Chapter 2 – Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 and the Senate privilege resolutions
Passage of Parliamentary Privileges Act and Senate Privilege Resolutions
2.1
The passage of the Parliamentary
Privileges Act 1987, and the agreement by the Senate on 25 February 1988 to a
series of eleven privilege resolutions, represented a watershed in the history
of privilege matters in the Senate. The passage of the Act was designed to
confirm what had always been assumed to be the scope of freedom of speech in
Parliament. The necessity for the declaratory enactment derived from unusual
judicial interpretations, by two judges of the Supreme Court of New South
Wales, of the position concerning the use of proceedings in Parliament during
court proceedings. Unlike previous judgments on the question, the two judgments
indicated that words spoken in parliamentary proceedings could be used against
a person in subsequent court proceedings. Problems with some judicial
interpretations of the Parliamentary Privileges Act have continued to the
present day, as will become apparent in later chapters.
2.2
While the need to make a corrective declaration
provided the impetus for the passage of the Act, the opportunity was also taken
to bring into effect changes to the law partly based on recommendations of the
Joint Select Committee on Parliamentary Privilege,[35] tabled in the Senate and the House of
Representatives in October 1984, which required legislation for their
operation. The proposal to appoint the joint committee was initiated in the
House of Representatives in March 1982, in order to review, and report
whether any changes were desirable in respect of:
- the law and practice of parliamentary
privilege as they affect the Senate and the House of Representatives, and
the Members and the committees of each House;
- the procedures by which cases of
alleged breaches of parliamentary privilege may be raised, investigated
and determined; and
- the penalties that may be imposed for
breach of parliamentary privilege.[36]
The Senate agreed to the proposal on 29 April 1982.[37]
2.3
The committee had not reported by the time both Houses
of Parliament were dissolved in February 1983, but was re-established early in
the new Parliament.[38] Despite the
change of government which had occurred following the March 1983 election, the
chairman and deputy chairman of the committee, the latter of whom was by then
Attorney-General, remained in those positions for the duration of the inquiry.
The wide-ranging report of the committee concluded, as its primary
recommendation, that the exercise of Parliament’s penal jurisdiction should be
retained in Parliament. It further recommended that, other than the abolition
of defamatory contempts and the removal of each House’s power to expel its
members, no substantive changes be made to the law of contempt. It also
recommended that each House codify its own proceedings, for the general
information of persons who might be affected by contempt proceedings or by
being named by members of either House.[39]
2.4
The report set out the matters which required changes
by parliamentary enactment under section 49 of the Constitution, or by
amendments to the standing orders of each House, and changes to be implemented
by special resolutions.
2.5
No action was taken on the recommendations of the joint
committee until 1986, when the need to declare the privileges of Parliament
became imperative as a result of the decisions made in the New South Wales
courts, referred to above,[40] which
impinged upon what had previously been regarded by all legislatures as the
scope and protections of privilege. Wide consultations were held both within Australia
and with overseas Parliaments, resulting in the introduction of the
Parliamentary Privileges Bill in the Senate by the President of the Senate,[41] the first occasion in the Commonwealth Parliament
on which a bill had been introduced by a presiding officer. Following its
passage through the Senate, the Bill was
introduced in the House of Representatives by the Attorney-General, supported
in debate by the Speaker.[42] The Bill
secured passage through the House in the first half of 1987,[43] and came into operation on 20 May
of that year.
2.6
At the same time as the bill was being debated, a
series of eleven draft privilege resolutions was tabled in both Houses. These
resolutions were intended to be complementary to the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 and were also partly based on
recommendations in the report of the joint committee. After significant
discussion and negotiation, they were ultimately the subject of debate in the
Senate and were agreed to with modifications on 25 February 1988.[44]
The House of Representatives has not as yet considered or adopted most of them,
although in August 1997 it adopted, with some minor amendments, the
right-of-reply procedure established by Senate resolution 5,[45] and subsequently modified the
guidelines under which the House of Representatives Committee of Privileges
operates.
2.7
In essence, most of the Senate privilege resolutions
codified already-existing practices. By the time of their adoption, the Senate
had had extensive experience in committee work, which not merely required
standardised procedures but also, as in ensuing years, had generated most of
the matters giving rise to possible contempts of the Senate. Several new
features of these resolutions, however, have ensured that the Committee of
Privileges has performed something of an exploratory and a pathfinding role.
For this reason, over the past eighteen years
it has developed informal methods of interpreting and adding to a general
understanding of privilege. In its reports on most of the specific matters
which it has considered, it has adopted the practice of making comments on the
general principles of privilege, and this present report, like its
predecessors, summarises the matters and themes canvassed in individual
reports.
2.8
The Act, resolutions and the explanatory statements
relating to each are at Appendices A and B to this report, together with a
summary of each of the committee’s reports to the Senate (Appendix G).
Summary and discussion of privilege resolutions
Raising matters of privilege
2.9
While, as indicated above, many of the resolutions
codified and gave guidance on already-existing practices, they also established
a new process for raising matters of privilege. Most other parliaments insist
that privilege matters be raised at the first opportunity, a practice which
gives little time for reflection and can be arbitrary in what may or may not be
referred. Resolution 7, however, ensures that matters need not be raised at the
first opportunity; the President of the Senate is not required to make any
determination as to whether a prima facie case exists; and the matters are
normally first raised in writing with the President by a senator, thereby
removing them from the more heated and public arena of the Senate chamber. The
resolution provides that the President must make an early determination as to
whether a matter of privilege should have precedence over other business, and
must communicate the decision to the senator raising the matter. If the
President determines that a matter should have precedence, the President must
report that decision to the Senate as well as to the senator concerned. The
President’s decision to give precedence gives the senator raising the matter a
right to give notice of motion to refer the matter to the Committee of
Privileges, and such a motion has precedence over all other business on the day
for which the notice is given. The President has given such precedence on 63
occasions, although in respect of one matter no further action was taken by the
senator raising the matter, or any other senator, to refer it to the committee.[46] On one occasion, a notice of motion to
refer a matter relating to the alleged failure of a senator to provide a
statement of certain interests to the Registrar of Senators’ Interests was
withdrawn following an apology from the senator concerned.[47] One further contempt matter was
referred to the committee following the President’s tabling of certain
documents.[48] In respect of two other matters
to which the President gave precedence,[49]
the Senate determined that they should not be referred to the committee.[50] In both cases, the issue was
determined by a division.
2.10
The President has reported three times to the Senate
that precedence has been refused to matters raised,[51] but is not obliged to report all such
decisions to the Senate. If the President determines that a matter should not
have precedence a senator is not precluded from taking other action, but so far
senators appear to have been satisfied with the President’s decisions.
2.11
Cases of possible contempt frequently arise from
proceedings of Senate committees. Such committees are obliged to adhere to
strict procedures to protect the integrity of their operations and to ensure
the protection of witnesses.[52]
Nevertheless, on occasions a committee may become aware that its proceedings
have been disclosed in an unauthorised manner, that it has been misled, or that
witnesses have been improperly influenced, threatened or penalised because of
the evidence they gave, or intended to give, to the committee. In such a
situation, the committee makes its own investigations and may report the facts
and its conclusions to the Senate, while usually at the same time raising the
matter with the President. If the committee recommends that the matter be
referred to the Committee of Privileges, it is usual for the chair of the
originating committee to give notice of motion to that effect, although it is
open to another senator to so move, regardless of the views of the committee as
a whole.[53]
Criteria for determining contempt
2.12
In making a decision as to whether a matter which a
senator has raised should have precedence, the President is bound under
resolution 4 to have regard to two criteria only:
- the principle that the Senate’s power
to adjudge and deal with contempts should be used only where it is
necessary to provide reasonable protection for the Senate and its
committees and for senators against improper acts tending substantially to
obstruct them in the performance of their functions, and should not be
used in respect of matters which appear to be of a trivial nature or
unworthy of the attention of the Senate; and
- the existence of any remedy other than
that power for any act which may be held to be a contempt.
2.13
In determining whether the matter should be referred to
the Committee of Privileges, and ultimately whether a contempt has been
committed, the Senate is required by resolution 3 to take into account the same
criteria as the President, but additionally must take into account whether a person
who committed any act which may be held to be a contempt knowingly committed
that act, or had any reasonable excuse for the commission of that act.
2.14
The Committee of Privileges is similarly required by
resolution 3 to take all three criteria into account when inquiring into any
matter referred to it.
Committee of Privileges proceedings
2.15
The Committee of Privileges is bound under resolution 1
to observe the normal procedures of Senate committees for the protection of
witnesses. These include inviting witnesses to make submissions or produce
documents in the first instance, unless there are exceptional circumstances;
giving witnesses reasonable notice to appear before it and opportunity to
comment on adverse evidence; and other, similar protections.[54] However, these protections are
supplemented and where necessary overridden by the special provisions of
resolution 2 when the committee is considering any matter which may involve or
give rise to any allegations of a contempt. Further details of the committee’s
proceedings are given in Chapter 5.
Matters constituting contempts
2.16
All matters which the committee has been required to
consider have come within the ambit of the matters constituting contempts set
out in resolution 6 of the resolutions. The full text of resolution 6 can be
found at Appendix B; in brief, the matters which the Senate may treat as
constituting contempts include:
-
interference with the Senate
-
improper influence of senators
-
senators seeking benefits, etc
-
molestation of senators
-
disturbance of the Senate
-
service of writs in the Senate precincts
-
false reports of proceedings
-
disobedience of Senate or Senate committee
orders
-
obstruction of Senate or Senate committee orders
-
interference with witnesses
-
molestation of witnesses
-
offences by witnesses (such as failure to
produce documents)
-
unauthorised disclosure of evidence or
proceedings.
2.17
As the preamble to resolution 6 makes clear, the list
is not exhaustive but is intended as a general guide to persons that acts
coming within the prohibitions specified under the resolution may be treated by
the Senate as contempts. The committee is satisfied from its experience that
the matters raised in that resolution give firm guidance to persons the subject
of contempt references, to senators and Senate committees, and to the Committee
of Privileges itself. The committee has not found it difficult to categorise
any of the matters before it under one or more of the resolution 6 provisions,
and has not had to deal with all the indicative categories.
Findings of and punishments for
contempt
2.18
The final resolution relating to consideration of
contempt matters concerns the treatment of persons who have been found to be in
contempt of the Senate. In practice, action arising in the Senate following a
finding of contempt has been generated by the chair of the Committee of
Privileges. If the committee has determined that a contempt has been committed
or that a penalty should be imposed, the chair is required to give seven days’
notice of a motion for the Senate to determine a contempt or impose a penalty.
Since the passage of the Parliamentary Privileges Act and Senate privilege
resolutions, the committee has found contempt by persons in only nine cases,[55] recommending a penalty in respect of
one of those cases,[56] and the requisite
notice has been given. In other matters it found that contempts had been
committed[57] but, because it was unable
to discover the source of the contempt, the seven days’ notice was not required
or given.
Right of reply
2.19
A further resolution which involves the Privileges
Committee concerns the protection of persons referred to in
the Senate. This resolution, the only resolution which was the subject of some
controversy at the time of its adoption, enables a person who has been referred
to in the Senate in a way in which the person regards as adverse to seek a
right of reply in the same forum. Details of its operation are discussed in the
next chapter.
2.20
While the right-of-reply procedure is helpful to
persons who consider themselves maligned by comments made in the Senate,
ultimately the responsibility for minimising hurt to a person lies with
individual senators. While privilege is a necessary instrument of a free and
functioning parliament, the most important guardians of that privilege are the
legislators. To this end the committee draws attention to a further resolution
(resolution 9), which enjoins all senators to exercise their valuable right of
freedom of speech in a responsible manner.
Other resolutions
2.21
The two remaining resolutions, although mechanical in nature,
are significant in that they recognise the particular relationship between the
Senate and the courts on the one hand, and the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the other. Briefly, Resolution 10 declares that leave of the
Senate is not required to admit into evidence before courts or tribunals
reports of evidence of proceedings in the Senate or its committees, although
paragraph (3) of the resolution provides that the Senate should be notified of
any such admission. Resolution 11 empowers the committee to confer with the
Committee of Privileges in the House of Representatives, although the
respective committees have not as yet found the need to do so.
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