Chapter 3
Key issues and committee view
Introduction
3.1
This chapter discusses the key issues raised during the inquiry and
contains the committee's view and recommendations. Key issues raised during the
inquiry include:
-
the definition of 'legislative instrument' and general rule-making
powers;
-
the correction and editorial change powers of the FPC;
-
exemptions from disallowance;
-
consultation requirements; and
-
notifiable instruments.
Legislative instrument definition and rule-making
3.2
Existing subsection 5(1) of the Legislative Instrument Act 2003 (LIA),
provides that (subject to some exceptions) a legislative instrument is an
instrument in writing:
- that is of a legislative character; and
-
that is or was made in the exercise of a power delegated by the
Parliament.[1]
3.3
The 2008 review described the LIA definition of 'legislative instrument'
as 'workable', but considered 'that improvements should be made'. It stated:
There is an unhelpful circularity in paragraph 5(1)(a) of the
definition, which defines a legislative instrument as an instrument 'that is of
a legislative character'. It is difficult to see that this adds anything to the
definition. The concept of 'legislative character' is defined in non-exclusive
terms in subsection 5(2), and the Committee is not aware of any legislative
instrument that is caught by paragraph 5(1)(a), but not subsection 5(2).
Moreover, as noted above, the practice has developed since
the commencement of the LIA of explicitly declaring in the enabling legislation
whether or not instruments are legislative instruments. The Committee is
therefore of the view that the circular reference in paragraph 5(1)(a) could be
removed without altering the intended operation of the definition.[2]
3.4
Pearce and Argument's Delegated Legislation in Australia, referring
to the 2008 review's criticism of the definition of 'legislative
instrument', commented:
While the definition has its difficulties, it must be
remembered that those issues have largely been addressed by the express
designation of instruments, as legislative or not, in Commonwealth legislation.
However, there is a residual danger of a court deciding...that an instrument
previously thought to be administrative – and, as a result, not registered –
is, in fact legislative.[3]
3.5
The EM sets out that the bill 'more clearly defines legislative
instruments and legislative character' but that '[t]hese concepts are not to be
substantially changed':
However, the amendments address the circularity in the
existing definition of legislative instrument, bring together the disparate
strands of the definition (currently spread between section 15AE of the Acts
Interpretation Act and a number of sections of the Legislative Instruments Act)
into a single section and clarify the inter-relationship between the different
aspects of the definition.[4]
3.6
The Clerk of the Senate, Dr Rosemary Laing, drew the committee's
attention to an issue which has been considered by the Senate Regulations and
Ordinances Committee (R&O Committee). She considered it was 'relevant to
the bill because it involves a problematic policy change made without
parliamentary scrutiny, apparently in connection with the organisational change
that consolidated the functions of OLDP and OPC, a major reason for the
development of this bill'.[5]
3.7
The updated OPC Drafting Directions on subordinate legislation summarise
the change at issue:
It has long been the practice to include general
regulation-making powers in Acts.
More recently, an approach has been taken to adapt that
practice for other legislative instruments. (For examples of this approach, see
the 'rules' in the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act
2013 and the 'PPL rules' in the Paid Parental Leave Act 2010.)
As with the current practice for regulations (which includes
a general regulation-making power in the Act), this approach involves including
a general legislative instrument-making power. However, instead of authorising
the Governor-General to make regulations when 'required or permitted' or 'necessary
or convenient', it authorises another person (e.g. a Minister) to make another
type of legislative instrument (e.g. rules) in those circumstances.[6]
3.8
Dr Laing outlined that the R&O Committee has established that:
-
the broad rule-making power has only been used in Acts since
2013, after the consolidation of OPC and OLDP;
-
it is a practical response to the need for OPC to concentrate its
resources on drafting regulations, a class of instruments with sensitivities or
risks appropriate to a higher level of oversight;
-
it also provides scope for OPC to establish a revenue stream from
drafting rules or other types of instrument on a fee for service basis.[7]
3.9
Dr Laing noted that the R&O Committee has 'pursued a number of
concerns with OPC and agencies about rules made pursuant to the new type of
broad rule-making power'. These concerns included:
-
lack of consultation over the implementation of what the R&O
Committee regarded as a new type of delegated legislation;
-
potential diminution in the quality of rule drafting and in
quality-control mechanisms generally, from a lower level of executive
oversight;
-
the impact of potentially lower quality instruments on the
workload of the committee;
-
how to ensure that particularly sensitive matters involving
rights, obligations, liabilities and penalties (including offences, powers of
arrest, entry, search or seizure) will continue to be dealt with by regulation;
and
-
whether a rule-making power should be able to be delegated.[8]
3.10
She suggested that '[w]hile the new broad rule-making power is in the
process of being deployed more widely across Commonwealth legislation, the
committee may wish to consider whether there is a need to include in the definition
of "legislative instruments" in the Legislative Instruments Act (as
amended), these types of legislative rules made under the new broad power,
rather than leaving them to be dealt with on a case by case basis'. She noted
there would be arguments for and against this 'all-encompassing' approach which,
if adopted, would mean the R&O Committee would be required to scrutinise
all rules. However, Dr Laing also observed that the terms of reference of the Senate
Scrutiny of Bills Committee ensure that the case-by-case approach can be
monitored in any event.[9]
3.11
In response to these concerns, the Attorney-General stated:
It is not practicable or desirable to provide a provision in
new section 8 for a categorical declaration that rules made under a broad
rule-making power are legislative instruments. This is because it would be
difficult to formulate such a provision, and because it is preferable to
determine the status of instruments in enabling legislation on a case-by-case basis,
and to express that status clearly on the face of the enabling legislation.[10]
3.12
In particular, the Attorney-General suggested that changing the 'definition
of a legislative instrument to include all rules by default could have significant
unintended consequences' such as for rules of court which are declared not to
be legislative instruments.[11]
3.13
Both Dr Laing and the Attorney-General highlighted the differences
between the more restrictive rule-making power to make rules 'as required or
permitted' by the relevant Act, and the broader power to make rules 'necessary
or convenient' for carrying or giving effect to a relevant Act.[12]
3.14
Dr Laing pointed out that the bill itself inserts a rule-making power in
new section 61A which provides that the FPC may, by legislative instrument, make
rules prescribing all matters required or permitted by the Act to be prescribed
by the rules. She stated:
The rule-making power does not extend to making rules 'necessary
or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this Act',
so it is not as broad as the general rule-making power that has made an
appearance in Commonwealth legislation since 2013.
The narrower scope of the rule-making power in this case
means that the power is limited to making rules authorised by specific
provisions in the legislation and not otherwise...
The bill thus provides an example of how the new
broad-ranging rule-making power can be modified to keep it within definite and
appropriate limits.[13]
3.15
In relation to the broader ruling-making power, the Attorney-General outlined:
If there is a power to make rules that are 'necessary or
convenient' for carrying out or giving effect to the Act, it is true that such
rules are generally legislative in character, and in accordance with
established government policy and drafting practice, the enabling legislation
is required to declare such rules to be legislative instruments.[14]
3.16
However, the Attorney-General emphasised that legislative instruments
are described differently in different legislative contexts and could be legislative
instruments under the various tests in new section 8 (but need not be). He argued:
It is considered that the greatest degree of transparency is
achieved by including individual declarations of legislative instrument status in
each enabling law, to ensure that users of the enabling law have greater
certainty about the status of instruments under that law. Accordingly, the
status of such instruments will be clear in the immediate context of the
enabling law, without requiring users to be familiar with a generic provision
in another Act (the Legislation Act).[15]
Correction and editorial change powers
3.17
Currently under the LIA, the FPC must rectify the Federal Register of Legislative
Instruments (FRLI) as soon as possible if he/she becomes 'aware that the
Register is erroneous because of a mistake or omission'. The FPC must also 'annotate
the [FRLI] as so rectified to explain the nature of the rectification, the date
and time it was made and the reason for it'.[16]
3.18
Similarly, the Acts Publication Act provides that the FPC must 'arrange
for an Acts database to be altered to rectify an error as soon as possible
after the [FPC] becomes aware of the error'.[17]
The FPC must be satisfied that the error has the result that:
- for an error concerning an Act—the electronic text of the Act as it
appears in the database does not represent the text of the Act as assented to;
or
-
for an error concerning a compilation of an Act—the electronic text of
the compilation as it appears in the database does not represent the state of
the law that the text purports to represent.[18]
3.19
As with the FRLI rectification power, the FPC must arrange for the Acts
database (as rectified) to be annotated to explain: the nature, day and time of
the rectification; and the reason for the rectification.[19]
3.20
The amendments of the bill would provide for corrections and editorial changes
to the Register to be made by the FPC in certain circumstances. Proposed new
subsection 15D(1) would provide that, if the FPC is satisfied there is a
mistake, omission or other error in the Register consisting of an error in the
text of an Act, legislative instrument or notifiable instrument, or compilation
of an Act, the FPC must:
- correct the error in the Register as soon as possible; and
-
include in the Register a statement that the correction has been made,
and a brief outline of the correction in general terms.
3.21
New subsection 15D(2) reflects existing provisions in the Acts
Publication Act and LIA that a correction of the Register does not affect any
right or privilege that was acquired, or that accrued, because of reliance on
registered text of any Act, instrument or compilation before they were
corrected; and does not impose or increase any obligation or liability that was
incurred before the correction. New subsection 15D(3) provides the FPC may
correct any other documents on the Register, subject to any rules. New
subsection 15D(4) clarifies that a formal correction cannot be made if the
error was made at law as part of enacting, making or amending a law.
3.22
New section 15V enables the FPC to make editorial and presentational
changes to a compilation of an Act or an instrument. However, under new
subsection 15V(2) the FPC may only make an editorial change if he or she
considers the change desirable to bring the Act or instrument that has been
compiled into line with, or closer to, current legislative drafting practice,
or to correct an error or a misdescribed amendment where the intended effect of
the amendment is clear.[20]
New subsection 15V(6) also provides the FPC 'must not make a change to an Act
or instrument under this section that would change the effect of the Act or
instrument'. Editorial changes made by the FPC are treated the same way as an
amendment to the Act or instrument (new section 15W).
3.23
New section 15X outlines the kinds of editorial changes that the FPC may
make to an Act, legislative instrument or notifiable instrument under section
15V in preparing a compilation of the Act or instrument. New subsection 15X(2)
lists a number of changes which could be made as editorial changes. Some of
these editorial changes are narrow and specific, such as changing the order of
definitions or other provisions of an Act or instrument. Others could be viewed
as very broad. For example, new paragraph 15X(2)(g) provides that an editorial
change could change 'the way of referring to or expressing a number, year,
date, time, amount of money or other amount, penalty, quantity, measurement or
other matter, idea or concept'.
3.24
In particular, new paragraph 15X(2)(p) provides that an editorial change
could be one which 'corrects an error covered by subsection (4)'. New subsection
15X(4) covers a number of errors such as 'typographical and clerical errors'
and 'errors in or arising out of an amendment of an Act or instrument,
including errors relating to the number of times such an amendment is expressed
to be made'. Further, new paragraph 15X(4)(f) covers 'any other error of a
nature similar to those mentioned' in the subsection.
3.25
The EM to the bill notes that editorial powers in the publication of
legislation have been used in other comparable jurisdictions for over four
decades and that currently the Commonwealth and the Northern Territory are the
only Australian jurisdictions which do not have legislative editorial powers of
some kind.[21]
It states that the 'power to make editorial changes is intended to reduce the
time needed for parliamentary consideration of these matters and ensure that
readers of legislation can clearly see the law as in effect in the Act or
instrument':
In addition, some presentational and other non-substantive
changes may be made in preparing compilations to update the layout or style of
an Act or legislative or notifiable instrument, or to insert or make changes to
text in the compilation that is not formally a part of the Act or instrument. This
provides a statutory basis for longstanding Commonwealth practice.[22]
3.26
Differing views were expressed in relation to the correction and
editorial changes power granted to the FPC under the bill. The Clerk of the
House, Mr David Elder noted that '[p]roposed new section 15V(6) specifically
prohibits the First Parliamentary Counsel from making a change to an Act or
instrument that would change the effect of the Act or instrument, and proposed
new section 15X clearly defines editorial change'. He stated '[t]hese provisions
would appear to ensure that no changes of a substantive nature could be
effected to legislation without passing through the established parliamentary
processes'.[23]
3.27
However, the Clerk of the Senate, Dr Laing, raised several concerns
regarding the scope of the correction and editorial change powers granted to
the FPC under the bill. She stated:
It is clearly stated that the editorial power cannot be used
to change the effect of a law, resolve an ambiguity or rewrite legislation.
However, section 15V and the definition of editorial change in section 15X
would appear to permit a wide range of editorial and presentational changes and
there is no mechanism – as there is in section 15D – for transparency, let
alone oversight...[24]
Given that 'current legislative drafting practice' is not a
defined or regulated concept and, in practice, is a set of directions and
practices determined by First Parliamentary Counsel without necessary reference
to the Parliament itself, the committee may wish to be reassured that these
provisions do not diminish the legislative authority of the Parliament and
increase - beyond what is appropriate - the power of First Parliamentary
Counsel to make changes to legislation after it has been approved by the
Parliament.[25]
Scope of the FPC's discretion
3.28
The Attorney-General made a number of comments regarding the scope of
the FPC's discretion to make corrections and editorial changes in his responses
to the committee's questions on notice. In particular, the Attorney-General
stated that the intention was that the editorial change power would be
exercised carefully and with 'due conservatism':
This is the same approach that is taken to the decision about
whether to include a formal amendment of a law in the regular Statute Law
Revision Bills. Disputes about whether amendments made by Statute Law Revision
Acts have changed the intended effect of the law are almost unheard of. The
same rigorous oversight will be extended to editorial changes in compilations
to ensure that there is no perceived or actual change to the intended effect of
the law concerned.[26]
3.29
The Attorney-General noted that the FPC has 'the responsibility of
providing the public with improved access to law by improvements in drafting
practices and by the vigilant maintenance of the Register to maximise its
usefulness'. He stated that having regard to this principle, appropriate
editorial changes will only be made by the FPC if it is clear that they will
make the law easier to use and to understand.[27]
The Attorney-General also highlighted that an editorial change is not
authorised unless it meets the specific criteria in new subsection 15V(2).
3.30
The Attorney-General advised that the FPC will issue further guidance
(in the form of a Drafting Direction or other publically available document)
about cases in which it would be appropriate to use the power.[28]
Recording corrections and editorial
changes
3.31
Dr Laing noted that where a correction is made to the Register, new paragraph
15D(l)(b) provides that the FPC must include in the Register a statement that
the correction has been made and a brief outline of the correction in general
terms. She stated:
On the one hand this provision provides transparency in
relation to the correction. On the other hand, it begs the question why the
requirement is for an explanation only in general rather than specific terms.[29]
3.32
In responding to this issue, the Attorney-General argued that '[h]ighly specific
explanations of corrections are unlikely to significantly assist users of the Register':
The detail involved may actually impede users from finding
more relevant information about the law. It is considered that a brief outline
in general terms is sufficient, and will alert interested users to investigate
further. OPC is always ready to respond to user queries.
The existing provisions require the Federal Register of
Legislative Instruments or Acts database to be annotated with the nature, day
and time of the rectification and the reason for the rectification. The highly
detailed nature of the corrections involved, however, makes such specific
annotation redundant and overly pedantic, particularly given the additional requirement
to state the reason for the rectification...
The requirement to include 'a brief outline of the correction
in general terms' is not intended to provide less information than is currently
provided but to make it easier to provide a clear explanation of the correction
in one place. To provide additional transparency, the incorrect version of the
law is never removed from the Federal Register of Legislative Instruments or
the Acts database. It will also never be removed from the new Federal Register
of Legislation.[30]
3.33
Further, the Attorney-General noted that the amended Legislation Act
2003 will require the FPC to record the use of editorial powers in a statement
in the registered compilation concerned:
Public notice of editorial change will be required by the
proposed Commonwealth Legislation Act under new section l5P(l)(b). A registered
compilation that incorporates editorial changes will be required to include a
statement that editorial changes have been, and a brief outline of the changes
in general terms. The proposed Commonwealth requirement will require as much,
if not more, transparency as is required by any other comparable scheme...[31]
3.34
The Attorney-General also noted that the FPC and OPC are subject to the
normal annual reporting requirements applicable to other government agencies.
He advised that OPC would publish a section in its annual report summarising
the use of the correction and editorial powers in each financial year.[32]
Consultation
3.35
The 2008 Review recommended that the 'regulation-making power in the LIA
be amended to authorise the Attorney-General to formally revoke registered
instruments that are spent or invalid and to amend them to correct
typographical errors'. However, it also stated that '[t]his should occur only
after appropriate consultation with the responsible Minister or rule-maker'.[33]
3.36
The Attorney-General commented that it was 'not considered appropriate
to undertake any consultation about the correction (rectification) of errors in
the [Register], although [OPC] is always responsive to comments from members of
the public about the accuracy of the Register'. He noted that 'in no other
comparable jurisdiction is there any requirement for prior consultation with a
particular person or body before a correction is made'. Further:
The FPC only corrects the existing Federal Register of
Legislative Instruments in very clear cases, for example, the removal or
insertion of text to correct an obvious oversight in the compilation process.
In such cases it is considered imperative to act swiftly after the identification
of an error to preserve the integrity of the Federal Register of Legislative Instruments
and ensure proper access to a correct statement of the law. It is also unclear what
public benefit would be achieved by consultation about the correction of such
errors.[34]
Parliamentary correction processes
3.37
The potential interaction between the parliamentary mechanisms for
corrections to proposed legislation and the proposed correction and editorial powers
granted to the FPC under the bill was also raised. The standing orders of both Houses
allow for corrections to be made to bills. In the Senate, Standing Order
124—Corrections provides:
Amendments of a formal nature may be made, and clerical or
typographical errors may be corrected, in any part of a bill by the Chairman of
Committees.
3.38
Similarly, in the House of Representatives, Standing Order
156—Corrections to a bill provides:
Under the authority of the Deputy Speaker, the Clerk may
correct clerical or typographical errors in a bill.
3.39
These corrections to bills are often made at the request of the OPC or
OPC advice may be obtained on the correction before it is made.[35]
3.40
The Clerk of the House, Mr David Elder noted that as 'the bill gives the
First Parliamentary Counsel authority to make editorial changes only to Acts
and compilations of Acts and not to bills before the Parliament, the role of
the Parliament and the parliamentary departments would appear to remain
unchanged'. He stated:
In terms of the Parliament's role in correcting errors in
bills before the bills are presented for assent, the bill does not appear to
have any effect on current practice. At present, if an error is discovered in a
bill before Parliament the usual practice is first to determine whether the required
correction is editorial or substantive. In the case of editorial changes the
Deputy Speaker or Deputy President authorises the responsible department to
make the necessary change in preparing the bill for transmission to the other
House or for assent by the Governor-General. In the case of errors of a
substantive nature corrections can be made by an amendment during passage of
the bill or by a subsequent amending Act.[36]
3.41
The Clerk of the Senate, Dr Laing explained that '[a]ny proposals for
corrections of this type, so far as Senate practice is concerned, are assessed
against the standing order and the following guidance in Odgers' Australian
Senate Practice':
This procedure is used to make changes to a bill which are
clearly required by any amendments which have been agreed to, and to correct any
clear errors. The citation of a bill which originated in one year and passed in
another may be altered by this means. The procedure may not be used to make
changes of substance, which should be made only by amendment in committee of
the whole.[37]
3.42
However, she observed that an '[e]xamination of Senate records shows
that Senate officers have been very conservative in agreeing to recommend
corrections to the Chair of Committees and have often knocked back requests
from OPC which were considered to have exceeded the parameters of what the standing
order permits, judgements made on the basis of practice and precedent, and on
the principle that legislators should have the final say on the substance of
legislation'.[38]
3.43
Dr Laing continued:
There is no question that the discretion proposed for First
Parliamentary Counsel is both practical and necessary, and subject to detailed
constraints, but it is not clear how the proposed new discretion would operate
in practice, including in conjunction with the existing process for Chair's amendments.
The majority of bills now introduced into Parliament amend existing law and on
enactment will be incorporated into existing law by means of a compilation, a
process which this bill seeks editorial powers to facilitate. If a Chair's amendment
on such a bill were sought by OPC but declined, could that amendment then be made
pursuant to these new provisions? If OPC considered that a request for a
Chair's amendment was unlikely to be acceptable to officers of the relevant
House, would the availability of these new provisions provide a reason to
bypass the process authorised by standing orders and go straight to the new
editorial powers for authorisation when the compilation is made?
Such questions are unlikely to arise frequently, but they
will arise. The lack of visibility on the exercise of the proposed discretion
means that we may never know the extent to which the editorial power is being
used.[39]
3.44
In relation to the interaction of the parliamentary processes for the
correction of bills and the FPC's powers, the Attorney-General commented:
In practice, it is rare for an OPC request for a Clerk's or
Chair's correction of a Bill to be refused. In any case, the FPC would not seek
to achieve by editorial amendment what could not be achieved by a parliamentary
correction. On the other hand, while a Bill is before the Parliament, if a
clear formal error is found, the OPC would seek to make the requisite correction
by the established parliamentary process, to ensure that the Bill as enacted is
correct.
The power to make editorial changes is designed to correct
formal errors in the law after the time for making parliamentary corrections
has passed, that is, after enactment. It is not considered that there would be
any necessary interaction between the two processes.[40]
Review of corrections and editorial
changes
3.45
The Attorney-General acknowledged that 'the decision to make an editorial
change to the law would not be subject to administrative challenge' as an
editorial change to a law has the status of an amendment of a law in the bill
(new section 15W). However, the Attorney-General outlined that an individual affected
by 'an editorial change to the law may have a right to challenge the validity
or effectiveness of the law as changed in a court':
This may be possible by seeking judicial review of the change
under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 or under section 75(v) of
the Constitution. In addition, any individual concerned by an editorial change
could raise the matter with the FPC who would take any such concerns very
seriously.[41]
Exemptions from disallowance
3.46
Existing section 42 of the LIA contains the process for the disallowance
of legislative instruments by either House of the Parliament. Existing section
44 of the LIA includes a list of legislative instruments that are not subject
to the disallowance process. Under the bill, existing section 44 would be
repealed and replaced. The EM to the bill notes:
New paragraph 44(2)(a) provides that an Act may declare or
have the effect of exempting a legislative instrument or a provision of a
legislative instrument from disallowance under section 42. A number of
enabling Acts already provide for exemptions from disallowance...
New paragraph 44(2)(b) provides that regulations may be made
that exempt a legislative instrument from disallowance. This paragraph
preserves the effect of existing subsection 44(2). The table of exemptions in
existing section 44 will be transferred to the new Regulations and consolidated
with other exemptions from disallowance already prescribed by regulation,
making it easier for users to find exemptions.[42]
3.47
The EM to the bill notes '[a]dditional disallowance exemptions can be
prescribed by regulation, and it will continue to be possible to declare in the
enabling Act that an instrument is not subject to disallowance'.[43]
3.48
Dr Laing described the removal from section 44 of the table of
instruments exempt from disallowance as a significant amendment but noted that
'exemptions may be made in future by declarations in Acts, or in regulations
made for the purposes of paragraph 44(2)(b)'.[44]
She cautioned that, while the rationale 'to consolidate prescribed exemptions
for greater accessibility' was commendable, the rights of the Parliament should
not be affected.[45]
3.49
Dr Laing noted that 'the new regulations will be subject to examination
by the Regulations and Ordinances Committee, and will also be subject to
disallowance' but also suggested the committee could seek the draft regulations
which would contain the consolidated list of legislative instruments exempt from
disallowance. The committee sought the draft regulations from the
Attorney-General and these were provided as part of the responses to questions
on notice.[46]
The Attorney-General stated the exposure draft regulations do 'no more than
consolidate all existing exemptions under the Act and the regulations'.[47]
Notifiable instruments
3.50
The Migration Institution of Australia (MIA) raised its concern that
'notifiable instruments' could potentially be used to prevent parliamentary
scrutiny and disallowance of legislative instruments:
It is not clear from the Bill or from the Explanatory
Memorandum under what circumstances an instrument would be classified as
'legislative' or 'notifiable' or what use can be made of notifiable
instruments.
This does not provide any assurance that notifiable
instruments would not or could not be used to evade the disallowance of
legislation.[48]
3.51
The Attorney-General provided a response to this concern, noting that
under the bill notifiable instruments are administrative in character rather
than legislative:
Any instrument that has a legislative character will be, by
definition, a legislative instrument (s8(4)), and therefore subject to
disallowance unless exempted (either by the enabling Act, or by regulation made
under the Legislation Act). The Bill will prevent an instrument that is a legislative
instrument from being registered as a notifiable instrument (s11(2)).
Accordingly, the Bill ensures the new category of notifiable
instruments will not be able to be used to avoid parliamentary scrutiny.
Further, any provision in a Bill or legislative instrument specifying that an
instrument is to be a notifiable instrument will be subject to Parliamentary
scrutiny. This scrutiny should ensure instruments that should be legislative instruments
are not specified to be notifiable instruments.
In addition, the Act also continues to provide a powerful
incentive for rule-makers to identify legislative instruments correctly: a
legislative instrument is not enforceable by or against any person unless it is
registered as a legislative instrument (new section l5K). As such, any attempt
to 'evade' consultation and disallowance processes by lodging a legislative
instrument as something else would have substantial legal and other consequences
for the rule-maker.[49]
Consultation
3.52
Existing subsection 17(1) of the LIA includes a requirement that rule-makers
should consult before making legislative instruments:
Before a rule-maker makes a legislative instrument, and
particularly where the proposed instrument is likely to:
- have a direct, or a substantial indirect, effect on
business; or
- restrict competition;
the rule-maker must be satisfied that any consultation that
is considered by the rule-maker to be appropriate and that is reasonably
practicable to undertake, has been undertaken.
3.53
Pearce and Argument have observed that under these provisions of the LIA
'consultation is at the discretion of the rule-maker' and described compliance
with the consultation requirements as 'patchy at best'.[50]
3.54
The existing consultation requirements are maintained but amended in the
bill. The EM to the bill states:
The consultation requirements are amended so that the
requirement to undertake appropriate consultation (which can include no
consultation) applies equally to instruments that affect business and/or
competition and those that do not. The list of circumstances in which
consultation may be unnecessary or inappropriate is removed. The consultation
requirements for legislative instruments do not apply to notifiable instruments.[51]
3.55
The MIA raised its concern that 'the use of notifiable instruments may
have the possibility of being used to circumvent requirements for consultation'.
It highlighted that the consultation requirements for legislative instruments
do not apply to notifiable instruments. It stated:
The process of proper and genuine consultation is an
essential feature of our democratic system and should not be removed as a
requirement for notifiable instruments in cases where the effect of those
instruments could adversely affect individuals or businesses.[52]
3.56
The Attorney-General provided a response to this concern:
Many Acts require certain instruments to be published or
notified in the Gazette, and in some cases they also require consultation
before such instruments can be made. However, imposing a blanket requirement
for consultation may be excessive considering the nature and volume of the
instruments in question.
To illustrate, and as explained in new section 11 of the
Legislation Act as amended by the Bill, examples of notifiable instruments may
include notices of appointments and of approved forms. Based on recent Gazette
notices, additional examples could include factual notices of Royal Assent to
Acts, of bond or exchange rates, and of consultation opportunities linked to an
application or intention to do something under an Act.
Commonwealth agencies will consult when developing notifiable
instruments if it is appropriate to do so.[53]
3.57
The Attorney-General noted that guidance on when consultation is
appropriate is available in the Australian Government Guide to Regulation (Guide).
The Guide provides that most regulatory impact statements must include evidence
of appropriate public consultation and full public consultation is the default
approach.[54]
Committee view
3.58
It is a fundamental principle that those who are subject to the law
should be able to access the law. In the view of the committee, the single
register to be established by the bill which will include all legislation, Acts
and instruments, as well as other relevant documents, will clearly be
beneficial reform. As Minister Keenan noted in introducing the bill, reforms
which enhance the accessibility of Commonwealth law will promote the principle
of access to justice.[55]
3.59
The bill implements a number of sensible recommendations for reform made
by the 2008 review, as well as making other amendments to improve the operation
of the legislative frameworks for the Commonwealth Acts and instruments. In
particular, the amendments to simplify and align the processes for the
registration, compilation and editorial changes and authorised versions of Acts
and instruments will produce long-term efficiencies.
3.60
The committee acknowledges the significant issues raised by the Clerk of
the Senate and the Senate Regulations & Ordinances Committee in relation to
the recent inclusion of 'general ruling-making powers' in recent legislation.[56]
The committee shares the Senate Regulations & Ordinances Committee's
concern that the use of this general rule-making power appears to have been introduced
without notification or consultation to parliamentary stakeholders.[57]
The Clerk of the Senate has also suggested the committee considers the need to
include in the definition of 'legislative instrument' the types of legislative
rules made under the general rule-making power.
3.61
The Attorney-General has argued that there may be 'significant
unintended consequences' in relation to such a proposal. However, the committee
is not convinced these consequences could not be avoided through an
appropriately drafted amendment. The Attorney-General's stronger argument for
the new approach is that greater transparency is achieved through including
'individual declarations of legislative instrument status in each enabling
law'.
3.62
The committee notes this issue has also been raised in relation to the
bill by the Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee.[58]
In particular, the Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee has sought the
Attorney-General's advice regarding:
[W]hy all instruments made on the basis of the general
instrument making powers should not be included in the definition of
instruments and so deemed to be legislative instruments (so that disallowance
and sunsetting requirements apply unless they are explicitly excluded).[59]
3.63
Noting that the Senate Regulation and Ordinances Committee and the
Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee have ongoing processes in relation to this matter,
the committee considers it would be premature to recommend an amendment to the
definition of 'legislative instrument' at this time. This specific issue may be
best considered as the subject of a discrete inquiry once the operation of the
'Legislation Act 2003' is commenced and the practice of using general
rule-making powers in legislation is clarified over time.
3.64
The committee was interested in how the discretion of the FPC to change
the Register has been framed within the bill. It is appropriate that the FPC,
as the person responsible of the accuracy and completeness of the Register,
should have correction and editorial powers in relation to its contents. As the
EM notes, making changes in this way, rather than through legislation, has a
number of advantages including conserving limited parliamentary time and other
resources.[60]
This reform will also bring the Commonwealth into line with editorial powers
for legislation used in other jurisdictions.
3.65
However, the committee agrees there should be clearly articulated
principles for the use of the FPC's the correction and editorial powers. In
this respect, the committee welcomes the Attorney-General's advice that the FPC
will issue guidance on the use of the editorial powers proposed in the bill.[61]
In the view of the committee, this guidance should be released at the earliest
opportunity.
3.66
Consultation by the FPC with relevant persons or organisations to ensure
that a correction or editorial change to the Register is being properly made
may be appropriate in a limited number of cases. The FPC's guidance on the use
of the correction and editorial change powers should include consideration
regarding when, in exceptional circumstances, notification or consultation may
be required (for example, with the responsible Minister).
3.67
The Register is intended to be an accurate and authoritative legal
resource. Accordingly, adequate transparency mechanisms should also be attached
to the exercise of the FPC's powers. The committee notes that new sections 15D
and 15P require that statements be included in the Register or the compilation
regarding changes made, including brief outlines of the change in general
terms. Further, the committee notes that incorrect versions will not be removed
from the Register.[62]
The committee is satisfied that sufficient information will exist on the
Register for users to track corrections and editorial changes made by the FPC.
3.68
The Clerk of the Senate appropriately highlighted the potential for
tension to exist between the correction and editorial powers granted to FPC
under the bill and the existing parliamentary mechanisms for corrections to
bills. Given that the some discretion must be exercised by the FPC in
administering the Register, this issue can only be resolved through increased
parliamentary scrutiny. The committee welcomes the Attorney-General's
commitments that OPC will include a section in its annual reports summarising
the use of the correction power and the editorial change power in each
financial year.[63]
This reporting will facilitate scrutiny and oversight of these powers by the
Parliament, including through the Senate estimates process. The committee notes
that should the correction or editorial change powers be inappropriately
utilised the potential consequences are likely to be significant.
3.69
The committee appreciates the detailed responses to questions on notice
provided by the Attorney-General during the inquiry. However, some ambiguity remains
in relation to how the new regime will operate in practice. This is not
surprising given the large number of technical amendments contained in the
bill. The bill repeals existing section 59 of the LIA which provided for the
2008 statutory review of the operation of the LIA. The committee considers it
would be prudent to include a provision for a similar statutory review of the
'Legislation Act 2003' to be conducted five years after commencement. As with
the 2008 review, the report of this review should be provided initially to the
Attorney-General and then the Parliament.
3.70
The committee notes that the bill, and its associated regulations, may
impact on the work of the scrutiny committees of the Parliament: the Senate
Scrutiny of Bills Committee; the Senate Regulations and Ordinances Committee;
and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights. Clearly, if these
scrutiny committees have concerns in relation to the provisions of the bill, they
should be given immediate consideration by the Senate.
Recommendation 1
3.71
The committee recommends that item 83 of Schedule 1 of the bill be
amended to require a review of the operation of the proposed Legislation Act 2003,
in similar terms to existing section 59 of the Legislative Instruments
Act 2003, to be conducted five years after commencement.
Recommendation 2
3.72
Subject to recommendation 1, the committee recommends that the Senate
pass the Acts and Instruments (Framework Reform) Bill 2014.
Senator the
Hon Ian Macdonald
Chair
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