CRITICISMS

Criticisms of international safeguards fall into two broad categories. First, there is a general critique of nuclear power and the prospects of confining its application to civil purposes. The second criticism is more focussed upon the Australian role. These categories are not self-contained and a number of submissions which the Committee received based their criticism of uranium exports from Australia at least partly on a lack of faith in the international regime to regulate nuclear energy.

Major general criticisms focus on the destructive capacity of nuclear power when used for military purposes, the ease with which, it is claimed, civil facilities can be redirected to military ends, the brevity of notice required for withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the existence of nations with nuclear interests outside the NPT system, the fact that safeguards are based on verification not control, and the ease with which it is considered that the safeguards system can be evaded. The case of Iraq in the pre-Gulf War period, when it clandestinely developed a nuclear military capacity, is cited as an illustration of the weaknesses of the NPT safeguards system.

Professor J.A. Camilleri, Professor of Politics at La Trobe University, Victoria, was especially critical of the NPT system generally and the International Atomic Energy Agency in particular (S 72). In summary, Professor Camilleri's views were that:

• there is a conflict between the IAEA's roles as a regulator and as a promoter of nuclear energy. According to Professor Camilleri, "[t]his dual function feeds the widespread perception that the IAEA may at times be severely constrained in its capacity to carry out independent and probing scrutiny of nuclear facilities" (S 72, 2).
• As Professor Camilleri states, "[t]he underlying aim [of safeguards] is not prevention but timely warning of such diversion" (S72, 2).
• He observes that as nuclear technology develops, so too does the difficulty of monitoring the civilian nuclear industry. Professor Camilleri states that "Israel, India, Pakistan and South Africa have all demonstrated that a full-scale nuclear test is not necessary for the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability" (S 72, 2). [These nations until recently were not signatories to the NPT; only South Africa now is.]
• "In the case of Iraq, the IAEA's failure to discover substantial nuclear weapons activities was not merely the result of deficient safeguards or intelligence-collection-methods. Equally important was the lack of political will on the part of Western governments who, for various economic and strategic reasons, chose to turn a blind eye to Iraqi militarization. The Iraqi nuclear programme offers compelling evidence that technical improvements in the safeguards regime, however comprehensive or sophisticated, do not in themselves constitute a guarantee of timely or effective detection." (S 72, 3)
• Another case cited by Professor Camilleri is that of the People's Republic of Korea which for a time proposed to withdraw from the NPT and refused various IAEA requests to make inspections and for information (S 72, 4).
• Despite a significantly increased workload, there has been little sign of a commensurate increase in IAEA resources (S 72, 5).
• Professor Camilleri considers that "to have universal legitimacy, IAEA safeguards will need to be much more transparent than is presently the case, which will in turn require the agency to conduct 'any time, any place' inspections at relatively short notice" (S 72, 5).
• Professor Camilleri's concerns also derived from what he considered were the declining prospects of the nuclear industry (S 72, 6).
• In Professor Camilleri's opinion, "[t]he international safeguards regime, despite recent improvements, does not provide a guarantee against the clandestine diversion of nuclear facilities and materials. Even if such diversion is detected, it does not follow that the response of the international community will succeed in putting an end to a nuclear programme. The risks of nuclear proliferation in the post-Cold War period are perhaps greater than at any time since the early 1960s." (S 72, 8)

He also challenged the idea that there could be a difference between the "peaceful" and "military" atom. Moreover, as he emphasised in public evidence to the Committee, Australia's promotion of non-proliferation would have greater legitimacy if Australia were not a supplier of uranium (8 November 1996, 856-7).

These themes were present in several submissions: People for Nuclear Disarmament (WA) stated that "[t]here is no way any Government in Australia can claim that our uranium stays only in the realm of nuclear power generation" (S 2, 8).

Mr Peter Milton was dismissive of the safeguards system: "I would charge that Australia's bilateral agreements, with countries importing Australian uranium, are not worth the paper they are written on, when our Safeguards Office can be so easily fooled" (S 9, 5). [Mr Milton was referring to an obligation exchange in 1988 described below.]

Mr Gavin Mudd warned of "a growing number of incidents, mostly in eastern Europe, of the smuggling of nuclear materials and technology. Although it is claimed that no weapons grade nuclear material has been reported on the black market, the mere possibility that an illicit trade could lead to terrorist groups or organised crime obtaining nuclear strike capability is a very frightening prospect" (S 34, 5).

Mr Frank Miller was, inter alia, concerned that uranium loses its identity upon conversion. In a more general critique, he warned that "[t]he real risk with the IAEA safeguard system is that it gives people a false sense of security. People have been thinking for years there are effective safeguards and safety regimes in place. As long as people think the IAEA safeguard system is effective, they will condone the expansion of uranium mining and nuclear power"(S 35,10).

The limited staffing of the Australian Safeguards Office and of the IAEA itself, and the lack of effective sanctions for breaches of the safeguards regime, concerned Mary Bruce (S 48, 2-5).

The Minerals Council of Australia drew attention to the problem of weapons proliferation, "albeit a fraction of what had been feared when the NPT was set up, and none of the problem arises from the civil nuclear cycle" (S 61,19).

The Tasmanian Greens considered that the "main weakness of the NPT is that any country can withdraw with three months notice. Australia has absolutely no way of forcing a country to maintain its agreement if, for reasons of national security, it decides to develop nuclear weapons using yellowcake imported from Australia" (S 66, 3).

Among the criticisms from the Movement Against Uranium Mining were weaknesses in safeguards, especially in relation to plutonium, difficulty in supervising uranium once it leaves Australia, the number of facilities not covered by safeguards, loopholes in safeguards agreements, and the absence of reliable sanctions (S 68).

The Australian Nuclear Association was also aware of the risk posed by political instability. It proposed that Australia should only export uranium to countries where there has been a political assessment that it does not intend to divert material; being a signatory to the NPT ought not be enough (S 71, 3). It also believed that exported uranium could be controlled more effectively if it were converted in Australia, leased to user countries and returned to Australia after use ( S 71, 6).

The Medical Association for Prevention of War had a fear of "a thriving black market in radioactive substances, and no government guarantees can make it impossible for Australian uranium, in transit, to be procured by terrorists" (S 79, 15).

The Australian Conservation Foundation illustrated Australia-specific concerns about exporting uranium: " . . . there is no guarantee that fissionable material derived from Australian uranium will not end up in nuclear weapons". The ACF was also critical of the IAEA: "The ability of international arrangements to control the regulation of fissionable materials is largely symbolic. The International Atomic Energy Agency, in the conduct of inspections, can gain entry by invitation only. They have no legally enforceable role in the policing and enforcement of safety standards" (S 81, 18).

Friends of the Earth Sydney shared the concern that "atoms of Australian uranium have ended up on the defence-related side of at least either the French or the British nuclear fuel cycles" (S 40, Part 2, 8).

This enumeration of the criticisms of the safeguards system is formidable but it is not unchallengeable either on pragmatic or conceptual grounds. The Committee is conscious that the system is not self-regulating and requires constant and continuing vigilance. Moreover, telling as some criticisms are, they relate to countries such as India, Pakistan and Israel which are among those which have not been persuaded to join the NPT.

The Committee's view that the safeguards system has to be treated both seriously and constructively was in fact supported by a witness who was basically critical. Ms J. Vallentine, Coordinator, People for Nuclear Disarmament (PND), was asked at the Committee's hearings in Perth whether, in view of PND's criticisms of international safeguards, the system should be discontinued. Her answer was that "it is better having it than not having it," adding that "it is not watertight - there are a lot of loopholes" (20 January 1997, 946).

Ms Brenda Roy, also representing PND, added: "Surely the point of criticising something or asking for it to be better is that you ask for those safeguards to be tightened up and to be looked at so people can see if they are in fact efficient safeguards. We are not saying, 'Well, these safeguards don't work, so let's not have any' ."(ibid.)

Another consideration of concern to the Committee is whether all examples of the failings of the system actually support the argument. A clear instance is that of the People's Republic of Korea (PRK). Continuing attention by the international system resulted in the suspension of the PRK's intention to leave the NPT and there have been some steps taken to allay the apprehension which many nations, including the PRK, have about nuclear development in North Asia.

In a world without the safeguards system, the PRK and undoubtedly many other countries in other regions as well, according to their perceptions of their security interests, would press ahead to assemble a nuclear arsenal. The NPT framework in this case is available to assist in the minimisation and aversion of threatened nuclear development.

Considered in a longer range historical context, the NPT process, over a generation, has secured increasing support. Success of the NPT may be seen in the form of the slow growth in the number of nations with nuclear weapons. As David Anderson advised the Committee: "It is often forgotten how much longer the list of potential nuclear powers was two or three decades ago, when it included countries like the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Australia. Proliferation of nuclear weapons has been far slower than expected at that time, when it was widely believed that by now there would be as many as 25 nuclear weapon states" (Anderson, 1).

All but six countries are now signatories to the NPT. As Mr Ian Cousins of DFAT told the Committee: "We need to convince the remaining six countries to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty" (8 November 1996, 803). More tellingly, again in the words of Mr Cousins:

We now have a permanent Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with near universal adherence. The process of nuclear disarmament has started and weapons are being dismantled. All five nuclear weapon states have agreed to halt nuclear testing. Four of the five nuclear weapon states have announced that they have ceased production of fissile material for weapons purposes . . . Nuclear export controls have been strengthened and are now more widely applied. The principles on which Australia's nuclear export policy is based are now more widely recognised and applied by other nuclear exporters. (8 November 1996, 803)

Another sign of the strengthening of the safeguards system, not least in the wake of the Gulf War and disclosures about clandestine developments by Iraq, is that the strictness of standards internationally has come closer to that applied by Australia from the inception of exporting in the late 1970s.

As noted, several of those who lodged submissions sought to challenge the equivalence and proportionality principles. One effect of uranium exports from Australia is that that proportion of nuclear material coming from Australia is available only for civil purposes. None of those stressing the possibility that atoms from uranium originating in Australia should not physically find their way into military use actually thought it necessary to outline the argument or its rationale. It was assumed to be self-evident.

Not everyone will find the theory self-evident, either in its own terms, in relation to uranium exported from Australia, or in a more general context - whether Australia should ban the export of any commodity which could hypothetically, or potentially, find its way into a military application.

A more sustainable and compelling argument would concentrate on whether Australia, by exporting uranium, contrary to stated policy, was contributing to nuclear proliferation. DFAT's proposition that "Exports of Australian uranium do not contribute to the ability of N[uclear] W[eapon] S[tates] to produce fissile material for their weapons programs" went unchallenged (S 60, II.28, 11). Similarly unchallenged was DFAT's assertion that "Australian safeguards policy and practice has been and remains to ensure that AONM makes no contribution whatsoever to non-peaceful activities in these NWS" (II.28, 11).

It may be added that even if there was a plausible challenge to the validity of the principles of equivalence and proportionality, it is the case that none of the evidence submitted to the Committee went beyond exposing the possibility that atoms from uranium mined in and exported from Australia might have been used for an explosive purpose.

The principles of equivalence and proportionality are the only practical basis for controlling utilisation of uranium mined in Australia in the nuclear fuel cycle. So far the philosophical case for these principles also remains firm. The more uranium (or AONM) in the fuel cycle which is effectively subject to Australia's safeguards, the less uranium (or AONM) there is which is potentially available for military purposes.

The Committee shares the apprehensions of Professor Camilleri and Mary Bruce that resources assigned for safeguards programs and developments are not keeping pace with developments in the nuclear industry. The Committee has noted progressive reduction in the staffing of the Australian Safeguards Office and its requirement for a measure of flexibility in order to accommodate training and fostering of constructive and informed links internationally. Most of its responsibilities have an international focus on its capacity to maintain real contact with both the IAEA and other state control agencies.

As David Anderson has described, in the aftermath of the Gulf War there has been a substantial overhaul of safeguards. Iraqi violations, in the words of one analyst, revealed deficiencies rather than inefficiencies in the classical system of safeguards. The Iraqi violations furnished a timely reminder that a fundamental reappraisal of safeguards was essential. This is occurring under the rubric of what is known as "Programme 93+2". "Programme 93+2" is an IAEA initiative aimed at increasing the effectiveness and cost efficiency of safeguards, embracing greater transparency, new methodologies and a more systematic evaluation of information held by IAEA concerning states' nuclear and nuclear-related activities (S 60, II. 16-22).

Even so, as Anderson has shown, there is still much more to do in revamping safeguards for the post-Cold War era. There are old, unresolved matters concerning IAEA powers and their exercise in relation to sovereign states, in addition to the challenge of technology. Another unresolved matter is control of nuclear materials outside the safeguards system. Increasingly large stockpiles of plutonium is another long-standing matter which is still very much on the safeguards agenda.

Finally, it needs to be emphasised that safeguards are not a panacea. As Ian Cousins informed the Committee, "the actual product of safeguards [is] confidence (8 November 1996, 813)." Confidence is both essential to the workings of the safeguards system, and its major outcome. But the safeguards system needs constant attention to work. Australia has a long record of contributing to the vitality of safeguards, international and otherwise. It is a record which should be maintained.