Minority Report -Part 2
The consequences for participants in the music industry
Major record companies
Labor Members of the Committee have deliberately chosen to refer to the
major companies in the recording industry first because we are in no doubt
that the political rationale which is driving the Government in its advocacy
of this Bill is to damage or destroy it and its owners..
Professor Fels' evidence
The evidence of Professor Fels a passionate and long time critic
of the major record companies - gives the clearest possible proof that
this is the case. In fact, Professor Fels is quite blatant about it.
For example, he candidly admitted that whilst there were independent
people in the music industry "this is really - and the record
companies well understand it - an assault on multinational privilege which
has cost Australians a lot". (Fels, Hansard, p13)
We found it interesting to note that Professor Fels continually referred
to the "multinational" record companies.
Indeed, we came to the conclusion when reading Professor Fels' written
submissions and when listening to his oral evidence that the Professor
has developed what could be regarded as an unhealthy obsession.
The problem for us is that this obsession coloured Professor Fels' evidence
to an extent that we found disappointing and unhelpful from someone in
the Professor's position, and which detracted markedly from his credibility
on this issue.
We shall give two examples of this unhelpful outcome.
First, the Professor's apparent obsession led him to make a blatantly
misleading statement of the law, which tended to undermine the evidence
he gave to the Committee on the issue. Moreover, not only did he make
this misleading statement in his written submission, he repeated it up
front in his oral evidence. What Professor Fels misleadingly said was
that "the law confers a monopoly or an exclusive right
on multinational record companies in Australia to import their own CDs".
(Fels, Hansard, p2, see also ACCC, Sub 159, p1)
However, as any first year student of copyright law would know - and
as our discussion above has demonstrated - the exclusive rights Professor
Fels refer to are in fact owned by a wide variety of interests in Australia,
not exclusively by multinational record companies.
Professor Fels neglected to mention, or chose to ignore that in thousands
of cases the rights are held by independent Australian-owned record companies.
And they are often held by the artists or bands themselves. Professor
Fels also failed to even have regard to the exclusive rights in the underlying
musical works - the songs - which are usually held by publishing companies
- foreign owned and Australian - and often by an individual songwriter
or composer.
Unfortunately for Professor Fels - and for his credibility on this issue
- this was not an isolated omission. In the first 2 pages of his written
submission the Professor referred to the "multinationals" or
"foreign-owned multinational" only on 7 occasions, when he was
actually discussing the rights and interests of all owners of copyright
in music CDs.
This pattern of omission, and repetitive reference to the multinationals,
could simply be evidence that Professor Fels is ignorant of the nature
of copyright law and of the rights it provides.
Another interpretation would be that it is part of a deliberate plan
to capitalise on perceived opposition in the community to "evil"
multinational companies, thereby obscuring the damage being done to local
interests with which the community may have sympathy, such as independent
record companies, publishing companies, composers and artists.
Certainly we have noted that the Prime Minister is not above this sort
of thing. For example, in his interview of 16 October 1997 to which we
have already referred the Prime Minister could not help but mention that
the issue was about a group of companies who "are largely overseas
owned companies".
Perhaps we should now wait with baited breath for the forthcoming attack
by Mr Howard on foreign owned multinationals in the, car industry, oil
industry and, closer to home, in the computer software industry.
In Professor Fels' case, perhaps the best we can do is repeat an observation
made by Senator Jim McKiernan during the course of Professor Fels' evidence:
"Listening to you speaking, I thought I had Professor Ted Wheelright
in front of me, rather than Professor Alan Fels, because of his work
against the 'evils' of the multinationals." (McKiernan, Hansard,
p14).
Professor Fels' apparent obsession with the multinationals led him to
also dismiss other music industry participants opposing the Government's
Bill as mere stooges of the major record companies.
For example, when asked why the independent record companies are opposed
to the change, Professor Fels says that their source of nervousness is
that "they, too, have been visited by the record companies".
(Fels, Hansard, p13). But no tangible evidence was offered.
Similarly, the Australian Music Retailers Association were dismissed
as being "too close to ARIA". (Fels, Hansard,
p9)
To put it mildly, this 'conspiracy theory' type of evidence was singularly
unhelpful to the Committee's deliberations.
Labor Members of the Committee were pleased to see that each of the industry
participants that had been impugned in this way took the opportunity,
before the Committee, forcefully to deny the implication.
Effect on major record companies
But of course the ultimate irony of the foregoing discussion is that
the one message which came through the evidence loud and clear was that
of all the interests in the music industry that will be affected by this
Bill the major record companies are the least likely to be damaged.
This was a view that was put by a wide variety of industry representatives.
Mr David Caswell, a successful Australian song-writer of long standing,
said that if the Bill does become law it will not hurt the multinational
record companies very much. They will merely change from being manufacturing
and distribution organisations to become import organisations. (Caswell,
Hansard, p73).
James Woodruff said it more bluntly:
"By bringing this (the bill) in the multinationals are
the only ones who will not get hurt". (Woodruff, Hansard, p136)
Ms Riccobono, the General-Manager of the long-established Australian
publishing company J. Albert and Son Pty Ltd, stated:
"You are not going to hurt the multinationals. You are going
to hurt us". (Riccobono, Hansard, p86)
The Australasian Music Publishers Association said that the Bill will
most severely and directly affect independent Australian companies, not
the multinationals (AMPAL, Sub 147, p3)
And finally, even Mr Dwyer candidly admitted that he does not believe
the Bill will really cause the multinationals much pain. (Dwyer, Hansard,
p103).
That these comments were made should not have come as a surprise. It
should be obvious that if the investment environment for the multinationals
in Australia becomes too adverse the prospect is they will simply seek
alternative environments where the value of their investment is secure
or profitable..
Thus the irony of the fact that the multinationals are least likely to
be adversely affected by this Bill was not lost on us, and certainly not
lost on Mr David Caswell:
"The worst case scenario is that, in sorting out these 'greedy'
multinational record companies, you are going to wipe out the small
business artists, the small independent writers and the small independent
record stores. You are going to put a lot of people out of work."
(Caswell, Hansard, p77).
Independent record companies
As we have alluded to above, we became very concerned during the course
of some of the evidence before this Committee that insufficient regard
was being paid to the interests of independent Australian-owned record
companies.
Perhaps the most extraordinary example of this was the reaction of Professor
Fels when he was directly asked by Senator Murphy about the effect of
this Bill on the interests of the independent Australian record companies.
After first refusing to address the question he went on to say that:
"It is a minority; that is the key point". (Fels,
Hansard, pp5-6).
We found this response particularly disturbing. If the implication is
that, because the independents do not control a majority of the Australian
music CD market their interests can be sacrificed, we reject this totally.
First, the interests of the independents are just as relevant in the
consideration of this Bill as the interests of the major record companies.
These companies also employ Australians, invest in and develop Australian
artists and repertoire, and export Australian music overseas.
Secondly, although a minority of the industry the independents nonetheless
represent a substantial and important part of the market.
As Shock Records pointed out in their written submission, there are over
200 independent Australian-owned record companies and all of these will
be affected by the change in the law. (Shock, Sub 90, p4).
Indeed, Professor Fels', in his own statistics, stated that these independents
together account for 28% of the total wholesale market for sound recordings.
(ACCC, Sub 159A, p7).
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it must be recognised that the
independents frequently perform a different role to the majors in finding
and developing Australian talent. As Ms Michel Hryce of the Media Arts
and Entertainment Alliance pointed out, these are the people who find
talent and invest in it at a very early stage. (Hryce, Hansard, p71).
So it is clear, on any objective analysis of the evidence that the independent
Australian-owned record companies are a vital part of the Australian music
industry whose interests must be taken into account.
We are disappointed that the Government Members of the Committee failed
to do so. Had they been more open-minded, we suggest that they would have
had no hesitation in concluding and recommending to government that this
Bill would be shelved.
It is important to note that virtually all independent record companies
have strongly and consistently opposed this Bill. Moreover they have reached
this position independently, and we regard it as an insult to suggest,
as Professor Fels did, that "they, too, have been visited by the
record companies". (Fels, Hansard, p13).
The reasons for this opposition were meticulously explained by Mr David
Williams, the Managing Director of Australia's largest independent record
company, Shock records, in his oral evidence before this Committee.
Mr Williams explained how the three levels of Australian artists, and
their development by independent record companies, will be affected by
this Bill. (Williams, Hansard, p122).
At the ground level, development of new Australian artists will be affected
by lack of retail space as retailers rush to import. It is already difficult
for independent record companies to persuade music stores to place the
CDs of new, up-coming artists on the limited retail space available. The
introduction of unrestricted imports will only further minimise the retail
space available to these CDs, as retailers, especially the large retailers,
increase their stocks and display of imported CDs.
At the next level, in respect of artists that the independent record
companies are trying to break, it will be very difficult for the company
to spend money breaking the artist without concerns for people "free-riding"
and bringing in imported copies. In addition, the companies are able to
make money investing in international artists through exclusive distribution
rights, which enables the companies to afford to risk the expense of breaking
Australian artists, will be substantially reduced.
At the highest level, in the case of successful artists, the concern
is with overseas "deletions" coming back into Australia.
Thus it can be seen that the foremost adverse effect of this Bill on
the independent record companies will be in respect of their investment
practices, particularly in relation to the development of Australian talent.
This effect was succinctly summarised by Shock Records in its written
submission:
"Small record companies will not be competing with the multinational
record companies, but rather with importers, especially those seeking
to free-ride by importing product that others are marketing."
(Shock, Sub 90, p6).
It should also be noted that independent record companies will also suffer
in relation to the new piracy provisions (which will be discussed below).
For present purposes we simply note the submission made by Shock Records
that the cost for an independent record company in monitoring imports
of their product and launching legal actions would be prohibitive for
a company the size of Shock. (Shock, Sub 90, p6).
Artists and Managers
It is appropriate to discuss the position of artist and managers after
that of the record companies because the two are closely connected.
First, as we have noted before, the copyright in the sound recording
- one of the copyrights in music CDs that is being affected by this Bill
- will ordinarily lie in either the record company or, less commonly,
the artist.
Secondly, and more important for present purposes, the discovery, development
and promotion of Australian artists is at the very heart of the business
of record companies.
It should therefore be obvious that the success of local talent (and
therefore of the managers who manage them) is closely tied up in the success
of the record companies and of the recording industry. For artists and
managers therefore, the investment environment which exists for record
companies to invest in the discovery, development and promotion of talent
is as important to them as it is to the record companies.
Indeed, this was the very strong theme which underlay the oral and written
submissions of many of the artists, managers and their representatives
(especially, the International Managers Forum) who appeared before the
Committee.
For example, Ms Sarah Longhurst of the IMF made the telling point that
for a developing Australian artist to succeed requires an initial and
ongoing investment - in things such as live shows, promotion, creation
of video clips, advances for them to live on:
"An extremely important thing to understand is that getting
to that point requires investment and ongoing investment. Allowing parallel
importation threatens that investment environment. That is something
that we feel very strongly will be an unintended consequence of this
Bill". (Longhurst, Hansard, p108).
In a similar vein, Ms Hryce raised the concern that if companies are
not earning the money to invest back into the Australian industry, Australian
performers are not going to develop:
"If the majors no longer feel obliged to produce anything in
Australia, markedly reduce their presence and become a post-office box
in Australia for a bit of distribution from somewhere else, they are
not here looking at artists or having our artists throw themselves in
front of them. . . . . It means every Australian will have to go overseas,
which is a major problem." (Hryce, Hansard, p70 & p75).
Thus at a general level, artists and managers will be adversely affected
by this Bill because, for the reasons we have already articulated, the
environment for investment in those artists is undermined.
Moreover, there are some specific aspects of this problem that Labor
Members of the Committee would like to highlight.
First, it should be noted, as Mr Michael McMartin of the IMF noted, that
one of the biggest loss leaders for record companies, particularly for
the major record companies, is investment in Australian acts. In short,
very few Australian acts in which investment is made ultimately become
successful. (McMartin, Hansard, p109). This of course has the obvious
consequence that where the investment environment is tighter - as will
be the result of this Bill - investment in local talent will likely be
the first to fall by the wayside.
As the Shock submission succinctly put it: "(the Bill) will make
investment in unproved local talent too great a financial risk."
(Shock Records, Submission 90, p3).
Secondly, the Australian Copyright Council made the important point that
the local presence of multinational record companies (and music publishers)
provide a gateway to international release of Australian music (ACC, Sub
164, p4). Thus to the extent that the multinational presence is diminished
by this Bill the international gateway is made smaller for Australian
artists.
Thirdly, a related point made by Mr David Williams is that most overseas
companies want to see some sort of success in the home territory before
they will invest in an artist. (Williams, Hansard, p127). Thus, with less
investment by locally based record companies there is likely to be less
local success and therefore reduced prospects of international success.
Clearly then Australian artists stand to lose a great deal from the Bill
in terms of the potential for their discovery, development and promotion.
But unfortunately for them, that is not the only adverse impact of this
Bill.
The other negative relates back to the problem of free riders and deletions.
Put simply, to the extent that the Bill encourages the production of CDs
outside of Australia that are subsequently brought back into the country,
the performers income will be reduced - there record companies will not
receive the appropriate returns on the imported CDs and as a consequence,
neither will the artist. (Hryce, Hansard, p70).
The evidence we have heard makes it crystal clear to us - and frankly,
we have difficulty understanding why it is not crystal clear to the Government
Members of the Committee - that the negative impact this Bill will have
on investment by record companies in Australia will inevitably have a
negative impact on the development of Australian artists and on the Australian
culture which they foster.
We regard this as a simple but obvious conclusion.
We can only wonder how on earth Professor Fels came to the conclusion
that he does "not foresee very much effect at all" on
artists. (Fels, Hansard, p3).
Perhaps a clue is given by his ensuing comment that "most (artists)
will be a bit better off because they will get cheaper CDs".
(Fels, Hansard, p3).
Only a man who is long past listening to rational counter-argument could
One wonders what type of person would believe that artists are more concerned
with getting cheaper CDs for themselves then developing their own career
and receiving appropriate rewards when they succeed.
Composers and publishers
We turn now to composers and publishers, those participants in the music
industry who benefit from the second copyright in music CDs - the copyright
in the underlying musical work, the song.
We have found during the course of the debate around this parallel importation
issue that composers and publishers have been the forgotten parties. For
example, if you look at the record of government statements on this issue
the focus has seemingly always been on record companies and artists, with
the composers and publishers apparently languishing as irrelevant.
Indeed, even the detailed evidence that was initially submitted to this
Committee by Professor Fels made virtually no mention of the interests
of publishers and composers, despite the fact that their copyright is
also vitally affected by this Bill.
Mechanical royalties
Composers and publishers are affected because of the crucial role copyright
law plays in providing them with royalties for their songs. These are
the so-called 'mechanical royalties' which are the financial rewards for
composers and publishers for the reproduction of their works.
In practical terms, the present copyright provisions ensure that when
a music CD is sold to the public in Australia, the royalties due to the
composer and/or publisher of the works reproduced on the CD are paid in
Australia, according to Australian standards of equity, probity and business
practice, regardless of whether the CD has been manufactured in or imported
into Australia. (APRA, Sub 145, p2)
Under the terms of this Bill, composers and publishers will lose this
assurance.
Instead, royalties on works that are reproduced overseas and imported
into Australia will be paid according to the copyright law of the overseas
country.
As we shall see, the royalty regimes of many other countries from which
music CDs may be imported under this Bill are vastly inferior to that
which exists in Australia.
For that reason, Mr Jeremy Fabinyi of the Australasian Mechanical Copyright
Owners Society was certainly not exaggerating when he said that the Bill
will render valueless rights which publishers have spent tens of millions
of dollars acquiring. In short, rights which have cost a lot of money
will become meaningless if the Australian copyright owner cannot collect
the royalties from the exploitation of those rights in this territory.
Therefore, the rights for which the owner paid large sums of money evaporate.
(Fabinyi, Hansard, p81).
The first problem that the proposed change in the law will produce is
in relation to the amount of royalties that will be paid.
The Australian Music Publishers Association gave some important evidence
on the amounts of royalties that will be received by Australian composers
and publishers when their works are reproduced overseas even though they
are imported into and sold in Australia.
The rate of royalty for a musical work reproduced in Australia is $1.68.
However, if the work is imported from France the royalty will be $1.37,
from the US the royalty will be $0.91 and from Malaysia the royalty will
be $0.29. (AMPAL. Sub 147, p10).
It will therefore be obvious to all that to the extent that the Bill
permits and encourages imported music CDs to replace locally manufactured
CDs, there will be a significant reduction in royalties earned by Australian
composers and publishers.
We note that the Majority Report, relying on a submission by the Department
of Communications and the Arts, attempted to argue that such a reduction
could be counter balanced by increased royalties flowing from increased
sales flowing from price reductions. The problem with this analysis however
is that it requires demand for music CDs to be price sensitive.
The evidence before us was that this is not the case. For example, Mr
Williams of Shock Records gave evidence that he experiments quite a bit
with pricing, and it does not necessarily result in selling thousands
of records. (Williams, Hansard, p125).
Moreover, we are reminded that in his 1990 PSA Report, Professor Fels
expressly found that demand for music CDs is not price sensitive.
The second problem, related to the first, is that payment of royalties
in accordance with the copyright law of the country in which the work
is reproduced will lead to increased delays in the receipt of the royalties
and new uncertainty about the proper calculation of that royalty. (APRA,
Sub 145, p2). For example, even in the case of imports from the US, the
composer and/or publisher will suffer delays in receiving the royalties,
will have lost withholding tax and will find it extremely difficult to
attempt to obtain verification of the royalty calculation.
Similarly, Mr Eric McCusker, one of Australia's successful songwriters,
gave evidence of the extreme difficulties that would be had in collecting
royalties from countries such as Brazil and Korea (McCusker, Sub 133,
p2).
Extraordinarily, as the APRA submission noted:
"All these difficulties will be presented to the Australian
songwriter in relation to records sold in Australia to be enjoyed by
Australian consumers". (APRA, Sub 145, p4).
Sadly for the Australian composers and publishers these consequences
of the Bill on royalties are by no means the worst effect of it.
The most devastating problem arises because, as AMPAL have pointed out,
the Bill will actually allow imports from countries with no copyright
laws at all. (AMPAL, Sub 147, p17). (As an aside we were astonished to
see in the ACCC's supplementary written submission - which at last dealt
with composers and publishers - the assertion that the Bill only facilitates
parallel imports from countries with copyright protection - ACCC, Sub
159A, p9. Put simply, this assertion is wrong.)
In these countries without copyright laws no consent is required from
the copyright owner of the musical work, and there is no obligation to
pay the copyright owner one cent. As Mr Brett Cottle of APRA stated:
"As a result of this legislation, if CDs are imported into
this country from countries such as Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand
or, closer to home, Papua New Guinea, there will be no royalty paid
to any composer anywhere. . . . In those countries there are no royalty
collection mechanisms in place . . . . and there is no court or administrative
infrastructure to ensure that royalties are paid at a reasonable rate
in accordance with normal commercial conditions". (Cottle,
Hansard, p58).
To take the example of PNG, a record producer could go to PNG and record
karaoke versions of Midnight Oil and sell them in Australia without the
consent of the band or songwriters and without payment of any royalty
to the songwriters. (AMPAL, Sub 147, p17).
To put it mildly, this is an outrageous outcome and, in itself, should
have been sufficient to persuade the Government Members of the Committee
to recommend to government to abandon this Bill.
Indeed, we note with the interest that when the PSA last reported on
the parallel importation issue it itself recognised this appalling outcome
and addressed it by recommending that imports only be allowed from countries
with "comparable levels of protection over the reproduction of musical
works and sound recordings".
Labor Members of the Committee find it extraordinary that the ACCC -
by supporting imports from any country irrespective of the comparability
of the levels of copyright protection - has now come to a position which,
by its own admission, is inconsistent with the position previously taken
by the PSA. (Lee, Hansard, p17)
And we find Professor Fels' explanation for this change of heart totally
unsatisfactory:
"that was in 1990 and the piracy enforcement has tightened
up a lot in Asia since then." (Lee and Fels, Hansard, p17)
The hypocrisy of the Professor's reference to the irrelevance of 1990
will only become apparent when we refer later to his attempts to rely
on the same 1990 report, and 1990 evidence, to support his position on
price.
As to the notion that enforcement in Asia has tightened up since that
time, all the evidence before the Committee was to the contrary.
Furthermore, as the evidence outlined above establishes, the problems
of imports from countries without comparable copyright protection extends
far beyond the piracy issue.
Other adverse consequences
Unfortunately, the negative effects of this Bill for composers and publishers
do not only relate to payment of royalties.
First, up and coming composers rely on investment from publishers just
as much as up and coming artists rely on it from record companies. And
the same conclusion follows - this Bill will undermine the investment
environment for publishers, discouraging them from investing in untested
composers.
As Mr David Caswell stated:
"My ability to survive is because of the seed money that is
provided by major companies that have been prepared to advance me money.
. . . I could not have survived without that. . . . If this Bill comes
in there is going to be no-where for (young talented songwriters) to
go". (Caswell, Hansard, p73).
Second, parallel importing will actually be a disincentive to exporting
musical works into Asia. As Mr Eric McCusker explained:
"Any sales there would be offset by the potential damage to
my local income that imports from those territories would cause".
(McCusker, Sub 133, p4).
Given these appalling circumstances that face composers and publishers
should this Bill become law, it is very easy to sympathise with the sentiments
of Ms Riccobono, General Manager of the Australian publishing company,
J Albert & Son, when she said:
"Professor Fels keeps talking about this coming about: its
being against the multinationals and how it is going to help the independents.
I am an independent and I have not been able to see one thing here
that is going to help us". (Riccobono, Hansard, p86).
Even at this late stage, Labor Members can only hope that the Government
heeds these warnings, at very least so that Mr Ross Wilson does not act
on his threat, if the Bill goes through, to leave Australia and go and
live somewhere where his talents and efforts are appreciated and rewarded.
(McCusker, Sub 133, p5).
Music retailers, especially small businesses
It was interesting to note that this group of music industry participants
- music retailers - were the one group that did not present a united front
of opposition to the Government's proposal.
It was more interesting to note that, generally speaking, the division
of opinion in the retail sector was very much determined by the nature
of the retail outlet - large department stores and large music chains
tended to support the Government's Bill, whereas small independent music
retailers, including many family run businesses, were by and large vehemently
opposed to the proposed changes.
This reasons for this division of opinion will become obvious as we examine
some of the evidence that came forward.
Before examining that evidence however, we just want to note the strength
of feeling that small business music retailers expressed in opposition
to this legislation.
For example, the Australian Music Retailers Association gave evidence
of a survey they conducted of 105 small retailers, both members and non-members,
about parallel importing. About 95% of these small retailers indicated
opposition to the Government' Bill. (Bull, Hansard, p114).
In addition, Mr Barry Bull of AMRA gave evidence that small retailers
were sick and tired of being told by the Government and by Professor Fels
how parallel importing would be good for them, when they know the reverse
is true:
"As small businesses, we are annoyed that Professor Fels, who
does not know what it is like to be behind a shop counter seven days
a week offering the best service possible, continually tells us how
easy it will be to exist as small retailers under the parallel importing
regime and how fortunate we will be. He ignores the problems we retailers
will face in being forced to import to be competitive". (Bull,
Hansard, p114).
We note this evidence because, quite frankly, we are surprised that the
Government is apparently ignoring it. Our surprise arises because, of
course, this Government constantly claims to be sympathetic to small business
in this country, to represent its interest and to champion its cause.
We know however - as do the small music retailers - that this is simply
not the case when it comes to the music industry. In fact the Government
apparently is selective when it comes to the sectors of small business
that it considers worthy of support.
The tragedy is that, blind to the problems that small retailers will
face under parallel importation, the Government is prepared to sacrifice
their interest in a head long rush to become the champion of the major
retailers, including ironically some multinationals.
Professor Fels you have been alerted.
The problems small retailers will face
Under a parallel importation regime small retailers will have immediate
problems in terms of changed trading conditions.
An example given by Mr Barry Bull is the change that will occur in distribution
networks, particularly having to handle and take into account changes
in the exchange rate:
"The legislation is asking retailers to forego an established
and reliable distribution network for a constantly negotiable set of
forces. This is a huge expectation on smaller retailers to perform and
respond quickly in this competitive chain-dominated environment".
(Bull, Hansard, p114).
Another example is the change in trading terms that will apply to small
retailers, with AMPAL noting that trading terms from countries such as
Asia will not be as favourable as in Australia. For example, small retailers
will be very unlikely to obtain terms that are customarily offered by
Australian companies, such as those which allow them to return unsold
stock - so-called 'sale or return'. (AMPAL, Sub 147, p15).
However, whilst these problems will be significant, by far the most damaging
problem that will confront small retailers under parallel importation
will be their inability to compete with the big retailers and big chains.
The reason this problem will arise should be obvious to anyone. In a
situation where open imports by retailers are promoted, those retailers
with large buying power will be able to access better trading terms from
overseas wholesalers, including lower wholesale prices.
This was put succinctly in the AMRA written submission:
"Independent music retailers will never be able to compete
with the larger chains who have their own well established international
distribution and credit facilities. Those with buying power will be
able to exploit a situation where open imports are permitted. That is,
the rationalists' model of open imports makes the playing field very
un-level." (AMRA, Sub 150, p3).
In this statement AMRA alludes to one of the significant specific advantages
the major retailers will have - established credit and supply lines, either
from the resources of their parent company or directly from the international
record companies, that are not available to small independent retailers.
(AMRA, Sub 150, p4).
Mr Barry Bull noted another advantage: the major retailers can buy better
by dealing directly with the major US record labels whereas the independents
can only deal with middle-man wholesalers called one-stops, who add their
own margin, thus inflating the price to smaller retailers (Bull, Hansard,
p115).
Given this evidence we were not shocked that support for the interests
of small music retailers came from some surprising quarters.
For example, the Sydney Morning Herald music critic, Mr Bruce Elder,
who was otherwise basically a supporter of the Government's Bill, recognised
that large retail organisations will be able to buy in very substantial
quantities, but that this:
"would not operate for a small retailer, and it is likely that
it would probably produce a fairly negative effect for small retailers".
(Elder, Hansard, p55).
That concern even went to the Trade Union movement. Ms Hryce of the Media
Arts and Entertainment Alliance, a union not known as a representative
or advocate for small business, said she was concerned about how independent
retailers are going to compete, particularly as they cannot put in a bulk
orders like Woolworths or Sanity. (Hryce, Hansard, p75).
Indeed, one suspects that both Woolworths and Sanity well know there
are advantages to being a large retailer under a parallel importation
regime, such as being able to buy better by, for example, taking advantage
of arrangements under which rebates are given for volume purchases.
In fact, even Professor Fels was capable of recognising the "buying
power of the big retailers", although he claimed that small retailers
could respond to this buying power in ways which would ensure big retailers
would not 'put the squeeze' on them. (Fels, Hansard, p3).
Needless to say, these ideas were dismissed by the people with the hands
on experience as opposed to the theoretical expectation - the small music
retailers themselves.
The evidence strongly supported the position taken by small retailers
that they would be seriously disadvantaged under a parallel importation
regime.
We hold very real fears that the proposal will inevitably wipe out large
numbers of small music retailers in Australia. Moreover it could very
well lead to the situation, recognised by Senator Shayne Murphy during
the course of the hearings, where the Bill professes to be about destroying
a monopoly on distribution by multinational record companies, but actually
creates a monopoly on retailing by multinational retailers.
Indeed, it does not take a genius to understand that this is precisely
the reason why big retailers, such as Woolworths, are enthusiastic supporters
of the proposal.
The disadvantage suffered by small business - and the prospect of small
businesses being wiped out -is in itself a tragedy, and in our view is
reason enough for opposition to this Bill.
But this view is strengthened when regard is also had to the broader
consequences should larger retailers gain substantial dominance of the
retail market.
For example, we note that comments by Mr Barry Bull that Woolworths has
no interest in the development and future of Australian artists and of
the Australian music industry, only in the commodity it knows as a CD.
They do not support the range which independents must carry or provide
the service or knowledge to support that range. They use highly discounted
CDs merely to induce customer traffic into their stores. (Bull, Hansard,
p114).
Similarly, we note the evidence of AMRA that choice of music will suffer
as major retailers concentrate on importing high demand (top selling)
product - the fast moving product which Australian distributors rely on
for their capacity to maintain stock of the wider slower moving back catalogue.
(AMRA, Sub 150, p5).
Given all this we cannot help but be somewhat bemused by a comment made
by Professor Fels when reflecting on the reasons AMRA and small retailers
are opposing the Government's Bill - they are "very nervous about
change". (Fels, Hansard, p9).
Frankly, they have good reason to be.
Manufacturers
In this Minority Report, we can deal with the position of CD manufacturers
very briefly because, regrettably, their position under a parallel importation
regime is all too predictable.
At present 95% of CDs sold in Australia, are manufactured in Australia
by Australian workers.
Unfortunately for them, this Bill provides an explicit incentive for
CD manufacturers to move their manufacturing offshore - to source their
product where the costs are cheapest - and then to import the material
back into Australia. (AMPAL, Sub 147, p4).
Indeed, we note that even Professor Fels conceded that "to the
extent that there are more direct imports of CDs made overseas (as a result
of this Bill), there is a reduction in the number of CDs manufactured
in Australia". (Fels, Hansard, p7).
Others in the industry
Given the impact on manufacturing, it is undoubted that job losses will
occur in that sector should this Bill become law.
Initially there will also be job losses in the publishing and recording
industries as these industries inevitably contract in the more hostile
investment environment this Bill will impose. (AMPAL, Sub 147, p4).
These effects on employees in the music industry are, regrettably, all
too obvious.
But we should also bear in mind that job opportunities in a myriad of
related fields will also be affected as the Australian music industry
inevitably contracts in the wake of this Bill. (AMPAL, Sub 147, p4).
This includes opportunities in music related businesses such as rehearsal
studios, freelance sound recording services, music video businesses, concert
promoters, venue operators, booking agents, advertising agencies, retailers,
performers and songwriters.
The most recent evidence of the number of people employed either directly
in the business of recording, publishing or manufacturing CDs or indirectly
in these music related businesses was provided by Price Waterhouse in
1993 - 50,000 employees. (AMPAL, Sub 147, p4).
The Copyright Amendment Bill puts the jobs of each and everyone of these
50,000 people at risk.
Not all of them will lose their jobs - but many of them will. A strange
ambition for a government in a country where job security is a priority
and unemployment is far too high.
The consequences for piracy
There is no doubt that the Government itself knows that the introduction
of parallel importation of CDs would, in itself, lead to an increase in
pirated CDs entering this country.
Indeed, this was precisely the point that was made by the written submission
of APRA:
"The fact that the Government has decided to increase penalties
for piracy at the same time as repealing the import rights is itself,
of course, acknowledgment that the increased importation of pirate product
into Australia is indeed a likely result of the removal of the import
right". (APRA, Sub 145, p4).
The Government's response, however, has been to say that any increased
piracy that would otherwise arise will be discouraged by the proposal
to increase the penalties for piracy and to allegedly "make it
easier to prove offences of piracy in the courts by reversing the onus
of proof". (Fels, Hansard, p2).
Unfortunately for the Government, it is easy to demonstrate that this
is a flawed response.
The key is the fundamental role the existing copyright law currently
provides as the threshold identification mechanism - the very mechanism
that will be lost under this Bill.
Identification of piracy
The existing restriction on parallel imports provides a mechanism for
identifying pirated CDs at two important points - the point of import
and the point of sale (or at least, stocking for sale).
The written submission of AMPAL gave a detailed explanation of the identification
mechanism at the point of import. (AMPAL, Sub 147, p23).
The existing provisions give the copyright owner the right to exclusively
import a CD in which copyright is owned. In practice, this means a CD
importer is required to have an import licence from the Australasian Mechanical
Copyright Owners Society (AMCOS - acting on behalf of the copyright owner)
prior to importation into Australia. When a shipment of CDs arrives in
Australia Customs has the power to seize CDs which have been imported
by someone other than the licensed CD importer, and to hold such product
until AMCOS institutes proceedings for unlicensed importation. Thus, under
the existing provisions Customs and AMCOS automatically know that if a
shipment of CDs was not imported by the licensed CD importer it must be
a pirated CD imported in breach of copyright law.
Under the changes proposed by this Bill, as we have seen, the exclusive
right of copyright owners to import CDs into Australia is removed. This
means AMCOS will no longer have the right on behalf of the copyright owner
to require a CD importer to hold an import licence, or indeed to bring
proceedings for unlicensed importation; similarly Customs power to hold
unlicensed imports is rendered meaningless. The problem with this however,
in terms of pirate identification, is that Customs and AMCOS will no longer
automatically know that a shipment of CDs imported by someone other than
the copyright owner or exclusive licensee is a pirated CD imported in
breach of copyright law. The shipment could have been lawfully imported
by someone else pursuant to their right to parallel import CDs into Australia.
It can therefore be seen that the existing provisions are vital to control
piracy at the point of importation.
The respected piracy investigator, Mr Michael Speck, gave an explanation
of the identification mechanism at the retail point. (MIPI, Sub 142, p6).
Under the existing provisions, the only stocks of CDs that should be
in retail stores are those made by the Australian copyright holders or
exclusive licensors. When stocks are identified that are not made or authorised
by the local copyright owner these are immediately suspect as pirates.
Indeed, with 95% of CDs made in Australia, stocks not made in local factories
are automatically suspect.
Under the changes proposed, the mere presence of stocks of CDs in retail
stores not made or authorised by the Australian copyright owner would
not prima facie mean anything other than that an import has taken place.
In order to ascertain whether the import was illicit, the country of manufacture
would need to be known as well as other details - usually not known or
offered by the importer.
Thus it can also be seen that the existing provisions are vital to control
piracy at the point of sale (or stocking for sale).
In summary then if the restriction on parallel imports is repealed identifying
and therefore prosecuting pirated product becomes in a practical sense
impossible.
Why the Government's response is flawed
This last statement explains why the Government's response is flawed.
The Government's response is directed solely to making prosecution (allegedly)
easier and to increasing penalties after a successful prosecution.
But these points will never be reached if identification of pirated product
is practically impossible. No pirates will ever be identified to be subject
to prosecution or to increased penalties.
Other problems with the Government's response
In relation to the Government's proposal to increase penalties for piracy
we can be very brief.
We endorse completely the comment by Ms Baulch of the Australian Copyright
Council that:
"it is difficult to believe that somebody who is undeterred
by a fine of $250,000 is suddenly going to be deterred by a fine of
$275,000". (Baulch, Hansard, p65).
The Government has stated that it now intends to propose a 10% increase
in all relevant fines. This is a classic policy making on the run, and,
as usual, the proposal alone cannot repair bad law.
Put simply, we do not believe this increase will provide any deterrent
effect whatsoever in the case of pirated CDs, particularly as potential
offenders would be safe in the knowledge that detection of their piracy
is now all the more difficult.
In relation to the proposal to "reverse the onus of proof"
we can also be very brief.
The Government has proclaimed from the outset that this Bill will reverse
the onus of proof in cases concerning piracy, arguing that this will make
it easier to bring successful prosecutions of piracy cases.
But the evidence before this Committee proved conclusively that the benefits
of this change are largely illusory.
First and foremost, the proposed change in the onus of proof does not
apply in criminal cases - and so the criminal prosecutions of pirates
are not affected.
Second, in relation to civil cases, where the Government claims the change
will have an effect, the evidence put before us demonstrated that the
Government's Bill does not in fact reverse the onus of proof, and that
the change is of little practical, benefit at all.
As was authoritatively stated by the Australian Copyright Council in
its written submission:
"The Bill does not 'change the onus of proof' as claimed in
the Government's press release of 8 October 1997. As with other infringements,
the copyright owner would have to prove all elements to make out a prima
facie case, including that the copyright owner had not licensed the
act alleged to be an infringement. In an action for unauthorised importation,
the copyright owner must also prove that the defendant knew, or ought
to have known, that making the imported article in Australia would have
infringed copyright.
"The Bill would shift the onus of proof to the defendant only
when a prima facie case had been made out. This is no different to the
onus of proof in relation to existing exceptions and provisos in the
Act, including the provisions which allow the importation of books.
The Bill would not remove any of the elements which a copyright owner
currently has to prove". (ACC, Sub 164, p7).
And, as AMPAL explained in its submission, the practical result of this
is that the benefits of the alleged 'reversal of the onus of proof' are
largely illusory. Thus, the copyright owner will still:
have to show that the importer had constructive knowledge that they
were infringing rights;
have the same onerous evidentiary burden to establish copyright ownership;
have a very small window of opportunity to advise Customs that imported
works are infringing;
be exposed to damages while trying to enforce their rights;
have to argue in court the legality of a licence purportedly issued
in a foreign country under foreign laws.
(AMPAL, Sub 147, p25).
Given this detailed and expert testimony, we can only conclude that the
Government, and Minister Alston in particular, have been deliberately
deceptive in relation to the onus issue, in order to create an impression
that prosecutions will be easier when in fact there is no substantial
change at all.
Conclusion
Given the obvious flaws in the Government's response to the piracy threat
we, and the music industry, are right to be very concerned about the prospect
of increased piracy should this Bill become law.
Labor Members of the Committee are particularly concerned about the empirical
evidence we heard that piracy has rapidly increased in those few countries
in which parallel imports have been allowed.
Here we refer to the evidence of Mr Speck that in Norway, after parallel
importation was allowed, there was a dramatic influx of pirated material
and the overall level of piracy increased markedly. (Indeed, the problem
became so bad that parallel import restrictions were reimposed). And we
refer to his evidence that in Singapore since the introduction of parallel
importation there has been a significant influx of pirated material. (Speck,
Hansard, p94).
We can only conclude that this Bill inevitably poses a grave threat to
the Australian music industry in the form of increased piracy. And that
the Government's response is woefully inadequate and fundamentally flawed.
The prospects for cheaper CDs
In light of the alarming evidence about the negative consequences on
parallel imports on the Australian music industry and on participants
in it, we would expect that the evidence presented to this Committee about
the alleged beneficial impact on CD prices would be overwhelming. After
all, the Government alleges that the removal of the restriction on parallel
importation will lead to a decrease in CD prices, and that on balance
this consumer benefit is worth any potential damage to the industry.
Frankly, we were underwhelmed by the evidence of potential price reductions.
Missing was any evidence at all that could support the Prime Minister's
outrageous claim, at the time the Government's decision was announced,
that:
"the decision . . . . will mean that CDs will fall by at least
$7 an item". (John Howard, Press Conference, 16 October 1997,
Sydney).
Missing was any empirical evidence of the price reduction it is alleged
will occur.
Missing in the first instance (that is, until Senator Murphy pointed
out the startling omission in the ACCC's initial evidence) was any serious
attempt by the supporters of this Bill to examine the cost structures
that would confront an Australian retailer seeking to parallel import
CDs. (As we shall see, this is the central issue in the price debate).
Rather, this Committee was presented with an argument which simply asserted
that the retail price of CDs is lower in some countries, most notably
the US; that:
"The cause of the price difference is that the law confers
a monopoly or an exclusive right on multinational record companies in
Australia to import their own CDs". (Fels, Hansard, p2);
and that:
"It is quite clear that, if the import restrictions are removed,
prices of new CDs will fall quite sharply in Australia by several dollars
at least, if not more. . . . . It is inconceivable, given the large
price differences between Australia and the US, that the price here
would not fall". (Fels, Hansard, p2).
The best that can said of this argument is that it is a theoretical conclusion,
derived from an erroneous causal assumption, built on an irrelevant price
comparison.
For this reason, we believe the argument is seriously flawed ought not
be accepted by this Committee.
Indeed, we noted with some humour the suggestion in the Majority Report
that many witnesses spent much time and artistry asserting that parallel
importation would not bring about cheaper CDs prices. Of course it was
Professor Fels who spent all of his time and all of his economic artistry
asserting that parallel importation would bring about cheaper CD prices.
The irrelevance of retail price comparisons
It was clear to us at the outset of this Committee process that the most
important evidence that would be forthcoming on the issue of price was
evidence of the wholesale price in the US and other countries, and evidence
of other costs to potential Australian importers.
Our reason for this was obvious: if parallel imports are to reduce the
retail price of music CDs in Australia, this could only be because Australian
retailers are able to parallel import CDs from overseas cheaper than they
can access them here. Clearly, no retailer will import CDs from overseas
if that actually results in a higher landed cost than would otherwise
be available in Australia.
Thus, it is the whole cost structure that Australian retailers will face
when parallel importing CDs that is the central, indeed only, issue -
if that cost structure does not make it economical to import, retailers
will not do so.
And no price reductions will follow.
It is for this reason that we find any comparison of retail prices entirely
irrelevant. The fact that consumers in the US can presently buy CDs cheaper
than consumers in Australia is entirely irrelevant. The only relevant
fact is whether Australian consumers will be able to buy cheaper CDs in
Australia because Australian retailers can import cheaper from the US.
Given these relatively basic propositions, we were astounded during the
course of the evidence that none of the promoters of this legislation
even attempted to analyse the cost structure parallel importers would
face.
The evidence from the Australian Consumers Association was entirely silent
on this issue, and chose instead to focus on retail prices.
The initial evidence from Professor Fels and the ACCC also completely
neglected the issue, and also gave voluminous evidence about retail prices.
Indeed, when challenged by Senator Murphy about his lack of evidence about
wholesale prices and potential cost of importing CDs for retail in Australia,
the best Professor Fels could come up with was that his "impression"
is that you can import, even today at the exchange rate, more cheaply
from the US. (Fels, Hansard, p9).
With all due respect to Professor Fels, we did not find his "impressions"
overly helpful.
[Thankfully, the ACCC did in a supplementary submission at least make
some effort to address the issue, albeit (as we shall see) erroneously.]
Indeed, the only evidence of any weight supplied to the Committee about
the cost structures confronting parallel importers was suppled by the
Australian Music Retailers Association. In a sense this at least did not
surprise us. After all, if anyone is to understand whether parallel imports
will be a cheaper source of music CDs for Australian retailers it would
be their industry association.
We shall return to this evidence shortly.
Some comments on the retail price comparisons
As we have shown above, there is no doubt that the evidence presented
to this Committee concerning retail price comparisons, although interesting,
is entirely irrelevant to this debate.
Indeed, this is one of the reasons why we believe the argument presented
by Professor Fels is seriously flawed - it is built on an irrelevant price
comparison.
Nevertheless, we believe it would be remiss of us not to make some comments
about the evidence that was presented.
The quality of the retail price evidence
First, we found the quality of this evidence very disappointing.
The best example of this was the persistent and central reliance by the
ACCC on the previous findings of the PSA Report of 1990. This reliance
was suspect for a number of reasons:
the report was actually focussed on the price of music cassettes not
CDs; in fact, appendix J of the report convincingly demonstrated that
CD prices in Australia were not high in 1990;
the report was completed in 1990 and was based on data from the late
1980s; the industry and market have changed radically in the last 10
years, and even Professor Fels himself dismissed one of his own from
1990 as now irrelevant;
the report failed to take into account whether there were differences
in any of the factors which make up the retail price in various countries
(these are listed below);
the report failed to consider whether any price differential was out
of line with other comparable goods.
(AMPAL, Sub 147, pp13-14).
Retail price differentials for other goods
Secondly, we found it annoying that the price comparison evidence failed
to recognise price differentials also exist between Australia and the
US for a very large range of goods. AMRA gave examples of goods that are
cheaper in the US than in Australia: footwear (Reebok and Nike), designer
clothing, tents, jeans, motor vehicles, fishing tackle and cameras. (AMRA,
Sub 150, p7).
Indeed, even a 'Big Mac' is only USD$0.99 in the US (that's AUD$1.41
@ 70c USD/AUD, compared to AUD$2.65 in Australia). (AMRA, Sub 150, p7).
Other factors for retail price differentials
Thirdly, we found the evidence of price comparison seriously deficient
in that it failed to consider other reasons - besides the prohibition
on parallel importation - that might explain the differences in retail
prices across countries.
These were listed generally in the AMPAL submission: differences in wholesale
prices, royalty rates, sales and value added taxes, typical retail mark-ups,
discounts and terms of trade, economises of scale, distribution costs,
market idiosyncrasies. (AMPAL, Sub 147, p14)
In the specific case of comparison with the US, AMRA noted the following
substantial differences:
US has lower royalty rates;
US has lower sales tax rates; indeed, in some states of the US there
is no sales tax at all;
US has bigger economies of scale; and
Australian retailers suffer higher shopping mall rental rates plus
other imposts
(AMRA, Sub 150, p7).
In New Zealand, although wholesale prices are the same, retail prices
are marginally cheaper because of lower royalty rates and cheaper distribution
networks. (ARIA, Sub 153, p6).
And in Asia, CDs may be cheaper because of lower wages rates, very much
lower - and in some cases, non-existent - royalty rates, and floods of
pirated product. (ARIA, Sub 153, p6).
Thus, it is clear that many other factors besides the restriction on
parallel imports may cause differences between prices in Australia and
elsewhere in the world.
Indeed, one of the great ironies of this whole debate is that many of
the countries which the Government, the ACCC and others consistently allege
have cheaper CDs prices - US, UK, Canada and New Zealand - all have restrictions
against parallel imports.
It is therefore at least possible to suggest that the one factor that
does not explain the differences in retail price is the prohibition on
parallel imports.
Certainly we have enough doubt to reject entirely the almost arrogantly
definitive statement by Professor Fels that:
"The cause of the (retail) price difference is that the law
confers a monopoly or an exclusive right on multinational record companies
in Australia to import their own CDs". (Fels, Hansard, p2);
We have already pointed out that this statement is wrong as a matter
of law. It is also doubtful as a matter of market economics.
We also note that this another reason why we believe Professor Fels'
argument is flawed - it is derived from an erroneous causal assumption.
Legitimate retail price differentials
We found it interesting to note the argument advanced by the Australian
Copyright Council that it is not necessarily wrong that a music CD may
have different prices in difference markets:
"There may be a number of legitimate reasons for a sound recording
being available at a cheaper price in another country, where it would
unfair to permit its importation into Australia. For examples:
a) a copyright owner may elect to sell legitimate recordings at
a low price in a country where piracy is rife and/or disposable income
is low, as part of a strategy to establish a legitimate market; or
b) a recording may be sold as a "deletion" or cut-out
in another country, but still be selling at normal retail price in Australia
(for example, because it is a local artist)."
Hearsay evidence of retail price reductions
Finally, we were constantly frustrated by the use by proponents of this
Bill - particularly the ACCC and Australian Consumers Association - of
hearsay evidence from others about likely price reductions flowing from
the Bill.
The ACA was the worst offender in this regard. Whilst it gave reams of
irrelevant evidence about differences in retail prices, when specifically
asked for evidence that prices would fall the best the ACA could come
up with was:
"Ultimately when it comes to price, the testimony of some major
retailers provides evidence that significant price savings to consumers
could be achieved if parallel imports were allowed". (ACA,
Sub 166A, p34).
Professor Fels also offended in this way. His approach to giving evidence
about likely price reductions was to give hearsay evidence that quite
a few retailers have advised there would be significant, substantial price
falls. Examples he gave included some outlandish claims that were never
backed by testimony (but that were widely reported in the press) that
prices would fall by 25 - 30%, that there would be prices in the low $20s,
and that possible market price of $19.95 would be reached. (Fels, Hansard,
p4).
Indeed, this is the third reason why Professor Fels argument is seriously
flawed. The reality is that he has no evidence that permitting parallel
imports will reduce CD prices - at best comes to a theoretical conclusion
that this will occur because of the effects of increased competition.
We will next show why this theoretical conclusion is actually wrong in
practice.
Before doing so we would like to make two relevant comments that arise
out of the Majority Report
First, we note that the Majority report relies on evidence supplied by
Woolworths about likely reductions in CD prices consequent on this Bill.
We found it extremely disturbing that Woolworths were prepared to give
written evidence in public, but chose to move in camera when responding
to our questions on the content of that submission. This means we are
unable to refer to those responses, and note that their evidence remains
publicly untested. We therefore believe that the weight of their public
evidence as slight. That publicly untested evidence should not have been
referred to in the Majority Report and should not be taken into account
by this Committee.
Second, we note the extraordinary comment in the Majority Report that
"attempts to quantify the potential price effects of parallel
imports are not the issue". But of course the Government made
it the issue, specifically in its public rationale for the Bill, but all
the more so because of the Prime Minister's outrageous attempts to himself
quantify the alleged price benefit (we have quoted the comment above).
Let there be no mistake: we regard this comment as a damning admission
that the Government itself now admits it is impossible to quantify any
price benefits from this Bill, and any attempt to do so publicly in future
can only be regarded as cant and hypocrisy.
The cost of importing CDs
We return to the central point that we made at the commencement of this
section on price - the only relevant evidence is that concerning the cost
structure that Australian retailers will face when parallel importing
CDs, especially the wholesale price they will face, as well as other imposts.
In this regard we are indebted to the evidence of the Australian Music
Retailers Association.
Their evidence is summarised in the following table (AMRA, Sub 150, p7).
It illustrates the cost to an Australian retailer of importing into Australia
for retail sale a standard-priced and premium-priced (new release) music
CD from the US, assuming an exchange rate of 70c USD/AUD.
|
Standard
|
Premium
|
Import price from US "One stop shop" |
USD$11.50
|
USD$12.20
|
Converted to AUD @ 70c |
AUD$16.43
|
AUD$17.43
|
Add sales tax and customs costs @ 26.4% |
$4.34
|
$4.60
|
Add freight @ AUD$1.00 per CD (this assumes a minimum
of 200 CDs) |
$1.00
|
$1.00
|
Total cost to retailer to import CD |
AUD$21.77
|
AUD$23.03
|
This wholesale cost to the retailer compares with the wholesale cost
presently available to a retailer buying locally, including sales tax,
of AUD$21.70 - $22.24.
Thus, at an exchange rate of 70c USD/AUD it is cheaper for an Australian
retailer to source music CDs in Australian than in the US.
Indeed, allowance must also be made for additional terms of trade differences
that the retailer would need to build into the retail margin - for example,
the cost of financing (assuming international credit facilities are not
available), marketing, and a factor of obsolescence because no returns
would be permitted - which would be in the vicinity of $2.00.
This means that at the standard retail mark up a retailer would have
to sell an imported CD at AUD$35.00 just to maintain the normal margin.
This in itself is powerful evidence that CDs imported from the US will
not be cheaper to the retailer than Australian-sourced CDs. But if further
evidence is necessary we also note a case study that was also presented
by AMRA (AMRA, Sub 150, p8).
A Melbourne independent retailer randomly selected 6 separate orders
from November 1997 just prior to the dive in the Australian dollar's value.
Using Abbey Road (a USA one stop) and others from the majors in Australia
and from an independent distributor, MRA. The following results were obtained:
Distributor |
No. of CDs |
Cost |
Average cost per CD |
Abbey Road |
43 |
$950.29 |
$22.10 |
BMG |
38 |
$748.51 |
$19.69 |
EDC |
91 |
$1,548.71 |
$17.25 |
Festival |
28 |
$453.78 |
$16.20 |
Polygram |
49 |
$1,018.45 |
$20.78 |
MRA |
95 |
$1,625.00 |
$17.11 |
Thus, the average cost of a CD imported from the US is much higher than
the Australian-sourced CD. This disparity would actually now be exacerbated
since the decline in the value of the Australian dollar.
To us, this is vital evidence that the price of retail CDs is Australia
will not fall if parallel imports are permitted.
The simple fact is that it will continue to be cheaper for the retailer
to source CDs from Australian distributors.
Moreover, the suggestion of Professor Fels, repeated in the Majority
Report that the threat of imports will in some way cause local distributors
to reduce prices is, in this light, fanciful. Such a threat can only have
any effect if it is real, and there will not be a real threat so long
as local distributors know their product is cheaper than potential overseas
imports.
Indeed, it is interesting to note that, once the full implications of
this analysis became clear to Professor Fels, he too appreciated its significance
and, belatedly, put up some evidence in an attempt to rebut the evidence
of AMRA. That evidence was that an Australian retailer could purchase
CDs from the US, at an exchange rate of 70c USD/AUD, for a total landed
cost of between AUD$19.30 - $20.43; and from the "rest of the world"
at a cost of AUD$15.86
We note at the outset that we were very disappointed that this evidence
was so late in forthcoming because it did not permit us to question Professor
Fels about it. To that extent the evidence is untested by us, and for
that reason alone, deserves less weight in our considerations.
More important to us, however, is that the evidence supplied by Professor
Fels contained two significant flaws. These were as follows:
- There was no evidence presented about the source of the CDs in the
US because of claims by Professor Fels of the necessity for confidentiality.
(This contrasts with the AMRA evidence that specifically identified
a US CD wholesaler).
- Besides concerns about verifying the ACCC's evidence, this omission
is important because if the ACCC's evidence relates to supply directly
from distributors in the US it will be completely misleading. Australian
independent retailers (like their US counterparts) will have to
buy from wholesalers, and therefore will have to pay this wholesaler's
mark up also. The fact that the prices quoted by the ACCC are not
consistently available to independent retailers in Australia make
us suspect that the direct distributor price has been used.
- The evidence assumed a sales tax and customs rate of either 18.3%
or 22% (as opposed to AMRA's rate of 26.4%). The former figure is
simply wrong, and that latter is only available if the importer
is a wholesaler who has a VS number. This is unlikely to be the
case for small, independent retailers.
We also note in relation to the comparison with the "rest of the
world" that this is simply a worthless exercise. Put simply, there
is no way of knowing what countries are included in the comparison (for
example, whether Asian countries notorious for piracy or non-payment of
royalties are included), whether the price is available for importers
and what terms would be available to the importer.
For these reasons we are not persuaded that ACCC's evidence in any way
detracts from the credibility of AMRA's evidence on this the core issue
- whether an Australian retailer will be able to access CDs from US suppliers
cheaper than from Australian suppliers.
At the present exchange rate, and at an exchange rate of 70c, the answer
is a resounding no.
Can CD prices fall, and is it worth it?
We want to conclude this report by attempting to objectively answer this
the core question asked by the Government's Bill.
In our view, the evidence of a reduction in price consequent on this
Bill was uncertain at best. The theory proffered by Professor Fels to
explain why a price reduction will occur was significantly flawed. The
evidence of the actual cost structure to be confronted by retailers attempting
to parallel import music CDs into this country strongly suggested there
was no price reduction to be gained from that source.
Indeed, the reality probably is that the only way CDs can be sourced
cheaper from overseas is to rely on:
Thus in each case damage in inflicted upon the interests of a significant
part of the music industry.
This leads to our more general point.
Although the evidence of price reduction was uncertain, the evidence
was very certain in demonstrating that the Australian music industry,
and the various interests within it, would suffer damage from parallel
imports.
This indelicate balance was best expressed by Mr Dobe Newton when he
said:
"We have any amount of evidence to suggest that there is no
guarantee that prices will fall. . . . Perhaps we can have cheaper CDs.
But there is certainly no guarantee of that unless we are talking about
from areas that will damage the interests of Australian artists and
people who invest in them." (Newton, Hansard, p146).
This is an indelicate balance that we are not prepared to tolerate.
We cannot and will not support a Bill which seeks uncertain benefit for
the consumer at the expense of certain detriment to the music industry.
Senator N. Bolkus, Senator J. McKiernan and Senator S. Murphy