The Office of the Supervising Scientist

The Office of the Supervising Scientist

Derek Drinkwater

Committee Office, Department Of The Senate

Under Section 4(b) of its terms of reference the Senate Select Committee on Uranium Mining and Milling is required to inquire into and report upon 'the role of the Office of the Supervising Scientist in monitoring Australian uranium mining and milling activities'. [1] In Part I of this paper it is proposed to explore the role of the Office of the Supervising Scientist (OSS) by examining its history and functions as well as the problems associated with the discharge of its responsibilities between its establishment in 1978 and 1994, when the organisation was restructured and its functions broadened. In Part II of the paper the effect and implications of the 1994 reforms will be examined, and in Part III the future role of the OSS will be discussed.

PART I: OSS, 1978-1994

Following the discovery of significant deposits of uranium ore in the Alligator Rivers Region (the Region) of the Northern Territory (NT) in the early 1970s, the Commonwealth Government instituted an inquiry, presided over by Mr Justice R W Fox, under the Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 into the proposal by the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC) in association with Ranger Uranium Mines Pty Ltd (Ranger, later Energy Resources of Australia Ltd (ERA)) to develop uranium deposits in the NT, in particular those known as the Ranger deposits at Jabiru, some 220 kilometres east of Darwin. Although the Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry (RUEI) under Mr Justice Fox concentrated on the Ranger proposal, it also considered briefly the potential environmental impacts of three other proposed uranium mining developments in the Region: the Pancontinental Mining Ltd deposit at Jabiluka, the deposit at Koongarra discovered by Noranda Australia Ltd, and Queensland Mines Ltd's Nabarlek deposit in the Arnhem Land Aboriginal Reserve (one third of the Region lies in Arnhem Land).

The RUEI's second report, which appeared in May 1977, considered the issues related to proposed uranium mining in the Region, and set out recommendations aimed at ensuring environment protection for the area in the event of mining going ahead. [2] The Commonwealth Government accepted the RUEI recommendations and in August 1977, in pursuance of its goal of adopting 'strict environmental controls and standards in relation to uranium mining' [3] in the Region, announced the appointment of a Supervising Scientist (SS) - a specific RUEI recommendation - to co-ordinate research and environment protection monitoring in relation to the Ranger development. Also envisaged were a Research Institute to serve as a centre where research and monitoring staff could share their expertise and pursue environmental research, and a Co-ordinating Committee which would include representatives of Commonwealth and Northern Territory Government agencies involved in research and monitoring activities, the mining industry and other interested bodies like the Northern Land Council.

Mr R M Fry, [4] who brought nearly thirty years of practical and academic experience as a physicist to the task, was seconded from the AAEC in September 1977 to oversee the establishment of a statutory office of the SS (it did not become known as the OSS until 1985). He was appointed SS in June 1978 under Sections 4 and 8 of the Environment Protection (Alligator Rivers Region) Act 1978 (the Act).

A succinct outline of the SS's responsibilities between 1978 and 1994 - which takes into account his expanded role after 1987 in relation to the Kakadu Conservation Zone - is to be found in the SS's 1987-88 annual report:

The EP(ARR) Act makes no provision for the Supervising Scientist to license or regulate mining operations. The OSS is not therefore a regulatory body and it was never intended that it should be. Its primary charter is to assist in the development of environment protection measures and arrangements, to oversee these arrangements, to provide independent advice to the Government on their adequacy, and to carry out problem-oriented environmental research necessary to ensure achievement of the Government's objective. Licensing and regulation of uranium mining in the Region is carried out, for the most part, under the NT Uranium Mining (Environment Control) Act 1979 which is administered by the NT Department of Mines and Energy. The Supervising Scientist does not regulate or impose environmental conditions upon the uranium mining operations and has no powers of enforcement. Nor does the Office carry out scheduled compliance monitoring, which is the responsibility of the mining companies; or verification monitoring which, it has been agreed, is the responsibility of the NT supervising authorities. He must ensure, however, that the licensing and regulatory regime being implemented by the NT gives effect to the environment protection measures that the Commonwealth requires be applied to the uranium mining operations.

In addition to these uranium related functions the Supervising Scientist now [since the amendment of the EP(ARR) Act in 1987] has a role in the supervision and control of environmental aspects of general mining and exploration within the Kakadu Conservation Zone and for the conduct of research to support this role. The Supervising Scientist is required to provide advice to the Government on environmental aspects of the exploration and resource assessment program to be carried out in the Zone, which includes the gold mining prospect at Coronation Hill; the adequacy of environment protection in the conduct of exploration within the Zone; and the environmental implications of mining at Coronation Hill or in any other areas that might be excised from the Zone for the purpose of mining operations. [5]

Although Section 5(f) of the Act allowed monitoring and supervisory functions to be conferred on the SS by or under a 'prescribed instrument', such as the Environmental Requirements to be met by Ranger, the Act did not provide the SS with any powers of regulation or enforcement. Infringements of environmental standards by mining companies or questionable monitoring performance by supervising authorities were to be considered by the Co-ordinating Committee of the Alligator Rivers Region, two members of which - the Director of the Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service (ANPWS) (renamed the Australian Nature Conservation Agency (ANCA) in 1993) and the representative of the Northern Land Council - were empowered, under the Environment Protection (Northern Territory Supreme Court) Act 1978, to seek orders for the enforcement of Environmental Requirements from the NT Supreme Court. Nevertheless, even the Co-ordinating Committee, the principal institutional mechanism for regulatory supervision, possessed no statutory powers, although it could make recommendations to the SS in relation to research and monitoring programs, standards, environment protection measures and the implementation of environmental requirements. [6]

From the outset the SS was required to discharge his responsibilities within a complex interlocking network of Commonwealth and NT legislation and instruments (for example, permits, licences and agreements), a reflection of the conflicts of interests aroused by mining developments in the Region and of the need to reconcile Commonwealth control of uranium mining with the self-governing NT's own regulatory requirements. [7] Disagreements arose sooner rather than later over several aspects of the SS's role, most notably between Ranger and the SS and the latter and the NT Department of Mines and Energy (NTDME). Between its inception in 1978 and its reorganisation in 1994, a number of inquiries and reports examined, in detail or in passing, the role of the OSS and all reached conclusions or made recommendations regarding its structure and administration and its research and monitoring roles. Their prescriptions for improving OSS operations will be examined later when the difficulties encountered by the OSS are discussed. For the purposes of clarity and easy identification, a list (by no means definitive) of these inquiries and reports is provided below:

March 1982 ASTEC, Office of the Supervising Scientist: A Report to the Prime Minister by the Australian Science and Technology Council (ASTEC), AGPS, Canberra, 1982.

June 1984 Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Aborigines and Uranium: Consolidated Report to the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs on the Social Impact of Uranium Mining on the Aborigines of the Northern Territory, AGPS, Canberra, 1984.

November 1988 Senate Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts, The Potential of the Kakadu National Park Region, AGPS, Canberra, 1988.

September 1989 Auditor-General, Office of the Supervising Scientist for the Alligator Rivers Region - Research Project Administration, Audit Report No. 10, 1989-90, AGPS, Canberra, 1989.

November 1989 DASETT, Review of the Office of the Supervising Scientist, (Reviewer: Professor G H Taylor), AGPS, Canberra, 1989.

December 1989 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts, Review of the Auditor-General's Report on Research Project Administration in the Office of the Supervising Scientist, AGPS, Canberra, 1989.

February 1991 Industry Commission, Mining and Minerals Processing in Australia: Vol 3, Report No. 7, AGPS, Canberra, 1991.

June 1992 Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Public Sector Research and Development: Vol 1, AGPS, Canberra, 1992.

August 1993 ASTEC, Research and Technology in Tropical Australia and their Application to the Development of the Region, AGPS, Canberra, 1993.

With only one exception, all of these inquiries saw a continuing role for the OSS, and even the Industry Commission, which effectively advocated the abolition of the OSS and the transfer of its functions to the ANPWS, the NT Government, the CSIRO and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, recognised that the work performed by the SS was necessary. [8] Nevertheless, each inquiry did comment on a number of problems besetting the OSS. The chief difficulties encountered by the organisation and the major criticisms made of its operations by interested parties like Ranger between 1978 and 1994 are outlined below:

Staffing

A continuing refrain in the annual reports of the SS between 1978 and 1993 was the deleterious effects on OSS performance of inadequate numbers of qualified scientific research staff, which arose from funding constraints and the difficulties experienced in attracting staff to settle and work in the NT. [9] The SS told a Senate Estimates Committee in October 1989 that the biggest obstacle to his organisation in successfully discharging its functions, apart from funding problems, was that of staff shortages. [10] As early as 1982, ASTEC, in its review of the OSS, recommended the appointment of more scientific research staff. [11]

Research

During the 1980s expenditure on research accounted for three quarters of OSS financial resources. [12] The amounts invested in research by the OSS, the nature of the research and the outcomes from it have always been contentious issues. The ASTEC inquiry in 1982 considered that the OSS research program was too wide and not sufficiently refined and focussed, [13] while the Senate Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts concluded in 1988 that the OSS lacked key monitoring and evaluation expertise in the field of mining engineering. [14] The Australian Mining Industry Council criticised the OSS in the late 1980s as a poor research manager and an organisation lacking scientific credibility; [15] ERA/Ranger's continuing complaint during this period was that OSS research was inappropriate and irrelevant to the Company's needs.

After investigating OSS research project administration in 1989, the Commonwealth Auditor-General recommended that the OSS:

In its review of the Auditor-General's report, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts expressed its agreement with the subjects examined and the conclusions reached by the Auditor-General (the development and approval of OSS research projects; the OSS's engagement of consultants; OSS monitoring of the progress of reports; and OSS reporting of research results). [17] A 1993 ASTEC report on research and technology in tropical Australia recommended, inter alia, that the OSS's principal research body, the Alligator Rivers Region Research Institute, be restructured and its funding base expanded in order to provide it with a broader research role. ASTEC also argued that the Institute should be encouraged to form joint ventures and develop research programs with other organisations and industry. [18]

Geographical Distance Between Research and Administration

As early as 1982 there were at the very least perceptions that the separation of the OSS's research operations (located in the NT since 1978) and its administrative headquarters (in Sydney, 1978-92 and henceforth in Canberra) were causing difficulties and adversely affecting OSS research performance. [19] The Senate Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts recommended in 1988 that the only way of solving problems like the duplication of functions associated with this state of affairs was to locate all OSS functions - research and administrative - in the NT. [20]

Tensions Between the OSS and the NT Regulatory Authorities

It was apparent to the Senate Committee in 1988 that a major difficulty in environment protection monitoring in the Region was the periodic breakdown in effective communication between the parties involved in regulating and supervising uranium mining activities in the Kakadu area. [21] The principal protagonists were, of course, the OSS, Ranger (whose relationships with the OSS will be examined later) and the NT Government, particularly its Department of Mines and Energy. The SS himself pointed out in his 1988-89 annual report that the NTDME, whose prime responsibility was to promote the development of mining in the NT, found the Commonwealth Government's environmental constraints 'inflexible and sometimes inappropriate, and the presence of the OSS intrusive'. [22] The OSS and the NTDME disagreed over matters as diverse as water release standards and when to prosecute Ranger for its environmental transgressions. Despite NTDME objections to its operations, however, the OSS continued to regard its presence as essential, pointing out in its 1987-88 annual report that:

The Northern Territory, though carrying out the day-to-day licensing of the mining operations, has not established the scientific resources necessary to ensure comprehensive protection of the environment of the Region to the standard required by the Commonwealth ... Nor has it established an environmental protection agency independent of the regulating Department of Mines and Energy ... [23]

At the heart of NT Government-OSS disagreements, however, were two very different conceptions of what environmental monitoring in the Region should involve: while the OSS was convinced that 'the only practical protection target ... is that the mining operations produce no observable biological impact', [24] the NT regulatory authorities appear to have believed that they should aim at no more than the prevention of serious environmental damage.

Quality of Laboratory Facilities

Deficiencies in laboratory facilities emerged as an early impediment to OSS operations. [25] In 1982 ASTEC recommended the construction of a permanent field laboratory at Jabiru; [26] seven years later a new environmental radioactivity laboratory was completed at the Alligator Rivers Region Research Institute. [27]

ERA/Ranger Criticisms of OSS Operations and Performance

The most strident critic of the OSS over the years has been ERA/Ranger. In addition to its concerns relating to OSS research and the OSS's jurisdiction as an environmental watchdog, it has questioned the cost of and outcomes from OSS research. In 1988 the SS lamented the fact that the long-term absence of effective liaison between the OSS and ERA/Ranger had been a serious problem for them both. [28] ERA/Ranger's most trenchant objection to the OSS, however, derived from its resentment of the levy imposed upon its uranium production, the proceeds of which were used partly to finance OSS operations. This resentment was particularly pronounced in the late 1980s when the Commonwealth increased the levy at a time when the international market for uranium was collapsing.

OSS Lack of Regulatory Power

Although the OSS has had 'supervisory, co-ordination and research roles' [29] in environment protection throughout the Region since it was established, its overall effectiveness has been hampered by its lack of any regulatory powers which would have enabled it to enforce its environmental monitoring decisions. This has always been a serious problem for the organisation. Emeritus Professor G H Taylor, in a review of OSS operations commissioned by the responsible Minister in 1989, attempted to redress this deficiency by recommending that the SS's powers be expanded to oblige the NT regulatory authorities to adhere to and implement OSS advice concerning the 'statutory instrument', Environmental Requirements. [30] The recommendation was never acted upon.

Aboriginal Concerns

As will be seen in Part II of this paper, when the 1994 OSS reforms and their implications are examined, Aboriginal concerns about uranium mining in the Region and the role of the OSS in environmental monitoring have centred largely on the perceived exclusion from or inadequate inclusion of Aboriginal representative groups in initial planning and continuing negotiations over the effects of uranium extraction in the area. The Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies (AIAS) (later AIATSIS to give formal recognition to the role of Torres Strait Islanders in indigenous affairs) in its report, Aborigines and Uranium in 1984, questioned the role of the OSS, but did not seriously criticise its performance, seeing it as one of several players in a complex regulatory environment based on a series of 'structured conflicts':

Structured conflicts can serve as a regulatory mechanism - as clearly seen by [Mr Justice] Fox [in the Ranger Reports] when he set the mining companies, the Northern Land Council and the Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service in a delicate balance with each other. It could be argued that the Office of the Supervising Scientist and its associated Alligator Rivers Region Research Institute were intended to be neutral parties in this equation: the voice of reason, the bearers of the scientific tradition, and the arbiters of true knowledge. While this was done in the name of the environment, they were not neutral, or, more to the point, they themselves were subject to supervision, (formally through the Coordinating Committee for the Alligator Rivers Region) and required to be responsible to pressures, not only from the mining companies, ANPWS and the Land Council, but also from the Commonwealth and Northern Territory governments and various of their departments. [31]

OSS/EP(ARR) Act Secrecy Provisions

The secrecy provisions of the Environment Protection (Alligator Rivers Region) Act 1978 have been the subject of concern since the EP(ARR) Bill was first debated in the Commonwealth Parliament in May 1978. Under Section 31 of the Act, the SS, present and past, and his employees , present and past, are forbidden to divulge any information about their OSS work to anyone, other than the responsible Minister or the Permanent Head of the relevant Department of State. However, the Act made it possible to obtain from the Minister a declaration that 'it is in the public interest that the information be communicated or the document produced [to another party or other parties].' Despite this safeguard the ALP opposition argued in 1978 that 'the supervising scientist is not independent of the Minister and the provisions for his reports and recommendations to come before the Parliament are inadequate. The Parliament and the public will not have access to the findings of the supervising scientist. Findings detrimental to the Government's credibility could be concealed'. [32]

Part II: OSS, 1994-1996

In December 1993, the Commonwealth Government set out to address the problems outlined in Part I of this paper. The passage of the Environment Protection (Alligator Rivers Region) Amendment Act 1993, which came into effect in February 1994, resulted in significant amendment of the existing legislation governing the functions and powers of the SS, and far reaching changes to the size and scope of the organisation, its method of operation, its relationships with key clients and the focus of environmental research undertaken by the OSS in the Region. [33] In summary, the 1994 reforms:

The following changes also occurred as a result of the amendment of the Act:

In essence, the 1994 reforms were aimed at enabling the OSS to contribute more widely to the national environmental research effort by strengthening its capacity for research and allowing it to disseminate its scientific and monitoring expertise more widely.

By mid-1995, under its new chief executive, Mr Barry Carbon, [36] the OSS had introduced the 1994 changes and was beginning to consolidate the reforms. The recommendations of the review of research conducted on the ERISS were implemented. This entailed the development of a new research program structure and the refocusing of research into two main streams - the impact of mining and wetlands management, as well as general environmental research. Revision continued of Commonwealth/Northern Territory Government Working Relationships and of the Commonwealth's Environmental Requirements for the Ranger Mine. The OSS and the Tasmanian Government embarked on a joint study of the environmental damage caused by copper and gold mining at Mount Lyell on Tasmania's west coast in June 1995.

In August 1994 the Commonwealth Government and ERA signed a deed of agreement which replaced the Uranium Export Levy with an annual ERA contribution (1994-95 base figure: $1.5m) towards the cost of Commonwealth research related to the Ranger mining operation. The bulk of this amount has been and will continue to be used to finance OSS environmental research and monitoring.

PART III: THE FUTURE OF THE OSS

ERA continues to operate the Ranger Mine which is located eight kilometres east of the township of Jabiru. The Mine lies within the seventy-eight square kilometre Ranger Project Area, and is near Magela Creek, a tributary of the East Alligator River. The Ranger Project Area is within, but does not form part of, Kakadu National Park. [37] The mining and commercial production of uranium concentrate has been underway since 1981. The extractable resource at Ranger consists of two orebodies. Mining of the first of these (Orebody #1) was completed in December 1994. Development of Orebody #3 is scheduled to begin in 1996.

Queensland Mines Pty Ltd (QMPL) operated the Nabarlek mine and mill situated thirty kilometres east of Oenpelli in Arnhem Land, near Cooper Creek, a tributary of the East Alligator River. All of this small, high-grade orebody was mined and stockpiled during the 1979 dry season, and ore processing was completed in June 1989. Exploration in the Region has continued since the 1980s, but failure to discover further economic deposits led to the beginning of the decommissioning and rehabilitation of the site in 1995.

Two significant uranium deposits discovered in the Region in the early 1970s remain undeveloped. The Jabiluka (North Ranger) deposit, twenty kilometres north of Ranger, lies in the East Alligator River catchment and within the project area excised from the Kakadu National Park. Jabiluka is owned by ERA. The Koongarra deposit is situated about twenty-five kilometres south-west of Ranger within the South Alligator River catchment. An Act providing for the excision of the Koongarra Project was passed in 1981, but has not yet been proclaimed. Denison Mines Ltd began transferring seventy per cent of its ownership of Koongarra to Cogema in April 1992, a process expected to be completed in 1996. During the dry season of 1994-95, uranium exploration was undertaken in the Region by QMPL and PNC Exploration (Australia) Pty Ltd.

The 1994 changes were a serious and ambitious attempt to deal with the difficulties examined in Part II of this paper. Greater OSS-NT Government-uranium industry interaction and cooperation and a more visible national environmental role for the OSS have resulted from the 1993 amendment of the 1978 Act. However, a number of problems still exist; some of these were in evidence prior to 1993-94, and others have resulted from the 1994 reforms.

As of mid-1996, uranium mining companies in the Region must continue to comply with NT regulatory safeguards, and with the Commonwealth Government's Environmental Requirements. The NT Government remains responsible for establishing, under NT legislation, through leases, authorisations, approvals and other legal instruments, the conditions under which uranium mining and mineral processing is undertaken. NT agencies are also responsible for ensuring compliance with these conditions. The OSS continues to collect and assess information on the effect of uranium mining in the Region; to develop practices and measures aimed at the protection and restoration of the environment; and to ensure that the environmental requirements contained in legislation ('prescribed instruments') as well as relevant regulations and codes of practice are observed and implemented. [38]

Although no serious environmental damage to the Region has occurred as a result of uranium mining, and no major infringements of environmental requirements have occurred in fifteen years of mining - which led Senator G Tambling (CLP) (NT) to describe the Ranger Project as 'one of the most tightly regulated and heavily scrutinised mines in the world' [39] - the continuing lack of any OSS powers of regulation and enforcement remains a cause for concern, especially at a time when a number of mining companies may be about to embark on uranium extraction in different areas of the Region.

The risk of major environmental damage surely could be said to increase when more than one company is involved in mining in separate parts of any region, which suggests the need for greater OSS regulatory powers. The fact that an environmental disaster has never occurred in a certain environment is not in itself a strong ground for adhering to the status quo; the entry of more stakeholders into the mining equation may well be an argument for providing the OSS with regulatory and enforcement powers, considering the complex and sensitive regulatory situation in which mining is taking place and the serious consequences which may result from delays in Commonwealth -NT agreement about what steps to take should a serious environmental problem occur. The OSS has the greatest amount of expertise in the environmental sphere of all the parties involved; endowing it with regulatory powers of enforcement to deal expeditiously with serious environmental infringements seems a course of action worth considering.

Speaking in the debate in May 1996 on the proposal to appoint a Senate Select Committee on Uranium Mining and Milling, Senator Meg Lees (AD) (SA) referred to a problem which the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies had identified in 1984: the inadequate opportunities open to local Aboriginal people to participate in information exchange and decision making about uranium mining in the Region. In 1984 the AIAS had described how:

... Aboriginal people are not centrally involved in the legal and administrative machinery which has been imposed on the Region, and have not become effective members of the special committees established to deal with social and other problems as they arise. [40]

Improvements have certainly occurred; in April 1995 QMPL negotiated six exploration leases around and south of the Nabarlek area, after extensive negotiations with the Northern Land Council. [41] However, some areas of consultation remain neglected; Senator Lees pointed out that OSS contact with Aboriginal groups is restricted to occasional meetings and periodic briefings. [42] In the era of native title and increased government and community awareness of Aboriginal concerns, this is an issue which needs to be addressed as soon as possible. The OSS's lack of regulatory powers and matters related to Aboriginal involvement have been longstanding matters of concern; particular questions concerning OSS funding and research responsibilities and commitments resulting from the 1994 reforms have arisen as largely new difficulties for the organisation.

The first matter - how is the OSS to expand its functions beyond the realm of its NT commitments to encompass a wider national advisory role? - which was raised by Senator Dee Margetts (GWA) when the OSS changes were being debated in December 1993, remains relevant today, given the significant decline in its funding (twenty-five percent between 1994 and 1996) and a decrease of one third in its staff numbers. [43] It is too early to reach any definitive conclusions about the new OSS research approach being pursued through the ERISS; perhaps the Select Committee on Uranium Mining and Milling should seek evidence on this subject, given that the perceived poor quality of its research was one of the main sources of criticism of the OSS between 1978 and 1994. A note of caution should also be sounded about the new arrangements which allow, indeed encourage, the OSS to undertake commercial research and advisory work on environmental issues around the country. As such, this is a valuable initiative in that it increases OSS interaction with industry and helps to defray the high cost of its research operations at a time when research costs in most fields are burgeoning. A close watch should be kept, however, on the human and financial resources of the OSS which are devoted to this type of activity, lest it make serious incursions into the OSS's primary NT role, especially at a time when mining operations in the Alligator Rivers Region and nationally, look set to expand considerably. This could also be a subject for investigation by the Select Committee.

The AIAS concluded in 1984 that 'the implementation of controls and regulations through a system of conflicting structures [in the Region, for example, ERA, the NT Government, the ANCA and the OSS] as conceived by the Fox Commission, has been quite successful'. [44] This paper sees no reason to dissent from this view.

It should be emphasised, however, that the matters of OSS funding and staffing; OSS powers of regulation and enforcement; and the commercialisation of the organisation, albeit a partial one, should be the subject of careful scrutiny in the future by inquiries like that being undertaken by the Select Committee. That having been said, the OSS is now performing and, perhaps more to the point, has the potential to perform more efficiently than was possible before the 1994 reforms.

 

footnotes

[1] Senate, Journals, 2 May 1996, 83.

[2] Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry: Second Report, (Presiding Commissioner: Mr Justice R W Fox), AGPS, Canberra, 1977, 293-305, 331-333.

[3] CPD, Senate, 8 May 1978, 1454.

[4] Fry's career as a physicist had been spent in the fields of radiological and environment protection. He had worked for two years with the CSIRO as a meteorological physicist; for five years at the University of Adelaide on research into medical radiation physics; and for twenty years with the AAEC where his responsibilities included radiation protection practice and research and the regulation of the environmental and public health aspects of nuclear energy.

[5] OSS: Annual Report, 1987-88, (Parl. Paper No. 215, 1988), 2.

[6] OSS: Annual Report, 1978-79, (Parl. Paper No. 347, 1979), 6.

[7] ibid., 15.

[8] Industry Commission, Mining and Minerals Processing in Australia: Vol 3, Report No. 7, (Parl. Paper No. 105, 1991), AGPS, Canberra, 1991, 598.

[9] OSS: Annual Report, 1982-83, (Parl. Paper No. 291, 1983), 6-8;

OSS: Annual Report, 1983-84, (Parl. Paper No. 13, 1985), 6;

OSS: Annual Report, 1985-86, (Parl. Paper No. 359, 1986), 6.

[10]Senate Estimates Committee D, Hansard, 5 October 1989, D141.

[11] ASTEC, Office of the Supervising Scientist: A Report to the Prime Minister by the Australian Science and Technology Council (ASTEC), (Parl. Paper No. 145, 1982), AGPS, Canberra, 1982, 2.

[12] OSS: Annual Report, 1986-87, (Parl. Paper No. 370, 1987), 1;

OSS: Annual Report, 1987-88, op. cit., 5.

[13] ASTEC, Office of the Supervising Scientist, op. cit., 12-13.

[14] Senate Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts, The Potential of the Kakadu National Park Region, (Parl. Paper No. 389, 1988), AGPS, Canberra, 1988, 222.

[15] OSS: Annual Report, 1989-90, (Parl. Paper No. 263, 1990), 4.

[16] Auditor-General, Office of the Supervising Scientist for the Alligator Rivers Region - Research Project Administration, Audit Report No. 10, 1989-90, (Parl. Paper No. 183, 1989), AGPS, Canberra, 1989 ('Key Findings').

[17] House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts, Review of the Auditor-General's Report on Research Project Administration in the Office of the Supervising Scientist, (Parl. Paper No. 483, 1989), AGPS, Canberra, 1989, 2.

[18] ASTEC, Research and Technology in Tropical Australia and their Application to the Development of the Region, (Parl. Paper No. 207, 1993), AGPS, Canberra, 1993, 23.

[19] ASTEC, Office of the Supervising Scientist, op.cit., 12.

[20] Senate Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts, The Potential of the Kakadu National Park Region, op. cit., 225-226, 228.

[21] ibid., 226-227.

[22] OSS: Annual Report, 1988-89, (Parl. Paper No. 360, 1989), 9.

[23] OSS: Annual Report, 1987-88, op.cit., 4.

[24] ibid., 18.

[25] OSS: Annual Report, 1983-84, op.cit., 6.

[26] ASTEC, Office of the Supervising Scientist, op.cit., 2.

[27] OSS: Annual Report: 1988-89, op.cit., 7.

[28] Senate Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts, The Potential of the Kakadu National Park Region, op.cit., 225.

[29] ibid., p.223. See also 222.

[30]DASETT, Review of the Office of the Supervising Scientist, (Reviewer: Professor G H Taylor), AGPS, Canberra, 1989, 55-56.

[31] Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Aborigines and Uranium: Consolidated Report to the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs on the Social Impact of Uranium Mining on the Aborigines of the Northern Territory, (Parl. Paper No. 310, 1984), AGPS, Canberra, 1984, 126.

[32] CPD, Senate, 24 May 1978, 1793-1794.

[33] OSS: Annual Report, 1993-94, (Parl. Paper No. 333, 1994), xi.

[34] Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Public Sector Research and Development: Vol 1, (Parl. Paper No. 170, 1992), AGPS, Canberra, 1992, 285.

[35] CPD, Senate, 28 October 1993, 2689, 2691-2693;

OSS: Annual Report, 1993-94, op.cit., xi.

[36] R M Fry retired as SS in April 1993. Dr Glen Riley acted as SS until the appointment of Mr Barry Carbon as Executive Director of the EPA and SS in February 1994. Mr Carbon's experience has included research scientist and planning positions with the CSIRO; the management of Alcoa Australia's Environmental Department; and the post of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of WA's Environmental Protection Authority, 1985-93.

[37] A map of the Region is included in Appendix B.

[38] ibid., 9.

[39] CPD, Senate, 16 December 1993, 4817.

[40]Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Aborigines and Uranium, op.cit., 130.

[41] OSS: Annual Report, 1994-95, op.cit., xii.

[42] CD, Senate, 2 May 1996, 209.

[43] CPD, Senate, 16 December 1993, 4818.

[44] Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Aborigines and Uranium, op. cit., 131.