CHAPTER 3
Key issues
3.1
This chapter discusses some of the key issues raised during the inquiry,
including:
- in-principle support for a parliamentary joint committee on human
rights;
- suggestions for improvement to the role, mandate and practical operation
of the new joint committee, namely:
- expansion of coverage of relevant 'human rights' standards; and
- additional or specific functions and powers for the new joint
committee; and
-
content, form and scope of statements of compatibility.
Support for a parliamentary joint committee on human rights
3.2
The vast majority of submitters and witnesses expressed in-principle
support for the proposed new joint committee.[1]
While many submissions noted their disappointment that the government's response
to the National Human Rights Consultation does not include a federal Human
Rights Act or a Charter of Human Rights,[2]
all of those submissions nevertheless welcomed the introduction of the measures
in the two bills as an important step towards improving protection of human rights
in Australia and ensuring that human rights are taken into account during the
legislative process.
3.3
The Law Council of Australia (Law Council) expressed its 'general
support' for the bills;[3]
in particular, the Law Council supported the establishment of a human rights committee
and the requirement that all bills and certain delegated legislation must be
accompanied by statements of compatibility:
Australia is the only Western democracy without an effective
federal constitutional statutory mechanism to provide comprehensive
parliamentary scrutiny of new and existing laws for compliance with human
rights. The mechanisms proposed in these bills are, in our submission, an
important step towards addressing this gap.[4]
3.4
Similarly, the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) submitted that,
in its view, the new joint committee 'will form an important mechanism at the
parliamentary level to ensure that the human rights impact of legislation and
delegated instruments [is] fully considered as part of the policy development
process'.[5]
3.5
The Human Rights Council of Australia noted that, '[w]hile the Government's
decision to not accept the Brennan Committee's recommendation for a federal
Human Rights Act was disappointing', the establishment of the new joint
committee would be 'a very significant step forward' for better protecting and
promoting human rights in Australia:
It
is particularly pleasing that the rights to which the Parliamentary
Joint Committee must have
regard when performing its functions are all of the rights expressed and
declared in the relevant international instruments listed in clause 3(1) of the
Bill, as distinct from merely a selection of some of these rights. This will
serve to remind the federal legislature that, at international law, Australia
has an obligation to observe and respect all rights that are the subject of
international treaties to which Australia is a party. This is very welcome.[6]
3.6
The Public Interest Law Clearing House (PILCH) also expressed its
support for the bills:
PILCH is pleased that the Bills, if enacted into law, will
enhance parliamentary scrutiny of proposed laws for compatibility with human
rights. Enhanced parliamentary scrutiny will help to ensure that the human
rights of all persons, including the most vulnerable and disadvantaged members
of society, are respected, protected and fulfilled. In this regard, the Bills
represent an important step forward in the domestic protection and promotion of
human rights and fundamental freedoms.[7]
3.7
The Human Rights Law Resource Centre welcomed the bills, despite
perceived 'gaps and deficiencies in the Government's Human Rights Framework',
and supported their expeditious passage:
Whilst our system undoubtedly has strengths, we should always
strive to do better to ensure the enjoyment of human rights by all people in
Australia. The Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Bill 2010 is a small step
in the right direction. It has the potential to make a modest but welcome
contribution to the legislative and institutional protection of human rights in
Australia and to play an important role in human rights education and
acculturation.[8]
3.8
Professor David Kinley and Ms Christine Ernst from the Sydney Law
School, University of Sydney commended the introduction of the measures:
We believe that the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny)
Bill is an important step towards creating a human rights culture. Its
introduction ought to be commended. By proposing a Joint Committee on Human
Rights and requiring new legislation to be accompanied by a statement of compatibility,
the Bill seeks to make human rights considerations an integral part of the
decision-making of Parliament and the Executive.[9]
3.9
Amnesty International Australia also endorsed the bills:
A Parliamentary Scrutiny Committee tasked with assessing
legislation on the basis of adherence to the seven major international human
rights instruments to which Australia has committed to upholding is a positive
step towards human rights protection in this country...
In the absence of a Human Rights Act, the Human Rights
(Parliamentary Scrutiny) Bill 2010 if implemented in full will be a useful and
tangible measure to further the human rights protection for people in
Australia.[10]
Suggested improvements to enhance role and mandate of joint committee
3.10
Despite widespread support for the proposed new joint committee and the
other measures contained in the bills, most submitters and witnesses were of
the view that the joint committee's role and mandate could be usefully enhanced
in a number of ways to better achieve its intended purpose. Without such
improvement, many argued that the capacity of the joint committee to protect
and promote human rights in Australia would be significantly undermined.
Definition of 'human rights'
3.11
Concerns were raised about the definition of 'human rights' contained in
clause 3 of the Human Rights Bill on the basis that the definition is too
narrow, uncertain in coverage, and fails to include important international and
domestic human rights standards.[11]
Recognition of a wider range of
international human rights instruments
3.12
Many submissions proposed that the definition of 'human rights' should
be expanded to include a wider range of international instruments than the
seven core UN conventions currently captured, in order to more accurately
reflect Australia's international human rights obligations.
3.13
For example, the Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies at the
University of Melbourne argued that a 'genuine commitment' to scrutinise bills and
existing legislation to ensure compatibility with Australia's obligations under
international law 'will require the proper consideration of more international
instruments than the seven core human rights treaties to which Australia is a
party'.[12] In
particular:
The list of treaties in section 3(1) is not a comprehensive
list of the international human rights instruments to which Australia is a
party as it excludes several of the Optional Protocols to these treaties to
which Australia is also a party. For
example, it excludes the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights [of
the Child on] the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography
which was ratified by Australia on 8 January 2007.
The list of treaties in section 3(1) does not include those
international treaties to which Australia is a party and which impact directly
on human rights. Treaties
that fall within this category include, for example, the Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees 1951, which was ratified by Australia on 22
January 1954 and the numerous conventions of the International Labour
Organisation to which Australia is a party...[13]
3.14
Further:
The definition of human rights does not make any reference to
the various declarations and resolutions that have been adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly on human rights and which Australia has adopted or
affirmed. The most notable exclusion is the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights but there are others such as the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples which was affirmed more recently by the Federal
Government. Although these instruments do not impose direct obligations on
Australia under international law, they are often relevant to understanding the
meaning of the rights under the core human rights treaties.[14]
3.15
The Australian Privacy Foundation argued that the human rights
conventions specified in clause 3 of the Human Rights Bill should be a minimum
'floor' and that the joint committee 'should have the discretion to make
reference to higher 'ceilings' such as other human rights instruments and laws,
both international and in other jurisdictions, even where they have not yet
been adopted in Australia'. Accordingly:
...the role of the Committee [would keep] pace with both
domestic and international developments, and [would] not fall behind 'world's
best practice' pending the inevitably lengthy process of treaty negotiations
and ratification. The Committee would of course distinguish in its reports between
rights already formally accepted by Australia and other relevant rights and
standards. Parliament, and the public, could then decide what if any weight to
give to the latter.[15]
3.16
The NSW Disability Discrimination Legal Centre (NSWDDLC) also suggested
expanding the definition in clause 3 to recognise international human rights
instruments of a 'lesser status' than the seven core treaties:
There may be compelling reasons why, in specific instances,
the Australian Government would wish to recognise international human rights
instruments of lesser status to the core human rights treaties as falling
within the definition of human rights for the purpose of this Bill. For
example, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is
not a core human rights treaty and is not currently within the Bill's
definition of human rights. In our view it ought to be, as none of the other
treaties deals in any substantial way with the specific rights of indigenous
peoples. In our view the Bill ought to therefore also include provision for the
Attorney-General to declare, in appropriate circumstances, 'other human rights
instruments' as falling within the definition of human rights.[16]
3.17
The National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU) expressed particular concern
about the omission from clause 3 of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples:
...the National Human Rights Consultation final report...focused
upon the need for a framework to consider the distinct impact of legislative
acts upon Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples (Recommendation 15) as
well as a negotiated framework for self-determination (Recommendation 16). Considering the Federal Government's strong
stated commitment to 'closing the gap', it is a major concern that the Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has not explicitly been included as a 'human
rights' matter within the auspice of the Joint Committee.[17]
3.18
While acknowledging that the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples is not legally binding and does not create new rights, Australians for
Native Title and Reconciliation also argued that, for the sake of clarity, the
declaration should be included in clause 3 as a relevant international
instrument, or scheduled as an interpretive tool. This would provide 'a
comprehensive statement of Australia's human rights obligations to Indigenous
peoples for consideration by the Joint Committee'.[18]
3.19
The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) also submitted that the
definition of human rights does not capture the full scope of internationally
protected human rights. Focussing on the rights of workers, the ACTU argued
that the definition in clause 3 should be broadened to include reference to the
work of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) when determining the scope
and applicability of workers' rights, particularly in relation to freedom of
association.[19]
Further, it was suggested that reference to the ILO's work should not be
limited to the text of its conventions, but should also include the work of the
respective treaty bodies of the ILO that interpret the human rights outlined in
the ILO conventions.[20]
3.20
There were also calls for other rights to be recognised in the
definition of 'human rights':
- the Arts Law Centre of Australia suggested broadening the definition
to take into account the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of
the Diversity of Cultural Expressions to 'further ensure critical examination
of the potential impact of new legislation on freedom of expression';[21]
-
the Australian Privacy Foundation argued that the current definition,
which includes reference to the ICCPR (covering privacy at Article 17), should
also specify the parent treaty, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, capturing
privacy at Article 8;[22]
and
- Urban Taskforce Australia suggested that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights should be included, to address its concerns that
the seven core international instruments contained in the current definition do
not contain explicit recognition of property rights.[23]
3.21
Mr Philip Lynch, from the Human Rights Law Resource Centre, held a
different view. Favouring an inclusive definition of 'human rights', he
contended that it is not necessary to explicitly enumerate any additional
international treaties in the Human Rights Bill. Suggesting the replacement of
the word 'means' with the word 'includes' in subclause 3(1), Mr Lynch argued
that the additional treaties would be covered in any case:
First, most if not all of the rights contained in those
instruments are covered by the seven core human rights treaties. Second,
declarations, particularly the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
whilst important instruments that should guide the development and
interpretation of law and policy, are not legally binding and therefore do not
have the status or carry the legal obligations of the seven treaties. Finally,
as a practical matter, the task of prelegislative and parliamentary scrutiny
risks becoming overly complex if the assessment of compatibility is against too
many instruments.[24]
Consistency with Australian Human
Rights Commission's mandate
3.22
The AHRC recommended that there should be consistency between the
definition of human rights for the purposes of the joint committee and for the
purposes of the AHRC's mandate, and recommended amendments to both the
definition in clause 3 and the definition in the AHRC Act. In particular, the AHRC
noted that the AHRC Act empowers the AHRC to investigate complaints and to
report to the Parliament on breaches of human rights in relation to ILO
Convention 111 concerning Discrimination in respect of Employment and
Occupation, and the UN Declaration on Religion and Belief:
Given that people in Australia have an avenue to pursue a
remedy through the [AHRC] where their rights are breached under these
instruments, it would be logical for government to ensure processes to assess
compatibility with these instruments in order to avoid infringements of
people's rights in the first place.[25]
3.23
In addition:
...while the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
does not create binding legal obligations, it does provide a comprehensive
guide to assist in protecting the rights of Indigenous peoples. The rights in
the Declaration are covered in the seven instruments listed and under which
Australia does have binding legal obligations. Including the Declaration in the
definition of human rights would explicitly acknowledge this connection and
ensure that the rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly considered in the
development of statements of compatibility and by the Joint Committee. It would
also give meaning to Australia's formal position that it supports the
Declaration.[26]
3.24
At the public hearing in Canberra, the President of the AHRC, Ms Catherine Branson
QC, elaborated on the rationale for harmonising the definitions of human rights
under the Human Rights Bill and the AHRC Act:
...I think to have differing definitions of human rights in
this bill—should it become an act—[and] in the Australian Human Rights
Commission Act, is likely to cause confusion, and I think it would be
detrimental to the achievement of the objectives of the national framework on
human rights and education and understanding in this country. It would of
course also facilitate this commission providing submissions and such support
to the committee should it come into existence, as it might be asked to do. We
would then be able to make submissions more readily across the full range of
the human rights that the joint committee is concerned with, and our own work
would encompass that broader range of rights.
...
So I think that harmonisation of the definitions of human
rights would be extremely helpful for...principally educative purposes and to
assist clear understanding of human rights.[27]
3.25
Accordingly, the AHRC specifically recommended inclusion in clause 3 of
the ILO Convention 111 concerning Discrimination in respect of Employment and
Occupation; the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
and of Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief; and the UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.[28]
3.26
The AHRC also noted that the absence of some of the seven core UN
treaties from the mandate of the AHRC 'is a longstanding concern', and is
inconsistent with the first key principle of the Australian Human Rights
Framework to promote awareness and understanding of human rights in the
Australian community and to respect the seven core United Nations human rights
treaties to which Australia is a party. The AHRC therefore recommended that the
Consequential Bill include amendments to the AHRC Act to ensure that the
following instruments fall within the definition of 'human rights' for the
purposes of the AHRC Act: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and the UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.[29]
Incorporation of human rights
recognised by customary international law
3.27
Several submissions argued that the definition of 'human rights' should
be expanded to explicitly include recognition of customary international human
rights law.[30]
Examples of human rights that are recognised in customary international law are
the right to life; the prohibition of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment; the prohibition of arbitrary detention; the prohibition
of slavery and forced labour; the principle of equality before the law; the
freedoms of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of speech; the right to
fair trial; and the principle of non-refoulement.[31]
3.28
At the public hearing in Melbourne, Professor Spencer Zifcak from
Liberty Victoria argued that customary international law rights should
also be included in the definition of 'human rights' in clause 3:
Customary international law is law that is developed on [the]
basis of state practice and which is accepted by the community of nations as
being imperative...[F]or the sake of completeness it seems to me that...rights
[recognised under customary international law] ought also to be considered as
part of the joint committee's scrutiny. Having said that[,]...most of them are already
included in the human rights treaties themselves, but just for the sake of
completeness we have said let us look at the fundamental rights that are
recognised as pre-emptory norms of international law.[32]
3.29
The NSWDDLC expressed a similar view:
International statutory law is not the only source of 'core'
human rights law. We view it as essential that the definition of human rights
incorporated into the Bill explicitly include customary international human
rights law. Apart from ensuring that existing customary human rights law that
is currently not also codified is capable of being recognised, this would
assist in ensuring that the definition of human rights
incorporated into the Bill does
not become time-locked against future developments in customary international
human rights law.[33]
3.30
In this context, Mr Benjamin Lee and Mr Chris Sidoti argued that
customary international law 'should not be narrowly construed'. Further:
It should extend beyond human rights norms to include
peremptory provisions in international criminal law and international
humanitarian law. This would be consistent
with Australia's international obligations and consonant with domestic
legislation.[34]
Incorporation of international
human rights jurisprudence
3.31
A number of submissions also suggested that the definition of 'human
rights' should be expanded to provide scope for consideration of international
human rights jurisprudence in assessing Australian legislation for
compatibility with human rights obligations.[35]
3.32
For example, the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law (Castan Centre) suggested
that the jurisprudence of a range of bodies, including UN treaty monitoring
committees, the courts of other countries and regional human rights systems,
must logically form part of the content of human rights for the purposes of the
Human Rights Bill.[36]
The Castan Centre recommended amending the Human Rights Bill to clarify that
the joint committee may refer to jurisprudence from such sources in assessing
the compatibility of Australian legislative provisions with human rights.[37]
3.33
The Human Rights Law Resource Centre considered that clause 3 should be
amended to ensure that, in determining the scope and content of 'human rights',
proper consideration is given to international human rights law and the judgements
of domestic, foreign and international human rights courts, bodies and
tribunals:
This would encourage and enable both policy-makers and
parliamentarians to draw on extensive and illuminating international and
comparative human rights jurisprudence. This direction would also be consistent
with and complement the principle that it is desirable, as far as possible,
that expressions used in international agreements be construed in a uniform and
consistent manner by both municipal courts and international courts and panels.[38]
3.34
The NSWDDLC expressed an analogous viewpoint, arguing that the
definition of 'human rights' should explicitly provide that 'in determining the
scope and content of a human right, proper consideration must be given to
relevant international law and jurisprudence'.[39]
Maintaining currency of the definition
3.35
Another criticism of the definition of 'human rights' was the apparently
static nature of the exhaustive list of seven core human rights treaties, which
makes no provision for other international instruments to which Australia may
become a party in the future.
3.36
The NSWDDLC recommended that, given that the development of
international human rights treaties is an ongoing process, the Human Rights
Bill should be amended to permit the Attorney-General to declare additional
human rights instruments as falling within the definition of 'human rights' if
Australia becomes party to future relevant treaties.[40]
3.37
In their submission, a number of academics from the ANU College of Law
suggested that the definition should 'anticipate prospective legislative
compatibility treaties Australia has signed, but not yet ratified'.[41]
In a similar vein, the NTEU argued that the definition in the Human Rights Bill
fails to address '[p]rospective human rights obligations that Australia may
become a signatory to in the future'.[42]
Specific coverage of human rights protected
under domestic law
3.38
Many submissions argued that the definition in clause 3 is deficient
because it does not include human rights protected under domestic law, including
express or implied constitutional rights or guarantees, judicial decisions that
develop the common law, and legislation.
3.39
For example, Civil Liberties Australia (CLA) argued that 'the current
definition...ignores the vast body of human rights which derive from the Common
Law and the Australian Constitution'. In CLA's view, this means that the joint committee
would be deprived 'of an important function to ensure the compatibility of
proposed legislation with the full breadth of human rights'.[43]
3.40
Dr Julie Debeljak from the Castan Centre proposed that the current
definition in the Human Rights Bill could be amended to make it inclusive,
which would indicate that 'pre-existing rights within Australian domestic law,
be they common law, statutory based or constitutional based, are not excluded'.[44]
3.41
Mr Phil Lynch from the Human Rights Law Resource Centre also supported
an inclusive, rather than an exclusive, definition of 'human rights':
That would do two things. The first is that it would allow
for the evolutionary nature of human rights and enable the consideration of
human rights incidents that are not enumerated in proposed section 3(1) but
that are clearly relevant to the proposed law. It would also clarify that the
committee was empowered to consider those human rights that are recognised in
the seven treaties but are also enshrined in Australian law, whether in
legislation, the common law or the Constitution.[45]
3.42
Professor Spencer Zifcak of Liberty Victoria concurred:
We agree, broadly speaking, with the definition of human
rights in the legislation. However, we think that this ought to be an inclusive
rather than an exclusive definition. In other words, the definition of human
rights would include the rights in the seven human rights treaties but not exclude
others that may also be recognised legitimately as fundamental human rights.[46]
3.43
Reverend Professor the Hon. Michael Tate AO, a former Senator, former Minister
for Justice and former Chairman of the Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee,
provided the committee with an alternative approach to defining 'human rights'
under clause 3:
My definition would run this way: that the committee should
report on the compatibility or incompatibility of the bills for acts insofar as
they may trespass on personal rights and liberties recognised or expressed
under the Australian Constitution, in the common law, in statutes of the
parliament or in treaties ratified with the government of Australia and
incorporated into law.[47]
3.44
Reverend Professor Tate submitted that this approach:
...has the merit of being politically uncontroversial in that
it refers to the sources of law with which we are familiar. And it is
ambulatory: able to encompass any changes made by the electorate in referenda,
by the judiciary expounding Constitutional and Common Law, by the Parliament
passing legislation, or by the Government ratifying treaties incorporated into
law.[48]
3.45
The Australian Christian Lobby (ACL) expressly endorsed Reverend
Professor Tate's suggested definition and agreed that 'such a definition of
human rights is more politically acceptable than the framework proposed because
it is more inclusive and reflective of the way that human rights have come to
be expressed and understood in Australia throughout its democratic past and
present'.[49]
3.46
The ACL also argued that the current definition in clause 3 is
problematic because it 'creates a difficult hierarchy of rights that
de-emphasises domestic sources of rights'. In particular:
This is troublesome because it negates the very good work of
parliaments past to negotiate and pass legislation which balances rights in a
way that is reflective of the unique cultural circumstances of Australia. The
definition of human rights in the Bills regards with more esteem the statements
of international bodies than Australian parliamentary law, our own common law
tradition and even the Constitution.[50]
3.47
Professor Bryan Horrigan from Monash University also noted the
significance of rights and freedoms enshrined under Australian constitutional,
statutory and non-statutory law:
...the catalogue of possible legal sources to which the
Parliament might have regard in assessing how a proposed law interacts with
basic rights and liberties – under international human rights instruments,
human rights as protected under Australian legislation (whether pursuant to
formal international instruments or not), and human rights respected by the
common law – are part of the legal equation in assessments of compatibility of
laws, even putting to one side for the moment wider public policy goals in
assessing competitions between rights and conflicts between rights and social
goals within the legislative domain.[51]
3.48
In this context, former Senator Mr Barney Cooney drew comparisons with
the much wider ambit of the Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee and argued that
the process undertaken by the Scrutiny of Bills Committee is superior to that
currently proposed for the joint committee under the Human Rights Bill:
The Joint Committee's task is limited to making a judgment as
to whether or not legislation is in conflict with the provisions of a modest
number of international conventions or covenants whereas the Scrutiny of Bills
Committee can express an opinion about the overall fairness and justice of Acts
and Bills.
The Joint Committee is restricted to interpreting legislation
and deciding whether it is compatible with its concept of certain international
instruments. This is a judicial like function rather than a parliamentarian one
and confines the capacity of those on it to act as members of the Legislature.
In contrast members of the Scrutiny of Bills Committee undertake a much wider
exercise and can deal with legislation as parliamentarians.[52]
3.49
The Queensland Council for Civil Liberties agreed that the Senate
Scrutiny of Bills Committee 'should be the model' for the new joint committee
but emphasised that it 'would not like to see [the Scrutiny of Bills Committee]
abolished or its functions reduced in any way'.[53]
3.50
Professor James Allan from the University of Queensland opposed the
bills '(t)o the extent the proposal outsources views about rights to offshore
people'.[54]
However, Professor Allan expressed support for 'the joint committee aspect'[55]
and argued that the Human Rights Bill would be improved if the joint committee
were to assess legislation against its own view of whether particular statutory
language trespasses unduly on rights:
I think it would be a better bill if the joint committee were
directed to consider whether bills trespass unduly on personal rights and
liberties in accord with the existing set-up [of the Scrutiny of Bills
Committee]. I think there is a risk in outsourcing the rights to treaties that
were entered into under the prerogative power...
...
...just asking the legislators whether the bill unduly
trespasses on personal rights and liberties really puts the question right to
the elected legislators. The way this bill has been set up is not asking you
what you think, it is asking you what you think the UN committee thinks, which
is a mistake...[56]
Departmental response
3.51
At the public hearing in Canberra, officers from the Attorney-General's
Department responded to some of the concerns raised in relation to the
definition of 'human rights'. An explanation was provided as to why the Human
Rights Bill defines 'human rights' by reference to the seven core human rights
treaties to which Australia is a signatory:
The government's view is that the seven treaties are widely
recognised as the pre-eminent international human rights instruments. Together
they cover the most prevalent areas of discrimination and human rights
concerns. The rights in those treaties also overlap or duplicate rights found
in other United Nations instruments. The seven treaties are directly relevant
to the human rights issues which are likely to arise in the context of Australia's
domestic legislation.
3.52
Further:
The seven treaties are international instruments to which
Australia is a party and we have indicated to the world that we will abide by
the obligations set out in them. The seven treaties were identified in the national
human rights consultation committee report as listing the rights which should
be protected and promoted. The seven treaties taken together provide a clear
and useable set of enumerated obligations on which the new committee and public
officials can rely when scrutinising legislation or drafting statements of
compatibility respectively.[57]
3.53
The officer also put forward reasons for the omission from the
definition of the ILO Convention No. 111 concerning Discrimination in respect
of Employment and Occupation; the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief; and
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People is a UN
resolution. It is not binding on Australia. The ILO is not considered to be a
treaty in the same sense as those treaties I have referred to, and the
declaration I think is exactly that and not binding on Australia.[58]
3.54
However, according to the departmental officer, the joint committee
would not be precluded from considering such instruments:
The parliamentary committee can consider all those matters
but would only report back...on the question of compatibility in relation to the
seven treaties...But all those issues could indeed be engaged with, particularly
through public hearings and so forth.[59]
3.55
The officer also noted that '[t]here is quite a considerable overlap,
particularly in relation to Indigenous people', between the 'kinds of issues
that are picked up in [the relevant declarations] and the rights and freedoms
that are outlined in [clause 3]'.[60]
Functions and powers of new joint
committee
3.56
A large number of submissions and witnesses argued that the functions
and powers of the new joint committee should be expanded in order to enable it
to better perform its role. Specifically, there were suggestions that, in
addition to the Attorney-General's power to refer matters to the joint
committee for inquiry and report, the joint committee should have the power to
initiate its own inquiries.[61]
Many also expressed the view that both Houses of the Parliament should have the
ability to refer matters relating to human rights to the joint committee.[62]
3.57
Mr Nicholas Cowdery AM QC from the Law Council drew an analogy with the
powers of other parliamentary joint committees in expressing support for the
new joint committee to undertake its own inquiries:
...unlike other joint committees, the general powers for the
human rights committee are not explicitly prescribed in the bill and do not
extend to the committee initiating its own inquiries or receiving references
from other than the Attorney-General into matters of substantial human rights
concern. The Law Council submits that the effectiveness of the human rights
committee would be enhanced by providing the committee with specific powers,
including the power to initiate its own inquiries and receive references from
elsewhere...[63]
3.58
Former Senator Mr Andrew Murray submitted that '[t]here is a deliberate
omission in [clause] 7 which should be rectified' so that the new joint
committee has 'the power to provide advice or make recommendations to the
Parliament or to any Minister on human rights on its own motion'.[64]
3.59
Amnesty International argued that the joint committee's 'mandate should
be expanded to allow for [it] to regularly conduct more thematic inquiries into
human rights issues and how they relate to Commonwealth legislation'.[65]
By way of example, Amnesty International pointed to the UK Joint Committee on
Human Rights, noting that it 'regularly conducts inquiries on a broad range of
areas with human rights implications'.[66]
3.60
Liberty Victoria expressed a similar view:
The Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights in the
United Kingdom, which is empowered to conduct own motion inquiries on thematic questions,
has done enormously useful work in considering the human rights implications of
a diverse array of government legislation, policies and practices...These
thematic inquiries have been the most successful aspect of the Joint
Parliamentary Committee's work, resulting in major changes in policy and
extensive public education with respect to human rights issues.[67]
3.61
Members of the Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies at the
University of Melbourne agreed that the functions of the joint committee should
be expanded to enable it to conduct wide-ranging inquiries:
[Our] recommendation is modelled on one of the terms of
reference of the UK Parliament's Joint Committee on Human Rights [JCHR]. It has
allowed the UK JCHR to examine systemic and structural issues about the
protection of human rights, and issues about the protection of human rights in
practice that are not revealed by a single-minded focus on the terms of
Bills and Acts.[68]
3.62
The Human Rights Law Resource Centre supported a broad referral function
from either House of the Parliament:
In the HRLRC's view, the functions conferred under s 7 should
be expanded to include the power 'to inquire into any matter relating to human
rights which is referred to it by resolution of either House of Parliament'.
This would enhance the independence and effectiveness of the Committee and
ensure that its capacity to conduct thematic inquiries is not solely determined
by the Government of the day.[69]
Broader monitoring function for new
joint committee
3.63
Many submissions suggested that the joint committee should have a
broader human rights monitoring function as part of its power to self-initiate
inquiries; and, in particular, that such a monitoring role should include the
ability to initiate and conduct inquiries regarding the issues raised in
the findings of UN treaty bodies (such as concluding observations) and special
procedures of the UN Human Rights Council (such as reports of special
rapporteurs, working groups and under the Universal Periodic Review process).[70]
3.64
Ms Emily Howie of the Human Rights Law Resource Centre submitted:
We...support and call for the expansion of the new
parliamentary scrutiny committee's role and function to include monitoring and
reporting on the implementation of the recommendations from United Nations
human rights bodies. Through this function, the parliament can become part of
the constructive dialogue with the international community on the application
of international human rights standards in Australia. Parliament has an important
institutional oversight role to play in relation to the implementation of
treaties that are ratified by the executive...[71]
3.65
The Law Council agreed that the new joint committee should undertake a
monitoring function:
...the Human Rights Committee would be well placed to assist
the Australian Government in its interactions with the UN treaty monitoring
bodies. When exercising its scrutiny functions under the Parliamentary Scrutiny
Bill, the Human Rights Committee will develop experience and expertise at analysing
how the rights contained in the seven core treaties apply in Australia. This
experience and expertise would in turn prove useful when Australia is reporting
on the performance of its international human rights obligations, or responding
to recommendations from the treaty monitoring bodies.[72]
Departmental response
3.66
In evidence before the committee, a representative from the
Attorney-General's Department explained the policy position with respect to
own-motion inquiries for the new joint committee:
There is the capacity for own-motion inquiry around Acts,
which is very clear and, in the department's view, quite broad. The policy
decision taken thus far does limit the own-motion inquiries to those. However,
the Attorney is able to refer matters too.[73]
3.67
In relation to any monitoring role for the joint committee, the
representative confirmed that any such monitoring would need to be the subject
of a specific referral from the Attorney-General.[74]
Procedural powers and resources for
new joint committee
3.68
Many submissions made suggestions about the types of procedural powers
that should be made available for the new joint committee. Some argued that
these powers should be entrenched in the Human Rights Bill itself;[75]
however, others considered that such matters could appropriately be included in
resolutions of the Houses of the Parliament, as contemplated by clause 6.[76]
3.69
The Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies at the
University of Melbourne suggested that, if the joint committee is to operate
effectively, 'it is likely to require the full suite
of powers normally conferred on Committees by resolution of the House...,
including the powers listed in Odgers Guide to Australian Senate Practice'.
These include the power to:
- send for persons and documents (that is, to summon witnesses and require the production of
documents);
- move from
place to place;
- take evidence
in public or private session;
- meet and transact business notwithstanding any prorogation of the
Parliament or dissolution of the House of Representatives; and
- appoint
subcommittees.[77]
3.70
Former Senator Mr Andrew Murray submitted that the joint committee 'must
be able to freely interact with Ministers, government agencies, and other
individuals or entities as part of its function'. Further:
One would assume that would automatically be the case for any
parliamentary committee, but if there is any doubt the [Senate Legal and
Constitutional Affairs Committee] should recommend an unfettered ability to
function in this manner.[78]
3.71
The Queensland Council for Civil Liberties agreed that the joint
committee 'should be empowered to communicate directly with members of the
Executive';[79]
and the Law Council recommended 'that consideration be given to investing the
Human Rights Committee with the power to request and obtain relevant
information from Ministers and government departments in a timely manner'.[80]
3.72
There were also suggestions that the joint committee should have access
to independent legal or specialist advisers to assist the committee in undertaking
its work.[81]
For example, the AHRC expressed the view that the new joint committee should
have the ability to obtain and utilise independent legal advice in a similar
way to other scrutiny committees:
...the Committee will be best able to execute its complex role
with the assistance of independent legal advice. This will require adequate
resourcing of the committee to ensure such advice as required. This is a common
practice for committees of this nature. It is also a common feature of parliamentary
scrutiny committees on human rights in other jurisdictions (such as in Victoria
and in the United Kingdom).[82]
3.73
A number of submitters and witnesses also suggested that it is
imperative that the new joint committee be adequately resourced to fulfil its functions,[83]
particularly since, as Liberty Victoria (and a number of other submissions)
noted, the seven core international human rights treaties to which Australia is
a party are long and comprehensive instruments, and the task of reviewing all
Commonwealth Bills and Acts with reference to these treaties is a 'formidable'
one.[84]
3.74
The Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies at the University of
Melbourne described the joint committee's scrutiny task as being 'so onerous that
there is
a question whether the approach to human rights protection proposed in the Bill
is practicable, except in the most perfunctory sense'. Further:
We have suggested that this Bill will only achieve its aims
if the definition of human rights is expanded. However, this will make the
already onerous task imposed by the Bill even more considerable. It is
important that this be recognised before the Bill is enacted and appropriate
commitments given that resources will be adequate to the task. (In particular,
effective scrutiny could not be achieved if the Joint Committee on Human Rights
were only allocated a single adviser as proposed in at least one submission.)
It would be a great pity if the promise of the Bill is undone because resources
are not adequate to the task of effective scrutiny.[85]
3.75
However, the Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) noted that, while
there may be criticism that 'the task of considering seven instruments will be
too complex', in practice:
...the complexity of the task is diminished by the fact that
only the relevant human rights instruments and provisions will be considered,
in the context of a particular legislative instrument. PIAC believes it is not
only a good thing in principle to include all the international human rights
instruments to which Australia is a party, but that it is necessary to ensure
that the particular impacts of government laws on people facing particular
disadvantage due to race, gender, age, disability, etc, need to be expressly
considered and understood.[86]
3.76
In their submission, Mr Benjamin Lee and Mr Chris Sidoti also advocated
a 'strategic and targeted' approach to the joint committee's work. In
particular:
While required to screen all Bills for human rights
compliance, the Committee should 'focus...its inquiries and reports on those Bills
which raise prima facie human rights concerns'. Similarly,
it should examine Acts 'with the greatest potential impact on human rights'
first...[T]he Joint Committee should also have the power to appoint
subcommittees. Accordingly, it may wish to consider dedicating a separate
subcommittee to each of its main functions.[87]
Content, form and scope of statements of compatibility
3.77
Submitters strongly supported statements of compatibility as a mechanism
to enhance government transparency and accountability, and to ensure that human
rights considerations are integrated into policy-making and legislative
development.[88]
However, many argued that greater guidance should be provided in relation to the
precise content, scope and form of statements of compatibility to, among other
things, avoid them becoming a mere 'tick in the box' exercise.[89]
Lack of requirement for reasons
3.78
In particular, a number of submitters expressed concern about the lack
of a requirement for reasons to be provided in a statement of compatibility.
3.79
As Liberty Victoria explained:
The statement of compatibility must include 'an assessment of
whether the Bill is compatible with human rights'. This raises the question as
to what will constitute an adequate and appropriate assessment. In the early
years of the operation of the UK Human Rights Act, the Government thought it
sufficient simply to say that the Minister concerned believed that legislation
proposed was compatible or incompatible without specifying the reasons for that
view. This is clearly inadequate. To be effective as a means of strengthening
the capacity of the Parliament to review proposed legislation, a statement of
compatibility must be accompanied by a clear analysis of provisions in a Bill
that may limit human rights and the reasons for determining whether any such
limit is consistent or inconsistent with the human rights to which it relates.[90]
3.80
The NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee argued that, '[i]n addition
to an 'assessment', it is critical that statements of compatibility also include
reasoned, sound, evidence-based justifications in relation to any
incompatibility with human rights'.[91]
3.81
The ACT Human Rights Commission submitted that a requirement for
reasoned statements could be made clearer in the Human Rights Bill:
In our view this is important, because in the ACT the absence
of reasons for compatibility has reduced the transparency of the compatibility
assessment process, and has made it more difficult for the community to
understand the reasoning behind compatibility decisions.[92]
3.82
Some submissions argued that a similar model to that used in Victoria
should be adopted in the Human Rights Bill. For example, Dr Julie Debeljak
noted:
Section 28(3) [of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities
Act 2006 (Vic)] explicitly acknowledges the possibility that a proposed law
may be considered incompatible by requiring the executive to state whether a
Bill is compatible or incompatible with human rights. Section 28(3) also
imposes an obligation on the executive to state 'how [a Bill] is compatible' or
'the nature and extent of the incompatibility'.[93]
3.83
The ACT Council of Social Service (ACTCOSS) favoured the Victorian model
over the approach taken in the Australian Capital Territory. According to
ACTCOSS, '[u]nder the ACT model, there is a risk the scrutiny will be cursory
and little in-depth analysis will be engaged in about the true extent' of a
bill's compatibility with human rights. Specifically:
The Victorian requirement is more stringent than that of the
ACT, as it requires an explanation of how the Bill is consistent, not just
whether it is consistent and requires an explanation of the nature and extent
of any incompatibility.[94]
Lack of guidance as to form
3.84
The Victorian Government noted that 'without any specific guidance' in
the Human Rights Bill:
...there is the prospect of one-line statements of
compatibility noting that a bill is incompatible with human rights without any
detail regarding the human rights that are limited and why the legislation
needs to be passed notwithstanding its incompatibility with human rights. This
would not achieve the goal of increased transparency and accountability where
proposed legislation is incompatible with human rights.[95]
3.85
The Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission (VEOHRC)
agreed:
In some jurisdictions, this type of provision has led to a
one-line statement of compatibility. This approach has not been useful in
informing parliament about the human rights issues raised by a bill and can
severely limit the capacity of statements of compatibility to contribute to
public oversight of legislation.[96]
3.86
However, drawing on the experience in Victoria, VEOHRC provided some
useful information in relation to how statements of compatibility might develop
over time:
In practice, Ministers have had to find a balance between
providing enough detail and not being overly legalistic and technical. In
Victoria, work has been done since the Charter came into force to find this
balance and statements have improved in recent years. One of the ways this
improvement has been achieved has been by focusing on the rights that may be
limited, rather than every right that is potentially engaged by a bill. Public
sector staff, particularly those directly involved in preparing statements of
compatibility, are also becoming more adept at identifying and evaluating the
human rights implications of legislative proposals. These developments have
been accompanied by increasing use of public consultations when developing
legislation (before it is tabled in Parliament).[97]
3.87
The Human Rights Law Resource Centre emphasised the importance of
ensuring that the content and form of statements of compatibility are relative
to the impact on human rights arising from any proposed legislation:
Statements [of compatibility] should not be too long,
legalistic or technical as this will detract from their utility in informing
parliamentary dialogue about rights. Neither, however, should they be too brief
or cursory. The detail and length of Statements should be commensurate with the
human rights implications of the proposed legislation or legislative
instrument.[98]
3.88
The Human Rights Council of Australia suggested that an objects clause could
be included in the Human Rights Bill as a means of clarifying what information
should be included in statements of compatibility:
The Council submits that consideration be given to amending
the Bill so as to include an objects provision or some other equivalent
statement about the purposes of the Bill. This provision should make it clear
that the purpose of the Bill is to promote and protect human rights. This will
help to guide those preparing statements of compatibility.[99]
3.89
The Human Rights Council of Australia submitted further:
...statements of compatibility should, as far as possible,
include a description of the nature and extent or the degree and type of
incompatibility. Reasons should be given for why a legislative measure
infringes an internationally recognised and declared human right, particularly
where it has already been adopted or endorsed by the Australian Government.
This will assist both the Parliament and the Parliamentary Joint Committee in
making an assessment as to whether the measure is justified for proper policy
reasons.[100]
Lack of guidance for derogating
from certain human rights
3.90
The Gilbert and Tobin Centre of Public Law (Gilbert and Tobin Centre) also
noted that the Human Rights Bill does not provide instruction on the basis for
drafting and considering statements of compatibility that will accompany legislation
(nor on how the new joint committee should carry out its functions). In
particular, the Gilbert and Tobin Centre noted that the Human Rights Bill does
not set out any principles that should be applied by the joint committee,
Ministers or the Parliament more generally when considering conflicting rights
or the need to derogate from certain human rights; therefore, the Human Rights Bill
should be amended to clarify the position in respect of non-absolute, or 'derogable',
human rights.[101]
3.91
Similarly, the Law Council argued:
Unlike the consolidated lists of rights contained in human
rights legislation in the ACT, Victoria and the UK, there is no common
limitation clause or proportionality test within the seven core treaties to
guide decision makers as to what circumstances, if any, may justify a limitation
on or derogation from a protected right. This has implications for the
information and analysis included in the Statements of Compatibility and their
format.[102]
Timing for presentation of
statements of compatibility
3.92
The Human Rights Bill does not specify when statements of compatibility
should be presented, although the EM suggests that the statement will usually
be incorporated in the EM or the explanatory statement accompanying the
relevant bill or legislative instrument.[103]
3.93
PIAC suggested that the Human Rights Bill be amended to clearly provide
that statements of compatibility should be presented before the second reading speech.
In particular, PIAC submitted that the Human Rights Bill should include a
provision similar to subsection 28(2) of the Victorian Charter of Human
Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 which states:
A member of Parliament who introduces a Bill into a House of
Parliament, or another member acting on his or her behalf, must cause the
statement of compatibility prepared under subsection (1) to be laid before the
House of Parliament into which the Bill is introduced before giving his or her
second reading speech on the Bill.[104]
3.94
The Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies at the University of
Melbourne argued that any substantive amendments to a bill should also be
accompanied by a statement of compatibility:
Statements of Compatibility should be required for any
substantive proposed
amendment to a Bill (even if such statements may not be able to be introduced
at precisely the same time as the Bill). Experience in New Zealand has shown
that the amendment process is one of the stages in which legislation is
vulnerable to the inclusion of poorly thought out additions that can have
serious implications for human rights. For the same reason, legislation that
undergoes substantial amendment after it has passed though the joint committee
process should be returned to the committee to determine if it wishes to make
any further points with respect to amendments.[105]
Training for those preparing
statements of compatibility
3.95
The Law Council argued that the quality of statements of compatibility will
rest upon the provision of adequate human rights training for public servants:
...in order to ensure the quality of Statements of
Compatibility, and that human rights considerations are integrated throughout
the policy making process, it will be critical that all government
policy makers receive adequate training in order to become familiar with the
rights contained in the definition proposed in clause 3 and their practical
application in the Australian context.
...This is likely to be resource intensive for many
Departments and Agencies who may benefit from a centralised repository of
advice, such as a particular Unit within the Attorney General’s Department.
This approach has been adopted in Victoria where the Human
Rights Unit within the Department of Justice has responsibility for
coordinating implementation of the Charter of Human Rights and
Responsibilities (the Charter) and facilitating the development of a human
rights culture across the Victorian Government.[106]
3.96
PIAC suggested the development of guidelines for those preparing
statements of compatibility:
PIAC submits that the nature of the examination envisaged in
the Explanatory Memorandum and Second Reading Speech necessitates the
development of comprehensive guidelines for legislative and policy officers
across government, to enable them to make reasoned and rigorous assessments to
complete statements of compatibility. These guidelines will need to include
information regarding relevant interpretive communications and international
and domestic human rights jurisprudence appropriate to the identified human
rights to be considered under the Bill.[107]
Departmental response
3.97
At the Canberra public hearing, an officer from the Attorney-General's
Department reiterated the intended purpose of statements of compatibility as a
'dialogue' between the executive and the legislature:
The bills establish a requirement that all new legislation be
accompanied by a statement of compatibility outlining the compliance of the new
laws with the rights set out in the seven treaties. However, statements are not
simply an additional step in the legislative process. As the Attorney-General
has said in the debate on the bills, the statements effect a dialogue between
the executive which is responsible for formulating statements and the
legislature which considers the statements as part of its process for enacting
new laws. Statements of compatibility also ensure that human rights are
considered from the very early stages of policy formulation and they contribute
to the transparency and accountability of government. Taken together the
requirement for statements of compatibility and the establishment of the joint
committee on human rights will provide increased parliamentary scrutiny,
support a transparent and accountable legislative process, and promote greater
participatory democracy.[108]
3.98
In relation to the content of statements of compatibility, the departmental
officer noted that '[i]t will be a matter for each minister how the relevant
statement of compatibility is prepared and expressed'. Further:
There is nothing which prevents ministers from including in
those statements an explanation as to why the exercise of a certain right may
have been limited. For example, statements may contain analysis of restrictions
or limitations on rights in a bill and an assessment on whether restrictions
are in the interests of other individuals or society more generally as
consistent with the government's responsibilities under the seven treaties.
Overall, statements are intended to be succinct assessments aimed at informing
parliamentary debate and containing a level of analysis that is proportionate
to the impact of the proposed legislation on human rights.[109]
3.99
The officer also clarified that the effect of statements of
compatibility will not be as far-reaching as in other jurisdictions:
The bill does not confer additional powers on judges and
statements of compatibility do not change the current rules of statutory
interpretation. The courts can only use statements of compatibility as aides to
statutory interpretation similar to explanatory memoranda. The bills do not
provide judges power to issue statements of inconsistency—that is, declarations
that a law is inconsistent with a jurisdiction's human rights obligations, as
is the case in the United Kingdom, the Australian Capital Territory and
Victoria.[110]
Committee view
3.100
The committee notes that the key objectives of the measures contained in
the Human Rights Bill are to enhance understanding of, and respect for, human
rights in Australia, and to ensure appropriate recognition of human rights
issues in legislative and policy development. The committee strongly supports
these objectives. The committee is of the view that the new Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Human Rights will provide a platform for an Australian human
rights discourse, and regards the establishment of the joint committee as an
integral element of the Human Rights Framework announced by the
Attorney-General in April 2010.
3.101
The committee notes that the vast majority of submitters and witnesses expressed
their in-principle support for the measures contained in the bills. Much of the
evidence provided to the committee during the course of the inquiry was
therefore aimed at improving the effectiveness of the bills in achieving their
objectives. The committee is cognisant that contributors to the inquiry
invested considerable time and energy in identifying possible improvements to
the bills, and acknowledges all efforts made in that regard.
Definition of 'human rights'
3.102
The committee heard a range of views regarding the definition of 'human
rights' in clause 3 of the Human Rights Bill, which defines 'human rights' by
reference to the seven core UN human rights treaties. In particular, concerns
were raised that the definition is restrictive and fails to capture the full
range of internationally protected human rights.
3.103
The committee notes that a number of submitters and witnesses suggested
that additional international human rights instruments should be added to the
list of seven core treaties in the proposed definition. In particular, it was
suggested that the ILO Convention No. 111 concerning Discrimination in respect
of Employment and Occupation; the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief; and
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, should be included in
the list of international human rights instruments identified in subclause 3(1).
3.104
However, the Attorney-General's Department advised that the seven core
treaties are the pre-eminent international human rights instruments and that
there is considerable overlap between the provisions of those instruments and
the provisions of the treaties already listed in subclause 3(1). While their
inclusion may assist in clarifying the definition of 'human rights', the
committee agrees that it is unnecessary to specifically include them at this
stage.
3.105
Evidence to the committee also raised concerns that the approach of
defining human rights by reference to the core international human rights
treaties is static and makes no provision for the incorporation of rights
protected under international instruments to which Australia may accede in the
future. Further, the definition does not encompass other important domestic
sources of law which protect human rights: namely, the rights protected under
the Australian Constitution, statute and the common law. In particular, the
committee notes the omission from the definition of those rights recognised
under domestic law, and the inability of the definition to accommodate new
rights which may be recognised in the future (under international or domestic
law).
3.106
Several submissions and witnesses suggested that human rights should be
defined by reference to the sources of law which establish rights. The
committee considers that this may be a superior approach because it permits the
inclusion of rights recognised under domestic Australian law, which may not be
recognised internationally, and it allows the content of rights to evolve over
time without the need for amendments to the statutory definition. Further, such
an approach may facilitate parliamentarians undertaking assessments of human
rights compatibility based on their own judgements, rather than requiring them
to undertake a judicial-like function. The committee notes that this would
align with the approach taken by the Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee in assessing
bills against its terms of reference which, in the view of the committee,
accounts for that committee's long-term effectiveness in protecting and
promoting fundamental common law rights.
3.107
The committee acknowledges the extensive discussion and evidence
throughout the inquiry in relation to the definition of 'human rights'.
However, the committee is of the view that, at this stage, priority should be
given to establishing the joint committee, and the seven core UN conventions
listed in clause 3 provide an appropriate context at this point in time within
which the joint committee should operate. In other words, the committee is
satisfied that the current definition of 'human rights' is appropriate to
provide an initial reference point upon which the new joint committee can rely
when undertaking its scrutiny role. As noted by the Attorney-General's
Department, the seven core conventions taken together provide a clear set of overarching
obligations most directly relevant to the types of human rights issues which
are likely to arise in the context of Australian domestic legislation.
3.108
Having said that, the committee recognises that the current definition
of human rights may be too prescriptive in practice and that an inclusive
definition of 'human rights' may be a preferable long-term approach.
Accordingly, the committee considers that the joint committee should comprehensively
review the definition of 'human rights' and the scope under which it has
operated during its first 12 months. The purpose of the review should be to
ensure that the seven core UN conventions provide an appropriate basis for the
definition and to ascertain, in particular, whether the following sources of
law should be specifically articulated in the definition itself:
- the Australian Constitution;
-
the common law as applied in Australia; and
- statutes of the Commonwealth or state or territory parliaments.
3.109
The committee is also of the view that, as far as possible, there should
be consistency between the definition of 'human rights' for the purposes of the
joint committee and for the purposes of the mandate of the Australian Human Rights
Commission. The committee is aware that the AHRC Act is currently being
reviewed; following that review, the committee recommends that the respective
definitions of 'human rights' used for both purposes should be harmonised.
Recommendation 1
3.110
In acknowledging the significant level of discussion throughout the
inquiry in relation to the definition of 'human rights' in clause 3 of the Human
Rights Bill and its relevance to the role and functions of the proposed joint
committee, the committee recommends that the joint committee undertake a
comprehensive review of the definition at the end of the joint committee's first
12 months of operation. The purpose of the review should be to ensure that
the seven core UN conventions provide an appropriate basis for the definition,
and the review should include specific consideration of whether the following
sources of law should be articulated in the definition:
- the Australian Constitution;
- the common law as applied in Australia; and
- statutes of the Commonwealth or state or territory parliaments.
The joint
committee's review should also consider harmonising the definitions of 'human
rights' for the purposes of the new joint committee and for the purposes of the
Australian Human Rights Commission's mandate.
Role and mandate of new joint
committee
3.111
The committee considers that the functions of the new joint committee,
as described in clause 7 of the Human Rights Bill, are too limited, and that
the joint committee should be given a wider mandate to allow it to operate more
flexibly. In particular, the committee agrees with suggestions that the joint
committee should have broad and permissive powers to undertake own-motion inquiries
in relation to those human rights issues relevant to its duties and functions,
particularly in relation to thematic or systematic human rights issues, or
those of national significance.
3.112
The committee is of the view that the joint committee should not be
restricted to inquiring into matters that the executive is willing to refer to
it, rather than having a wider remit to identify and investigate human rights
issues of its own initiative. The current requirement for a reference from the
Attorney-General is, in the committee's view, a significant restraint on the
potential effectiveness of the joint committee, as it may have the effect of
limiting the joint committee's capacity to conduct general human rights
inquiries to the priorities and agendas of the government of the day. If it is
only the Attorney-General who has the power to refer matters impacting on human
rights which are not regulated by a Commonwealth Act to the joint committee,
there may well be circumstances where particular inquiries would be
uncomfortable for the relevant government and would never be referred. In the
committee's view, that would clearly be an unsatisfactory outcome.
3.113
Further, as currently drafted, clause 7 would not empower the joint
committee to initiate inquiries in relation to existing subordinate legislation,
in order to determine whether that legislation is consistent with human rights,
because paragraph 7(b) refers only to the ability of the joint committee to
examine Acts for compatibility with human rights. As legislative
instruments regulate many significant matters, this could prevent the joint
committee from properly fulfilling its role of scrutinising the full range of existing
Commonwealth legislation.
3.114
The committee also notes that existing parliamentary joint committees
with statutory functions have broad powers to initiate and conduct inquiries
related to their duties or functions. Under their establishing legislation,
those committees are also able to inquire into matters related to their duties
and functions which are referred to them by either House of the Parliament.[111]
3.115
The committee's view is that the new joint committee should have a
similarly broad mandate, to examine not only the compatibility of Commonwealth
Acts with human rights standards, but also other human rights issues of systemic
or national significance. The committee is also concerned to ensure that the joint
committee has the independence and credibility which comes from joint
committees receiving broader references from the parliamentary chambers.
3.116
As a result, the committee recommends that clause 7 of the Human Rights Bill
should be amended to provide the joint committee with the power to initiate human
rights inquiries connected to its functions, and to inquire into human rights matters
connected to its functions which have been referred by either House of the Parliament.
The committee notes that, under a broader function articulated in this way, the
joint committee would also have the ability to examine issues raised in the
findings of UN treaty bodies (such as concluding observations) and special
procedures of the UN Human Rights Council (such as reports of special rapporteurs,
working groups and under the Universal Periodic Review process), if considered
appropriate.
3.117
As an additional point, the committee recommends that specific provision
should be made in clause 7 of the Human Rights Bill for the joint committee to
examine any amendments to bills; and recommends that statements of
compatibility must accompany all such amendments, particularly those amendments
which have a substantive outcome or impact.
Recommendation 2
3.118
The committee recommends that clause 7 of the Human Rights
(Parliamentary Scrutiny) Bill 2010 be amended to enable the proposed joint committee
to report to both Houses of the Parliament, with such comments as it thinks
fit, upon any matter connected with the performance of its functions that the joint
committee considers should be directed to the attention of the Parliament.
Recommendation 3
3.119
The committee recommends that clause 7 of the Human Rights
(Parliamentary Scrutiny) Bill 2010 be amended to enable the proposed joint
committee to inquire into any matter or question in connection with its
functions which is referred to it by either House of the Parliament, and to
report to that House upon that matter or question.
Recommendation 4
3.120
The committee recommends that paragraph 7(a) of the Human Rights
(Parliamentary Scrutiny) Bill 2010 be amended to specifically provide that the
proposed joint committee may examine any amendments to bills that come before
either House of the Parliament for compatibility with human rights.
Procedural powers and proceedings
for the new joint committee
3.121
The committee agrees with
suggestions that the joint committee should have wide-ranging procedural powers
in order for it to properly fulfil its role and purpose, and is of the view
that the Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee is a useful model on which such
powers could be based. In particular, the committee considers that the joint
committee should have the unfettered ability to communicate with Ministers (and
relevant government departments and agencies) to request and obtain information
relevant to its functions; and to request clarification, or consideration that matters
or concerns be addressed in a particular way.
3.122
In line with the powers of other
parliamentary joint committees and the Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee, it
is imperative that the new joint committee has the power to, for example, call
for submissions, conduct public hearings, move from place to place and examine
witnesses, including relevant departmental officers. The committee notes advice
in the Attorney-General's second reading speech, the EM, and evidence from the
Attorney-General's Department that this is intended; and the committee anticipates
that such procedural powers would be included in the resolutions of both
Houses, as provided for under clause 6 of the Human Rights Bill.
3.123
The EM to the Human Rights Bill suggests that the joint committee will
be able to determine the manner in which it performs its scrutiny function, to
ensure that reports on the compatibility of bills and legislative instruments
with human rights are provided to the Parliament in a timely manner.[112]
The committee is of the view that the joint committee should have to ability to
report to the Parliament on a regular basis (for example, on a weekly basis if
considered appropriate), in a similar way to the Senate Scrutiny of Bills
Committee. Therefore, the committee considers that the Parliament's
resolutions, as contemplated by clause 6, should entrench a specific power for
the joint committee to report from time to time its proceedings and evidence,
and any recommendations; and to make regular reports of the progress on its
proceedings.
3.124
The committee also emphasises the importance of adequate resources for
the joint committee, including engagement of specialist legal advisers as
considered appropriate, and a suitably staffed secretariat.
3.125
As a final point, the committee recognises that there may be some interaction
between the new joint committee and the existing bipartisan Senate Scrutiny of
Bills and Regulations and Ordinances committees. The committee notes that there
are many circumstances where Senate, House and joint committees have
overlapping responsibilities: parliamentary committees are often required to
perform their functions in a manner that prevents unnecessary duplication and
accords comity to the activities of other committees. The committee's view is
that the new joint committee should not prevent existing Senate scrutiny
committees from continuing to perform their valuable roles. While there may be
some overlap between the role of the new joint committee and these existing
committees, the committee is confident that the committees will identify and
develop constructive means of operating in tandem, and effectively managing any
such interaction.
Recommendation 5
3.126
The committee recommends that the parliamentary resolutions contemplated
under clause 6 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Bill 2010 relating
to the powers and proceedings of the proposed joint committee should include
the ability for the committee to report from time to time its proceedings and
evidence, and any recommendations; and to make regular reports on the progress
of its proceedings.
Recommendation 6
3.127
The committee recommends that the parliamentary resolutions contemplated
under clause 6 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Bill 2010 relating
to the powers and proceedings of the proposed joint committee should include the
ability to interact freely with, and request and obtain information from, Ministers,
government agencies and other individuals or entities in relation to the
exercise of the joint committee's functions.
Recommendation 7
3.128
The committee recommends that the parliamentary resolutions contemplated
under clause 6 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Bill 2010 relating
to the powers and proceedings of the proposed joint committee should include
the ability to draw to the relevant Minister's attention any matters or concerns
in relation to a bill, Act, legislative instrument or other human rights issue;
and to request clarification, or consideration that those matters or concerns
be addressed in a particular way.
Statements of compatibility
3.129
The committee recognises that statements of compatibility will have an
important role in forming part of the dialogue between the executive and the
legislature, and providing an initial assessment of the executive's view of the
human rights compatibility of a particular bill or legislative instrument. The
committee supports statements of compatibility as a useful mechanism to enhance
government transparency and accountability, and to assist in ensuring that
human rights standards are considered during the legislative process.
3.130
In the committee's view, statements of compatibility will form one part
of the range of information, material and resources provided to the Parliament
(and to the joint committee) to inform parliamentary debate and to enhance the understanding
of human rights issues throughout the legislative process. Further, the
committee would expect the joint committee, in assessing and reporting on the
human rights compatibility of legislation and legislative instruments, to
conduct rigorous, evidence-based and independent analysis, over and above its
consideration of statements of compatibility. The joint committee will
necessarily draw its own conclusions in reporting on the compatibility of legislation
with applicable human rights standards.
3.131
The joint committee will develop expertise on statements of
compatibility over time; and the joint committee will no doubt express its view
in due course with respect to the content of statements of compatibility and
the manner in which they are, and should be, presented so as to provide optimal
assistance to the joint committee (and the Parliament) in its examination of
proposed legislation against relevant human rights standards.
3.132
The committee is mindful of evidence it received from a number of
witnesses and submitters expressing concern that the Human Rights Bill provides
little guidance in relation to the content and form of statements of
compatibility. The committee considers that the Attorney-General's Department
should, as soon as practicable, set out more detailed requirements in relation
to the form and content of statements of compatibility, and make them publicly
available.
3.133
In this context, the committee understands that, while there is no
prescribed form for statements of compatibility, a range of templates will be
developed to assist in their preparation.[113]
The committee would also encourage the development of guidelines to assist
those preparing statements of compatibility. As a matter of principle, the
committee considers that statements of compatibility should be comprehensive
and sufficiently detailed, but not legalistic or overly complex.
3.134
The committee recommends that the Human Rights Bill should be amended to
provide that statements of compatibility must clearly explain the nature and
extent of, and provide reasons for, any incompatibility with relevant human
rights standards. Relevant to that, the committee notes that the EM provides
that the level of analysis in statements of compatibility must be proportionate
to the impact of the proposed legislation on human rights.[114]
3.135
The committee also agrees with the suggestion that an objects clause could
be usefully included in the Human Rights Bill as a means of clarifying what
information should be included in statements of compatibility. The objects
clause should make it clear that the purpose of the Human Rights Bill is to
promote and protect human rights in Australia. In the committee's view, such a
clause may assist in providing guidance in the preparation of statements of
compatibility.
3.136
The committee also considers that there should be a clearer articulation
as to the timing of presentations of statements of compatibility to the
Parliament in the EM to the Human Rights Bill. Specifically, the EM should be
revised to explain that statements of compatibility must form part of, or be
attached to, the EM and must be provided as part of the EM's presentation to
the Parliament.[115]
Recommendation 8
3.137
The committee recommends that subclause 8(1) of the Human Rights
(Parliamentary Scrutiny) Bill 2010 be amended to require that a member of
Parliament who proposes to introduce amendments to a bill into a House of the
Parliament must cause a statement of compatibility to be prepared in respect of
those amendments.
Recommendation 9
3.138
The committee recommends that the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny)
Bill 2010 be amended to include an objects clause to serve as a means of
clarifying the content of statements of compatibility by clearly articulating
that the purpose of the Human Rights Bill is to promote and protect human
rights in Australia.
Recommendation 10
3.139
The committee recommends that clauses 8 and 9 of the Human Rights
(Parliamentary Scrutiny) Bill 2010 be amended to provide that statements of
compatibility must clearly explain the nature and extent of, and provide
reasons for, any incompatibility of a bill or legislative instrument with
relevant human rights standards.
Recommendation 11
3.140
The committee recommends that the Explanatory Memorandum (EM) to the Human
Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Bill 2010 be revised to provide greater detail
in relation to the timing of presentation of statements of compatibility,
namely that statements of compatibility must form part of, or be attached to,
the EM and must be provided as part of the EM's presentation to the Parliament.
Recommendation 12
3.141
Subject to the preceding recommendations, the committee recommends that
the Senate pass the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Bill 2010 and the Human
Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) (Consequential Provisions) Bill 2010.
Senator
Trish Crossin
Chair
Navigation: Previous Page | Contents | Next Page