a participation
report is submitted and upheld, an excuse considered ‘reasonable,’ and a set of
circumstances regarded as ‘special,’ highlights the importance of clear
guidelines and comprehensive training of Centrelink and ESP staff.
1.52
The Committee places a high level of importance on ensuring that all
elements of the Bill are adequately and clearly explained to job seekers, ESPs,
and Centrelink staff.
1.53
To this end, the guidelines being developed to accompany the Bill should
be clear, comprehensive, and disseminated to ESPs, Centrelink staff, and all
other relevant stakeholders as soon as possible in order to enable adequate
preparation for the commencement of the measures proposed by the Bill.
1.54
In addition, it appears from the evidence provided by DEEWR that two, or
possibly more, sets of guidance material are being prepared in the form of
internal Centrelink guidance material and the guide that is being prepared by
DEEWR to be read alongside the Bill.[26] A crucial element to any
guidance material disseminated to EPSs, Centrelink staff, consumers, and other
relevant stakeholders is consistency.
1.55
The Committee heard from numerous witnesses about the difficulties faced
by organisations and individuals when dealing with what appears to be a complex
and multi-faceted social security system. Any inconsistency in guidance
material provided in relation to the application and implementation of the
measures proposed by the Bill will only exacerbate these issues further and
should be avoided.
1.56
On this point, Mission Australia indicated that there appears to be a
disconnect between the guidance provided to ESPs and Centrelink staff around
the submission of participation reports:
[P]roviders and Centrelink [must be] in sync so that when we
actually issue a participation report it is not rejected...Our people do not
issue participation reports just for the hell of doing it. They go through a
significant amount of emotional anxiety about issuing a participation report.
Then when they see that turned over by somebody at Centrelink, that means that
the disengagement process is reinforced. Then we have to start the
re-engagement process with the job seeker all over again, because our people
have now lost credibility with the job seeker... It is consistency and
follow-through with these people that counts. So there is that significant
issue about there being consistency in the way that we go about working with
both Centrelink and our job seekers.[27]
1.57
In addition, the CPSU indicated that there appears to be a lack of
cohesion between different Government departments and ESPs:
In terms of the system’s alignment, we have identified work
effectiveness in relation to how the job service provider system interacts with
other government departments. This has seen... people being required to give
their information to the government a number of times. It has also been seen to
retard the ability to make appointments between Centrelink and the job service
providers. There are definitely issues here.[28]
1.58
It is clear that a unified and consistent approach to any guidance
material provided to Centrelink staff, ESPs, and any other relevant
stakeholders, is crucial for the successful implementation of the measures
proposed by the Bill.
1.59
To this end, the Committee considers that it would be valuable for
DEEWR, DHS, and ESPs to work together to ensure that all guidance material
provided is consistent and clear. Furthermore, the Committee considers that
DEEWR and DHS should consult with stakeholders in the course of developing the
guidance material and notes the importance of involving job seekers in this
process:
In the development of the guidelines the first point...would
be to go to the customer, in this case the job-seekers, and work with them to
understand how best to communicate this and come from the bottom up... what we
would like to see is that we work with the job-seekers—not with Centrelink, not
with the providers but with the job-seekers—to see how it is that they will
understand and receive this stuff and actually consume it.[29]
1.60
Similarly, the training provided to Centrelink staff and ESPs must be
consistent and comprehensive. The Committee anticipates that training provided
to Centrelink and ESP staff will be based on the guidance material being
developed, thus, as with the guidance material, the training material should be
developed collaboratively to minimise the risk of inconsistency.
Recommendation 2 |
|
The Committee recommends that the Department
of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, the Department of Human Services,
employment service providers, and other stakeholders work together to develop
consistent guidance and training material to accompany the Bill. |
1.61
Although the Committee understands that both DEEWR and DHS are intending
to provide guidance material to staff and ESPs, it is also crucial to ensure
that, where possible, front-line staff are provided with interactive training
rather than merely having to rely on written guidance material. As explained by
Professor Disney, front-line staff ‘have a lot of work and they cannot be
reading the guidelines all the time—50 or 100 pages.’[30]
1.62
The CPSU indicated that they held serious concerns as to whether the
training provided to Centrelink staff would be sufficient, particularly in an
environment characterised by budget pressures:
‘Unfortunately, this department, along with most others, is
operating under an efficiency dividend. It means that there are budget
pressures normally. We are expecting these to increase, particularly in the
next budget. When things are tight and staffing levels go down, the first thing
that we see is a reduction in training. That is a real concern with the
workload now. With any changes, such as we are contemplating here today,
obviously that is going to be amplified. It is absolutely a live concern.’[31]
1.63
On staff training, DHS stated: ‘[i]n our training for our customer
service advisers, we will focus on case studies and scenarios using that policy
to go through what action to take in certain situations.’[32]
1.64
The Committee is encouraged by the fact that DHS have indicated their
preparedness and willingness to provide training. The training of all relevant
staff members should be both comprehensive and comprehensible in order to
ensure that the measures proposed by the Bill are implemented consistently and
fairly.
1.65
Furthermore, DHS indicated that they are working closely with ESPs:
We have regular six-weekly meetings now between providers,
Centrelink and representatives from the Department of Education, Employment and
Workplace Relations where we talk about the big changes that are happening in
each agency. We work together to make sure we all have the same understanding
and that we understand the changes.[33]
1.66
The ongoing communication between Centrelink, DEEWR, and ESPs is
encouraging and should continue in order to ensure that Centrelink, DEEWR, and
ESPs are working collaboratively and providing the best available service to
job seekers.
Recommendation 3 |
|
The Committee recommends that
Centrelink and employment service provider staff are provided with
comprehensive training in relation to the measures proposed by the Bill and the
guidelines that will accompany the Bill. |
1.67
The Committee has some concerns about the nature and quality of the
training that will be provided to ESPs in relation to the changes proposed by
the Bill. As discussed above, ESPs have the discretion to determine whether or
not they submit a participation report for a missed appointment, thereby
potentially triggering a payment suspension. Professor Disney noted that, ‘[s]ome
providers will be very tough on this. Some providers will probably be too easy.’[34]
1.68
ESPs have the discretion to determine whether or not a participation
report is submitted. Mission Australia noted that ESPs work with job seekers on
a more regular basis than Centrelink staff and have an opportunity to interact
with job seekers on a one-on-one basis more frequently.[35]
Thus, ESPs are arguably in a better position to determine whether or not
submitting a participation report will have the desired reengagement effect or
whether other mechanisms are more appropriate.
1.69
On the other hand, the NWRN noted that there are a number of key factors
that work against the supposition that ESPs will utilise their discretion to
the benefit of job seekers by employing methods such as contact requests,
rather than submitting participation reports:
...significant pressure is applied to providers from the
DEEWR contract management arrangements which require quick decisions to be made
about applying Participation Reports or if not, providing reasons why the
failure should not be applied. The DEEWR system demands quick, immediate
responses, and given large caseloads, micro-management of the contracts, and
the extremely time-consuming nature of meeting DEEWR requirements...many
providers may push the key stroke for generating a participation failure.[36]
1.70
It is vital that ESPs develop a comprehensive understanding of their
jobseekers’ circumstances in order to ensure that they utilise their discretion
fairly, equitable, and correctly. Furthermore, it is crucial that DEEWR and
ESPs work together to develop an understanding of ESP discretion and how it is
intended to operate in connection with DEEWR requirements and systems. Guidance
and training around the use of ESPs discretion, combined with stakeholder
consultation, is necessary.
1.71
The guidance and training provided to ESPs must be consistent and
provide information as to when ESPs should and should not consider submitting a
participation report for a missed appointment. Inconsistency on this point
could worsen any apparent disconnect between Centrelink and ESPs and lead to an
unequal application of the compliance regime proposed by the Bill.
1.72
It is important to emphasise that a payment suspension should not be
utilised as a punitive measure. The Government has indicated that the focus of
the measures proposed by the Bill is not punishment, but re-engagement.[37]
1.73
Guidance given to ESPs on this point should cover whether a
participation report for a missed appointment should be submitted in a
situation where other methods may be used to successfully reengage the job
seeker. ESPs should be guided and encouraged to consider utilising all
mechanisms available to them.
1.74
In addition to concerns relating to communication with jobseekers and
guidance and training for staff, the Committee also heard from many witnesses
that concerns exist regarding the timing of payment suspensions.
1.75
In particular, there appear to be concerns around the unequal
application of payment suspensions depending on whether the suspensions are
applied at the beginning, middle, or end of a job seeker’s payment cycle.[38]
1.76
The Committee considers that it is important to include information as
to the application and timing of payment suspensions in the proposed guidance
and training material to avoid any inequality in the application of payment
suspensions.
Recommendation 4 |
|
The Committee recommends that
employment service providers be given clear and comprehensive guidance as to
how to utilise their discretion to submit a participation report in relation to
a missed appointment. |
Data
1.77
A recurring theme throughout the course of the inquiry related to the
lack of available data available in relation to why job seekers who did not
have a reasonable excuse for missing appointments with providers and Centrelink
were missing those appointments.
1.78
DHS indicated that the reasons why individuals without what are
considered reasonable excuses miss appointments, ‘is not something that is
really captured a lot in our data.’[39]
1.79
DEEWR provided information on the reasonable excuses that job seekers
have for missing appointments and indicated that they have data on the reasons
that providers submit participation reports; however, it appears that no
comprehensive data is available to explain why job seekers without reasonable
excuses are missing appointments.
1.80
The apparent lack of data in this area is concerning. This problem
should be remedied in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of
why job seekers miss appointments when they do not have a reasonable excuse.
Additional information in this area is crucial to ensure that all possible steps
are being taken to engage job seekers and to manage and control any unidentified
barriers to employment participation.
1.81
The importance of accurate and comprehensive data in this area is
amplified, given that the Bill under consideration will implement a compliance
regime that responds to missed appointments with the possibility of payment
suspension,.
1.82
DHS indicated that Centrelink is working with non-government
organisations and other community partners to gather information in relation to
why individuals do not attend appointments.[40] The scope of the working
group is broader than considering non-attendance at Centrelink appointments and
will look at non-attendance at a range of appointments, including those with
doctors, housing authorities, Centrelink, and employment service providers.[41]
1.83
The Committee recognises the importance of gathering information on
non-attendance at appointments. The information that will be collected as a
result of the actions of the working group will go some way to remedying the
data deficit; however, further work needs to be done, not only in relation to
the collection of data in this area, but also the accuracy, presentation, and
explanation of data that is already collected.
Recommendation 5 |
|
The Committee recommends that the Department of
Education, Employment and Workplace Relations and the Department of Human
Services collect and publish data in relation to why job seekers without
reasonable excuses miss appointments. |
1.84
Professor Disney expressed concern about the data that he and the other
members of the Independent Review were provided with during the course of
conducting the review:
There was almost no data being given to us that we could rely
on...there was a fair degree of confusion on the part of those both collecting
and analysing the data. The extent to which the data was being misunderstood
both within the department and within the ministerial office was a matter of
great concern...[42]
1.85
The Committee understands that DEEWR reports on a quarterly basis in
relation to participation failures and serious failures by job seekers in
receipt of social security payments and publishes its data on the internet.[43]
Professor Disney raised concerns as to a lack of clarity in the presentation of
the data collected and published by DEEWR.
1.86
To remedy this, Professor Disney recommended that the quarterly data
published by DEEWR ‘should be published in the same format as we [the
Independent Review] had published the data,’ because this format ‘enables you
to see the history and enables you to be absolutely sure you are looking at
consistent things.’[44]
1.87
The Committee was provided with copies of updated data presented in the
format suggested by Professor Disney and reviewed the presentation of the
relevant data in the Independent Review, as well as the data published on a
quarterly basis by DEEWR.
1.88
The Committee found the data presented in the same format utilised by
the Independent Review clearer than the data provided by DEEWR, particularly as
it enabled the Committee to readily view statistics from previous years and
identify trends. Furthermore, the quarterly data provided by DEEWR contains no
summary or breakdown of the statistics collected and published, which does not
aid in the understanding or analysis of such data.
1.89
In addition to altering the format in which the data is presented,
Professor Disney suggested that there was a need to start breaking down the
data into various categories, for example what kinds of appointments are being
missed and the extent to which those missing appointments are young people:
[w]e need less of the huge aggregate approach to data and
more of a focussed approach to, firstly, find out what the problem is and
address it and, secondly, to see the extent to which you have achieved
improvement.[45]
1.90
The Brotherhood of St Laurence echoed Professor Disney’s sentiment,
stating, ‘we need a more considered understanding through research of the
reasons why the various subgroups, subpopulations, of job seekers are actually
not connecting well with their services.’[46]
1.91
The Committee agrees with Professor Disney’s recommendations in this
regard and considers that careful consideration must go into the collection,
presentation, and explanation of compliance data in order to facilitate ease of
understanding and effective analysis.
1.92
It is important to note that the Committee does not seek to prescribe
how the data should be collected; however, it notes that the data needs to be
presented in a manner that is clear, accurate, and accountable.
Evaluation
1.93
As explained by the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill, section 42ZA of
the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) will be repealed, as
the review required by that section has been completed.
1.94
The Committee understands that no review will be undertaken in order to
evaluate the effectiveness and impact of the measures proposed by the Bill;
however, DEEWR will work with Centrelink ‘to consider the impact of the policy
on job seekers and on Centrelink performance.’[47]
1.95
According to DEEWR, ‘[a] key measure of the effectiveness of this bill
will be job seeker attendance rates.’[48] Furthermore:
[t]he key indicator of the legislation’s success in terms of
affecting more attendance at appointments by job seekers will be the data
itself. That will become evident over time...[DEEWR] will be publishing that
data on a quarterly basis.[49]
1.96
The Committee received some evidence indicating concerns around the
unknown impact that the measures proposed by the Bill may have and the lack of
guidance as to how the success of the measures will be evaluated. ACOSS stated
that, ‘the impact is unknown, and we would be interested to hear exactly how
the impact of the changes is going to be evaluated.’[50]
1.97
The Brotherhood of St Laurence echoed the sentiments expressed by ACOSS:
In light of the changes proposed to the compliance system and
the lack of evidence on sanctions, we would recommend that...the requirement
for an independent review be reinstated to ensure further independent
assessment of the framework is undertaken to monitor progress and ensure public
access to compliance performance data.[51]
1.98
Professor Disney also commented on this point:
Perhaps the last thing to emphasise is about checking the
success of this [the Bill]. The department mentioned that improvement... would
be assessed by determining the improvement in the rate of appointments... I do
not think that would be an appropriate measure at all unless the data has been
greatly cleaned up in its accuracy and in its targeting. It would be much
better now to look at the particular groups of concern and focus on them.[52]
1.99
Given the concerns raised above in relation to the lack of data around
job seekers who miss appointments without a reasonable excuse, and Professor
Disney’s comments as to the unreliability of compliance data, the Committee
considers it prudent to undertake a review of the compliance regime proposed by
the Bill that goes beyond the quarterly statistical reporting undertaken by
DEEWR.
1.100
As DEEWR have already indicated that they, in cooperation with
Centrelink, will consider the impact of the measures proposed by the Bill, the
Committee is of the opinion that it would be valuable to extend this
consideration to a broader review of the impact of the proposed compliance
regime.
1.101
Beyond considering the broad impact that the measures proposed by the
Bill are having on job seeker attendance at appointments, the review should
also take into consideration the impact on job seekers successfully finding
employment and consult with ESPs to obtain a more comprehensive view of the
impact of the proposed compliance regime.
1.102
Additionally, it is important that the review considers the impact that
the new compliance regime is having on subpopulations for which concerns were
expressed by many witnesses and in a number of submissions, particularly
vulnerable job seekers, Indigenous Australians and young people.
1.103
The Committee notes Professor Disney’s statement as to the timing of the
review that he chaired:
In many ways perhaps the inquiry was a little premature
because it was not really until towards the end of the year we were meant to be
reviewing that you could say with any confidence at all that you were really
looking at how the system would operate when it was fully up and running.[53]
1.104
Given Professor Disney’s comments, the Committee considers that a review
of the compliance regime proposed by the Bill should only be undertaken after
the compliance regime has been operating for a long enough period to enable a
full year of data relating to the impacts of the new compliance regime to be
collected and analysed.
Recommendation 6 |
|
The Committee recommends that the Department
of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations and the Department of Human Services
undertake a review of the impact of the measures proposed by the Bill after one
full year of data has been collected under the proposed compliance regime. |
Vulnerable Job Seekers
1.105
Many stakeholders and witnesses expressed concern as to how the changes
to the compliance framework proposed by the Bill will impact on vulnerable job seekers.
1.106
Vulnerable job seekers are identified by virtue of a vulnerability
indicator, which is recorded on a job seeker’s record by Centrelink following
the receipt of evidence suggesting that a vulnerability, or multiple
vulnerabilities, could potentially impact upon a job seeker’s ability to comply
with their participation requirements.
1.107
Vulnerability indicators may include, but are not limited to,
homelessness, drug or alcohol dependency, mental illness, or language,
literacy, or numeracy difficulties.[54]
1.108
The St Vincent de Paul Society recommended that ‘a person flagged with a
vulnerability indicator should never experience a suspension or reconnection
failure’ due to the risks associated with the non-payment of income support to
vulnerable job seekers.[55] The NWRN indicated that
‘it is distressing that people who are vulnerable, experiencing mental illness
or homelessness will be caught in the compliance system.’[56]
1.109
The Committee recognises the importance of ensuring that appropriate and
effective measures and safeguards are in place to prevent any adverse effects
flowing to vulnerable job seekers as a result of the measures proposed in the
Bill.
1.110
DEEWR and DHS referred to a number of safeguards already exist within
the employment services system to prevent vulnerable job seekers from being
disadvantaged by existing compliance measures and participation requirements.
1.111
DEEWR explained:
[T]hose elements of the current framework that are designed
to give added protection to vulnerable job seekers will continue to do so...
[including] the legislated requirement to consider the job seeker’s
circumstances and explanations for their actions before taking any compliance
action, comprehensive compliance assessments to identify barriers to
participation and recommended appropriate services or compliance action, and
provisions designed to allow the waiving of penalties for job seekers
identified as vulnerable for specified reasons.[57]
1.112
In addition, as per the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill and
the Minister’s second reading speech, job seekers with a vulnerability
indicator will not have their payment suspended as a result of their first
missed appointment. DEEWR indicated that, instead of payment suspension, the
first compliance failure would trigger contact from Centrelink.[58]
1.113
The Committee considers that the contact between Centrelink and the job
seeker at this point in time would provide Centrelink staff with an engagement
opportunity that they can use to explain the measures proposed in the Bill and
reiterate the consequences of missed appointments. This would assist vulnerable
job seekers to understand the compliance regime and enhance their ability to
engage with it. The Committee also considers that, in the case of job seekers
with a vulnerability indicator, this contact should occur on a one-on-one basis
via telephone or in person.
1.114
As per the Committee’s comments and recommendations above in relation to
communication, any opportunity to communicate with job seekers should be used
to provide clear, plain-English explanations of the changes flowing from the
measures proposed in the Bill. This is all the more important in the case of
job seekers with a vulnerability indicator.
1.115
The CPSU indicated that its members held serious concerns as to the
impact that the measures proposed by the Bill would have in vulnerable job seekers
and ‘expressed the need for compliance arrangements to be flexible to take into
account individual circumstances.’[59] The importance of
flexibility in the compliance regime proposed by the Bill, particularly in
relation to vulnerable job seekers, was echoed by a number of organisations.[60]
1.116
As discussed above, ESPs will have the discretion to decide whether or
not they consider it appropriate and necessary to report to Centrelink if a job
seeker with a vulnerability indicator fails to attend an appointment or comply
with a participation requirement.
1.117
DEEWR explained:
If the provider determines that at a particular point in time
they do not want to submit a PR [participation report] or have the suspension
occurring for job seekers, they can still use the other tools available to them
if they think those tools will better facilitate the re-engagement of the job
seeker. The provider could submit a contact request. That will not suspend the
job seeker’s payment. That is just about getting the job seeker to re-establish
contact and re-engage with their provider.[61]
1.118
DEEWR provided details of the information given to JSA providers in
relation to job seekers with a vulnerability indicator. This information
indicates that where a job seeker fails to meet their participation requirements
and this failure related to an identified vulnerability, compliance action is
unlikely to be the most appropriate means of re‐engaging
the job seeker.[62]
1.119
There appears to be some scope for flexibility in the application of the
compliance regime in this regard. Thus, particularly in the case of vulnerable
job seekers, the Committee considers that the guidance provided to ESPs should
provide that submitting a participation report against vulnerable job seekers
is a discretionary measure that should only be used after other reconnection
and reengagement mechanisms have been attempted.
Recommendation 7 |
|
The Committee recommends that
employment service providers should be advised to utilise all re-engagement
mechanisms available to them in relation to vulnerable job seekers before
considering compliance action and should carefully consider the implications of
the possible imposition of a financial penalty on this group. |
Vulnerable Job Seekers without a Vulnerability Indicator
1.120
Concerns were also raised in relation to individuals who do not have a
vulnerability indicator, and thus will not benefit from the safeguards
available to those who do, but arguably suffer from an undisclosed or
unrecognised vulnerability.
1.121
Jobs Australia raised concerns in relation to the identification of
individuals suffering from a vulnerability:
[T]here remains questions about whether the system is doing
the best it can to identify and flag all those people. A lot of the factors
that go to making somebody vulnerable are not necessarily disclosed by people
in the course of routine Centrelink interviews and other interventions that
they have.[63]
1.122
The NWRN indicated that,
People who have failed to disclose sensitive and personal
information about problems such as sexual abuse, bullying, mental illness or
mild intellectual disability or an acquired brain injury will be faced with a
major dilemma if this Bill proceeds. They may face a financial penalty because
they fail to disclose or recognise the existence of [a] barrier...the situation
will also be difficult for a person who may not recognise the existence of a
medical or mental health condition or be unwilling to accept that they have a
specific vulnerability.[64]
1.123
DHS indicated that Centrelink is able to consider implementing
additional support for an individual exhibiting a vulnerability, even if they
do not have a vulnerability indicator recorded. DHS noted that if a job seeker
fails to attend an appointment and they do not have a vulnerability indicator
recorded, the payment suspension and subsequent contact with Centrelink
provides an opportunity to assess the job seeker’s situation and determine the
best way forward.[65]
1.124
The CPSU noted that although Centrelink staff have the ability to
implement additional support mechanisms for individuals who exhibit
vulnerabilities, it appears to be underused and staff require additional
support in this regard:
We would like to see consideration given to more active
identification of people that do not currently have identified barriers. Our
members see these people all the time. They have undiagnosed psychiatric or
mental illnesses and the comments we often get is that someone is reading a
file in a PST team they will be able to judge from that file and the notes on
that file whether or not that person is likely to have participation failures
or not. At the moment the referral process to assist people without identified
conditions is lacking. If there could be improvements into this process that
would certainly assist and more tailored approach to complex case management.[66]
1.125
The Committee considers that it is crucial for Centrelink and ESP staff
to remain aware of the potential for individuals without vulnerability
indicators to suffer from a vulnerability and to consider the repercussions of
compliance action thoroughly before proceeding.
1.126
Specific challenges will be faced by those with a vulnerability that has
not yet been recorded by Centrelink; however, the compliance regime proposed by
the Bill has the potential to create opportunities for such vulnerabilities to
be identified and managed appropriately, if Centrelink staff have training and
resources available to them to enable such identification and management.
Recommendation 8 |
|
The Committee recommends that additional
training and resources be provided to Centrelink staff to raise awareness of
job seekers with undisclosed vulnerabilities to ensure that their needs are
identified and managed appropriately. |
1.127
Some stakeholders expressed concern in relation to job seekers being
initially placed into the incorrect streams and the apparent inability for job
seekers to be reassessed and placed into different streams when the initial
allocation leads to an inadequate level of servicing and support.
1.128
It is beyond the scope of this inquiry to consider issues pertaining to
the allocation of job seekers into streams; however, the Committee notes that
stakeholders indicated that this was an area of concern.
Job Seekers in Remote Areas
1.129
The Committee recognises the concerns raised by the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s
Office in relation to the unique challenges faced by job seekers in remote
communities as a result of ‘limited education, poor health, inadequate housing,
competing cultural requirements and limited access to mainstream services.’[67]
1.130
The Committee also recognises the difficulties that many job seekers in
remote communities face when attempting to engage with the employment services
system, including issues that relate to limited job opportunities and training
courses.[68]
1.131
DEEWR has indicated that being in a remote community is not, in and of
itself, a vulnerability indicator; however,
...things like homelessness, drug or alcohol dependency,
mental illness or language, literacy or numeracy difficulties are the sorts of
things that are vulnerability indicators. Job seekers living in remote areas
can access those, as can any other job seeker.[69]
1.132
The requirement that Centrelink book an appointment for a job seeker
with their provider within two days of contacting the job seeker following a
missed appointment[70] appears to be at the
core of many concerns held for job seekers in remote communities.
1.133
The Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Office commented on this point:
...we have received feedback that employment service
providers are often unable to attend communities as expected, whether due to
unexpected difficulties or community events. This is a significant issue if,
under the proposed amendments, the ability for job seekers to actually attend
interviews impacts upon the reinstatement of their payments. If so, this will need
to be managed properly to ensure individuals are not adversely affected.[71]
1.134
DEEWR has indicated that if a job seeker is unable to be booked into an
appointment with their provider within the two day limit through no fault of
their own, and they are the subject of a payment suspension, their payment
suspension will not continue:
...where contact with Centrelink is established with the job
seeker, Centrelink needs to book an appointment with the provider in the next
two working days. Now, if the provider is not in the community or in that area
in that time frame, and therefore it is outside the job seeker’s control to
have an appointment quickly, then if the job seeker is in a situation of
financial penalty the penalty immediately stops being incurred on the day on
which the job seeker speaks with Centrelink. So there are safeguards built into
the system to ensure that job seekers in remote areas are not penalised for
something that is outside their control.[72]
1.135
The safeguards discussed by DEEWR are contingent upon Centrelink
contacting the job seeker which, the Committee recognises, may prove
challenging in relation to job seekers in remote communities. DEEWR noted:
In remote areas a lot of job-seekers do interact with
Centrelink by the phone...The key thing to note is that...once the
participation report is submitted contact currently needs to happen with the
job-seeker before their next payment can be made. The new arrangements do not
change anything for remote job seekers in that regard.[73]
1.136
The National Employment Services Network also raised the issue of
communication with job seekers in remote areas and noted:
The one area, though, that will require special consideration
in all of this is in the remote communities, because, even if people have
mobile phones—if you were considering those sorts of mechanisms—you cannot
actually contact them because they do not have reception. You also have to have
flexibility so that it is when they come to town to lodge their Centrelink form
that you can get everything lined up, or, as has happened in some trials that
they have been doing in the Top End, you get all the stakeholders going out to
the communities together.[74]
1.137
As discussed above, communication is vital to the success of the
measures proposed by the Bill and it is important for Centrelink and ESP staff
to remain aware of the unique challenges faced by job seekers in remote
communities. The Committee considers that, in the case of job seekers in remote
communities, a degree of flexibility is necessary and both Centrelink and ESPs
should consider creating more opportunities for job seekers to engage with
their ESPs on a regular basis.
1.138
Furthermore, Centrelink and ESPs should take into consideration the
unique difficulties, particularly in relation to communication, experienced by
job seekers in remote communities when utilising their discretion as to the
submission of participation reports and the application of payment suspensions.
Staff and IT Resourcing
Staff
1.139
Centrelink and ESP staff will be at the centre of the implementation and
administration of the measures proposed by the Bill, as explained by Professor
Disney:
You can tell how effective a lot of these schemes will be by
looking at mundane things like the case load of the people involved—what is the
case load of the providers and the case load of the Centrelink workers, who are
going to be making their decisions and providing the assistance? There can be
all sorts of grand language in the legislation and in the minister’s speeches
but the crunch often will be how much time the front-line people are able to
give to helping people with disadvantage.[75]
1.140
As discussed above, the timing of notifications to job seekers in
relation to payment suspensions and the ability of Centrelink staff to contact
job seekers who are the subject of such suspensions is central to the measures
proposed by this Bill.
1.141
In terms of the work that will be incurred by ESPs, DEEWR stated:
The employment services providers actually will not be
incurring a significant change in the requirements upon them, because they will
be making an assessment individually when someone does not attend an
appointment, which they would do now about whether or not to submit a
participation report. They would need to have available follow-up appointments
if they do submit a participation report, as they do now. We will reinforce to
employment services providers the expectation that they would have appointments
available within the two days...[76]
1.142
The Committee considers that an ongoing dialogue should be maintained
with ESPs, particularly in relation to the requirement that they have
appointments available for job seekers within two days of Centrelink contacting
a job seeker following a missed appointment.
1.143
The Committee is concerned about comments from the CPSU indicating that
Centrelink staff members may not have the capacity to contact job seekers
immediately following a payment suspension or manage the other aspects of the
administration of the new compliance regime proposed by the Bill.
1.144
DHS has indicated that they intend to closely monitor the impact that
the implementation of the measures proposed in the Bill is having on Centrelink
staff and will rearrange current working arrangements to accommodate for any
increased workload:
Our response is to change our arrangements and work more than
anything else to accommodate what is proposed, so it is really around rejigging
some of the current work we do to bring this work in.[77]
1.145
In response to the comments from DHS, the CPSU indicated that Centrelink
staff are under considerable pressure and expressed their belief that a
‘rejigging’ of the current work done by Centrelink staff would not be
sufficient to enable them to successfully implement and administer the measures
proposed by the Bill:
It would be fair to say that Human Services staff now,
particularly in Centrelink, are pressed. We are seeing staff numbers reduce
across the board. People who leave the workplace are not being replaced. This
has also been seen in some of the Participation Solutions Teams [PST], who are
the workhorse on compliance within Centrelink. So we have real concerns about
any impact on work...We are concerned that a rejigging of workload may actually
not go to the heart of the issues that concern us. If this compliance regime is
to be changed, it will have an increase on workload. The question that we would
ask is: if workers and PST members are expected to implement these changes,
what do they not do? They cannot do everything they are being asked to do with
fewer resources, which is currently the case.[78]
1.146
The CPSU also explained the impact that increased workloads would have
on the ability of Centrelink staff to contact and communicate with job seekers
and the ability of job seekers to communicate with ESPs:
There are the workload pressures, and directly related to
that is the time factor in terms of customer contact that we are doing, both in
offices and in the PST team. We have these measures that we have to meet for
turning over the calls or the interviews. If we are talking quality and being
able to explain in plain English to a range of different customers, including
with interpreters when needed, it really does take a lot of time...Over the
last six months that team has been under such pressure. Just recently the
customers have been waiting one hour even to get onto them, and then the
customers can have a 45-minute conversation with them. Then they have to ring
the job providers, but the job providers have closed for the day. [79]
1.147
It is clear that waiting times of an hour for job seekers attempting to
contact Centrelink to discuss their payment suspension are not ideal,
particularly when job seekers may be utilising mobile or public phones and may
have limited credit. The Committee has concerns about the pressure that the
implementation and management of the new measures proposed by the Bill may have
on Centrelink staff.
1.148
On this point, the CPSU stated:
...there needs to be frank evaluation of exactly what the
workload spike would be and staff need to be involved in that conversation, as
they do with any evaluation of the implementation of any legislation.[80]
1.149
It is beyond the scope of the Committee to undertake a broad
consideration of the key performance indicators (KPIs) to which Centrelink staff
are expected to work; however, comments from the CPSU as to the pressure
Centrelink staff are under to meet KPIs, particularly those in areas that will
be directly impacted upon by the changes proposed by the Bill, are of concern.
The CPSU indicated that pressure resulting from KPIs may impact upon the
ability of Centrelink staff to contact job seekers in a timely fashion and
effectively explain the changes proposed by the Bill:
Under the PST KPIs, I believe they are supposed to be doing
20-minute interviews...and a lot of them are blowing out to 45 minutes because
they are complex, in-depth conversations. There is pressure on that team....WW When the PST
started they had two roles: taking inward calls from people and making outward
calls for people who had participation reports lodged so that they could be
dealt with before they arrived at customer service for not being paid. They no
longer have time to make outbound calls, so in every call they get the customer
is unhappy because they have not been paid.[81]
1.150
Furthermore, the Committee was troubled to hear that some Centrelink
staff face significant abuse from callers and are under considerable pressure
to deal with difficult calls on a daily basis as a result of the fact that they
do not have time to adequately deal with calls or to make outbound calls to job
seekers:
So they [Centrelink PST staff] have contact with someone in a
customer service centre or maybe a call centre and they have that the
discussion about why they have not been paid: ‘What have you done with my
money?’ Then they get told why, so they go and talk to somebody else, and they
may wait another hour to talk to somebody else.. the nature of their phone
calls is not pleasant. Basically they get abused and abused and abused. Very
few phone calls do not start off with that, and they may have 20, 30 or 40
calls a day. It is very hard. My office has abandoned the KPIs because they
cannot meet them. They have stopped looking at the board at the top of the room
that says how many calls are waiting. They cannot meet them. They will just
take one call after another and do what they can.[82]
1.151
The Committee considers that the current Centrelink staffing situation
should be monitored, in consultation with Centrelink staff members, in order to
ensure that Centrelink staff continue to have the capacity to implement and
administer the measures proposed by the Bill without undue stress or
unreasonable workloads.
1.152
In addition, Centrelink should monitor the levels of pressure and abuse
faced by Centrelink staff, with a view to providing increased and timely
support measures, if necessary.
IT Resourcing
1.153
In addition to the concerns raised by stakeholders as to the impact of
staffing capacity on the implementation and administration of the measures
proposed by the Bill, the Committee also notes that there appears to be
considerable concern around the functioning and quality of the IT systems are
relied upon by Centrelink, ESP, and DEEWR staff.
1.154
The Committee notes that the IT systems that will be utilised to implement
and administer the proposed compliance regime will be extremely important, not
only for the administration of the regime, but also for communication and reporting
purposes. Professor Disney explained that his experience of the relevant IT
systems led to some concerning revelations:
Another major problem...is that the implementation and the
reporting...was really overly influenced by the constraints and...to some
extent the idiosyncrasies of the IT system and the operators of the IT system.
Here, as in other areas of public policy, it is a little disturbing how often
one sees that actually in practice a scheme is being very heavily influenced by
the IT considerations rather than by the legislation and the policy. In some
instances we have found that the IT systems being operated were inconsistent
with the legislation and the policy.[83]
1.155
A core issue appears to be the interface of numerous IT systems. The
CPSU indicated that there are pre-existing IT issues that may impact upon the
implementation and administration of the measures proposed by the Bill:
The IT systems are a bit of a problem, inasmuch as you have a
number of private businesses that have their own system that they have chosen
to buy to run their business which has to interface with the DEEWR system,
which then has to interface with the Centrelink system. Our people work very
hard to fix problems as they arise, but the DEEWR IT system has limited
capacity for testing changes. So they fix things and it may or may not work.
Things fall through the spaces at quite a rate. There are people working on it
as best they can, but the fact is they are trying to make a large number of
computer systems or programming systems talk to each other, which is
difficult....The system is not on a real-time basis back to Centrelink. It may
take until after midnight, and the data does not always come through. So there
are some compatibility issues in terms of making sure the data comes through.[84]
1.156
These interface issues are of concern to the Committee, as an important element
of the compliance regime proposed by the Bill is the ability to immediately
reinstate payments once a job seeker makes contact with Centrelink and agrees
to attend an appointment.
1.157
If delays exist in the system such that it takes hours, or days, for data
to be transferred, the Committee is concerned about the impact that this may have
on the ability of Centrelink staff to reinstate payments or cancel payment
suspensions as soon as possible.
1.158
In addition, the Committee received evidence explaining that IT issues
may lead to participation reports being falsely recorded and, thus, payment
suspensions occurring in error. The CPSU explained that, according to their
members, approximately 15 per cent of failures triggered are due to incorrect
data coding or the Centrelink and DEEWR systems not reading or transferring the
data correctly.[85]
1.159
This information is of serious concern to the Committee, as is the
possibility that IT alignment issues may negatively impact upon communication
with job seekers. The CPSU provided the following example:
The reminder that goes to a customer about a rescheduled
appointment in Centrelink may not necessarily be sent depending on where the
customer’s information is located on the system. If the customer’s file has not
been moved across the system, for example, and they have moved interstate, a
rescheduled appointment reminder may not be sent even though an updated address
may have been provided. There were similar system problems for Job Network
providers where appointment reminders may not be going to customers, leading to
payment suspension.[86]
1.160
The Committee notes that DHS have indicated that they are in the process
of updating all of their communication systems and have developed a
communication strategy in preparation for the implementation of the measures
proposed by the Bill.[87] This should go some way
to solving the abovementioned pre-existing IT issues.
1.161
The Committee considers that it is necessary for DHS and DEEWR to review
their IT systems with a view to correcting any alignment issues that may impact
upon the administration and implementation of the compliance measures proposed
by the Bill.
1.162
Furthermore, it is important to ensure that all IT systems are aligned
in order to ensure consistent and accurate communication between DHS, DEEWR and
ESPs.
“Reasonable Excuse” and “Special Circumstances”
1.163
Item 15 of the Bill, which seeks to introduce a new section 42UA,
appears to be a point of contention and concern for some stakeholders.
1.164
The proposed section 42UA seeks to introduce a new reasonable excuse
provision, which provides that when the Secretary is determining whether a job
seeker has a reasonable excuse for a relevant compliance failure, as outlined
in proposed section 42UA(1), an excuse cannot be reasonable unless either the job
seeker has notified their specified contact person of that excuse prior to the
appointment, contact, or activity to which the failure relates, or the
Secretary is satisfied that special circumstances existed which it was not
reasonable for the job seeker to provide prior notice of the excuse to their
specified contact person.
1.165
The concerns raised by witnesses, and in submissions, that relate to
this provision can be broken down into two separate issues: the meaning of
‘reasonable excuse’ in the context of the proposed provision and the meaning
and purpose of the term ‘special circumstances.’
1.166
The Queensland Welfare Rights Centre expressed their concerns as to the
meaning and utilisation of the ‘reasonable excuse’ provision as follows:
The Bill seeks to ‘tighten’ the provisions available for a
Jobseeker missing an appointment with a ‘reasonable excuse.’ The Bill does this
by qualifying an excuse as reasonable only when the excuse is given prior to an
appointment or activity. It is our understanding that in providing for this,
the Bill does not ‘tighten’ the meaning, it changes it beyond the point where
the legal use of the word ‘reasonable’ has semantic attachment...We would argue
that one of the key facets of what is considered reasonable is that its flexibility
and scope is not limited by when the reason is known.[88]
1.167
A core concern raised by the Queensland Welfare Rights Centre was the
temporal nature of the definition of reasonableness in proposed section 42UA,
in that an excuse cannot be considered reasonable unless a job seeker notified
their specified contact person of that excuse prior to committing a compliance
failure, for example missing an appointment with their provider.
1.168
The question of reasonableness, explained the Queensland Welfare Rights
Centre, “does not concern whether that person would have been able to provide
that reasonable excuse ahead of time, nor should it.”[89]
1.169
The Committee notes, as recognised by the Queensland Welfare Rights
Centre, that proposed section 42UA does provide an exception to the requirement
for prior notice in that the Secretary may determine that ‘special
circumstances’ existed in which it was not reasonable to expect the job seeker
to give prior notice and, thus, determine that a job seeker had a reasonable
excuse for, for example, missing an appointment with their ESP, despite there
being no prior notice given.
1.170
Both the Queensland Welfare Rights Centre and the NWRN indicated that
the ‘special circumstance’ exception provides too high a bar for job seekers to
have to meet in order to prove reasonableness. The job seeker has to meet the
threshold of both ‘special’ and ‘reasonable’ for the ‘special circumstance’
exception to apply i.e. the Secretary must be satisfied that there were special
circumstances in which it was not reasonable to expect the person to
give prior notification.
1.171
The NWRN explained:
The problem is the requirement that the circumstances be
‘special’...in policy there is a tendency to only treat as ‘special’ something
that is out of the ordinary, uncommon, unforseen or exceptional. There is a
likelihood that requiring the circumstances to be special may result in
situations unforseen and unintended by the Department of Education, Employment
and Workplace Relations...which will cause unjust hardship to job seekers who
nonetheless have a perfectly reasonable excuse for failure to notify in advance
of their inability to attend.[90]
1.172
The NWRN provided examples of a number of circumstances that they
indicated may meet the general threshold of ‘reasonable excuse,’ but, due to a
lack of prior notice, may fall short, as they would not be considered ‘special
circumstances.’ One of these examples is as follows:
Using Minister Ellis’ own example reported in The
Australian on 8 April 2011, a job seeker who has care of a child may now
have to show that their child had a ‘serious accident’ to justify the missing
of an appointment. The fact that a child’s school called and asked the job
seeker to collect the child may well be disregarded under the new rules because
this situation is not special enough. A child’s illness may or may not be
special.[91]
1.173
In addition, the NWRN raised concerns as to how the term ‘special
circumstances’ in this context would be interpreted by courts and tribunals:
...inevitably matters will get to tribunals and courts and
they will apply the case law, the law and the statutory construction. As a
matter of the statutory construction, because of the fact that the word
‘special’ sits there, when you look at it and you start to apply the law, the
first step is: why is the word ‘special’ there? It has to have a meaning, and
then a meaning is put around it.[92]
1.174
DEEWR indicated that the term ‘special circumstances’ appears in many
provisions in the social security law and has been the subject of considerable
judicial scrutiny that has led to a general consensus that the term is not
capable of being defined in a precise or exhaustive manner.[93]
1.175
The Committee notes that the decision
of the Australian Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) in Re Beadle and
Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1 has been an oft-quoted
benchmark in relation to the interpretation of ‘special circumstances.’ In that
case the Tribunal said (at 3):
An expression such as "special circumstances" is by
its very nature incapable of precise or exhaustive definition. The qualifying
adjective looks to circumstances that are unusual, uncommon or exceptional.
Whether circumstances answer any of these descriptions must depend upon the
context in which they occur. For it is the context which allows one to say that
the circumstances in one case are markedly different from the usual run of
cases. This is not to say that the circumstances must be unique but they must
have a particular quality of unusualness that permits them to be described as
special.
1.176
In Boscolo v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1999) 53
ALD 277, French J held that ‘special circumstances’ is where there is ‘something
unusual or different to take the matter the subject of the discretion out of
the ordinary ...’
1.177
It seems to the Committee that the above judicial consideration of the
term ‘special circumstances’ indicates that it is incapable of precise definition;
however, it is intended to refer to circumstances that are unusual, different,
or out of the ordinary.
1.178
The Committee is concerned that circumstances that would otherwise be
reasonable, such as picking up a child from school because they were ill,
missed a bus, or expelled, may not be considered special as those circumstances
are, arguably, neither unusual nor exceptional.
1.179
Both the NWRN and the Queensland Welfare Rights Centre recommended that
the word ‘special’ be removed from this provision. On this point, DEEWR
indicated that they considered that the removal of the word ‘special’ would result in a less-stringent test of whether a person
should be excused for failure to give prior notification.[94]
1.180
Professor Disney contended that adding the requirement of ‘special
circumstances,’ in addition to the threshold of reasonableness, was an
unnecessary complication to an already complex social security system:
..it does not seem to me at all justifiable to add yet
another of these complexities of using the convoluted wording ‘special
circumstances in which it may be considered reasonable’. That can just be
‘reasonable’. Was it reasonable not to have provided advance notice?[95]
1.181
ACOSS echoed the sentiments expressed by Professor Disney, noting that,
‘ “[s]pecial circumstances” implies a narrow range of exceptions. Another
outcome of this requirement is a further layer of complexity in new compliance
rules.’[96]
1.182
The NWRN commented on this point:
“With the word ‘special’ in the bill, some people in those
circumstances may in fact find that, even though they had a valid reason, they
could not show ‘special’ circumstances not to notify. So we are saying that it
sets a standard that is far too high and we would like that word to be removed.
We think it will still fit into accordance with the second reading speech, and
it is certainly in accordance with the submission by DEEWR, the Department of
Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, at page 6, where the Department
says quite clearly:
There will be no requirement to give prior notice where it
is unreasonable to expect the job seeker to do so [emphasis added].
So you see that the department has not referred to the word
‘special’, and that sentence from the department’s submission fits very clearly
into the bill without the word ‘special’.”[97]
1.183
DEEWR contended that the implication of the
absence of the word ‘special’ from the table in subsection 42UA(2) is that the
tests in that table are broader than would otherwise be the case and the bar
that a job seeker has to hurdle to avoid the requirement to give prior
notification would be much lower.[98]
1.184
DEEWR has indicated that further guidance would be provided in the
proposed guidelines as to the meaning of ‘special circumstances;’ however, to
leave the meaning of both ‘reasonable’ and ‘special circumstances’ to policy in
an environment in which job seekers face a variety of circumstances that may be
‘special’ to them but not ‘special enough’ to another person may place too high
a threshold for job seekers to meet.
1.185
The Committee is of the opinion that the use of the word ‘special’ in
the test currently imposed by section 42UA(2) adds an unnecessary level of
complexity and is unnecessary in this provision. There are numerous
circumstances that may, to a reasonable person, appear to be completely
ordinary and every day, but, due to the nature of the individual to whom they
relate and their specific situation, should meet the threshold of
reasonableness for the purpose of proposed s. 42UA, despite a lack of prior
notice.
1.186
The removal of the word ‘special’ from this section, thereby altering
the provision to read ‘the Secretary is satisfied that there were circumstances
in which it was not reasonable to expect the person to give the notification,’ would
clarify the meaning and intended implementation of the section.
1.187
The circumstances that prevented the job seeker from providing prior
notice will still have to be such that it was reasonable for the person
to fail to provide prior notification. The removal of the word ‘special’ assists
to clarify the section and makes the threshold of reasonableness clearer,
thereby removing an unnecessary layer of complexity from, as the Committee
heard from numerous witnesses, an already extremely complex and often confusing
system.
1.188
If DEEWR holds serious concerns as to the detrimental impact of the
removal of the word “special” from this section, it is open to DEEWR to codify
in their guidelines the meaning of “circumstances in which it was not
reasonable to expect the person to give the notification.” Thus, the risk of
the threshold being too low is, arguably, averted.
1.189
It is, in the eyes of the Committee, easier for DEEWR to provide
guidance and training around the circumstances in which it is not reasonable to
expect a person to give the notification, rather than expect job seekers to
prove that the circumstances that prevented them from giving their specified
contact person notice were special enough that it was not reasonable
to expect the job seeker to give the notification.
Recommendation 9 |
|
The Committee recommends that the
word ‘special’ be removed from the table in proposed section 42UA, inserted by
Item 15 of the Bill, such that the relevant provisions read: ‘the Secretary is
satisfied that there were circumstances in which it was not reasonable to
expect the person to give the notification.’ |
Response from the Government to the Report of the
Independent Review into the Impacts of the new Job Seeker Compliance Framework
1.190
Throughout the course of the inquiry, the Committee heard from numerous
stakeholders who were concerned that the compliance regime proposed by the Bill
was the only measure from the Independent Review that had been considered and
actioned by the Government.[99]
1.191
Although there appeared to be general support for the recommendations
and findings of the Independent Review as a whole,[100]
the decision to target one measure suggested by the Independent Review without
a response to the remainder of the findings and recommendations garnered
negative reactions from many stakeholders.
1.192
ACOSS indicated that the Government has not yet responded to the good ideas
in the independent review, ‘but has already reached for the stick.’[101]
Similarly, the NWRN regarded the Government’s decision to, ‘cherry-pick just
this one negative proposal which...could be quite damaging to some people,’ as
disappointing.[102]
1.193
Professor Disney explained his position on the presentation of the Bill
as follows:
[T]his bill should be presented by the government as part of
an overall package of response to our review and any other measures they think
are appropriate. I do not think it is really desirable or in some ways fair to
any involved to pick out one relatively small area like this. There should be
an announcement.[103]
1.194
The Committee considers that it would be valuable for the Government to
provide a response to the remainder of the Independent Review as soon as
possible, in order to contextualise the measures proposed by this Bill and
indicate what action the Government intends to take in response to the other 24
recommendations in the report of the Independent Review.
Concluding Comments
1.195
An overarching theme that became clear during the course of this inquiry
was that many stakeholders are of the opinion that the social security system
is in need of review and reform. It is beyond the scope of this inquiry to
consider this kind of reform and, as such, this report has focussed on the
proposed Bill and the submissions and evidence received by the Committee that
pertain to it.
1.196
That said, the Committee also heard a considerable amount of reassuring
and encouraging evidence from witnesses in relation to areas of the social
security and welfare system that are succeeding. Particular emphasis was placed
on the Local Connections to Work pilot, which has experienced considerable
success of late and was put forward as an example of a program that is
achieving real change for many job seekers. The Committee is eager to follow
the progress of this program, and similar initiatives, into the future.
1.197
It was repeatedly emphasised to the Committee that any model that is
going to be successful in reengaging job seekers must not merely be repeating
measures imposed and proposed in the past. It must be focussed on reengagement
and empowerment, as those elements are key to fostering reengagement with the
employment services system.
1.198
The Committee considers that this Bill is a step in the right direction.
It provides the opportunity for ESPs and Centrelink staff to reengage and
reconnect with job seekers on a regular basis and reinforces the importance of
engagement with ESPs to job seekers. It is crucial for job seekers to attend
appointments with their ESPs, as those appointments are the first step to
finding job seekers sustainable and ongoing employment.
1.199
It is clear that communication problems have existed in the past in the
area of social security, which is why the Committee has placed considerable
focus on the importance of communicating the measures proposed to the Bill to
job seekers and Centrelink and ESP staff.
1.200
The measures proposed by this Bill are not intended to be punitive and
it is crucial that they be communicated to job seekers clearly and consistently
in order to ensure that they achieve their intended purpose of sustained
reengagement.
1.201
Given the right type of targeted and clear communication, thorough and
comprehensive guidance and training, and adequate and consistent support and
resources for front-line staff, the Committee considers that this Bill will
have the effect of encouraging job seekers to engage with their ESPs and
increase their chances of finding meaningful and long-lasting employment in an
environment characterised by a focus on reengagement and empowerment.
Recommendation 10 |
|
The Committee recommends that the
House of Representatives pass the Social Security Legislation Amendment (Job
Seeker Compliance) Bill 2011. |
Amanda Rishworth MP
Chair