Chapter 2 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Introduction
2.1
This chapter examines the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
There was wide agreement among submitters to the inquiry that bringing the CTBT
into force is one of the critical next steps to progressing nuclear
disarmament. This chapter examines the prospects for ratification of the treaty
by a number of key states, including the United States. It also looks at the
verification systems that will support the Treaty and which are already
operating. The chapter concludes with discussion of how Australia might
contribute to promoting the Treaty’s entry into force.
Background
2.2
A treaty banning all nuclear explosions was first advocated by the
international community in the early 1960s. In 1963 the United States, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom concluded the Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.
The preamble to this Treaty avows that States Parties will continue negotiations
to seek the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all
time. This commitment was recalled in the preamble to the NPT in 1968.
2.3
Little progress was made on the negotiation of such a treaty until the
break up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Following a series of meetings,
negotiations for a treaty banning all nuclear explosions began in 1993. In 1996
the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) which bans nuclear explosions in any environment.
Australia ratified the Treaty in 1998.[1]
2.4
Entry into force of the CTBT is conditional upon the ratification of the
Treaty by 44 identified states, of which 9 are still to ratify: China,
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel,
Pakistan and the United States.[2]
2.5
In 1999, the US Senate rejected a move for US ratification of the Treaty
and, as yet, the US Senate has not again considered the Treaty. A number of
other states have also resisted signature or ratification of the CTBT.[3]
2.6
In an April 2009 speech in Prague, US President Barack Obama renewed the
US commitment to seeking entry into force of the CTBT stating that his
Administration:
… will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.[4]
The Treaty
2.7
The CTBT limits the technological development of nuclear weapons and is
considered to be both a practical step towards nuclear disarmament and an
effective non-proliferation measure.[5]
2.8
Article I of the Treaty contains the fundamental obligations on States
Parties:
Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear
weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and
prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or
control.
Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from
causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any
nuclear weapon test explosion or other nuclear explosion.[6]
2.9
Article II of the Treaty establishes the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty Organization to ensure the Treaty’s implementation as well as to provide
a forum for consultation and cooperation.[7]
2.10
Article IV mandates the establishment of a global verification regime to
monitor compliance with the Treaty provisions. The Article states that the
verification regime must be established prior to the entry into force of the
Treaty.[8]
2.11
Annex II of the CTBT contains a specific list of countries that must
ratify the Treaty for it to enter into force.
2.12
In 1996, a meeting of States Signatories to the CTBT agreed to establish
the Preparatory Commission to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
(CTBTO) in order to prepare for the entry into force of the Treaty. The CTBTO’s
main area of responsibility is the establishment of the global verification
regime to monitor the ban on nuclear explosive testing under the Treaty.[9]
Verification regime
2.13
As previously stated, the CTBT’s verification regime must be established
prior to the entry into force of the Treaty. Accordingly, the CTBTO has
undertaken a substantial program of preparation. The regime is designed to
detect any nuclear explosion conducted on Earth—whether underground, underwater
or in the atmosphere—and consists of the following six elements:
n International
Monitoring System (IMS): the IMS is made up of 321 monitoring
stations and 16 laboratories located in 89 countries around the world, which
monitor the planet for any sign of a nuclear explosion. The IMS uses four
complementary verification methods:
§
Seismic, hydroacoustic and infrasound stations monitor
underground, large oceans and the atmosphere respectively; and
§
Radionuclide stations detect radioactive debris from atmospheric
explosions or vented by underground or underwater nuclear explosions.
2.14
Figure 2.1 provides an overview of the proposed distribution of these
monitoring systems across the globe.
Figure 2.1 CTBT’s International Monitoring System
Source Institute
for Energy and Environmental Science, ‘Verification Case Study: The
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’, IEER, 2000, viewed 7 August 2009,
<www.ieer.org>.
n International
Data Centre (IDC): the IMS is supported by the IDC located at
the headquarters of the CTBTO in Austria. The IDC processes and analyses the
data registered at the monitoring stations, and produces data bulletins that
are submitted to Member States for their evaluation and judgement. The IDC has
been providing IMS raw data and IDC data bulletins to Member States since
February 2000.
n Global
Communications Infrastructure (GCI): the GCI is an independent
and secure satellite system that transmits the data recorded at the IMS
stations to the IDC. It also transmits raw data and data bulletins from the IDC
to Member States.
n Consultation
and clarification: Member States will be able to request
clarification where it is considered that certain data collected imply a
nuclear explosion. A state will have 48 hours to clarify the event in question.
n On-site inspection: Member
States have the right to request an on-site inspection, regardless of the
results of the consultation and clarification process, in order to ascertain
whether a nuclear explosion has occurred in violation of the Treaty. On-site
inspections are regarded as the final verification measure under the Treaty.
n Confidence-building
measures: Member States are to notify the CTBTO Technical
Secretariat on a voluntary basis of any large chemical explosion detonated on
their territories. The purpose of these notifications is to confirm that such
explosions are not a nuclear explosion and to assist in the testing and fine
tuning of the IMS network.[10]
2.15
Upon Australia’s ratification of the Treaty in 1998, the Australian
Government was required to assist in the development and promotion of the
CTBT’s verification regime. Australia will host 20 facilities for the IMS, 16
of which are now in place and certified as capable of operating to CTBT
technical specifications. Australia also built a monitoring station in Papua
New Guinea, and operated the station from 2002 to 2006.[11]
2.16
The Committee inspected one of Australia’s facilities in Darwin, which
undertakes both particulate and noble gas monitoring. Data gathered at the
station is sent directly to the International Data Centre in Vienna. A
delegation of the Committee also had the opportunity to visit the International
Data Centre during its visit to the Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in July 2009.
2.17
The Committee observed that the verification system, particularly the IMS,
is well advanced despite the Treaty not yet being in force. In March 2009, Ambassador
Tibor Tóth, the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO, stated that, although only
60% of the IMS had been installed at the time of the 2006 North Korean test,
the verification system ‘exceeded the expectations of the Treaty negotiators in
1996 in terms of sensitivity, reliability, precision and characterisation.’[12]
2.18
The Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency told the
Committee that the technologies used in the IMS are extremely sensitive and
have the ability to detect any covert nuclear weapons test, whether in the
atmosphere or underground.[13]
2.19
In detecting North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006, the technical capability
of the system, and the quality of information and data, was proven.
Specifically, over 20 of the IMS stations worldwide detected the low yield
(well under one kiloton) explosion.[14]
2.20
More recently, the CTBTO succeeded in detecting and notifying Member
States of North Korea’s May 2009 nuclear test, hours before North Korea itself
officially announced the test. The CTBTO has stated that the IMS detected the
2009 nuclear explosion much more rapidly than the event in 2006 due to the
further development of the IMS and the increased density of monitoring systems.[15]
Importance of the CTBT
2.21
Participants in the inquiry emphasised the importance of bringing the
CTBT into force. Participants argued that an in-force CTBT is a crucial element
of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.[16]
2.22
One of the most commonly cited benefits of entry into force was that it
would provide assurance that countries would not be able to develop and test
nuclear weapons in a clandestine manner.[17]
2.23
Ms Joan Rohlfing of the Nuclear Threat Initiative told the Committee
that the CTBT would slow the ability of any state to develop a new nuclear
weapon capability, or to improve a currently existent nuclear weapon
capability.[18]
2.24
Submitters argued that entry into force would also help to reassure
nuclear armed states that their strategic competitors are not developing new
advanced nuclear weapons. Such confidence may in turn encourage nuclear armed
states to participate in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives,
such as reductions in their nuclear weapons stockpiles.[19]
2.25
The Committee also heard that the CTBT provides an opportunity by which
states that are currently outside of the NPT, such as India, Pakistan and
Israel, could be brought into the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
framework.[20]
2.26
Dr Hans Blix argued that:
To strengthen the [nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament]
regime further, and bring countries currently outside the NPT into the
international non-proliferation framework, no measure could be more important
than bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force. The
entry into force of the CTBT is important to prevent the development of a new
generation of nuclear weapons, and to help reduce reliance on nuclear
deterrence in security policies. It would also reset the stage for global
nuclear disarmament, signalling to the world that leading states stand firmly
behind their commitments to disarmament.[21]
2.27
Additionally, the Director General of the IAEA, Dr Mohamed ElBaradei has
commented:
…there has always been a permanent and indissoluble link
between ending nuclear explosive testing and moving down the path of achieving
a world free of nuclear weapons… Why is the CTBT so important? Because it would
send a very clear, very concrete signal that the nuclear-weapon States are
taking seriously the commitment under the NPT to move towards nuclear
disarmament.[22]
Importance of US ratification of the CTBT
2.28
Ratification by the US was seen by many inquiry participants as one of
the most critical steps towards bringing the CTBT into force.[23]
2.29
Witnesses told the Committee that US ratification of the CTBT is central
to the success of the Treaty and that, if the US does ratify, it would be
positively received elsewhere and may be the most effective way of encouraging
other Annex II States to ratify the Treaty.[24]
2.30
Ms Caroline Millar, Australia’s Ambassador for Disarmament, told the
Committee that, even though the US has not yet ratified the CTBT, President
Obama’s commitment to pursue ratification of the Treaty has already increased
the prospects of other Annex II parties joining the Treaty.[25]
2.31
The Committee notes comments by Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan
Wirajuda during a visit to Washington in June 2009 regarding ratification by
the United States:
We trust that [President Obama] will succeed in getting the
CTBT ratified – and we promise that when that happens, Indonesia will
immediately follow suit.[26]
2.32
Ambassador Tibor Tóth outlined the pathway to entry into force which may
follow US ratification:
U.S. ratification … will create new momentum and a new
political environment. …
This is how the pieces of the puzzle could fall into place:
Given China’s role during negotiations in 1996 … it is likely that China will
follow the US. In the case of the DPRK, ratification would come as a natural
consequence of the six-party talks. … Indonesia would likely come on board at
an early date … If Iran would like to restore confidence in the peaceful nature
of its nuclear program, as they claim, CTBT ratification would be a logical
step. … Israel … would likely follow the US and Iran. And Egypt would not want
to be the only remaining non-ratifyer in the Middle East. … India has stated
that it won’t stand in the way for the entry into force of the CTBT, and
Pakistan would follow India.[27]
2.33
The Committee notes that North Korea has announced its withdrawal from
the Six Party Talks. The Committee notes however the strong opinions amongst
participants in the inquiry that US ratification of the CTBT would have a flow
on effect which would lead to the ratification of the CTBT by a significant
proportion, if not all, Annex II countries.
Barriers to US ratification
2.34
The Committee was told that opponents of US ratification, especially
within the Congress, have three main concerns:
n whether the US can
maintain its nuclear weapons stockpile at a confident state of useability in
the absence of nuclear explosion tests;
n whether the CTBT
verification regime can reliably detect a nuclear weapon test anywhere in the
world; and
n whether all other Annex
II countries will follow the US in ratifying the Treaty.
Stockpile reliability
2.35
Witnesses told the Committee that there is a major concern in the US as
to whether nuclear weapons will be able to be maintained in a safe and reliable
way without the ability to conduct nuclear explosions.[28]
2.36
The Hon Gareth Evans AO QC told the Committee that a range of evidence
suggests there is no need to conduct test nuclear explosions in order to
maintain the reliability of current nuclear weapon stockpiles.[29]
2.37
In 2000, the US National Academy of Science, at the direction of the
then Special Advisor to the US President and the US Secretary of State for the
CTBT, conducted a detailed study on, amongst other things, ‘the capacity of the
US to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of its nuclear
stockpile … in the absence of nuclear testing’. The study concluded that ‘the
United States has the technical capabilities to maintain confidence in the
safety and reliability of its existing nuclear-weapon stockpile under the
CTBT’.[30]
2.38
Former US Senator Bob Graham told the Committee that, given the evidence
that the US can maintain its nuclear stockpile without detonation tests,
concerns that stockpile reliability will not be maintained under the CTBT are
diminishing.[31]
2.39
Nonetheless, Mr Evans suggested that the issue of stockpile reliability
would become entwined with the desire of some in the US to develop a new
‘reliable replacement warhead’; a new class of warhead that is enthusiastically
supported by a range of parties in the US. Mr Evans argued that the development
of such a warhead would be severely damaging to the success of the CTBT and the
nuclear disarmament regime as a whole.[32]
Verification
2.40
The Committee was informed that another major concern in the US, and one
of the primary reasons the US Senate did not approve the CTBT in 1999, is
whether the CTBT’s verification regime can reliably and confidently detect a
nuclear test anywhere in the world.[33]
2.41
The Executive Secretary of the CTBTO, Ambassador Tibor Tóth, has pointed
out that when the US Senate rejected ratification of the Treaty in 1999, ‘the
CTBT verification system was an idea, an ambition – its capabilities scientific
theory’. Ambassador Tóth stated that, in contrast:
[as of March 2009, the CTBT verification system] is nearing
completion, with 71% of the system’s 337 global monitoring stations already
sending operational-standard data to headquarters in Vienna. We are coming
within sight of the fulfilment of our mandate as a Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization whose main task it is to
establish the global verification regime so that it is fully operational once
the Treaty enters into force. Theory is moving in to the realm of established
fact.[34]
2.42
On the question of the reliability of the CTBT’s verification regime in
its current state, Ambassador Tóth stated:
…there is a very high probability today that states would be
able to discover any nuclear test using data generated by the CTBT verification
regime and other assets available to individual states.[35]
2.43
Additionally, the 2002 report by the US National Academy of Science
concluded that:
[assuming that] all of the elements of the IMS are deployed
and supported at a level that ensures their full capability, functionality, and
continuity of operation in the future … nuclear explosions with a yield of 1
kiloton (kt) or more can be detected and identified with high confidence in all
environments.[36]
2.44
The 2006 nuclear test by North Korea was described by Mr Gareth Evans as
‘the best possible practical demonstration we have that the verification system
works’. This test was detected seismically and then verified by atmospheric
radionuclide testing a few days later.[37]
2.45
Additionally, the CTBTO’s success in detecting and notifying Member
States of North Korea’s May 2009 nuclear test, hours before North Korea itself
officially announced the test, demonstrates the improved effectiveness of the
verification regime.[38]
Ratification by all other Annex II countries
2.46
Dr George Perkovich, from the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, told the Committee that another significant barrier to US ratification
is the concern that other Annex II States will seek to stay outside of the
CTBT, despite US ratification:
Somebody in the Senate will ask Secretary Clinton or another
administration witness: isn’t it true, even if we ratify this treaty, it will
not go into force unless and until the other states-which I have just
mentioned-also ratify? Secretary Clinton will have to say, ‘Yes, that’s true,’
and then they will say, ‘Do you have any indication that, if we do ratify it,
all of the others will do so? Why should we go first and lock ourselves in? Do
you have an indication that everyone else will follow?’ At the current point,
the Secretary of State would not be able to say with, I believe, any real
confidence that we know what India, Pakistan or Egypt would do, for example.
Those three countries-and we could go through the rest of the list, too-are
absolutely pivotal.[39]
2.47
Mr Gareth Evans told the Committee that ‘US Senators are going to want
to know what the response to US ratification will be from the other hold-out
countries’.[40]
Towards entry into force of the CTBT
2.48
In light of the evidence received throughout the inquiry, and especially
given the priority now being afforded to these issues by the US Administration,
the Committee considers that the most important factor in bringing the CTBT
into force is the Treaty’s approval by the US Senate.
2.49
The Committee heard that, given the significant opposition to the CTBT
in the US, the Obama Administration is unlikely to pursue ratification of the Treaty
in the US Senate until it is absolutely sure it will succeed. Ms Martine Letts
told the Committee:
…there is concern that the question of ratification not get
to the [US] Senate too quickly lest it fail again, which would be an absolute
nail in the coffin [for the CTBT] for a very long period of time.[41]
2.50
The Committee considers that every attempt should be made to support
current efforts in the US to ratify the Treaty. Dr Perkovich suggested one way
in which Australia might contribute is if it could help to reassure the US that
other Annex II States will ratify the Treaty following US ratification. Dr
Perkovich argued that Australia and other countries could privately seek the
commitment of other countries to follow the US in ratifying the Treaty. In his
view, this would not only assist the Obama Administration but also demonstrate
international support and teamwork to opponents of ratification.[42]
2.51
Australia has already encouraged ratification by other countries through
diplomatic channels such as the 2010 NPT Review PrepCom meetings, the
Conference of Disarmament, the UN General Assembly and through regional
workshops.[43] Submitters to the
inquiry supported continued efforts by Australia to advocate the entry into
force of the CTBT through traditional diplomatic channels.[44]
2.52
Submitters also argued that the completion of the verification regime is
necessary to prepare for entry into force of the Treaty.[45]
2.53
The Committee supports efforts by the Australian Government towards early
completion of the CTBT verification system. The Committee is of the view that
the completion of the CTBT verification system would further allay any concerns
relating to the systems reliability, which may in turn encourage US
ratification of the Treaty.
Recommendation 1 |
|
The Committee recommends that the
Australian Government promotes and supports efforts to achieve ratification
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the United States
Senate, including by making clear that United States ratification of the CTBT
would be positively received by Australia and other countries, and that
Australia seeks a world without nuclear weapons.
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Recommendation 2 |
|
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government
pursue diplomatic efforts to encourage ratification of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the remaining Annex II states whose
ratification is required to achieve entry into force of the Treaty, and seek
undertakings from these countries that they will not be the impediment to the
CTBT entering into force.
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