Footnotes

134th Report

[1]        See advice No. 37 from the Clerk of the Senate on this issue, published on the committee's website at https://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/priv_ctte/clerks_advices/index.htm.

[2]         New Zealand House of Representatives, Privileges Committee, Question of privilege referred 21 July 1998 concerning Buchanan v Jennings, May 2005; Legislative Assembly of Western Australia, Procedure and Privileges Committee, Effective Repetition: Decision in Buchanan v Jennings, Report No. 3, 2006.

[3]         1994 3 NZLR 1 at 6-7.

[4]         See Appendix 1 for the full text of section 16.

[5]         R v Murphy (1985, unreported) and (1986) 64 ALR 498. For an account of the background to and effect of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 see Odgers' Australian Senate Practice, 11th edition, 2004, ed. Harry Evans, pp. 34-41.

[6]         Senate Committee of Privileges, 125th Report, Parliamentary privilege: Precedents, procedures and practice in the Australian Senate 1966-2005, p. 91. The explanatory memorandum is reproduced in full at pp.88-94.

[7]         ibid. p.88.

[8]         ibid. p.92.

[9]         ibid. p.11.

[10]        Amman Aviation v Commonwealth 1988 19 FCR 223; Rann v Olsen 2000 172 ALR 395; Prebble v Television NZ Limited 1994 3 NZLR 1. Also see Report of the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege (UK), (1998-1999) HL 43-I/ HC 214-I.

[11]         Beitzel v Crabb 1992 2 VR 121.

[12]         Laurance v Katter 1996 141 ALR 447.

[13]         Buchanan v Jennings 2002 3 NZLR 145; upheld by the Privy Council on appeal.

[14]         Tipping J considered that the purpose and policy behind parliamentary privilege as a whole was correctly enunciated by the Privy Council in Prebble.

[15]         2002 3 NZLR 145 at [117].

[16]         ibid. at [150].

[17]         For a summary, see 125th Report, "Relationship with the courts", pp. 74-75.

[18]         125th Report, p. 74.

[19]         Report cited in note 2 above. Recommendation 2 of the report was that the Attorney-General raise at SCAG the form of wording to preclude use of parliamentary proceedings to establish what may effectively have been said (but not actually said) outside Parliament "to ensure as far as possible a uniform approach on the matter across Australia."

[20]         The Supreme Court Act 2003 (NZ) established the Supreme Court of New Zealand from 1 January 2004 as New Zealand's court of last resort. Section 42 ended appeals to the Privy Council, subject to certain transitional provisions.

[21]         Report cited in note 2 above.

[22]         The Australian cases referred to in paragraph 1.9 were settled out of court.

[23]         See, for example, Chief Justice Murray Gleeson AC, "The influence of the Privy Council on Australia", (2007) 29 Australian Bar Review, 123-135.

[24]         For example, without the clarification applying to the full scope of "proceedings in parliament", a person who later said "I was quite right in submitting that document [not composed by the person for the purpose] to the committee about the conduct of Mr X" could, on the Buchanan v Jennings doctrine, be indirectly liable for damages payable to Mr X for the act of providing the document to a committee.