Chapter 4 ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area
Introduction
4.1
As noted in Chapter 3, a wide range of benefits (and challenges) arise
from bilateral free-trade agreements. Even greater benefits, however, may be
anticipated for agreements that cover groups of nations. Lowering barriers to
trade across a number of countries brings with it a greater ability to access
business opportunities, to encourage investment synergies, and to market goods
and services on a greater scale. The recently signed AANZFTA is therefore
expected to be a highly significant treaty.
Impact of the agreement
4.2
DFAT told the Committee, that the main effect of AANZFTA would arise
from it being a ‘platform’ for further trade liberalisation. [1]
Subsequent to its release, DFAT gave the Committee a more complete description
of the unique nature and significance of AANZFTA.
4.3
The agreement was the first multi-country FTA that Australia had
negotiated and was the most comprehensive treaty ASEAN had entered into. DFAT
added that AANZFTA was:
… the largest free trade agreement Australia has signed,
covering 21 per cent of Australia’s trade in goods and services—valued at $103
billion in the 2007-08 financial year …
Australia stands to gain from this agreement across many
sectors, including exports of industrial goods, agricultural products and
services. Through this FTA, Australia has achieved significant tariff
elimination over time, from the more developed ASEAN member countries and
Vietnam, on between 90 and 100 per cent of tariff lines covering 96 per cent of
current Australian exports to the region. [2]
4.4
DFAT also described the anticipated present and future benefits of
AANZFTA:
In addition to the market access gains from the FTA, AANZFTA
provides a platform for Australia’s ongoing engagement with ASEAN that will
help to ensure that Australia’s competitiveness in the region is not
undermined. AANZFTA is a forward-looking FTA with built-in agendas and review
mechanisms in areas such as non-tariff measures, rules of origin, services and
investment, which are aimed at having AANZFTA’s commitments expand and deepen over
time, in line with the development of the ASEAN economic community. [3]
4.5
A further distinctive feature of AANZFTA lay in its relationship with
economic integration between countries in the region. DFAT told the Committee
that this was a ‘major driver’ for AANZFTA, and identified strong links between
AANZFTA and plans to establish an ASEAN economic community by 2015. [4]
4.6
From this description it is clear that AANZFTA occupies a distinctive
position within Australia’s trade apparatus. The following sections summarise
the main features of AANZFTA, and considers its implications for key aspects of
Australia’s trade with ASEAN member countries.
The agreement
4.7
AANZFTA was signed at Cha-am, Thailand, on 27 February 2009. It was
tabled in parliament on 16 March 2009 and will come into force on 1 July 2009
if it is ratified by a minimum of four signatory countries. DFAT predicted,
based on past experience, that ASEAN a member countries would move ‘within a
reasonable period’ to ratify the agreement. [5]
4.8
AANZFTA includes chapters on:
n Trade in goods and
Rules of Origin;
n Trade in services,
including Annexes on Financial Services and Telecommunications;
n Customs procedures
and Sanitary and phytosanitary measures;
n Movement of natural
persons; and
n Investment and
Intellectual Property.
4.9
External Annexes display important detailed information on:
n Schedules of Tariff
Commitments (Annex 1);
n Product Specific
Rules (Annex 2);
n Schedules of Specific
Services Commitments (Annex 3); and
n Schedules of Movement
of Natural Persons Commitments (Annex 4).
Objectives
4.10
The objectives of AANZFTA are to:
n ‘progressively
liberalise and facilitate trade in goods … through … progressive elimination of
tariff and non-tariff barriers’
n ‘progressively
liberalise trade in services’
n ‘facilitate, promote
and enhance investment opportunities’
n ‘establish a
cooperative framework for strengthening … investment and economic links’
n ‘provide special and
differential treatment to ASEAN Member States’. [6]
4.11
This is consistent with the approach taken within ASEAN—to respect
differences between member states while working toward closer ties and greater
efficiency.
Main elements
4.12
A central provision of AANZFTA is that parties accord each other
‘National Treatment’—that is, that each ‘shall accord to the nationals of each
other Party treatment no less favourable than it accords to its own nationals’. [7]
4.13
To support this, AANZFTA provides a number of mechanisms:
n It provides methods
to identify which goods, services or entities originate or belong to the Free
Trade Area, through Rules of Origin and Certificates of Origin. [8]
n It establishes a
series of Committees to administer the Agreement. These include the FTA Joint
Committee, Goods Committee, Rules of Origin Sub-Committee, SPS Sub-Committee,
and the STRACAP (standards) Sub-Committee.[9]
n It creates avenues
for consultation and dispute settlement. [10]This includes a
requirement for each signatory country to create Arbitral Tribunals through
which disputes and complaints may be resolved.
[11]
n The Agreement
stipulates methods through which to establish transparency[12]
and contact.[13]
4.14
These measures demonstrate the character of AANZFTA. The intention is to
bring signatory states into a greater state of consistency and dialogue on
matters of trade. In line with this, AANZFTA displays a strong emphasis on
consistency in standards and technical regulations, including for Intellectual
Property. [14]
A ‘platform’ for other agreements
4.15
Before it was released, DFAT told the Committee that AANZFTA would
operate as a ‘platform’ or ‘framework’, drawing on and affirming agreements
already in force, and fostering new agreements between signatory states. [15]
4.16
This is borne out by the released text, which throughout displays strong
linkages to GATT 1994, GATS and WTO agreements. [16]AANZFTA
itself is established under provisions of GATT 1994 and GATS. [17]
‘National Treatment’, and other key features of the Agreement, also reference
GATT 1994. [18]
4.17
AANZFTA allows parties to adopt new agreements which ‘accelerate and/or
improve tariff commitments made under this Agreement’. [19]
4.18
Conversely, there are clear directions that ‘no Party shall adopt or
maintain any prohibition or quantitative restriction’ on imports. [20]Similar
indications apply to non-tariff measures and their transparency—that the only
kind of change that is permissible is to reduce them and make them more
transparent. [21]
4.19
The combined effect is to facilitate progress toward trade
liberalisation, and make increases in trade protection more difficult. To the
extent that AANZFTA is effective, this will ensure that changes in trade
settings within the free trade zone will ultimately lead toward further
liberalisation.
Tariff settings
4.20
The body of AANZFTA defines and provides central principles,
administrative bodies and means of redress, among other things. Specific tariff
settings, and timelines for their reduction and removal under the
Agreement, are contained in Annex 1 - Schedules of Tariff Commitments.
4.21
Tariff settings for each signatory are contained in a separate
spreadsheet. Settings are commensurate with levels of economic
development—spreadsheets for more developed ASEAN member states show lower
tariffs, while for some countries tariffs continue at high rates in the near
term. However, future targets show reductions.
4.22
After the release of AANZFTA, DFAT commented on tariffs under AANZFTA.
DFAT told the Committee that a significant attribute of AANZFTA was that ‘exclusions
from tariff commitments have been kept to a minimum’, and ‘generally do not
exceed one per cent of a country’s national tariff lines’. [22]
4.23
DFAT also told the Committee that tariff settings under AANZFTA were
bound to settings applied by each signatory country as at 1 January 2005. These
‘bindings’ imposed an obligation on these countries not to raise tariffs beyond
the rates at that date. This was significant because these tariff rates were
most often lower than bindings under WTO agreements. Consequently, AANZFTA in
many instances represented an advance over tariffs under WTO. [23]
Specific areas of trade
4.24
AANZFTA makes specific reference to two areas of trade in services
significant to Australia.
4.25
The Annex on Financial Services focuses on transparency. [24]
There have been instances where an absence of transparency has hindered
Australian companies wishing to do business in the ASEAN region. Improvements
in this area could be significant to Australia, in view of expertise and the
possibility of growth in this area, subject to the financial crisis.
4.26
In relation to the Annex on Financial Services, DFAT told the Committee
that:
On investment, AANZFTA will create greater transparency and
certainty for Australian investors in the region. It establishes a regime of
investment protections; including an investor-state dispute resolution
mechanism. AANZFTA includes useful commitments in other trade-related areas,
such as intellectual property, as well as an economic cooperation component to
provide technical assistance and capacity building to developing ASEAN
countries—to assist in implementation of the FTA. This cooperation is an
integral part of the FTA and Australia has committed to provide up to $20
million in funding for worthwhile projects over a five-year period. [25]
4.27
The Annex on Telecommunications binds parties to ‘prevent suppliers …
from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices’ and, importantly,
requires parties to establish a ‘Telecommunications regulatory body … not
accountable to … any supplier of public telecommunications networks or services’. [26]
In the past, Australian firms have been frustrated in their attempts to find such
an arbiter while operating within the ASEAN region.
Rules of Origin
4.28
Central to AANZFTA are provisions for Rules of Origin, ‘which liberalise
the conditions under which products may receive tariff preferences within the
ASEAN – Australia and New Zealand region’. [27] They are intended to
allow signatory nations to trade with one another on a consistent basis,
irrespective of which nation they are dealing with in any particular
transaction.
4.29
DFAT advised the Committee that this ‘will help Australian and ASEAN
industry develop greater linkages into regional production chains’, increasing
efficiency and maximising benefits from trade.
[28]Modelling by DIISR
suggested that in its most ‘liberalising’ form, AANZFTA would increase
Australian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by $48 billion by 2020. [29]
4.30
Given the ‘geographic proximity’ of ASEAN members to Australia, DAFF
regarded AANZFTA as ‘an important foundation for the future prosperity of
Australian agricultural exporters’. On the other hand, DAFF noted, Rules of
Origin were more readily negotiated than more ‘far-reaching tariff
liberalisation’ for Australian agricultural exporters, and this showed the
limits to current progress on trade liberalisation. [30]
Movement of ‘natural persons’
4.31
On occasion, exporting industries can find their ability to do business
is limited by restrictions on the movement of persons—referred to as ‘natural
persons’— such as representatives or staff of exporting companies. DFAT told
the Committee that AANZFTA represented a considerable improvement on former
arrangements in this regard. [31]
4.32
Particularly notable is that greater freedoms apply across a wider
spectrum of business activity, including ‘investors, goods sellers, and service
suppliers’. DFAT advised this was a significant advance on WTO agreements,
which only contained more liberal arrangements for services exporters. DFAT
noted, however, that the significance of these changes was greatest for
Australian services exporters to ASEAN member countries. [32]
4.33
The Committee notes that the APEC Business Travel Card was introduced in
1997 as a means to facilitate business travel between participating countries.
The card:
… allows
business travellers pre-cleared, facilitated short-term entry to participating
member economies. The [card] removes the need to individually apply for visas
or entry permits, saving valuable time, and allows multiple entries into
participating economies during the three years the card is valid. Card holders
also benefit from faster immigration processing on arrival via access to fast-track
entry and exit through special APEC lanes at major airports in participating
economies.[33]
4.34
Most ASEAN member countries participate in the scheme,[34]
and therefore their business communities benefit from this initiative.
Greater economic integration
4.35
AANZFTA is part of a larger process of economic integration within ASEAN
and allied nations. This process could, over time, result in an ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC), that would share a ‘seamless production base’ along similar
lines to those envisaged for the European Union and similar trading blocs. [35]There
are also linkages between AANZFTA and other longer-term developments, designed
to result in the:
… elimination of the remaining intra-ASEAN tariffs and the
large number of non-tariff barriers, creating an effective intellectual
property regime, fully liberalising trade in services, and relaxing barriers to
flows of capital and skilled labour in all sectors. [36]
4.36
For members of such a community, the benefits of economic integration
could be significant, reducing operating costs by 25 per cent and increasing
aggregate GDP in the ASEAN region by 10 per cent. [37]
4.37
These long-term developments make it critically important that Australia
continue to develop its involvement in trading agreements with ASEAN nations. In
view of Australia’s engagement with them, its proximity and current high levels
of trade, a future for Australia within an integrated economic zone based on
ASEAN would be considerably more attractive than one without. Questions remain,
however, as to how Australia can join with ASEAN nations to establish
relationships of reliably mutual benefit. The record for Australia’s existing
Free Trade Agreements demonstrates the challenges Australia faces in this
regard.
Implications of AANZFTA for services exports
4.38
DFAT told the Committee that Australia had ‘secured a good outcome on
services’ under AANZFTA. It had produced ‘increasing certainty’ for Australian
services exporters ‘across a range of sectors’, including ‘professional
services, education, financial services and telecommunications’. [38]
4.39
DFAT also told the Committee that AANZFTA’s commitments on services were
an improvement on the commitments ASEAN member countries had offered in the WTO
Doha Round negotiations. [39]
4.40
Nevertheless, DFAT acknowledged that negotiations on services had ‘been
a very difficult area of negotiation within ASEAN’. This had chiefly been due
to ‘the so-called ASEAN-first policy’, in which ASEAN member countries were not
prepared to make commitments with an external partner which went beyond internal
ASEAN commitments. This, DFAT told the Committee, had been a constraint on
progress. [40]
4.41
This less positive side of AANZFTA negotiations was reflected in
attempts to liberalise markets for legal services. DFAT told the Committee that
legal services continued to be ‘a very sensitive area for ASEAN because it is a
profession in ASEAN countries that is very defensive’:
Australia was not able to obtain any improvements on the
existing WTO situation with regard to legal services in Malaysia, nor were we
able to improve on current SAFTA levels of commitment in relation to Singapore
on legal services. [41]
4.42
DFAT advised the Committee that there were also barriers in to trade
liberalisation for legal services in the Philippines. Australia’s response
would be to ‘to use the built-in agenda to review’, and to adopt a long-term
view so that Australia was in a good position to export legal services when
more liberal conditions eventuated. [42]
Relationships between bilateral and multilateral agreements.
4.43
As a party to bilateral agreements with ASEAN countries, and the new
multilateral agreement with ASEAN and New Zealand, Australia must decide how
best to coordinate between them. Are current and future bilateral agreements
likely to be the most rewarding avenues, or will multilateral agreements
replace them?
4.44
Prior to the release of AANZFTA, DFAT responded to the Committee’s
questions on this by identifying separate functions for bilateral and
multilateral agreements with ASEAN. In its view, bilateral agreements were the
proper forum for negotiations on the specifics of tariff and non-tariff
barriers, and the provision of time-lines to reduce them. Multilateral
agreements on the other hand provided a ‘framework’ that supports, and provided
a basis for bilateral negotiations. [43]
4.45
This is analogous to the use of WTO settings as templates and
bench-marks for other trade agreements. [44]
Choosing which free trade agreement to use
4.46
In trading with those ASEAN members nations which had a bilateral FTA
with Australia, exporters will need to decide whether to trade under AANZFTA or
under the bilateral FTA because the outcomes, although similar, might not be
identical. [45]
4.47
DFAT told the Committee that clarity and ease-of-use had been part of
DFAT’s stated objectives in the context of negotiating AANZFTA.[46] Australian exporters would have to examine
only a handful of tariff lines, which had consistent standard nomenclature, and
the associated rules of origin to decide whether to use AANZFTA or the
bilateral FTA if it was available. [47]
4.48
DFAT added that it had upgraded its support for exporters who could
contact DFAT for assistance, but added that exporters had expressed positive
responses to the documentation.
4.49
The Committee notes the advice from the Australian Wine and Brandy
Corporation that multilateral agreements were considered the instrument of
choice where smaller volumes of trade were distributed amongst ASEAN countries. [48]
Levels of liberalisation
4.50
A focus of concern throughout the Inquiry has been the levels of trade
liberalisation in domestic markets, for both Australia and its ASEAN trading
partners.
4.51
The ACTU suggested to the Committee that across-the-board liberalisation
was an unrealistic approach in view of Australia’s experience of continuing
trade barriers, and deteriorations of balance-of-trade, after FTAs have been
concluded. [49]
4.52
The ACTU considered that a better response was to adopt a pattern of
‘partial liberalisation’, based on a case-by-case assessment of barriers and
opportunities between Australia and another trading partner. [50]In
line with this, the ACTU called for ‘an end to the modelling of prospective
FTAs on the basis of comprehensive liberalisation of all sectors’. [51]
4.53
The ACTU also proposed that Australia employ a ‘positive list’ of areas
of trade to be liberalised, rather than the negative list approach employed by
Singapore. [52]These
views echo those of a number of contributions by Australian labour
organisations. [53]
Committee comment
4.54
The Committee considers that FTAs—bilateral and multilateral—will become
an increasing part of the trade environment in which Australia operates. This
will be ensured by the continued growth of Asia, and the trend towards trade
and other forms of integration between countries. With this in mind, the
Committee endorses the Australian government’s current series of engagements on
trade with ASEAN member states, and encourages it to continue with all possible
vigour.
4.55
The Committee recognises that free trade negotiations are inherently
complex and have the potential for both positive and negative effects on
aspects of Australia’s economy.
4.56
In view of the apparent inequalities arising from TAFTA, the Committee
emphasises the importance of Australia achieving favourable outcomes in such
negotiations. It also underscores the importance of knowing exactly what are
the benefits or costs of such agreements once they are concluded.
4.57
This puts considerable pressure on negotiators, who are obliged to focus
on tariff-based barriers as more of a known-quantity, despite the key
significance of non-tariff barriers. Under present conditions, Australia’s
capacity to arrive at favourable outcomes is stretched. In view of the
importance of these negotiations, the Committee believes that an increase in
analytical resources is warranted.
4.58
There are also opportunities to capture better levels of information
about non-tariff barriers, so that these can be costed and compared on a
like-to-like basis. If this could be achieved, the resulting simplification
would be a significant enhancement to the process of trade negotiation, and
Australia’s capacity to negotiate favourable outcomes.
4.59
As well, it is important that a regular reporting mechanism be
introduced, showing the consequences for Australia of its FTAs.
Recommendation 1 |
4.60
|
The Committee recommends that the Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade develop a single method of costing non-tariff barriers, to assist
Australian FTA negotiators to identify, evaluate and target barriers to
trade.
|
Recommendation 2 |
4.61
|
The Committee recommends that the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade reports annually to the Parliament on the impacts of
individual free trade agreements.
|
4.62
The Committee makes further recommendations on FTAs and the reporting of
outcomes in Chapter 9 after it has discussed human rights issues and the
environment.
Recommendation 3 |
4.63
|
The Committee recommends that when Parliamentary delegations
visit South East Asian countries with which Australia has a free trade
agreement, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade facilitate meetings
with Asian policy makers to monitor progress with these treaties.
|