CHAPTER 5
INAPPROPRIATE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
Application of criterion set out in Standing Order 24(1)(a)(iv)
5.1
The criterion in Standing Order 24(1)(a)(iv) requires the
Committee to draw the Senate’s attention to legislation where Parliament’s power
to make laws may have been delegated inappropriately.
5.2
In considering this criterion, a threshold question sometimes
arises: is the power proposed to be delegated legislative in nature? At times
it is difficult to determine whether the instruments that Parliament empowers
another body or person to make are legislative in character. Such instruments
might be ministerial guidelines, codes of practice, codes of conduct, or
practice statements. They are often described as made under a power to direct,
determine, notify, order, instruct, declare, issue or publish.
5.3
Examples of provisions that may inappropriately delegate
legislative power include those which:
- enable subordinate legislation to amend an Act of Parliament
(often called a ‘Henry VIII’ clause);
- provide that matters which should be regulated by Parliament are
to be dealt with by subordinate legislation;
- provide that a levy or a charge be set by regulation; or
- give to the Executive unfettered control over whether or when an
Act passed by the Parliament should come into force.
‘Henry VIII’ clauses
5.4
An express provision that authorises the amendment of either the
empowering legislation, or any other legislation, by means of delegated
legislation is called a ‘Henry VIII’ clause. The Macquarie Dictionary of
Modern Law defines a ‘Henry VIII’ clause as ‘a clause in an enabling Act
providing that the delegated legislation under it overrides earlier Acts or the
enabling Act itself; so named because of its autocratic flavour’[1].
Since its establishment, the Committee has consistently drawn attention to such
clauses.
Example: Private Health Insurance Bill 2006
5.5
In Alert Digest No. 1 of 2007, the Committee commented on
several ‘Henry VIII’ clauses in this bill. Firstly, subclause 78-1(6) provided
that the Private Health Insurance (Complying Product) Rules (a legislative
instrument to be made by the Minister) could modify the portability
requirements set out in the other provisions of clause 78-1 in relation to all
or particular kinds of private health insurers, benefits or insured persons.
The Committee noted that the explanatory memorandum sought to justify this
‘Henry VIII’ clause on the basis that it would ‘give the Government flexibility
in adapting the portability regime to emerging patterns of care to ensure a
fair balance between the interests of insurers and insured persons and persons
transferring between insurers.’ The Committee considered that this was a clear
case of delegation of legislative power, but left for the Senate as a whole the
question of whether this delegation was appropriate or not. The Committee did,
however, seek advice from the Minister as to whether the flexibility to modify
the portability requirements could be achieved in some other way.
5.6
The Minister responded that:
It has proved necessary in the past to make subordinate
legislation (under section 73B of the National Health Act 1953) to deal
expeditiously with practices introduced by some insurers which would have
unfairly limited transfer rights [of individuals to move between private health
insurers].
Subclause 78-1(6) of the Bill providing that the Private Health
Insurance (Complying Product) Rules may modify the requirements in clause 78-1
in relation to any or all private health insurers, benefits or insured persons
continues the ability under the current Act to address unfair practices
introduced by insurers without amending the primary legislation.
I consider that the most practical and appropriate way of
retaining the power to move swiftly to address emerging circumstances is to
include the provision that subordinate legislation may modify the portability
provisions as appropriately required, subject to a Parliamentary scrutiny and
disallowance regime.[2]
5.7
The Committee thanked the Minister for this response and did not
comment further, except to note that it would have been helpful if this
explanation had been included in the explanatory memorandum.
5.8
The Committee also commented on subparagraph 217-5(1)(b)(ii) of
the Private Health Insurance Bill 2006, which permitted the Private Health
Insurance (Health Benefit Fund Enforcement) Rules (also a legislative
instrument to be made by the Minister) to modify various provisions of the Corporations
Act 2001 in regulating the external management of a health benefits fund.
In addition, subclause 217-5(4) provided that the Private Health Insurance
(Health Benefit Fund Enforcement) Rules could provide for different
modifications according to the nature of the health benefits fund that was being
administered. The Committee considered that these provisions clearly delegated
legislative power but had no means of ascertaining whether or not the
delegation was appropriate because the explanatory memorandum provided no
information regarding the extent to which it was intended to modify the
provisions of the Corporations Act 2001, nor the purpose intended to be
achieved by such modifications. The Committee sought the Minister’s advice as
to the reason for this delegation of legislative power.
5.9
The Minister’s response to the Committee noted that the relevant
provisions replicated provisions in the existing regulatory regime under the National
Health Act 1953 and that the inclusion of these provisions in the bill
allowed for ‘the continuation of the current rules for the administration of
health benefits funds.’[3]
The Minister also advised the Committee that the intended scope of the
application of the provisions to the Corporations Act 2001 remained
unchanged.
5.10
The Committee thanked the Minister for this response and made no
further comment except to note that it would have been helpful if this
information had been included in the explanatory memorandum.
Example: Food Standards Australia New
Zealand Amendment Bill 2007
5.11
In Alert Digest No. 5 of 2007, the Committee commented on
proposed new subsection 112(6) of the Food Standards Australia New Zealand
Act 1991, to be inserted by item 76 of Schedule 1 of this bill, which
enabled regulations to modify all, or specified provisions of, part 3 of the
Act. The Committee noted that the explanatory memorandum sought to justify this
provision on the grounds that proposed
section 112 merely retained the status quo, ‘by replacing the current section
36A’ of the Food Standards Australia New Zealand Act 1991. While
acknowledging that this may have been the case, the Committee pointed out that
this was not an explanation for why a ‘Henry VIII’ clause was considered
necessary. The Committee sought the Minister’s advice in respect of this
issue.
5.12
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Health and Ageing
responded to the Committee in a letter dated 30 May 2007. The Parliamentary Secretary advised the Committee that subsection 112(6) ‘retained an existing
capacity provided in section 36A from the Food Standards Australia New
Zealand Act 1991’, but that, following consultation with Food Standards
Australia New Zealand ‘it appears that the provision has never been utilised
and there are no existing regulations to this effect.’[4]
The Parliamentary Secretary indicated that ‘as the provision is somewhat
antiquated and in light of the concerns highlighted by the Committee I intend
to remove section 112(6) from the Bill.’
5.13
The Committee thanked the Parliamentary Secretary for this
response and for the commitment to amend the bill to address the Committee’s
concern. On
14 June 2007, the Senate agreed to three amendments to the bill, one of which
implemented the Parliamentary Secretary’s commitment to remove section 112(6)
from the bill.[5]
Example: Superannuation Bill 2005
5.14
In Alert Digest No. 5 of 2005, the Committee commented on
clause 22 of this bill for several reasons. Firstly, subclause 22(2) was a ‘Henry
VIII’ clause in that it would permit the amendment of subclause 22(1) by
regulation. The Committee noted that any such regulation would be subject to
the usual tabling and disallowance regime under the Legislative Instruments
Act 2003 and subject to scrutiny by the Regulations and Ordinances
Committee, which would often meet the Committee’s concerns. However, the
Committee noted that the effect of such a regulation would be to expose the
Board of the Public Sector Superannuation Accumulation Plan (PSSAP), and the
Fund itself, to some form of taxation, from which subclause 22(1) provided
exemption. In effect, in addition to being a ‘Henry VIII’ clause, subclause
22(2) allowed for the imposition of taxation by regulation.
5.15
One concern that the Committee has regularly raised in relation
to the imposition of any form of taxation or levy by regulation is that the
regulation takes effect as soon as it is made, but may not be disallowed for a
considerable period of time after that date. For example, in this instance, the
Committee noted that if a regulation under subclause 22(2) was made soon after
the Parliament rose for the usual winter recess, the relevant tax could have
effect for a number of months before a disallowance motion was considered by
the Senate. In the meantime, the tax would have been validly levied, and could
not be refunded without further parliamentary intervention.
5.16
While the Committee noted that similar provisions existed in
relation to other superannuation schemes, for instance section 26 of the Superannuation
Act 1990, the Committee, nevertheless, sought the Minister’s advice as to
whether it was appropriate to provide for the imposition of taxation through
delegated legislation in this manner.
5.17
The Minister for Finance and Administration responded that, as
noted by the Committee, subclause 22(2) replicated similar provisions in the Superannuation
Act 1990 and would ‘ensure that the taxation arrangements applying to the
PSS Board, in respect of the PSSAP, and the PSSAP Fund are the same as would
have applied had the PSSAP otherwise commenced as a sub plan of the PSS.’[6]
The Minister further advised that the equivalent power in the 1990 Act had only
been used on one occasion, ‘in a circumstance where it was not possible for the
Act to be amended in time to ensure that the Goods and Services Tax would apply
to the Board and Fund on the same basis as it was to apply to other
superannuation trustees and funds’.[7]
5.18
The Minister noted the Committee’s concerns that regulations
could alter the taxation arrangements of the Fund before the Parliament had
time to consider the instrument. In response, the Minister proposed that any
regulations made under subsection 22(2) of the bill would have a commencement
date no earlier than the end of the period for which the instrument was subject
to disallowance. The Committee thanked the Minister for the response, noting
that the approach proposed by the Minister would add ‘a measure of certainty’
and met the Committee’s concerns.[8]
Example: National Offshore Petroleum Bill 2005
5.19
This same issue also arose in respect of a provision in the
National Offshore Petroleum Bill 2005, which would exempt the National Offshore
Petroleum Safety Authority from any liability to taxation under the laws of the
Commonwealth, States and Territories, but would permit that exemption to be
removed, in relation to a specified law, by regulation. The Committee raised
the same concerns as it had in respect of the Superannuation Bill 2005, ie.
that the provision would permit the imposition of taxation by delegated
legislation and the tax could be imposed for some period of time before the
instrument could be disallowed by the Parliament. The Committee sought the Minister’s
advice on the reason for this ‘Henry VIII’ clause.[9]
5.20
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Industry, Tourism
and Resources responded that:
- technically the bill did not allow taxation by regulation. The
effect of subclause 399(2) of the bill would merely be to remove the tax
exemption provided by subclause 399(1). The tax itself would be imposed by the
relevant Commonwealth, State or Territory Act;
- it is always the case when a regulation is disallowed that it
will have a period of operation prior to disallowance;
- this was not a case of a private citizen or commercial entity
being made subject to a tax as a result of the making of a regulation, as the
‘tax-payer’ in question would be a Commonwealth statutory corporation; and
- there were precedents for clauses of this nature in other Acts.[10]
5.21
The Committee thanked the Parliamentary Secretary for this
response. The Committee accepted that in a legal sense any tax would be imposed
by primary legislation, but remained concerned that in a practical sense it
would be the regulations that would allow the tax to be imposed. The Committee
also accepted that there were precedents for these sorts of clauses but
expressed the view that, as a matter of principle, the Parliament should
specifically consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether it is appropriate to
enact clauses of this nature.[11]
5.22
The Committee also noted the Parliamentary Secretary’s contention
that ‘it is always the case when a regulation is disallowed that it will have a
period of operation prior to disallowance’, but noted that there are options to
prevent this from occurring. These included, specifying that regulations would
not commence until after the disallowance period had expired (as the Minister
for Finance and Administration agreed to do in respect of the Superannuation
Bill 2005) or including a similar provision in the primary legislation itself.
The Committee suggested that these options might be considered in the policy
review of the legislation that was foreshadowed in the explanatory memorandum
to the bill.[12]
5.23
Finally, the Committee noted the advice from the Parliamentary
Secretary that the taxation arrangements that would be affected by this clause
exist between Government agencies, rather than members of the public or other
entities. The Committee indicated that this reduced its concerns with this
particular clause. In the circumstances, the Committee made no further comments
on this provision.[13]
Determination of important matters
by regulation
5.24
The Committee also draws attention to provisions that
inappropriately delegate legislative power of a kind which ought to be
exercised by Parliament alone. One example of such a provision (from a previous
Parliament) was a clause that conferred power on the Executive to define a word
or phrase in an Act. The definition determined the way in which the Act was to
operate.[14]
In such circumstances, the Committee will argue that the defining of the word
or phrase is too crucial a matter to be left to subordinate legislation and
should be undertaken by the Parliament.
Example: Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment
(Welfare Payment Reform) Bill 2007
5.25
The Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare
Payment Reform) Bill 2007 sought to establish a national income management
regime that requires parents on income support to ensure that their children are
enrolled at, and regularly attend, school. In Alert Digest No. 9 of 2007,
the Committee commented on proposed new subsection 123UK(1) of the Social
Security (Administration) Act 1999, to be inserted by item 17 of Schedule 1
of this bill, which provided that the question of whether an unsatisfactory
school attendance situation existed in relation to a child was to be
ascertained in accordance with a legislative instrument made by the Minister.
5.26
The Committee noted from the explanatory memorandum that ‘a
person can be subject to the income management framework only when an
unsatisfactory school attendance situation exists. The Committee concluded,
therefore, that ‘the definition of an unsatisfactory school attendance
situation was fundamental to the application of the income management
framework to welfare recipients’ and that, as such, the definition was a matter
more appropriately dealt with in primary legislation.
5.27
The Committee drew the provision to the attention of Senators on
the basis that it inappropriately delegated legislative powers, but left it for
the Senate as a whole to decide whether it did so unduly. The Senate passed
the bill on 17 August 2007. The bill was not amended to address the Committee’s
concerns.[15]
Example: Aviation Legislation Amendment (2007 Measures
No. 1) Bill 2007
5.28
In Alert Digest No. 8 of 2007, the Committee commented on
proposed new section 38B of the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004, to
be inserted by item 14 of Schedule 1 of this bill, which provided for
regulations to ‘prescribe offences in relation to the disruption or
interference with the activities of an airport operator or a security
controlled airport, or the activities of an aircraft operator at a security
controlled airport’ in certain circumstances.
5.29
The Committee noted from the explanatory memorandum to the bill
that:
new section 38B is needed because the existing regulation making
powers in the Act are not well adapted to creating offences that effectively
deter disruptive activities [within airports]... Similarly, the existing
regulation making powers do not permit the regulation of disruptive conduct
outside the boundaries of an airport even if the conduct has the direct effect
of severely disrupting the activities of the airport operator or of an aircraft
operator. Examples of conduct outside an airport that might disrupt airport
operations include directing light emitting devices (such as laser devices)
into the airport through or over the top of the airport’s perimeter fence.
Although some such incidents may not pose a direct threat to aviation, all
incidents inevitably invite a serious security response because the activity
has to be investigated quickly to determine whether there is a serious risk...the
existence of a set of appropriately crafted offences in the Regulations is
expected to provide a sensible deterrent for deliberate and repeat offenders.’[16]
5.30
The Committee further noted that sub-section 38B(2) provided that
the offences prescribed by the regulations ‘may relate to conduct that occurs
outside the boundaries of a security controlled airport’, which could
effectively mean anywhere, including, presumably, conduct that occurred on
residential properties abutting airports. Given the apparent wide scope of
these provisions and the not insignificant financial penalty that could be
imposed (up to 50 penalty units = $5500), the Committee questioned whether
these offence-making powers might be more appropriately exercised by the
Parliament.
5.31
The Committee, noting that the explanatory memorandum provided no
explanation as to why these ‘appropriately crafted offences’ could not be
included in primary legislation, sought the Minister’s advice as to why it was
considered necessary for these offences to be able to be created by regulation
rather than by primary legislation.
5.32
The Minister for Transport and Regional Services responded to the
Committee, advising that the approach followed in this bill ‘is used in Bills
where it is not possible at the time of drafting to anticipate all forms of
offensive conduct that will need to be prohibited or regulated and where a
relatively low penalty will apply.’[17]
The Minister also emphasised the importance of the proposed new regulation-making
power ‘as a first line of regulatory response in dealing with new problems as
they are identified’, citing the use of laser lights as an example:
One application of new section 38B will be to prescribe a new
offence to prohibit a person from shining a laser light from a place outside a
security controlled airport into the airport. Laser technology is changing
rapidly, so that more powerful laser devices are becoming more readily
available to the general public for a wide range of lawful purposes. In such
circumstances, where it is not possible to predict all of the circumstances in
which a laser device might be used to disrupt airport operations or against an
aircraft on the ground, the most flexible and responsive strategy is to prescribe
offences by regulation so that the regulations can be amended quickly as soon
as a new type of threat emerges.[18]
5.33
The Minister also assured the Committee that every regulation
that created a new offence would be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny and
disallowance.[19]
The Committee thanked the Minister for this response and made no further
comment on the provisions.[20]
Setting the rate of a ‘levy’ by
regulation
5.34
The Committee has consistently drawn attention to legislation
that provides for the rate of a ‘levy’ to be set by regulation. This creates a
risk that the levy may, in fact, become a tax. It is for the Parliament, rather
than the makers of subordinate legislation, to set a rate of tax.
Providing a statutory maximum rate
or a rate-setting formula
5.35
Where the rate of a levy needs to be changed frequently and
expeditiously, this may be better done through amending regulations rather than
the enabling statute. If a compelling case can be made for the rate to be set
by subordinate legislation, the Committee seeks to impose some limit on the exercise
of this power. For example, the Committee will seek to have the enabling Act
prescribe either a maximum figure above which the relevant regulations cannot
fix the levy, or, alternatively, a formula by which such an amount can be
calculated. The vice to be avoided is delegating an unfettered power to impose
fees.
Example: Offshore Petroleum (Annual Fees) Bill 2005
5.36
In Alert Digest No. 8 of 2005, the Committee examined the Offshore
Petroleum (Annual Fees) Bill 2005, the purpose of which was to impose annual
fees for various aspects of drilling for, and recovering petroleum in, offshore
areas. The Committee commented on subclause 4(3) of this bill, which would
allow the amount of each of these fees to be fixed by regulation, with no upper
limit set in the primary legislation.
5.37
The Committee noted that the Minister’s second reading speech
advised that ‘the holders of permits, leases and licences must pay a fee to
help recover the costs of administration’, suggesting that the fees would be
set at no more than cost recovery, but this was not clear from either the bill
or the explanatory memorandum. The Committee was of the view that if the amount
of the various fees was limited to cost recovery, then they could not properly
be regarded as taxes and the setting of their amount by regulation would not be
regarded as an inappropriate delegation of legislative power. The Committee
sought the Minister’s advice about whether the amount of the fees would be
limited to cost recovery and, if so, whether the bill might contain a clause
prescribing an appropriate limit.[21]
5.38
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Industry, Tourism
and Resources responded on 18 August 2005, assuring the Committee that the
amount of the fees had always been, and would continue to be, set with a view
to cost recovery.[22]
The Committee thanked the Parliamentary Secretary for this response, indicating
that this assurance met the Committee’s concerns. The Committee suggested,
however, that in the policy review of the legislation foreshadowed by the
Parliamentary Secretary, the Parliamentary Secretary might give consideration
to whether a clause giving legislative force to this assurance might be included
in future legislation.[23]
Example: Offshore Petroleum (Registration Fees) Bill 2005
5.39
In Alert Digest No. 8 of 2005, the Committee commented on a
number of provisions that provided for the amount of a tax to be set by
regulation. These were:
- items 2, 3 and 4 in the table to subclause 5(2), which provided
for the amount of the fees referred to in those items to be set by regulation,
with no upper limit specified in the primary legislation. Subclause 5(4) of the
bill stated that the ‘fee imposed by this section is imposed as a tax’; and
- items 5 and 6 in the table to subclause 6(2), which provided for
the amount of the fees referred to in those items to be set by regulation, with
no upper limit specified in the primary legislation. Subclause 6(6) of the bill
also stated that the fee is ‘imposed as a tax’.
5.40
The Committee noted that the explanatory memorandum specified the
amount of these fees at the time that the legislation was introduced into the
Parliament, but sought the Minister’s advice whether it would be possible for
the primary legislation to specify a maximum amount for each of these fees.[24]
5.41
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Industry, Tourism
and Resources responded that these provisions ‘replicate without change the
provisions of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands)( Registration Fees) Act 1967’
and that the rationale for providing for the prescribing of the fees by
regulation in that Act was to:
enable the timely adjustment of fees so that they more closely
reflect actual administrative costs and so that the Government is not in a
situation of trying to retrospectively catch up with incurred costs. In the
case of this legislation, the costs are, of course, administrative costs
incurred by the States and Northern Territory.[25]
5.42
The Parliamentary Secretary went on to state that:
There is evidence to suggest that the Parliament of the day saw
the abovementioned amounts, if not all amounts, imposed under the Petroleum
(Submerged Lands) (Registration Fees) Act as essentially about cost recovery,
not as a tax. Whether advice had then been received that this Act is a taxing
Act is unclear, but later legal advice has definitively affirmed that finding.
Despite the tax status of the moneys paid under this Act, I do
not see these prescribed amounts as a significant element of the tax base.
Rather, I see them representing a minimal contribution covering the
administrative costs of the registration procedure in the specified situations
where application of the ad valorem calculation would be inappropriate. During
the term of the current Government, the level of the amounts prescribed in
regulations under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Registration Fees) Act has
been increased by no more than the consumer price index, and this will continue
to be the policy pursued.[26]
5.43
The Parliamentary Secretary indicated that he had requested the
Department, as part of a forthcoming policy review of the legislation, to consider
the question of whether an upper limit should be set in the Act, noting that
the review could also consider the alternative of merely inserting a new
provision stating that these amounts cannot be increased by more than the
consumer price index.[27]
5.44
The Committee thanked the Parliamentary Secretary for this
response, noting that the assurances provided met the Committee’s concerns. The
Committee also thanked the Parliamentary Secretary for including this matter in
the foreshadowed policy review of the legislation.[28]
Commencement by Proclamation:
Office of Parliamentary Counsel Drafting Direction No. 1.3 (May 2007)
5.45
The Committee is wary of provisions that enable legislation to
commence on a date ‘to be proclaimed’ rather than on a determinable date. Where
a bill, or part of a bill, is expressed to commence on Proclamation, the date
proclaimed should be no later than six months after the Parliament passes the
relevant measure.
5.46
The Committee takes the view that Parliament, as the elected
holder of Federal legislative power, is responsible for determining when the
laws it makes are to come into force. In taking this view, the Committee is
conscious of Drafting Direction No. 1.3 (May 2007) issued by the Office of
Parliamentary Counsel. This provides, in part:
18. As a general rule, a restriction should be placed on the
period within which an Act, or a provision of an Act, may be proclaimed. The
commencement clause should specify either a period, or a date, after Royal
Assent after which:
-
the Act commences, if it has not already commenced by
Proclamation; or
-
the Act is taken to be repealed, if a Proclamation has not been
made by that time.
19. If the specified period option is chosen, the period
should generally not be longer than 6 months. A longer period should be
explained in the Explanatory Memorandum.
20. If the specified date option is chosen, there is no
restriction on how long commencement may be deferred. However, any substantial
deferrals should be explained in the Explanatory Memorandum, and it may in fact
be sensible to explain the significance of the specified date whenever this
option is used.
21. Note that if the “repeal” option is chosen, there is no
limit on the time from Royal Assent to commencement, as long as the
Proclamation is made before the end of the specified period or before the
specified date.
22. Clauses providing for commencement by Proclamation, but
without the restrictions mentioned above, should be used only in unusual
circumstances, where the commencement depends on an event whose timing is
uncertain and generally not within the Government’s control (eg. enactment of
complementary State legislation). Commencement provisions of this kind should
be explained in the Explanatory Memorandum.
5.47
Where the rules set out in the Drafting Direction are not
followed, the Committee prefers to see the reason for this departure set out in
the explanatory memorandum. For example, where a six month period is said to be
impractical, the Committee likes to see another period – such as a period of 12
months – specified and a justification provided in the explanatory memorandum,
rather than no period at all.
5.48
In Alert Digest No. 8 of 2005, the Committee drew
Senators’ attention to
item 2 in the table to subclause 2(1) of the Offshore Petroleum Bill 2005,
which provided that almost all of the bill’s provisions would commence on
Proclamation but failed to specify a limit within which the provisions must
commence in any event. The Committee noted from the explanatory memorandum that
the commencement of the measure was dependent upon the enactment of
complementary legislation by the States and Territories. The Committee
acknowledged that it would generally accept this justification for delayed
commencement, but that it was not justification for an open-ended period of
commencement, as provided for in this bill. As such, the Committee sought the
Minister’s advice as to whether the commencement clause might be subject to the
provision that, if the necessary Proclamation had not been issued by some fixed
date in the future, the Act would be automatically treated as having been
repealed at that date.
5.49
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Industry, Tourism
and Resources responded that the Commonwealth-State-Northern Territory inter-jurisdictional
issues in this package of legislation ‘have unusual characteristics’ that made
the open-ended commencement clause appropriate. These included that:
- the Commonwealth legislation recognised the State or Northern
Territory Minister as having functions and powers under the Commonwealth Act
itself and these functions and powers were tied to what was to appear in the
mirror State and Territory Acts; and
- there was at least one State Act unrelated to petroleum that referred
to adjacent areas under the Commonwealth Petroleum (Submerged Land) Act and
that State Act (and possibly others), might require pre-emptive amendments
before the new Commonwealth legislation was proclaimed.
5.50
In light of these complexities, the Minister considered it would
be ‘ill-advised to merely list the names of the mirror State and Territory Acts
in the Offshore Petroleum Bill and state that the proposed Act would need to be
proclaimed within a certain number of months of the last of these Acts being
amended.’ Similarly, the Minister considered that there would have been an
‘unfavourable reaction’ from stakeholders, such as the petroleum industry and
the State and Northern Territory Governments, if a provision was included
‘raising the possibility of repeal of the enactment before it even came into
force.’[29]
5.51
The Committee thanked the Parliamentary Secretary, noting the
many factors that made it difficult to more accurately set a likely
commencement date for the legislation. The Committee also noted that this bill
was a ‘rewrite’ of the existing law, making only modest policy changes. Given
that the consequences of delayed commencement would be the continuation of the
existing scheme, the Committee accepted the approach taken to commencement in
this bill.[30]
5.52
A number of other bills considered by the Committee during the
41st Parliament provided for commencement on Proclamation because
their application depended on uncertain events – either the passing of
complementary legislation by other jurisdictions (for example the Murray-Darling
Basin Amendment Bill 2006) or on the entering into force of an international
Convention or agreement (for example the Food Standards Australia New Zealand
Amendment Bill 2007). These provisions were of a kind contemplated by the
relevant Drafting Direction and, as long as a clear explanation was provided in
the accompanying explanatory memorandum, the Committee noted them without
further comment.
5.53
Where no explanation for commencement on Proclamation that
exceeded six months was provided in the explanatory memorandum, the Committee
continued to comment. For example, in Alert Digest No. 9 of 2004, the
Committee commented on provisions in the US Free Trade Agreement Implementation
Bill 2004 and the US Free Trade Agreement Implementation (Customs Tariff) Bill
2004,[31]
which provided for a large number of the proposed amendments in the bills to
commence on the later date of 1 January 2005 or on the day on which the
Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement came into force.
5.54
The Committee noted that while the bills provided that if the
Free Trade Agreement did not come into force then the relevant items did not
commence at all, they established no timeframe in which this needed to occur.
As such, the Committee concluded that the commencement of these amendments
remained uncertain and noted that the explanatory memoranda to the bills failed
to explain why this uncertainty was considered necessary. The Committee sought
the Minister’s advice whether the relevant items might include a provision that
if the Free Trade Agreement had not entered into force for Australia by some
fixed date, then the Act would be automatically treated as having been repealed
on that date.
5.55
The Minister for Justice and Customs responded that the
commencement clauses had been formulated with the advice of the Office of
Parliamentary Counsel and that similar formulations had been used in other
bills in the past. The Minister further advised that the ‘Government has
endeavoured to provide additional clarity by including our target date for
entry into force of the Agreement (1 January 2005) and by including a requirement
for the Minister for Trade...to announce by notice in the Gazette the day on
which the Agreement comes into force for Australia.’[32]
5.56
The Committee thanked the Minister for this response but
reiterated its concern that the commencement provision in these bills had ‘all
the hallmarks of open-ended proclamation provisions’ as they provided for
commencement on the date of an uncertain event without providing the means to
conclusively determine whether that event had not occurred or would not occur.
The Committee noted that the choice of the date of commencement was, therefore,
delegated by the Parliament to the Executive, without limitation.[33]
5.57
The Committee reiterated its view that:
- legislation implementing international treaty obligations should
not be treated any differently than other legislation susceptible to delay; and
- all such legislation should include a date (or period) after
which the legislation must commence or be taken to be repealed and, where a
particular date (or period) represents a significant delay in commencement, an
explanation should be provided in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the
bill.[34]
5.58
These bills were passed by both Houses of the Parliament prior to
the Committee reporting on the response from the Minister. The bills were not
amended to address the Committee’s concerns.
5.59
The Committee continued to raise this issue throughout the 41st
Parliament, with mixed success. For example, in Alert Digest No. 5 of 2005, the
Committee commented on item 3 in the table to subclause 2(1) of the Law and
Justice Legislation Amendment (Serious Drug Offences and Other Measures) Bill
2005, which provided that the amendments in Schedule 2 of the bill would
commence on the day on which the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, entered
into force. The Committee noted that the item did not provide any fixed date by
which it could be finally determined that the Optional Protocol would not
come into force and sought the Minister’s advice as to whether the item might
provide for a means of determining when (if ever) the Optional Protocol was to
be regarded as not coming into force.
5.60
The Minister for Justice and Customs responded to the Committee
in a letter dated 25 July 2005, agreeing that the bill should be amended to
provide certainty of commencement of the Optional Protocol. The Minister
proposed to introduce a Government amendment to the bill to provide that
Schedule 2 would not commence at all if the Optional Protocol did not come into
force in Australia within 6 months of the Act receiving the Royal Accent.[35]
5.61
The Committee thanked the Minister for this response and for
undertaking to amend the bill. Unfortunately, the bill was never amended to
address the concerns of the Committee.
5.62
The Committee also noted more generally that the 2005 revision of
the Drafting Directions issued by the Office of Parliamentary Counsel,
highlighted the Committee’s concerns regarding the commencement of bills
implementing international agreements without a time limit.[36]
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