10.1
The previous three chapters have outlined the higher education sector as it currently exists and the prevalence of insecure work within it. This chapter considers how past regulatory settings in the sector have facilitated an increasing trend of insecure work, and contemplates the need for reform.
10.2
The chapter then considers evidence from inquiry participants on how to improve job security in higher education. The committee's views and recommendations are provided subsequent to each proposed reform.
The need for reform
10.3
The current structure of the higher education sector has its roots in the Dawkins reforms of 1988 which were introduced to 'facilitate uniformity in higher education funding arrangements, regulation, rules, and controls'. The Hon John Dawkins MP, then Minister for Education, led the reforms which had explicit economic objectives, and were intended to ensure that graduates were equipped with the skillset and knowledge to 'contribute to and adapt within a changing economic environment'.
10.4
This section briefly:
outlines the lasting impacts the Dawkins reforms and more recent reforms to the higher education sector;
discusses how COVID‑19 has accelerated the need for further reform; and
considers who bears responsibility for job insecurity and job losses in the sector.
Impacts of the Dawkins reforms
10.5
The Dawkins reforms were outlined in Higher education: a policy discussion paper, a Green Paper published in December 1987, which was then followed by a White Paper, Higher education: a policy statement, in July 1988. The key reforms were:
the introduction of income contingent loans for tuition costs through the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS);
the conversion of all Colleges of Advanced Education (CAEs) into universities; and
a series of provisions for universities to provide plans, profiles and statistics to justify courses and research.
10.6
In his 2021 report, Rethinking Australian higher education: Towards a diversified system for the 21st century, Dr John Howard (not the former Prime Minister John Howard) observed that there were some concerns about the reforms when they were implemented 30 years ago. Dr Howard contended that these concerns have been borne out, because:
The system now lacks diversification in terms of institutional forms and education delivery options that can meet the distinct educational needs of students and businesses in a growing service-oriented knowledge economy.
10.7
Inquiry participants argued a new approach is needed in higher education. One academic submitter (name withheld) asserted that the Dawkins reforms directly influenced the status of universities today and specifically 'resulted directly in the casualization of a majority of academics'.
10.8
More recently, John Dawkins himself has called for a 'major renovation' of higher education policy. In a 2016 letter headed 'higher education reform malaise', he said that the system he unveiled thirty years ago is 'completely out of date for current circumstances'.
10.9
Dr Howard argued that over the past decade the Australian government has not implemented a 'consistent or coherent governance framework', and current governance measures in the sector have 'emerged haphazardly'.
Recent reforms to the sector
10.10
Recent Australian Government reforms outlined in Chapter 7, such as the Job‑Ready Graduates package, have been targeted at encouraging student enrolments in industry-specific courses such as nursing and science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM).
10.11
The Job-Ready Graduates package has yet to have a tangible effect on the sector, however many commentators are pessimistic about its benefits. When giving evidence to a New South Wales state inquiry, the Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU) NSW Branch, argued that the reforms are 'incredibly damaging':
[The] new funding and fees package for universities, if implemented in its current form, will result in a further decline in Commonwealth funding per student at a time when universities are in crisis and at a time when they need funding the most.
10.12
As discussed in Chapter 7, government funding received by universities has been decreasing over the past two decades. Australian government grants to universities in 2019 made up only 33.3 per cent of university revenue compared to 40.9 per cent in 2002. The National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU) argued that the level of funding per student for teaching, and the way university research is funded, encourages systemic precarious employment.
Pandemic accelerates need for reform
10.13
The impact of the pandemic on university workers has been significant. A September 2021 report by The Australia Institute, An Avoidable Catastrophe: Pandemic Job Losses in Higher Education and their Consequences, reported that since the beginning of 2021, 40 000 or around one-in-five employees have lost their job in the sector. Despite this employment crisis, Australian National University (ANU) Vice‑Chancellor Brian Schmidt has put forward a view that the government has left universities 'to bleed'.
10.14
Dr Howard argued that the lack of a targeted policy framework has resulted in the sector having an 'absence of overall strategic orientation and capacity to respond to major economic change and social imperatives'. This is particularly true in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Inquiry participants agreed that the pandemic has emphasised existing flaws in the higher education system, including an over-reliance on precarious employment.
10.15
However, it was put to the committee that responsibility for the excessive use of casual and fixed‑term employment, and the experience of universities during the pandemic, is shared. The NTEU argued that university managers also share responsibility as 'autonomous institutions responsible for their own industrial relations practices'. Motivated by cost cutting measures, universities have expanded the limits of casual academic use to unsustainable levels.
10.16
Director of Policy and Research at the NTEU, Dr Terri MacDonald, further explained the relationship between government and universities:
Universities are public institutions. They receive public funding. One of the reasons that we're in this mess, in a sense, is because, while government funding per student has been declining overall, in terms of proportion, for some time, quite a few years—decades, you could even say—universities have been leveraging off that as well. They've been able to do as they wish with their own workforces, without any kind of justification, without any kind of explanation.
10.17
One academic submitter (name withheld) made a similar observation, arguing that in order for universities to remain sustainable, 'the sector must be effectively regulated by government, not left to the decision making of university management'.
10.18
According to the University of Sydney (USYD) Casuals Network, the job losses and increased pressure university staff have endured during the pandemic has been 'entirely predictable' and 'part of the design of the University workforce'. This is because in times of crisis insecure workers are useful in that they are both 'easier to exploit and … offload'. The USYD Casuals Network argued that university managers have 'taken advantage' of casuals, and decasualising the sector is the only way forward:
The only way, then, to solve the problems of exploitation, chronic uncertainty, and vulnerability caused by casual work is to decasualise the workforce and to ensure that those working in the university sector are employed in secure jobs.
10.19
When asked if there was a connection between precarious employment in universities and the erosion of academic staff and student representation on university councils, Dr MacDonald said there is a clear cultural shift occurring where university stakeholders are 'given less and less of a voice':
What's happened is that universities are now corporatised. They are institutions that are run like corporate businesses. They have onshore and offshore campuses, they're concerned about branding, they're concerned about reputation, they're concerned about the bottom line. The boards have changed and there's less collegiality.
10.20
The combination of these factors has led to the sector having 'one of the highest levels of precarious employment in Australia'. The NTEU submitted this has caused:
[U]ntold damage to the lives of thousands of Australian workers, as well as significant damage to the quality of provision of education, and to the public interest.
10.21
Dr Yaegan Doran, member of the Casualised, Unemployed and Precarious University Workers, stressed the need for intervention. As noted earlier in the report, Dr Doran said that university managers cannot be expected to 'self‑correct' as there are strong incentives for universities to keep casual workers casual.
10.22
The Australia Institute quantified the scale of job loss to date in Australia due to the pandemic and underscored the urgency in rectifying policies that have contributed to mass casualisation:
Without urgent measures to limit casual hiring (including sessional instructors and other casual teaching staff), and protect permanent employment, the scourge of casualisation in Australian universities will clearly get worse in coming years.
10.23
The report also estimated how much the Australian Government would have to spend on the sector in order to keep it viable. According to The Australia Institute, 'the sector would now require about $3.75 billion per year to restore the estimated 35 000 jobs lost from public universities in 2021'. This $3.75 billion would represent only 1.2 per cent of the total cost of the government's financial COVID response.
Committee view
10.24
The issues affecting the higher education sector since the onset of the COVID‑19 pandemic are not new, but rather a continuation of established structural issues that have been exacerbated by the pandemic. The committee recognises that the crisis faced by universities during the pandemic has affected all individuals in the higher education sector. It is regrettable that academics, researchers, non‑academic staff and students have all suffered as a result of a crisis that was—if not entirely preventable—certainly foreseeable.
10.25
The biggest losers have been the universities' large insecurely‑employed casual teaching workforce, who lead a precarious existence on the margins of university life, providing an underpaid and overstretched workforce.
10.26
It is the committee's view that the increase in casualisation over the last few decades is not a result of the seasonal nature of the university semesters; it is a feature of cost-cutting and the corporatisation of the sector. Insecure workers are cheaper and easier to get rid of, and, over time, exploitative workforce practices such as piece rates have become the contractual norm.
10.27
The excessive reliance on casuals pre-pandemic, and the ease with which insecure workers have been discarded during the pandemic, represent a clear failure by the sector to value these workers. This cannot continue.
10.28
It is deeply concerning that the ongoing employment crisis in Australia's public universities is not receiving the critical attention it should be. It is the committee's view that there have been insufficient efforts by government, universities and industry bodies to address the underlying systemic causes for the prevalence of insecure work in the sector.
10.29
The committee notes that the Department of Education, Skills and Employment is currently developing a strategy for international education, which will address Australia's approach to international education until 2030. The committee is concerned that the strategy focus is too narrow, and excludes pressing domestic concerns—the entire education sector industry needs to be reviewed.
10.30
There is a real opportunity for reforms to facilitate a sustainable higher education system that delivers quality educational outcomes, generates greater economic and social prosperity, and promotes high-quality secure employment.
10.31
The committee believes that the industry would benefit from improved data‑sets to increase the government's understanding of the factors that contribute to insecure work in the sector; and how they can be mitigated in the future.
10.32
Furthermore, the committee believes that the sector is in dire need of additional public funding, and that universities themselves must diversify their revenue streams to offset their excessive reliance on international students.
10.33
The committee recommends that the Australian Government urgently develops a new National Higher Education Funding Strategy for the period 2021–2025. The new strategy should recognise and address:
the real cost of delivering high quality tertiary education including administration, marking, and ensuring staff and student wellbeing;
the role of research as a core university function;
increasing casualisation in university workforces;
revenue stabilisation and diversification, particularly with regard to the shift in international student enrolments;
the role for government in mandating and enforcing secure and fair employment practices in tertiary education; and
the need for an increase in government funding to the sector.
10.34
The committee recommends that the Australian Government provides temporary additional annual funding universities to restore jobs and rectify the damage inflicted upon the sector as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and funding cuts, until the new Higher Education Strategy has been developed and implemented.
Proposals for reform
10.35
The committee received a significant amount of evidence on the impacts of insecure work on higher education workers, their families and communities. However, evidence in relation to solutions—and specific proposals for reform—were somewhat limited. The committee thanks the NTEU for its comprehensive submission, which outlined a number of proposals for reform. Many of the proposals outlined below are supported by the NTEU's submission, although evidence from other witnesses has also been considered.
10.36
This section outlines and discusses a number of proposals for reform, including:
reforms to strengthen pathways to permanency, including through changes to casual and fixed-term conversion provisions;
reforms relating to reporting transparency for universities;
reforms relating to funding obligations; and
reforms to casual payment mechanisms.
10.37
It includes the committee's views and recommendations in relation to each of the proposed reforms.
Strengthen pathways to permanency
10.38
Chapters 8 and 9 discussed some of the impacts that come from being employed under casual or fixed-term contracts. While there are some legitimate uses for casual and fixed-term workers, inquiry participants argued that permanent work should be the norm, and it should be easier for casual and fixed-term employees to gain a permanent position.
Casual conversion
10.39
On 22 March 2021, the Parliament passed an amended version of the Fair Work Amendment (Supporting Australia's Jobs and Economic Recovery) Bill 2020 (Amended Omnibus Bill). The Bill amended the Fair Work Act 2009 to incorporate a statutory definition of a 'casual employee', and added the ability to request or be offered conversion from casual to permanent employment.
10.40
The NTEU argued that the Amended Omnibus Bill did not adequately 'deal with the problems that [casuals] face and the nature of work in universities', that is, the semester structure of university work. The NTEU asserted that the reality of university work is that it is 'routine and repetitive'. However, under the current requirements for casual conversion, casuals could be employed indefinitely with no opportunity to convert:
The recent changes are really just too weak to help our members. As long as there has been an advance commitment made by the employer to indefinite ongoing work, then that covers it. You also need the employee to be on a regular work pattern. That, again, is a problem with the sessional situation. You could essentially put your casual academics on four- to five-month contracts and keep employing them for years that way and it wouldn't trigger any of the conversions. What we actually need is an improved definition of casual work which actually covers the university sector, and the changes that were made under the [Amended Omnibus Bill] didn't go anywhere near that.
10.41
The USYD Casuals Network agreed with this viewpoint, arguing that university work is 'regular permanent work', and that university workers 'reapply for the same work year on year'. Furthermore, the Network argued that the amendments actually had a detrimental effect on ongoing enterprise bargaining:
In fact, many of our legal avenues that we were pursuing, particularly with enterprise bargaining coming up, we had to close off because we now have a consolidated definition of casual that specifies that, because we have nominally been called casuals, we are casuals by definition.
10.42
The Australian Higher Education Industrial Association (AHEIA) also stated that the amendments were not relevant to casual staff in the sector, due to the 'sessional nature of work'. Executive Director, Mr Stuart Andrews said many university casuals would not be the 'target of the legislative change', but gave a caveat that this may be an issue regarding the pattern of employment for some academics:
Obviously, there's going to be a continuum from people at that end to people who have been employed over a number of years for periods of time with some regularity relating to it.
10.43
Dr McDonald said this 'oversight' demonstrates the need for a 'genuine' definition of casual work that is specific to the university sector, and reflective of the ongoing nature of university work:
Once we've defined that, we need to limit it to those areas, as opposed to what is happening now. The reality is that most of the work that goes on in the universities is work that is routine and repetitive. Economics 101 will be offered every year. We can guarantee that. It's one of those things that really does need to be looked at.
10.44
The Council of Australian Postgraduate Associations (CAPA) contended that strengthening pathways to permanent work could be facilitated through the modification of industrial instruments. Conversion clauses could be added to Modern Awards that would give casuals more rights by allowing them to request permanent employment should they meet an identified conversion criteria.
10.45
The USYD Casuals Network observed that current conversion clauses already exist in some university Enterprise Agreements, such as at the University of Sydney, but are not strong enough:
According to organisers from the NTEU Sydney University branch, management have systematically rejected conversion applications, with very few being successful. As a tool for helping casuals who for all intents and purposes work as ongoing staff, the conversion clauses in the EBA have therefore demonstrably failed.
10.46
In contrast, NTEU member, Dr Elizabeth Adamczyk was critical of the idea of casual conversion, instead arguing that the academic role needed to be overhauled entirely in order for permanent conversion to be applicable:
So this idea of conversion—that you take casual staff in casualised teaching roles—is quite problematic. In the first instance we have decoupled the idea of what academia is, and we have only casualised teaching. So we've lost the research, and the service work that goes along with it, in that 40:40:20 model. The idea of conversion is something that I would push back on a little bit, in the sense that we want a holistic definition of what an academic is to be reinstituted into universities and valued for what it is.
Fixed-term conversion
10.47
The NTEU also advocated for broad based fixed-term employment conversion laws arguing that fixed-term workers should have specific workplace rights to apply for conversion to permanent work and only be employed on a fixed‑term contract in specific circumstances. This could be achieved through mandating a limited time that an individual can be employed on a fixed‑term employment contract in the same role.
10.48
Another submitter recommended that the scope of fixed-term contracts should be limited, and a justification or 'merit test' should apply when they are first implemented.
10.49
Dr Doran said it should be the norm for long-term casual or fixed-term staff to be able to convert to a permanent contract. Currently it is very difficult to get converted and there is no regulation that would 'allow for conversion as the standard'.
10.50
For both casual and fixed-term staff, the NTEU argued the benefits of such conversion provisions would present a 'fundamental' change and negate many of the effects of insecure work:
For the universities, it would be revolutionary. We would no longer have the problem of insecure employment at the same level as we do now. We would have staff who had permanency of employment, who would be able to do their research and their teaching, who would be able to offer their professional services and their general staff duties without fear or the anxiety of whether or not they had employment next semester or next year.
Committee view
10.51
Evidence received during the inquiry has raised a number of important and complex issues relating to the inability for casual and fixed-term staff to advance to permanent roles within the sector. Evidence suggested that, at present, many staff within the sector would like the opportunity to move to permanent roles, but are prevented from doing so.
10.52
The committee believes that employment conditions for casual and fixed-term workers need to be substantially improved, and facilitating pathways to permanent work is a crucial step. The Amended Omnibus Bill did not achieve this; in fact, the amendments are unlikely to bring many—if any—casual workers in the sector closer to secure work.
10.53
The Fair Work Act casual conversion clauses, as they currently stand, are difficult to apply in a number of sectors, including higher education. Casual and fixed-term workers in the sector are never going to meet the benchmark for conversion due to the sessional nature of their employment. Evidence also suggests that casual and fixed-term workers who may meet a conversion benchmark within university-specific enterprise agreements are often denied this opportunity.
10.54
The committee supports measures that would allow casual and fixed-term employees to convert to permanent full-time or part-time work, ensuring that they have access to entitlements such as holiday pay and sick leave.
10.55
Such measures could be designed in order to allow the employment of genuine casual workers to continue, and to maintain flexibility for workers who prefer a casual arrangement as they supplement other full-time work with teaching.
10.56
The committee recommends that the Australian Government Department of Education, Skills and Employment works closely with universities, workers, experts, the National Tertiary Education Union, and relevant sector bodies, to design a system of casual and fixed-term conversion that would be appropriate for the higher education sector.
This system should include sector-appropriate definitions of casual and fixed-term work, and limit the use of casual and fixed-term employment to genuinely non-ongoing work.
Improve collection and reporting of employment statistics
10.57
As discussed in Chapter 7, the scope of casualisation in the higher education sector has been difficult to quantify as universities are not required to report a headcount of casual staff. Many industry bodies and unions have attempted to fill this gap by presenting their own estimations on university workforce data but these rely on anecdotal evidence, different count methodologies, and varying sample sizes.
10.58
The NTEU argued that, due to the Department of Education, Skills and Employment (DESE) reporting criteria, universities have been able to 'conceal the true nature of their workforce'. The use of 'vague' and 'outdated' reporting measures such as Full-time Equivalent (FTE) are not appropriate tools and do not correctly identify the nature and size of the workforce.
10.59
The NTEU pointed to 2019 Victorian Government reforms which mandated that all universities report figures for insecurely employed staff as part of their annual reporting obligations. The NTEU recommend a similar national approach, in which universities would publicly report 'full employment statistics, including headcounts of staff by employment type and gender at regular intervals'.
Committee view
10.60
Casual work has clearly increased over time in the higher education sector. However, the lack of robust data has restricted investigative attempts to identify the exact size and composition of the higher education workforce, particularly with regard to the prevalence of casual work.
10.61
The committee supports greater university transparency on workforce composition, through the enhancement of annual reporting. This should include a greater focus on the collection of casual employee data, including on the staffing balance between teaching-only and researching-only functions, and on the gender and age of casual employees. Additionally, the committee acknowledges the need for better use to be made of available data sources, through improved linkage between data sources.
10.62
The committee supports requiring universities to collect and report this information to DESE, and expanding the powers of DESE to make this information more readily-available.
10.63
The committee recommends that the Australian Government requires all universities to provide a more detailed report of their staffing composition to the Department of Education, Skills and Employment, including:
annualised data on permanent, fixed-term and casual staff in terms of both headcounts and full-time equivalents;
annualised data on the use of labour hire and other external contractors; and
annualised detailed data around gender, cultural diversity, age, earnings, length of service and retention rates for casual staff, and compared with permanent staff.
Tie funding to employment outcomes
10.64
Some inquiry participants argued that there should be a legislative requirement on government funding linked to employment in universities, particularly with regard to the number of casual employees a university can employ.
10.65
The NTEU argued that the government should play a greater regulatory role in the sector, as a lack of public oversight has led to universities adopting a 'gig economy model', with the level of casualisation as a result 'unacceptable in public institutions'. One solution proposed would be to link university performance funding to 'targets for increased continuing employment'.
10.66
The Casualised, Unemployed and Precarious University Workers conditionally supported this recommendation, 'except in the situation whereby that would lead to an overall decrease in funding'.
10.67
In contrast, the AHEIA was strongly against 'legislative encroachment', contending that if employment composition were to become a 'criteria for university funding', this would not be 'good public policy'. One reason given by Mr Andrews was that universities are not standardised in their structure and workforce composition:
I just can't see a proper basis for some legislative requirement in some form or funding requirement imposed somehow that was based upon the workplace demographics of the university. And, if you think about what the demographics of a sandstone CBD university might be in Sydney and Melbourne compared to a regional university at one of the coastal locations on the east coast, obviously we're talking about quite different types of bodies.
10.68
Another reason argued by Mr Andrews was that 'artificially' implementing a casual employee cap may actually serve to disadvantage individuals attempting to gain experience in the industry, such as PhD students:
… when you think about what I was saying before about universities providing a whole lot of casual work to their PhD students. So what does the university do? Does it just reduce those casual employment opportunities for its student cohort so it can fit under an artificial cap?
Committee view
10.69
The continuing increase in the use of casuals in universities is unacceptable. The committee is supportive of measures that would promote decasualisation. However, the committee recognises that a universal approach linking government funding to specific permanent employment targets may not be appropriate.
10.70
For example, rural and regional universities may have vastly different employment profiles to 'Sandstone universities', and targets may not be appropriate or necessary. The committee therefore suggests that further research be conducted into this proposal.
10.71
The committee would support, however, a system whereby universities were required to set their own targets for increasing permanent employment, and decreasing casualisation—suitable to their circumstances—and required to report publicly their progress against these targets.
10.72
The committee recommends that the Australian Government requires, as a condition of receiving public funding, universities to set publicly-available targets for increasing permanent employment, and reducing casualisation, and report their progress against these targets on an annual basis. The targets should be established in consultation with industry experts, workers and the National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU).
The Department of Education, Skills and Employment should review the impact of this measure after three years, and—if it has not been effective in reducing the level of casualisation—the Australian Government should then work with universities and the NTEU to impose meaningful but achievable funding-linked targets.
Addressing exploitative piece rates
10.73
With 21 of Australia's 43 universities under investigation for wage theft, reforms to the enforcement of fair pay, particularly to the regime of piece rates for casual staff, were widely supported by inquiry participants.
10.74
Some participants, including the La Trobe Casuals Network and Dr Doran advocated for the abolition of piece rates.
10.75
The USYD Casuals Network called for the University of Sydney, in consultation with the NTEU, to alter existing payment schedules at the University of Sydney, such as through increasing allocated administrative hours for marking, and lecture and tutorial preparation. Such an approach may be suitable for other universities.
10.76
The AHEIA contested that piece rates have not been 'unilaterally' implemented by the universities to disadvantage staff. But rather, that they are a long‑standing payment mechanism, struck by the specialist Academic Salaries Tribunal in 1980, that the universities and the NTEU have both been party to:
Whether those estimations are accurate in each and every instance for an individual is another question altogether. But it's not a situation of the universities unilaterally dreaming up some regime that disadvantages casual staff.
10.77
The NTEU said the use of piece rates is 'widespread', particularly for the marking of examinations, essays and other written work, and that they are incorrectly administered:
The relevant enterprise agreements nearly all prescribe that employees are to be paid for this marking on a time-taken basis. Nevertheless, the University of Melbourne and many others instead have payment systems which automatically assign an amount of pay for each piece of work marked, or sometimes for each student irrespective of the actual hours worked. Moreover, these estimates of time taken are often seriously inadequate.
10.78
The NTEU added that 'the current regime of right-of-entry laws prevents the NTEU from uncovering much of the unlawful behaviour involved in the sector'. The NTEU also submitted that unions have 'specialist knowledge of the industries' that their members work in, which is 'not available to government inspectors and bodies such as the Fair Work Ombudsman'.
Committee view
10.79
The committee heard compelling evidence about how the rates of pay used to remunerate certain aspects of casual academics work known as 'piece rates' has contributed to significant underpayment of wages. Manipulation of the piece rate system has led to widespread underpayment of casual workers and is evidence of a failure in university leadership.
10.80
The committee believes that the disparity between the salaries paid to senior university administrators and senior academics, and the wage theft experienced by many of junior staff who conduct the day-to-day teaching and research in universities is indicative of a sector built on exploitative and insecure work.
10.81
The committee recognises that piece rates commonly grossly underestimate the time required to complete marking work, which has resulted in rampant underpayments as evidenced by the 21 universities currently being investigated for wage theft.
10.82
The committee's view is that the NTEU, with the support of networks of casual academics, has been instrumental in uncovering systemic wage theft in the higher education sector. However, they lack the powers to adequately enforce fair pay and conditions for all tertiary education workers in Australia.
10.83
The committee recommends, in light of the widespread wage theft in the Australian Government-funded higher education sector, that the government legislates improved rights of entry for all registered trade unions. These rights should include a right to inspect the records of both current and former employees, a right to enter a site without providing 24 hours' notice, and the removal of restrictions on trade unions accessing non-member records directly.