SAFEGUARDS IN CONTEXT

Safeguards are an important component of the international non-proliferation regime. Appraising their effectiveness must be undertaken in a general context of the regime itself, which embraces export controls, security assurances, nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and a variety of arms control and disarmament agreements. As the Committee was advised in a research paper by David Anderson of the Parliamentary Research Service: "These components are mutually reinforcing, and all must function effectively if proliferation is to be halted". (Anderson, i)

Australia currently has a network of 14 bilateral safeguards agreements covering 24 countries. Australia itself has agreements with Canada, Egypt, Finland, France, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The agreement with Euratom covers a further 11 countries - Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.

In addition, Australia has entered into a physical protection agreement with Singapore.

Australia has also concluded a bilateral safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in fulfilment of obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards Office (DFAT/ASO) in a joint submission, "[a]ll of the agreements cover the use of A[ustralian] O[bligated]N[uclear] M[aterial] within the agreement partner's nuclear fuel cycle program except the agreement with Russia which permits conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication on behalf of other customer countries only" (S 60, II.6, 6).

In explaining the nuclear fuel cycle to the Committee, DFAT/ASO observed that apart from weapon states,

[I]t is unusual for a country to be entirely self-contained in the processing of uranium for civil use . . . [I]t is not unusual for a Japanese utility buying Australian uranium to have the uranium converted in Canada, enriched in France, fabricated in Japan and reprocessed in the UK. The international flow of nuclear material enhances safeguards accountability through "transit matching" of transfers at different stages of the fuel cycle. (S 60, II.8,7)

Nuclear accountancy is, in a technical sense, the core of safeguards. The Australian Safeguards Office accounts for AONM in the fuel cycle through reports from each bilateral partner; shipping and transfer documentation; calculations of process losses, nuclear consumption, and nuclear production; knowledge of the fuel cycle in each country; regular liaison with counterpart authorities; and reconciliation of any discrepancies with counterpart authorities (S 60, II.2, 5).