CHAPTER ONE

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING UNAUTHORISED DISCLOSURE

Introduction

1.1 When the Senate adjourned its budget sittings in July 1998, the Committee of Privileges had before it six references relating to the unauthorised disclosure of documents and reports from Senate committees and joint committees administered by the Department of the Senate, and had completed its consideration of all references. Given the nature of its findings, it was required to notify certain persons of its conclusions, and thus did not have the opportunity to report to the Senate before the elections intervened. The committee has continued the references in the new Parliament.

1.2 The number of these references is unusual. The question of unauthorised disclosure of documents has been a theme of reports of the Committee of Privileges since its first-ever report on a matter of privilege, in 1971, with eight of the seventy-three reports presented dealing with the subject. However, the current set of references represents what might be regarded as almost an epidemic of unauthorised disclosures. Furthermore, even during the preparation of this present report, the committee has become aware, both formally and informally, of at least three further cases of possible unauthorised disclosure, involving two of the committees the subject of this report.

1.3 The primary task of the committee is to examine, in respect of each of the matters referred, whether a contempt of the Senate has been committed. The committee's conclusions and findings on each reference will be outlined in the next chapter, together with details of the matters. In addition, the committee has decided to examine why such a spate of these references should have come before it and to examine whether there continues to be a need for the present prohibitions on unauthorised disclosure.

1.4 If the committee and ultimately the Senate were so to conclude, the committee considers that it would be obliged to establish what might be appropriate guidelines for other committees, their members and staff to avert, or at the least alleviate, the problems which it has identified. It would also consider itself bound to warn any persons who might be minded deliberately to disclose information without authority that the tolerance of their actions which the committee foreshadows it has shown in this report would not be continued in future.

Background

1.5 Before examining whether some control over the unauthorised disclosure of committee proceedings is justified, the committee gives a brief background to the matters with which it has dealt since its establishment in 1966 and the evolution of its approach to dealing with these matters, particularly since the passage of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 and the complementary Senate Privilege Resolutions of 25 February 1988.

Unauthorised disclosure through media publications

1.6 The first case of unauthorised disclosure, on which the Committee of Privileges reported in 1971, [1] concerned the premature disclosure in two newspapers of details of a committee report which was due for tabling the next day. At no stage did the committee seek the source of the leak and, despite quite abject apologies, during the committee's proceedings, from the editors of the two papers concerned, the committee recommended that a contempt be found and the editors of both papers be formally reprimanded by the Senate. The entire proceedings were held behind closed doors. The Senate adopted the report, and the editors were duly reprimanded at the bar of the Senate — the only occasion on which a penalty has been imposed as a result of a contempt finding.

1.7 It was not until 1984 that the second such case arose. This involved what the committee regarded then, as indeed it still does, as the most serious of contempts — the unauthorised publication in a newspaper of evidence given by a witness in camera. Consideration of the implications arising from this case led ultimately to the prescription of unauthorised disclosure of in camera evidence as a criminal offence under the Parliamentary Privileges Act. The committee, after undertaking a public examination of a considerable number of witnesses, found a serious contempt against the editor, publisher and journalist concerned. Unlike the first committee, which did not consider itself entitled to inquire into the source of the information, the committee made exhaustive, but in the event unsuccessful, inquiries in an attempt to find the source of the disclosure, and reported that it would similarly have found against the source if the information had been disclosed deliberately. [2]

1.8 The committee made a separate report on penalty some months later, concluding that, given that the source of the information was undetected, it would be unfair to impose a penalty on the recipients, although it placed the persons concerned on notice that they could not expect immunity from penalty in future. It also recommended, successfully, that the Parliament's penal powers be statutorily clarified. [3]

1.9 In more recent cases involving disclosure to the media, the committee has concentrated almost exclusively on attempts to find the source, virtually ignoring the role of the media in publishing such disclosures. The committee has usually gone through the process of inviting submissions from the media, but has not found this method to be particularly efficacious in pursuing the source of the information. In accordance with its views expressed in the 1984 case, it has not been willing to punish the publisher of the information without being able to penalise the source.

1.10 In one of its later reports on media publication, the committee noted that the Legal and Constitutional References Committee had before it a reference on the rights and obligations of the media, and recommended that the terms of reference be extended to include the question of journalistic ethics arising from the premature publication of committee proceedings. [4] The recommendation was adopted on 30 June 1994, [5] but that committee has not pursued the reference in the present Parliament.

1.11 The committee suggests that the change in approach to dealing with the media, reflected in its own reports over a period of more than a quarter of a century, reflects the changed relationship between the Parliament and the media.

Unauthorised disclosure by public servants

1.12 Not all reports have involved unauthorised disclosure to the media. Two of the eight reports related to unauthorised disclosure of information to, and by, public servants, one of whom had deliberately disclosed information without authority, [6] while the other inadvertently disclosed an unpublished submission to a committee. [7] Although the committee reported to the Senate in both cases that a contempt should not be found, it drew attention to the obligations of public servants to be aware of parliamentary privilege — a theme addressed again in this report, as well as in several others not involving unauthorised disclosures.

Unauthorised disclosure in a state legislature

1.13 The most recent case on which the committee has reported was also the most serious involving unauthorised disclosure since 1984. It, too, involved the improper release of an in camera submission, which was quoted in a state legislature. The committee was unable to find the source of the improper disclosure, and was unable to take action against the recipients of the material, as they were protected by parliamentary privilege. [8] Indeed, it is almost customary that the committee fails formally to discover the source of the most serious improper disclosures, despite efforts to do so.

Questions for determination

1.14 The present cases thus continue the inglorious tradition of improper disclosure which has been part of parliamentary proceedings over a long period, and lead the committee to address the questions implicit in its attempts to perform the duties imposed on it in dealing with the present prohibitions on unauthorised disclosure of committee material.

1.15 These questions are:

(a) whether it is necessary to retain the prohibitions against disclosure which are currently provided under the Parliamentary Privileges Act, the Privilege Resolutions, and the standing orders of the Senate;

(b) if so, whether current mechanisms are adequate to ensure that the rules are adhered to; and

(c) the culpability of sources of disclosure and the publishers of confidential material received or acted on as a consequence of such improper disclosure.

Response to (a) — whether it is necessary to retain the prohibitions against disclosure

1.16 It is tempting sometimes, given the regularity of improper disclosure, to suggest that it may be time to determine whether the present prohibitions should be either modified or eliminated. It may at first sight be difficult to contemplate, particularly by an institution which is dedicated to the dissemination of information, why the authority of committees and the chamber to which they report should be absolute. Mindless secrecy is the antithesis of a working democracy and thus any decision to treat unauthorised disclosure of information as a possible contempt, with the attendant sanctions, should not be taken lightly.

1.17 There is, however, good reason for all deliberations and documents of committees to be kept private until there is a general release of not merely a report, but usually associated documents, by agreement between committee members. The rules laid down by the Senate, in common with most other legislatures, are not arbitrary or artificial, losing both effect and meaning the more they are flouted.

1.18 The primary reason for the sanction against improper disclosure is, as with all other matters of privilege, the protection of witnesses. Additional reasons, particularly when the question arises as to premature disclosure of an already-completed report, relate to the integrity of committee proceedings, and the relationship of trust between committee members which must exist for a committee to function constructively and productively.

1.19 These principles are underpinned by the duty imposed on the Senate, when considering whether to exercise its contempt power, to have regard to:

The principle that the Senate's power to adjudge and deal with contempts should be used only where it is necessary to provide reasonable protection for the Senate and its committees and for Senators against improper acts tending substantially to obstruct them in the performance of their functions, and should not be used in respect of matters which appear to be of a trivial nature or unworthy of the attention of the Senate. [9]

1.20 The first matter for the Committee of Privileges to establish is whether there should be some hierarchy of heinousness in considering any improper disclosures of material which is produced, in the first place, to or by committees as delegates of their respective chambers. The committee therefore discusses the types of documents which are released, and the damage that may result from unauthorised disclosure.

(a) Submissions and evidence

1.21 In keeping with its concern for the protection of witnesses, the committee first addresses unauthorised disclosure of submissions and evidence. Frequently, release of submissions which can in themselves be innocuous if published prematurely either by the authors of those submissions or by other persons, deliberately or inadvertently, can jeopardise the integrity of committee proceedings and can have unexpected consequences for external agents. For example, the premature release of information at an inopportune time may be the last link in a chain of events which could declare the hand of persons who were pursuing a perpetrator of a fraud. In addition, it may be necessary for submissions or other documents which, either explicitly or implicitly, make adverse comment upon persons who may be central or even peripheral to a committee's inquiry to be received in confidence until such time as the person concerned is able to make a response. Furthermore, persons giving evidence may be victimised if their evidence were to become public without their knowledge or authority. The seriousness and importance of these latter two matters are, as previously indicated, reflected in the criminal sanctions within the Parliamentary Privileges Act against the improper release of in camera evidence.

1.22 Given the capacities of the committees themselves to authorise release of the documents before them, and ultimately to publish even in camera evidence should the necessity be identified in the course of committee proceedings, it appears to the Committee of Privileges that the present rules which keep control of proceedings in the hands of committee members collectively are appropriate.

(b) Committee reports

1.23 Similarly, it appears to the committee that the obligation on committees and their members to report first to the relevant House of the Parliament before dissemination, whether selective or otherwise, to the media, or for that matter other persons, is also an appropriate duty to be impressed on parliamentary committees, their members and staff. Mechanisms are available to committees under the authority of the parent chamber to otherwise disseminate their completed reports should there be a compelling reason to do so. In other words, the requirements relating to unauthorised disclosure are neither mindless nor rigid. It is appropriate under these circumstances that any departure from the structures which enable the successful conduct, completion and reporting of an inquiry should be met with, at the least, disapproval, and if required by resort to the contempt powers, of the respective House.

1.24 Concern by Senate and joint committee members generally at such disclosures is evidenced in the documents associated with several of the Privileges Committee's present references. [10] Debate in the Senate on one such reference led the Chair of another committee to raise with the President of the Senate concerns about what this committee, too, regards as a more insidious subset of premature release of reports, the release of draft reports during their preparation. [11] Deliberate release of drafts at an early stage of committee deliberations has one purpose alone: to influence the outcome of deliberations, thereby impairing the integrity of committee proceedings. Only in rare circumstances should a committee ignore the privilege implications of disclosures of this nature.

1.25 Other documents, such as memoranda of advice, minutes of proceedings and private committee correspondence, are often crucial to the operations of any committee. Unauthorised disclosure of these internal working documents can destroy the relationship of trust which is essential to productive committee deliberations. Even if the documents, on their face, are harmless or routine, the importance to all participants in the deliberative process of the understanding that documents are, in effect, communal property overrides any individual right to release documents without consultation with other committee members.

Response to (b) — if so, whether current mechanisms are adequate to ensure that the rules are adhered to

1.26 The committee has noted from time to time several matters that have not been referred to it, even if, judging from media reports of their content, they appear to be of sufficient gravity as to warrant at least an examination as to whether a question of contempt is involved. In contrast, several of the matters which the committee has been required to consider in this report have, in its view, verged on the trivial. This is not to suggest any criticism of the President of the Senate who, once a matter has been raised which appears to involve unauthorised disclosure, has little choice but to give the matter precedence so that it can be properly investigated by this committee.

1.27 The difference between the first and the second cases lies in the mechanism which already exists to distinguish between matters which should be considered as questions of contempt, and other matters which might perhaps be an expression of frustration at a breakdown of committee processes or the politicisation of those processes.

1.28 The mechanism is provided for in a resolution of the Senate, which was agreed to on 20 June 1996 [12] following a report from the Committee of Privileges. [13] The resolution formalised a procedure suggested by the committee as early as December 1989, [14] and is now binding on all Senate and joint committees.

1.29 As with other Senate procedures, the resolution builds in a filter, so that, at least in theory, only serious matters should reach the Committee of Privileges for examination. In the first place, the relevant committee is required to seek advice from its members and staff about the possible source of the improper disclosure. The resolution provides that the committee itself should come to a conclusion as to whether the disclosure caused, or had a tendency to cause, substantial interference with the work of the committee or of the Senate. It is only after this process has been completed that a committee should seek a reference to the Privileges Committee.

1.30 Experience of Committee of Privileges members suggests that it is not unknown for a committee to discover who might have disclosed documents without authority. In some cases, the matter rests, without further action, on the ground that the disclosure has not interfered substantially with committee proceedings. However, even with the knowledge of the source of the disclosure, committees sometimes consider that matters should be taken further. For example, in three of the matters to be discussed in the next chapter, the identity of the person(s) who disclosed the documents without authority is known, and in two of those cases the relevant committee has determined that its proceedings have been jeopardised. [15] In the third case, the reference was made on the motion of a previous committee member and, while the committee concerned could not find that its work was substantially interfered with, it nonetheless expressed its disquiet about the matter of premature disclosure generally. [16]

1.31 If, as is more usually the case, no “culprit” can be found during the preliminary inquiries made by the relevant committee, the Committee of Privileges suggests that it is more likely that the committees will conclude that substantial interference has occurred. This is because of the harm done to the relationship of trust which this committee emphasises is basic to successfully-functioning committees. Whichever outcome results, the Committee of Privileges is of the view that the mechanisms in place are adequate to protect the integrity of committee proceedings.

1.32 This committee also accepts, and the 20 June 1996 resolution reflects, that senators must retain a right separately to raise a matter of privilege without using the committee mechanism, but would expect that this method would be used only when all other attempts to make the judgments required by the resolution have been unsuccessful.

1.33 The committee also emphasises that, prima facie, it would expect that any incident of improper release of in camera evidence would be brought by any other committee quickly to the attention of the Senate and ultimately to the Committee of Privileges, with a view possibly to criminal action if the matters raised are sufficiently grave as to justify such a course.

Response to (c) — culpability of sources of disclosure and the publishers of confidential material received or acted on as a consequence of such improper disclosure

Culpability of information providers

1.34 As the committee's earlier outline of its approach to the question of culpability demonstrates, the concentration on culpability has in recent years swung towards the provider of the information rather than its recipient. In all questions of contempt, there are varying degrees of seriousness with which any such culpability may be treated. Certainly, the inadvertent disclosure of information does not carry the same reprehensibility as a deliberate flouting of the rules, whether covertly or overtly. The committee would not wish, however, to absolve persons of a certain level of experience from responsibility for improper disclosure when they should have known of the prohibitions against any such disclosure.

1.35 The purpose of the present report is therefore both to remind those senators, members and staff who should already be aware of their responsibilities in this area, and to advise those who are being confronted with these rules for the first time, that improper disclosure of submissions, evidence, documents and private deliberations of all committees may constitute a serious offence against a House of Parliament.

— Deliberate disclosure

1.36 The primary motivation for the deliberate and improper disclosure of a report or other documents is always to gain maximum publicity for a particular and more often than not loaded or biased point of view. Those members of a committee who, notwithstanding the temptation to achieve a pre-emptive headline strike, behave properly and appropriately are seriously disadvantaged by adherence to parliamentary propriety while knowing that it is likely that their colleagues' slant on a matter referred to a committee will receive media prominence. If such practices become the norm within a committee it is inevitable that a relationship of trust breaks down and that to all intents and purposes the committee has ceased to function, let alone in either a constructive or a productive manner.

— Inadvertent disclosure

1.37 A common method of improper disclosure derives from inadvertent release. The Committee of Privileges is aware that since the March 1996 elections there has been a significant increase in inexperienced members of both Houses of Parliament, and concomitantly a similar lack of experience in parliamentary procedures and propriety by their staff. This is likely to be compounded by the influx of new senators, members and staff following the October 1998 election.

1.38 While the committee knows that seminars are conducted for both elected representatives and their staff, it accepts that the capacity to absorb the wealth of material presented in the early days of their coming to the Parliament is limited. It also acknowledges that follow-up seminars are difficult to arrange once offices are established and all too quickly involved in the parliamentary and political processes. It therefore is not surprised that the potential effects of improper or inappropriate disclosure of committee documents are not readily absorbed either by the members of the committee or by their staff. Even inadvertent disclosure can, however, lead to unfortunate consequences for the operations of a committee generally, and in respect of a specific inquiry, which can lead to a question of contempt being raised.

1.39 In the committee's view, ignorance of these necessary parliamentary requirements can no longer be regarded as an excuse for improper disclosure. Following the tabling of this report, the committee intends to draw the attention of all senators, Ministers and heads of public service departments to its content and warns that in future the committee will deal with any improper disclosures with less tolerance than it has done in respect of the present matters. It would also ask that the attention of Members of the House of Representatives similarly be drawn to prohibitions on disclosure, although it recognises the limitations on its own capacity to do so.

Culpability of recipients

— The media

1.40 Culpability is not, however, confined to the source of information. The recipients of improperly disclosed material — normally the media — have a stake in its provision. The committee has long observed that more often than not it is not the content of a document which is of intrinsic interest to media recipients: rather, its leaking makes the material newsworthy and frequently leads to biased or distorted reporting. The media, if they knowingly receive a leaked document or an improper briefing on committee proceedings, are complicit in any undue attempts to influence or distort the outcome of deliberations of a committee. The committee therefore warns media recipients of leaked information that, while it has in the past been reluctant to punish the media without satisfying itself as to the source of the information, it may not be so restrained in future.

— Other persons

1.41 For other persons who either consciously or inadvertently receive information, depending on the circumstances of the case and the attempts made by such recipients to alleviate the consequences of their receipt of any such documents, they too may find themselves subject to sanctions available to this committee and the Senate.

— Public servants

1.42 The most likely persons who receive such information are public servants. This is not surprising, because public servants are the primary source of advice to all parliamentary committees and consequently are the most used resource of, and have the greatest access and exposure to, members of parliamentary committees. One problem with this relationship, which has been identified in several reports of the Committee of Privileges, ranging from improper disclosure through matters of possible false or misleading evidence to what the committee regards as the most serious of possible contempts, that is, improper interference with witnesses before committees, is the ignorance about parliamentary privilege demonstrated by officers at the most senior levels of the service. A constant theme of all the committee's reports relating to public servants and statutory office holders has been its concern about their inability, if not unwillingness, to factor into their performance of their duties a knowledge of the requirements and demands of each House of Parliament and its committees.

1.43 As a result of previously-expressed committee concerns, [17] on 21 October 1993 the Senate agreed to the following resolution:

[T]hat all heads of departments and other agencies, statutory office holders and Senior Executive Service Officers should be required, as part of their duties, to undertake study of the principles governing the operation of Parliament, and the accountability of their departments, agencies and authorities to the Houses of Parliament and their committees, with particular reference to the rights and responsibilities of, and protection afforded to, witnesses before parliamentary committees. [18]

1.44 The committee has referred to the question of public servants' responsibilities to the Parliament most recently in its 73rd report, tabled on 30 June 1998. [19] In that report, the committee recommended that the resolution be reaffirmed and that all departments report, within twelve months of the Senate's adoption of the recommendation, on how the terms of the resolution have been complied with. The Senate adopted the recommendations on 1 December 1998.

1.45 Even before the Senate had considered the recommendations, steps had been taken to meet the requirements of the resolution. In addition to an existing program for SES Band 1 officers, the Public Service and Merit Protection Commission has, in consultation with officers of both Houses of the Parliament, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the Attorney-General's Department, created a specialised course dealing with matters covered by the resolution. Furthermore, the PSMPC invited the secretary to the committee to write an article in the widely-circulated SES News, drawing attention to the committee's concerns. SES officers of the Attorney-General's Department, itself the subject of the 73rd report, have attended the course established by the Department of the Senate in 1993 as a consequence of the adoption of the resolution; so too have officers of the then Department of Communications and the Arts, which is the subject of discussion in the second chapter of this report. The committee understands that some 300 officers of other departments have already participated in the Senate Department's SES courses. The committee looks forward to reports from all departments on their approaches to complying with the resolution.

Summary

1.46 The prescriptive declarations in this report are designed to emphasise to all persons associated with the Parliament and its committees the seriousness with which this committee regards the integrity of parliamentary proceedings. The committee continues to emphasise that its highest duty is to protect witnesses before parliamentary committees and will always regard improper disclosure of in camera evidence as the most serious of this genre of possible contempts. This is not, however, to diminish the significance it attaches to the relationship of trust between members of a committee; the duty of senators, members and parliamentary and ministerial staff to inform themselves of the obligations that are imposed on them; the obligation on public servants who have a particular relationship with the Parliament and its committees to keep themselves informed of and knowledgeable about parliamentary procedures of relevance to their work; and the responsibility of the media to work within the framework established for all participants in the parliamentary process.

1.47 The committee has determined for general guidance its future approach to improper disclosure of committee evidence, submissions, reports and documents and proceedings.

In camera evidence

1.48 All persons within the jurisdiction of the Senate who are party to disclosure of in camera evidence may be expected to face severe findings of contempt, with attendant penalties, and a possible prosecution under the criminal provisions of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987. Publishers and authors within the media, regardless of whether the source of the documents is discovered, can similarly expect to face severe sanctions.

Committee documents or proceedings not authorised for disclosure

1.49 Unauthorised disclosure of documents or proceedings of a committee can be expected to be examined by the Committee of Privileges on an assumption that a contempt is likely to be found.

Premature release of committee reports

1.50 This committee does not welcome any references of this nature, and is particularly concerned at the betrayal of trust and one-upmanship which deliberate, premature release of reports, at whatever stage of their preparation, represents. The committee does not subscribe to the fiction, either, that sanctions against improper disclosure of the material to the media may be evaded by phrases such as “it is believed that” or “the committee is expected to” or similar devices. If any such matters are referred to the committee in the future, both the discloser, if discovered, and the media, can be expected to receive severe treatment.

Investigations by relevant committee

1.51 In determining this approach, the Committee of Privileges points out that it is predicated on an assumption that a committee has undertaken its own investigations in accordance with the Order of the Senate of 20 June 1996. The committee assumes that adherence to this order will ensure that the relevant committees will deliberate seriously on a matter before a reference is sought from the Senate.

1.52 The committee also accepts and acknowledges that the procedures to be followed under the order may be used as a weapon by the majority to pursue, or subdue, the minority. The committee therefore continues to endorse the capacity included in that order for senators to take their own separate action under Standing Order 81 to raise a matter of privilege. It draws attention, however, to its comments at paragraph 1.32 above that every effort should be made to reach agreement within a committee as to whether a possible matter of contempt should be pursued.

1.53 The committee also accepts that a majority may attempt to prevent the views of a minority being recognised in the final outcome of committee deliberations. The Senate's similar acknowledgment of difficulties for a minority or independent committee member is reflected in the long-standing principle that dissents may be added to a majority report. In addition, provision is made within standing orders to enable the disclosure of in camera evidence, as follows:

A senator who wishes to refer to in camera evidence in a dissenting report shall advise the committee of the evidence concerned, and all reasonable effort shall be made by the committee to reach agreement on the disclosure of the evidence for that purpose. If agreement is not reached, the senator may refer to the in camera evidence in the dissent only to the extent necessary to support the reasoning of the dissent. ... [20]

1.54 The committee believes that a similar process should be available to, and must be followed by, a senator in respect of deliberations and other documents of the committee, and recommends that the matter be referred to the Procedure Committee to consider an amendment to standing orders to give effect to this proposal.Having set the framework under which the committee has operated, and expects to operate in future, in respect of unauthorised disclosure references, the Committee of Privileges addresses in the next chapter the matters referred to it by the Senate.

Footnotes

[1] 1st Report, Parliamentary Paper No. 163/1971.

[2] 7th Report, Parliamentary Paper No. 298/1984.

[3] 8th Report, Parliamentary Paper No. 239/1985.

[4] 48th Report, Parliamentary Paper No. 113/1994.

[5] Journals of the Senate, 30 June 1994, p. J.1999.

[6] 9th Report, Parliamentary Paper No. 506/1985.

[7] 22nd Report, Parliamentary Paper No. 45/1990.

[8] 54th Report, Parliamentary Paper No. 133/1995.

[9] Privilege Resolution 3, Standing Orders and other Orders of the Senate, August 1997, p. 99.

[10] Volume of Documents, pp. 91, 112, 125 and 131.

[11] ibid., p. 99.

[12] Continuing Order 3, Standing Orders and other Orders of the Senate, August 1997, pp. 116-117.

[13] 60th Report, Parliamentary Paper No. 9/1996.

[14] 20th Report, Parliamentary Paper No. 461/1989.

[15] References (2) and (3).

[16] Reference (4).

[17] See, e.g., 36th Report, Parliamentary Paper No. 194/1992, and 42nd Report, Parliamentary Paper No. 85/1993.

[18] Continuing Order 30, Standing Orders and other Orders of the Senate, August 1997, p. 130.

[19] 73rd Report, Parliamentary Paper No. 118/1998.

[20] Standing Order 37(2), Standing Orders and other Orders of the Senate, August 1997, p. 32.