VOLUME AND LOCATION OF AUSTRALIAN-OBLIGATED PLUTONIUM

The Committee was specifically asked to report on the volume and location of Australian-obligated plutonium currently in existence in the international nuclear fuel cycle (produced as a result of the use of Australian uranium), in what form it exists (for example, separated or in spent nuclear fuel) and its intended end use.

Plutonium is a fissile, transuranic, radio-active metallic element first obtained in 1940 by bombarding uranium with deutrons. It has been subsequently found in trace amounts in nature. It was discovered in the course of development of the atomic bomb. The weapon exploded at Nagasaki was a plutonium bomb.

Plutonium is seen by some as the most hazardous material known to humans, although this view is not shared by everyone.

One calculation is that there are 1300 tonnes of plutonium in the world and that it is produced at the rate of 75 tonnes per annum.

The Director of Safeguards' Annual Reports provide information on total quantities of Australian obligated plutonium. According to the DFAT/ASO submission:

Australia's bilateral agreement partners regard the specific quantity of AONM under each agreement as confidential information. Accordingly, the Annual Report gives only a general location by reference to the safeguards jurisdictions within which different categories of AONM are held. (S 60, III.3, 14)

The submission states that as at 31 December 1995, there were 25.983 tonnes of Australian obligated plutonium (S 60, III.4, 14), and 24.742 tonnes of irradiated Australian obligated plutonium (S 60, III.5, 14).

Every country using Australian-obligated uranium has irradiated Australian obligated plutonium. It is covered by agreements with Euratom, the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland (S 60, III.6, 14).

As at December 1995, the total quantity of separated Australian obligated plutonium (extracted from spent fuel not returned to reactors as fuel) is 1.241 tonnes (S 60, III.7, 14).

As at 31 December 1995, separated Australian obligated plutonium was located in Japan and Euratom countries (S 60, III.8, 14).

Reprocessing requires Australia's consent, which is given for recycling recovered nuclear material for electricity generation, spent fuel management, and research (S 60, III.13, 15).

Australian policy has been one of strict safeguards control over plutonium production and opposition to stockpiling.

Greenpeace Australia lodged a submission addressing the question of plutonium in detail. It claimed that between 1986 and 1994 permission was given to reprocess spent nuclear fuel containing 327 tonnes of Australian-origin uranium, yielding 2.88 tonnes of plutonium - ". . . enough to construct approximately 250 nuclear weapons" (S 73, Part A, 1).

Greenpeace concern derives from the proliferation risks posed by stockpiles of plutonium: ". . . the simple fact remains that the more separated plutonium that exists, the greater the chance that some of it will be stolen, diverted or lost." (S 73, Part A, 2)

Greenpeace claimed that "IAEA admits that it can only account for up to 97-99% of the plutonium separated from spent fuel in a commercial reprocessing plant . . . even this small margin of error is unacceptable" (S 73, Part A, 2).

The Director of Safeguards, Mr John Carlson, took significant issue with the Greenpeace submission: "a principal issue that I would take with Greenpeace is the inference that Australia has given consent to reprocessing of a certain quantity of plutonium which could lead to X number of bombs . . . " (8 November 1996, 811-2). Mr Carlson continued: " . . . it is a simple fact that the plutonium produced with Australian uranium in power reactor operation is not suitable for nuclear weapons" (8 November 1996, 812).

Subsequently a Greenpeace spokesperson, Mr Ben Pearson, informed the Committee that:

The question of the 250 bombs is something about which we had been accused of being sensationalist and of attempting to whip up fear. In fact, when we wrote that report, we intended it to be very much a public document. It was not simply a submission; it was a public document. We wanted to provide a context to people who did not know much about plutonium so that, when they looked at that figure of 2.88 tonnes, they could have something to measure it against so they could see what 2.88 tonnes actually meant. In this way, we gave them a bit of a context. (8 November 1996, 827)

And on the matter of making nuclear weapons from civil plutonium, when asked if Greenpeace could identify any known case where this had occurred, Greenpeace spokesperson Ms Jean McSorley told the Committee: "I think that would be a very difficult job"; she later stated: "Any government office or the Safeguards Office would be hard pressed to try to say the opposite - that they could identify that all the plutonium in nuclear weapons has come purely from military programs" (8 November 1996, 837).

Stockpiles of plutonium are a concern to Australia and it supports moves to avoid them. Australia's policy of strict safeguards control illustrates again that safeguards practices must continue to develop. From the Committee's perspective it is preferable that such development continue in a calm and rational manner without resorting to the techniques referred to by Mr Pearson in public evidence. Everyone is well aware of the grave risks which nuclear power involves. If these risks are addressed calmly, cautiously, deliberately and expeditiously, they are much less likely to engender unjustified apprehension, insecurity and even panic which accompanies more dramatic presentation of what may only be hypothetical problems.