Chapter 3 Operations
3.1
Throughout 2008-2009, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) continued to follow
the government’s strategic objectives in line with the 2000 Defence White
Paper. These objectives - defending Australia, contributing to the security
of the immediate neighbourhood, and supporting wider interests - were
reaffirmed in the new White Paper released in May 2009.[1]
3.2
The most significant contribution remained in support of the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan helping to deny
international terrorist safe havens, and in the mentoring and training of
Afghan national security forces. On a smaller scale, but nonetheless of
significant importance, ADF personnel continued to be deployed on international
operations to the Solomon Islands, Sudan, Lebanon, Israel, Iraq, Syria, the
Sinai and East Timor.[2]
Afghanistan
Background
3.3
Australia’s military contribution to Afghanistan is part of the
Government’s comprehensive approach to supporting international efforts to
prevent Afghanistan from being used as a safe-haven for terrorism. The mandate
for this peace enforcement mission is provided under Chapter VII of the United
Nations (UN) Charter and at the invitation of the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and under the United Nations Security Council
resolution (UNSCR) 1833.[3]
3.4
There are about 1550 Australian personnel based in Afghanistan whose
focus is on reconstruction and development efforts and disrupting the Taliban
led insurgency. Most of these personnel are located in Oruzgan province in a
junior partnership with a contingent from the Netherlands. The Netherlands will
give up their leadership role from 1 August 2010 and a new partner to the
Australian Mentoring Task Force will need to be found. The Australian
Government has made clear to NATO that Australia cannot lead in Oruzgan nor operate
alone.[4]
Current status
3.5
Defence categorised the prognosis for success in Afghanistan as ‘mission
possible’[5] on the basis that the
right strategy is being fully resourced and implemented by the right leaders.[6]
Defence stated:
The strategy is an integrated military civilian strategy,
which looks at establishing security, providing governance and providing
development right across the board. With the approach being taken by General
McChrystal[7] and its emphasis on protecting the population,
we have a lot of optimism that we will eventually prevail. Indeed, I would
submit that the tide is starting to turn. We are seeing the coalition starting
to get on top of the insurgents. However, I would not overstate that; there is
a long, long way to go.[8]
3.6
The committee noted that there is a ‘widespread misconception in the
community’ that the war is ‘unwinnable’ because the current conflict is similar
to past state-on-state conflicts such as the Soviet-Afghanistan war. However,
the committee agrees that there is a critical difference between the current
situation and past conflicts.
3.7
Defence told the committee that part of the strategy being followed in
Afghanistan is the clear, hold and build process whereby an area is
cleared of Taliban, local community leaders are engaged by way of tribal
meetings or shura, and then the right level of governance and support
infrastructure is established.[9] By way of example,
Defence told the committee of the ongoing operation in Helmand province,
Operation MOSHTARAK. This operation, which Australian forces and assets have
supported, has seen the Taliban cleared from around the town of Marjah, shuras
held and the beginnings of ‘establishing the right level of governance, good
policing services and delivering the appropriate services.’[10]
3.8
Complementing operations such as MOSHTARAK, the strategy in use also
involves building up the competency of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and
Afghan National Police (ANP) leading to a point where they will ‘take care of
their own affairs.’[11] In this regard,
Australia is responsible for the training of the ANA’s Fourth Brigade in
Oruzgan province by means of operational mentoring and liaison teams.
3.9
Defence, referring to media reporting that suggested otherwise, reminded
the committee that Australian forces do regularly operate outside Oruzgan
province by highlighting operations in the contiguous zones of Helmand,
Kandahar, and within Zabul and Paktika provinces. Furthermore, Australian Special
Forces have, and will continue to operate in northern Kandahar while the
Chinook helicopters operate widely throughout the southern provinces.[12]
3.10
The committee asked Defence whether the participation of Oruzgan based ANA
battalions, or kandaks, in any operations in Kandahar would be a good training
opportunity. Defence opined that the experience would be valuable while
highlighting that in Oruzgan the Kandaks are ‘in the fight all of the time
anyway.’[13]
3.11
In relation to who is likely to take-over from the Dutch, when they
leave the province in late 2010, Defence told the committee:
We were hoping that the Dutch would remain in the province. They
have been very good partners ....We were hoping that they would be able to
continue. With the collapse of their government in February, I guess all bets
are off. The advice we have is that they will cease their leadership role on
schedule on 1 August this year and we start to see their forces drawing down. My
expectation is that most of the military people will be out of the province by
the end of the year.
We have been engaging NATO at all levels, from the minister
down. ...we are assured by NATO that they will come up with suitable
arrangements which will take care of our needs....We have made it quite clear
that being a non-NATO nation that we don’t expect to lead in Oruzgan.[14]
3.12
Defence told the committee a significant threat to personnel comes from
the use of improvised explosive devices (IED). However, according to Defence,
‘the government has invested a lot of money in doing everything we can to
enhance our force protection status.’[15] Notwithstanding,
countering the problem has been exacerbated by the increased ‘use of non‑metallic
improvised explosive devices, which means that it is more difficult to detect
them with conventional detection methods.’[16]
3.13
On the question of when Australian involvement in Afghanistan is likely
to end, Defence told the committee that no withdrawal or exit date has been set
although once the job of training of the 4th Brigade of the ANA is complete;
this will put Australia in a ‘good position to pull our training forces out of
Oruzgan.’[17]
Iraq
3.14
The ADF ceased land combat operations in southern Iraq on 1 June 2008
and handed over security responsibility to the Iraqi forces. During the course
of operations in southern Iraq, successive Battle Groups completed
approximately 8700 patrols travelling more than three million kilometres, and
completed more than 250 reconstruction projects in Dhi Qar and Al Muthanna
provinces since April 2005.[18]
3.15
The committee noted that although the ADF military contribution to the
multinational force in Iraq has been withdrawn, there is still an ADF presence
in the country via the security detachment at the Australian Embassy in Baghdad[19]
and two military advisers to the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq.[20]
Timor-Leste
Background
3.16
Operation ASTUTE is the ADF’s contribution to the maintenance of peace
and stability in East Timor, following a request from the Government of
Timor-Leste to the Australian Government. The ADF deployed to East Timor to
assist the Government of Timor-Leste and support the UN in bringing stability,
security and confidence to the Timorese people.[21]
3.17
The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is working alongside the ADF to
assist with this mission. Together, the ADF and NZDF personnel form the ISF in
East Timor. Timor-Leste authorities have primary responsibility for policing
and security, supported by UN police officers from Australia and 20 other
nations.[22]
3.18
While the primary role of the ISF continues to
be the provision of security assistance to the Government of East Timor, the
improving security situation has enabled ISF efforts to increasingly focus on
building the capacity of the East Timorese Defence Force (F-FDTL)[23] enabling a
drawdown of total ADF numbers in support of Operation ASTUTE.
3.19
Operation TOWER is the ADF’s contribution to the United Nations
Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and was established by United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1704 following civil unrest in East
Timor in 2006. UNMIT is the UN’s fifth East Timor mission since 1999
and the third since Independence in 2002.[24]
3.20
With representation from 13 countries, the UNMIT Military Liaison Group
conducts daily monitoring of the security environment as well as providing
military advice on the restoration and maintenance of security. ADF
members are also employed as staff officers based at UNMIT
headquarters in Dili. These and other Military Liaison Officers play a crucial
role in security reform, including contributing to the professional development
of the East Timor Defence Force by designing and delivering Liaison Officer
training to personnel.[25]
Current status
3.21
Defence told the committee that there is a feeling of ‘normality’ and
confidence, and a certainty amongst senior people in Timor-Leste ‘that things
are going to be different this time around.’[26] This has set the conditions
for the ongoing drawdown of Australian troops as
‘there is a confidence that [the East –Timorese] can provide the stability that
is required to take the nation forward.’[27]
3.22
With the drawdown of forces, there is a ‘gradual transition from a
stabilisation force into a very large and comprehensive enhanced Defence
Cooperation Program, which is all about capacity building.’[28]
3.23
The Defence Cooperation Program has four main pillars: maritime
security, peacekeeping, engineering and an English language program.[29]
This program is, according to Defence, ‘going well’ and there is hope that in
the ‘not-too-distant future, we will see the ISF in a position where it is able
to leave.’[30]
3.24
In response to a question from the committee on East Timorese maritime
security and progress of their patrol boat program, Defence indicated that although
the East Timorese are yet to take delivery of their Shanghai Class patrol boats,
they have been ‘seized with the need to develop the right professional
standards within their maritime force’.[31] This has meant that the East
Timorese Armada want to ‘adopt a lot of our processes, a lot of our
professional standards and, indeed, they want to leverage off our naval
culture.’[32] Defence thought that
once they got their patrol boats, ‘they will use them quite effectively,
provided we can give them the necessary professional training that is needed in
the immediate future.’[33]
Committee conclusions
3.25
The committee acknowledges that the ADF continues to be an important
contributor to a significant number of diverse and challenging operations
across the globe. Additionally, in some of these operations, the ADF is leading
and commanding forces and assets from other countries, and this reflects
creditably on the ADF and Australia more generally.