Chapter 3
Issues
Need for the bill
3.1
Following the release of the Australian Crime Commission's Organised
Crime and Drugs in Sport report and other recent doping scandals, witnesses
expressed strong support for the Government's efforts to ensure that Australian
sport remains as far as possible drug‑free. There was also general support
for the strengthening of ASADA's investigative powers,[1]
although concerns were expressed about certain provisions contained in the bill.
3.2
The Government stated that drug testing alone is not enough to identify
anti‑doping rule violations (ADRVs) and that increased investigative
powers are needed. The department submitted that:
With doping becoming increasingly sophisticated, it is less
likely that anti‑doping rule violations will be detected through
analytical testing means alone. It is also the case that a number of the
behaviours which constitute an anti-doping rule violation in the World Anti-Doping
Code can only be detected and substantiated through non analytical means, that
is through investigations and the collection of evidence.[2]
3.3
The Australian Olympic Committee (AOC) submitted data obtained by an
international survey conducted by the Association of Summer Olympic
International Federations. That survey of the Association's members showed that,
despite expenditure of $US1.2 billion on testing every Olympic quadrennial, only
0.89 per cent of the thousands of anti-doping tests that were conducted resulted
in meaningful ADRVs. The AOC submitted that the increasing sophistication of
sports doping practices and the inadequacy of a traditional reliance on athlete
urine and blood testing demands stronger powers of investigation.[3]
3.4
The Coalition of Major Professional and Participating Sports (COMPPS),
which is the peak body for Australia's major professional sporing codes (namely
AFL, ARU, Cricket Australia, FFA, NRL, Netball Australia and Tennis Australia)
posed the question whether the new investigative powers contained in the bill
are needed. Mr Malcolm Speed, Executive Director of COMPPS, stated that:
The history of ASADA's involvements with athletes has
generally been one of full cooperation. That was Justice Wood's finding in that
respect. I do not expect that that will change. There is no doubt that the
provisions are quite extensive and unusual provisions. The issue is whether
they are justified. To establish that, we need to go back and look at what we
are seeking to achieve here, which is wider investigatory powers. Are those
wider investigatory powers required? That is the basic issue.[4]
3.5
In answer to the this question, COMPPS told the committee that the bill
will fill an existing gap in the major sports' investigatory and intelligence
gathering capabilities:
The sports do the enforcement but there is a gap in the
middle there between testing and investigation to build a case before we get to
the enforcement stage. The sports are very competent at dealing with tribunal
hearings and proceedings and imposing penalties. What this legislation seeks to
do is to increase the investigatory and intelligence gathering capability of
the sports. The sports for some time have been asking for assistance from
police forces and from government agencies to be able to collect greater
information to enable them to exercise their powers to a greater extent.[5]
3.6
The CEO of ASADA, Ms Aurora Andruska, informed the committee that since
2006 one third of all ADRVs that have been recorded have resulted from
investigative work not positive tests.[6]
Further, she stated that in the past 12 months 45 per cent of the persons
on whom ASADA had evidence of a suspected ADRV refused to cooperate with the
Authority in giving a full interview.[7]
3.7
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Act already provides ASADA with certain investigative
and intelligence gathering powers. The Government now proposes to increase these
powers to compel athletes and others to cooperate in ASADA's investigations.
This is to be done by imposing penalties on athletes and others who do not
comply with disclosure notices issued by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of
ASADA. Disclosure notices may be issued by the CEO if he or she reasonably
believes that a person has information, documents or things that may be
relevant to the administration of the National Anti-Doping (NAD) Scheme.[8]
3.8
Ms Andruska estimated that if ASADA had been able to compel compliance
in its investigations an additional ten ADRVs (or 25 per cent more ADRVs) would
have been recorded in the past 12 months.[9]
3.9
Although most witnesses agreed that ASADA's investigative powers should
be strengthened, the Australian Athletes Alliance, the Commercial Bar
Association and others had concerns about some of the bill's provisions. These
mainly related to human rights and common law privileges.
New coercive powers
3.10
As discussed above, the bill proposes that the CEO of ASADA would have
the power to issue disclosure notices to compel persons to cooperate in ASADA's
investigations. Arguing against the proposed coercive powers, the Commercial
Bar Association of Victoria submitted that:
Coercive powers including curtailing the right to privacy of
a citizen, requiring the writer of a document to produce the document against
that person's free will...should only be granted in exceptional circumstances.
...
There has been no material submitted to establish that the
coercive powers will assist ASADA in catching more drug cheats. The mere
assertion by ASADA that increasing its powers will make it more effective is
not supported by any evidence.[10]
3.11
The contrary argument was put by the President of the Australian Olympic
Committee, Mr John Coates:
I would like to say that we do not think that this [the
conferring of coercive powers] is a precedent. I know that the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission Act gives similar powers—and, while I
have not read the explanatory memorandum, I take it that is because it is
important to protect the integrity of our financial markets. I put it to you
that it is important to protect the integrity of Australian sport.[11]
3.12
ASADA's powers of compulsion would apply to anyone, not just athletes or
athlete support staff. This gave rise to questions during the inquiry about the
potential use of this process to conduct 'fishing expeditions'.[12]
3.13
It is relevant that anyone, even if he or she has not breached one of
WADA's eight anti-doping violations, may be issued with a disclosure notice if
the CEO has a reasonable belief that there is something relevant to the NAD
Scheme.[13]
Ms Perdikogiannis stated that:
...the CEO of ASADA...would need to have a reasonable belief that
a person has information that is relevant to the administration of the NAD
scheme. That means that a reasonable person sitting in the position of the CEO
of ASADA would need to have information in front of them that would enable them
to form that belief.[14]
3.14
Ms Andruska informed the committee that ASADA would not even ask to
interview someone unless it had good evidence and, further, that the Authority
must operate under the Government's investigative guidelines.[15]
The Department stated that there are very clear and well-established Australian
investigation guidelines which must be taken into account by the CEO before
notices are issued or a person is invited to an interview.[16]
Ms Andruska stated that ASADA 'would never have gone ahead without having a
substantial amount of evidence and a brief that was prepared...'[17]
3.15
Mr Speed, representing COMPPS, stated in relation to the CEO's power to
issue a notice that:
On reflection, we suggest that the threshold surrounding the
chief executive's decision to issue a notice be revised so that there is
greater transparency and protection around the process. We suggest we need some
provisions to protect against arbitrary and ill-informed use of the power to
issue a notice. Of course, we are very supportive of the current chief
executive of ASADA. All of the sports have good relationships with ASADA, but
this legislation will go well into the future. The current requirement is that
the CEO must have a reasonable belief that the person has information,
documents or things that may be relevant to the administration of the National
Anti-doping Scheme. We suggest that, as a minimum, a process similar to the
Australian Crime Commission Act be included whereby the CEO is required to
record written reasons for the issuing of a notice. Perhaps, we would go so far
as to agree with the AAA submission that the grant of coercive powers be
limited to cases where there is a probable cause to believe that the
anti-doping regulations have been violated and that the coercive powers are
necessary to investigate that violation.[18]
3.16
In answer to a question from the committee concerning the process that the
Australian Crime Commission (ACC) must undertake before it may use its coercive
powers, Mr Lawler, the Chief Executive Officer stated:
It is quite a lengthy process. The first part of the process
or the governance around the use of the coercive powers sits with the board of
the Australian Crime Commission. That is the 15 leaders of law enforcement in
this country who approve under the ACC Act either a special operation or a
special investigation. The term 'special' relates to an investigation where the
coercive powers can be utilised under that particular determination as approved
by the board. That is quite a formal document and it is supported by quite
detailed and wide-ranging information to support the particular criminal
activity and the board has two legal tests to apply in the case of a special
operation or a special investigation, they being different. A special operation
is for gathering intelligence and a special investigation is for gathering
evidence. One is an intelligence activity and the other is designed for
prosecution ultimately.
Those tests...go to the intent that traditional law
enforcement is or is likely to be ineffective. So it puts the application of
the powers at the top end of criminality—if I can call it that—where
traditional law enforcement efforts against the particular threat or target
have not been successful. Once those determinations are approved, officers of
the ACC can apply to an independent examiner. An independent examiner is a
statutory appointee who is independent of the commission for the exercise of
those powers and a large number of those examiners are either former judicial
officers or have a very long service in the legal world in some context or other.
...That is the second point in the process. The next issue is
that the examiner is presented effectively with an affidavit or a statement of
facts and needs to satisfy themselves, based on some legal tests within the ACC
Act, that an examination should be conducted. The examiner is required to
record the reasons as to why such an examination should be conducted or the
summons issued. If they are satisfied that those thresholds have been met, the
summons will be duly issued. Once the summons is issued, a person to be
summonsed before the ACC hearing is entitled to legal representation and to be
represented in the hearing. They are afforded strict secrecy and
confidentiality around their appearance to the extent that it is an offence
punishable by imprisonment for an officer of the ACC to disclose who may have
been called before an ACC hearing and it is an offence for the person so
summonsed to disclose that as well. We find that a very important mechanism in
providing assurances to people who come before the commission, including some
who come voluntarily but want that protection and secrecy around their
appearance for a whole range of reasons that are probably pretty self-evident.[19]
3.17
Mr Lawler observed that the ACC operates in the Criminal Code context
whereas ASADA operates in a civil and administrative context. He understood
that there are checks and balances in the ASADA legislation, including
confidentiality provisions; that the Ombudsman has the ability to oversee the
CEO's decision making; and that there is provision for judicial review.[20]
3.18
Mr Lawler's understanding was confirmed by the department in a
supplementary submission. In relation to the issuing of disclosure statements,
the department submitted that:
- Issuing of disclosure notices can only occur if the CEO has a
reasonable belief that the individual concerned has information, documents or
things that may be relevant to the administration of the NAD Scheme.
- The CEO’s reasonable belief will stem from intelligence obtained
by ASADA under the NAD Scheme.
-
As a matter of administrative practice, the reasons which
underpin the application of that discretion are to be properly recorded at the
time of the decision.
- The CEO is also bound by other Commonwealth provisions such as
the Australian Government Investigations Standards.
- The Bill makes clear that the power to issue a disclosure notice
cannot be delegated beyond the Senior Executive Service level within ASADA.[21]
3.19
The department also submitted that Sections 71 and 72 of the Act which
protect privacy and confidentiality will apply to the issuing of disclosure
notices.[22]
Committee view
3.20
The committee acknowledges the checks and balances in the ASADA
legislation and the statement in the statement of compatibility that it is the
Government's intention to provide further protections around the issuing of
disclosure notices in amendments to the regulations. It suggests, however, that
the minister might consider whether more transparency might not be appropriate
in the issuing of disclosure notices in light of the serious possible
consequences for athletes and others.
Recommendation 1
3.21
In light of the serious possible consequences for athletes and others, the
committee recommends that the Government consider additional transparency options
in the issuing of disclosure notices.
3.22
The committee is also of the view that there should be a mechanism in
the legislation to ensure that the Parliament is regularly informed about the
general use of the new coercive powers. In this regard the committee suggests
that the Government consider amendments requiring ASADA to report annually to
the Parliament on its use of disclosure notices. The provision of that report
to the Parliament would enable the Parliament and the public to know how often
ASADA is using the new coercive powers and whether the use of these powers has
resulted in identifying ADRVs. The report would provide an additional
transparency mechanism to balance the provision of this significant new power. Any
information provided would necessarily need to be de‑identified to
protect individuals' privacy.
Recommendation 2
3.23
The committee recommends that the Government consider amendments which
would require ASADA to report annually to the Parliament on its use of
disclosure notices.
Abrogation of the privilege against self-incrimination
3.24
The bill proposes to insert a new section 13D into the Act to enhance
ASADA's investigative functions. Section 13D will apply when a disclosure
notice has been issued by ASADA's Chief Executive Officer requiring a person to
attend an interview and answer questions or produce information, documents or
things. Subsection 13D(1) provides that a person receiving a disclosure notice
cannot claim the right against self-incrimination or that they might expose
themselves to a penalty if they refuse to respond to the notice.
3.25
The Government states in the explanatory memorandum that this approach
is necessary as anti-doping investigations are often significantly hampered, or
in some cases completely obstructed, by a person's refusal to provide
information if the person believes that they may implicate themselves in an ADRV.
Subsection 13D(1) will ensure that a person with information that may assist in
an anti-doping investigation is required to provide that information.[23]
3.26
Subsection 13D(2) provides use and derivative use immunities, which will
ensure that any information, answers given, documents or things provided as the
result of a disclosure notice, will be inadmissible as evidence against the
person in criminal proceedings, except in relation to providing false or
misleading information or documents. The reason for this provision is set down
in the explanatory memorandum which states that the primary intent of the bill
is to assist ASADA in its investigations into possible ADRVs and not to expose
individuals to other civil or criminal proceedings.[24]
The explanatory memorandum states further that:
Information, answers, documents or things provided in
response to a disclosure notice will also be inadmissible as evidence against
the person in civil proceedings unless the proceedings [are] under, or arising
out of, the ASADA Act or regulations. This would mean that the material
obtained under a disclosure notice could not be used in other civil litigation,
for example, an action by a sponsor to recover sponsorship money from an
athlete who had been found by a sport tribunal to have committed an anti-doping
rule violation.[25]
3.27
The Australian Crime Commission (ACC) and the Australian Sports
Commission supported the intent of the bill to increase ASADA's investigative
powers, with the ACC stating that the limitation to ASADA's investigative
powers is 'a significant disadvantage when dealing with persons who have a
vested interest in concealing their activities'.[26]
Mr John Coates, President, AOC, acknowledged that the bill proposed the
introduction of extraordinary powers but commented that they were necessary
because of the 'ineffectiveness of the current testing regime in catching all
the cheats'.[27]
3.28
Other witnesses, including the Law Institute Victorian (LIV), the
Australian Athletes Alliance (AAA) and the Commercial Bar Association of
Victoria (CommBar) raised concerns with section 13D. The LIV 'wholly' opposed
the introduction of the provision because 'the right not to self-incriminate is
a widely accepted, and is a basic human right' which should not be abrogated.
3.29
The AAA referred to the Attorney-General's Department's guide on framing
Commonwealth offences, infringement notices and enforcement powers. That
publication recognises that the right against self-incrimination is 'enshrined'
in Australian common law and the removal of the privilege represents a 'serious
loss of personal liberty' and thus should only be enacted for 'serious offences
and to situation where they are absolutely necessary'. The AAA argued that
there is no evidence that the investigation of doping offences are more
difficult, or that the offence of doping is more serious, than other matters
which are investigated without undermining the right against
self-incrimination.[28]
3.30
CommBar submitted that limitations [of human rights] are only recognised
as being permissible if there are reasonable limits that can be justified in a
free and democratic society based upon human dignity, equality and freedom.[29]
CommBar stated that it did not support the provision as there is no information
to suggest that criminal investigations by bodies such as the Federal Police
and ACC have been impeded under existing powers. CommBar considered that the
Government had not provided justification for the waiver of fundamental
principles of common law and human rights.[30]
3.31
In the bill's statement of compatibility with human rights the
Government stated that it is necessary to abrogate this right to ensure that
possible doping offences can be properly investigated. The Government stated
that there is 'currently no reason for a person of interest to provide
information to ASADA that may assist in building a doping case against an
athlete'.[31]
3.32
There are precedents for legislation to abrogate the privilege against
self‑incrimination, although these almost always include provisions for
use and immunity use immunities. In one case cited by ASADA, it was stated that
the Fair Work Ombudsman can require people to produce documents and there is no
immunity based on privilege against self-incrimination.[32]
3.33
The AAA and LIV stated that they did not consider the immunities
included in subsection 13D(2) provide sufficient protection for athletes.[33]
The AAA commented:
These immunities are insufficient because the impact of any
proceeding based on evidence adduced in the denial of this privilege could have
substantial and devastating effects on the person at issue, such as the loss of
his or her livelihood. The inflexible and harsh mandatory penalties applicable
under the WADA Code are highly relevant in this regard.[34]
3.34
However, the ACC considered that subsection 13D(2) 'achieves an
appropriate balance between compelling the production of information and the
protection of an individual's rights and reputation'.[35]
Similarly, Mr Coates, AOC, stated that the legislation 'protects the athlete in
terms of privacy until such time as they have determined that there is a
violation'.[36]
Committee view
3.35
The committee acknowledges the concerns raised by several submitters,
such as CommBar and LIV, regarding the proposal to remove the privilege against
self‑incrimination. The committee also acknowledges the counter view
posed by organisations, including the AOC and the ACC, which supports the bill
in this regard.
3.36
Furthermore, the committee notes the authoritative comments made by
PJCHR and the Scrutiny Committee, the former of which found that the proposed
section is 'generally consistent with the right not to incriminate oneself'.
Nevertheless the committee is mindful that the PJCHR and the Scrutiny Committee
have sought clarification from the minister on this matter (see chapter 2). The
committee notes that the minister has provided responses to the PJCHR and
expects that she will address the issues identified by the Scrutiny of Bills
Committee before the bill is debated in the Senate.
'Evidential burden' and failure to comply
3.37
The bill amends section 4 of the Act to insert a new definition of
'evidential burden'. The explanatory memorandum states that the definition of
'evidential burden' means the burden of adducing or pointing to evidence that
suggests a reasonable possibility that the matter exists or does not exist.
This applies to disclosure notices issued by ASADA – if a person who claims
that he or she does not have information, documents, materials or things in
response to a disclosure notice, the burden of demonstrating that the person does
not in fact possess them, rests with the person concerned.[37]
3.38
Some submitters opposed the reversal of the burden of proof provisions.[38]
The Australian Paralympic Committee (APC) stated that it considered, given the
extensive investigative and information sharing arrangements already available
to ASADA and the proposal for their extension, 'the shifting of this burden
might be an unreasonable step'. The APC went on to state that the bill
implicitly confers an assumption of guilt when it may be reasonable for a
person to have a genuine basis to claim non-possession but no reasonable way of
proving that beyond their declaration.[39]
The LIV also considered that the burden of proof should rest with ASADA to
establish that a person has the item or knowledge which they are purported to
have.[40]
3.39
The AAA also raised concerns about the reversal of the onus of proof,
submitting that:
Under the proposed legislation, someone who is compelled to
produce information, documents, or things that he/she does not possess, bears
the unreasonable onus of proving a negative — that he/she is not in possession
of such knowledge or said document/thing. If the person cannot perform the
potentially impossible task of proving that he/she does not know something
and/or does not possess something, he/she is subject to a sanction of 30
penalty units (more than $5,000) per day that he/she does not produce what
he/she does not possess.
The appropriate procedure would be to place the onus of proof
on ASADA.[41]
3.40
The AOC stated that the arrangement envisaged in the bill is the same as
that in the Australian Security and Investment Commission rules and that:
What is the big problem, if you have received a notice from
ASADA, with having to go and front up? The explanatory memorandum says that, if
you do not have the document that they are after, swear a statutory declaration
to that effect. It is very simple.[42]
3.41
In its supplementary submission the department stated that:
Under the bill, and in accordance with the World Anti-Doping
Code (the Code), the burden of proof for establishing an anti-doping rule
violation still rests with ASADA.[43]
Committee view
3.42
The committee acknowledges the concerns raised by several submitters,
such as the AAA and the APC, regarding reversal of the burden of proof
provisions. The committee also acknowledges the counter view posed by
organisations, including the AOC, which supports the bill in this regard.
3.43
The committee also notes the comments made by PJCHR which state that 'in
light of this explanation that these matters are peculiarly within the
defendant's knowledge, and as the burden is limited to an evidential burden
only and not a legal burden, the limitation on the presumption of innocence is
reasonable and proportionate'.[44]
3.44
Finally in this regard, the committee notes that the Scrutiny Committee
has sought the minister's advice as to whether a statutory declaration would be
sufficient for these purposes has been accepted by the courts and, if not,
whether consideration has been given to making it clear in the bill that such
evidence would be sufficient to discharge the evidential burden imposed on a
person under proposed subsection. At the time of tabling of this committee's
report, the Scrutiny Committee had not received a response from the minister on
this matter.
Penalties
3.45
Proposed new sections 73A to 73E introduce civil penalties for the
contravention of the requirements of disclosure notices.[45]
3.46
The AOC supported the imposition of penalties for failure to comply with
a notice but questioned whether civil penalties will be sufficient to compel
compliance when non-compliance will simply amount to a debt payable. The AOC stated
that athletes are being increasingly well rewarded financially and a penalty of
$5,100 for failure to comply with a disclosure notice is inconsequential. The
AOC submitted that:
...the legislation should also provide expressly that the
failure to comply will give rise to an adverse inference against the person, on
which the [Anti-Doping Rule Violation Panel] may make its decision or otherwise
act.[46]
3.47
Mr Nolan, representing CommBar, stated that:
We [members of the sports section of the Commercial Bar of
Victoria] provide both paid and pro bono services, more particularly pro bono
services to athletes. This service is offered particularly in relation to drug
cases, because contrary to the impression created today most athletes are not
professional athletes. Most athletes caught by this act are amateur athletes
dependent upon their parents or a sport scholarship which, last time I checked,
was about $12,500 per annum. Incidentally, when one is talking about penalties,
it must be remembered if an athlete has a sport scholarship and is found guilty
of a doping offence, that athlete is required to refund that scholarship, which
is a substantial impost upon the athlete over and above any other penalty.[47]
3.48
The AOC submitted that the sanctions for a failure to comply with a
disclosure notice should involve a criminal penalty to demonstrate the
seriousness with which compliance should be considered by the Government and by
the community. The AOC further submitted that criminal penalties should also
apply to the truthfulness of the information provided.[48]
3.49
The committee was informed that sports organisations make or intend to
make provision for athletes with whom they have agreements to sign statutory
declarations that they have not breached an anti-doping code.[49]
The making of a false declaration would invoke criminal sanctions.
Committee view
3.50
The committee notes the views of submitters on the adequacy of the
bill's penalty provisions. In the committee's view the civil penalties included
in the bill are a suitable starting point to deter the types of activities
targeted by this bill. Further consideration of the appropriateness of the
penalties may be required once the legislation has operated for several years.
Common law privileges
3.51
Some witnesses submitted that the bill might infringe the common law privileges
between persons and their lawyers and/or doctors. For example, the LIV
submitted that the bill is silent on this issue and sought clarification that
the implementation of the new legislation would not infringe on these common
law rights.[50]
Similarly, the AAA submitted that lawyer-client and doctor-patient privilege
should be explicitly recognised in the Act.[51]
Lawyer-Client Privilege
3.52
Ms Perdikogiannis, representing ASADA, provided the following reply to a
question concerning the common-law right of client legal privilege:
Ms Perdikogiannis: ...there has been a lot of discussion
this morning about client legal privilege having been overridden by the bill.
That is certainly not the intention of the bill. Client legal privilege is a
common-law right.
Senator Brandis: But it is able to be abrogated by
statute.
Ms Perdikogiannis: But that would need to be done by
clear and expressed words, Senator, so I think it is worth noting that persons
whom we interview will be able to claim client legal privilege where that
exists.
Senator Brandis: So your evidence, as you understand
it, is that there is nothing in statute to abrogate client privilege?
Ms Perdikogiannis: That is my evidence.[52]
Medical privilege
3.53
In relation to medical privilege, Ms Perdikogiannis stated that:
In terms of medical privilege, I think that is not absolute
now. So, unlike client legal privilege which exists in the common law, medical
doctor‑patient privilege is something that is regulated by statute. The
thing I would say about that is that, from an ASADA investigation of
anti-doping rule violations point of view, our interest, in terms of medical
practitioners, would be as to persons who are engaging in doping behaviour. We
are not interested in the GP of an athlete. We are not interested in trawling
through athletes' medical records in the event that we might find something. We
are not intending to go fishing. This is really about those cases. Take the
Dr Ferrari case, if we go back to Lance Armstrong. Here was a medical
practitioner who had created a doping program for members of the US Postal
cycling team. It is that kind of person that we are interested in.[53]
3.54
The Australian Psychological Society commented on the importance of doctor‑patient
confidentiality:
Psychologists take their commitment to client confidentiality
very seriously, and while confidentiality is never absolute, psychologists
disclose confidential information obtained in the course of their provision of
psychological services only under very specific circumstances. Any statutory
reporting requirement to breach this commitment would risk deterring athletes
from seeking the very services and support they might need to acknowledge and
address any substance-related health and behavioural issues.[54]
Committee view
3.55
The committee notes the concerns expressed by various submitters
regarding the common law privileges between persons and their lawyers and/or
doctors.
3.56
The committee is satisfied with the evidence provided by ASADA officials
that there is no limitation in the bill with respect to client legal privilege.
3.57
The committee also notes ASADA officials' evidence in relation to
medical privilege, and in particular ASADA's intended use of the new powers to
investigate sports medicine professionals who may be engaging in doping behaviour
rather than to obtain information from of an athlete's medical practitioner. The
committee would support any further clarification the Government may be able to
provide on this matter.
Recommendation 3
3.58
The committee recommends that, subject to the recommendations contained
elsewhere in this report, the Senate pass the Australian Sports Anti‑Doping
Authority Amendment Bill 2013.
Senator Glenn
Sterle
Chair
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