SAFEGUARDS POLICY: DEVELOPMENT

The Fox conclusions formed the basis of policy on bilateral safeguards outlined to the House of Representatives by the then Prime Minister, Mr Malcolm Fraser, on 24 May 1977 (CPD, HoR, 1700-5). The principal purpose of the policy was to establish a framework of control whereby nuclear energy could be employed for civil purposes whilst ensuring that nuclear material could not be diverted to nuclear weapons production or nuclear explosives. The features of the safeguards policy were:

• Australia would "retain the right to be selective in the countries to whom uranium export will be permitted" (ibid., 1702).
• Uranium mined in Australia would, as a minimum, only be sold to non-nuclear weapon states which were parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and to nuclear weapon states which gave Australia an assurance that nuclear material it may supply for peaceful purposes is not diverted to military or explosive purposes. Uranium supplied by Australia had to be covered by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards (ibid., 1702-3).
• All exports of uranium were to be covered by IAEA safeguards immediately upon leaving Australian ownership.
• Uranium mined in Australia would only be sold to countries which had concluded bilateral agreements with the Australian Government. Australia would seek undertakings that importing countries would only use nuclear material supplied by Australia for peaceful purposes, and that nuclear material derived from its use will not be diverted to military or explosive purposes. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards will apply to verify compliance with this undertaking. Australia would retain the right to cease supply of uranium to any country which breached safeguards undertakings (ibid., 1703).
• Nuclear material supplied by Australia or nuclear material derived from its use would remain under safeguards for the full life of the material in question or until it is legitimately removed from safeguards. The policy also provided that should comprehensive IAEA safeguards cease to apply to an importing country, international safeguards should continue to apply both to nuclear material derived from Australian imports and all other nuclear material (ibid., 1703).
• Under bilateral agreements, Australian consent would be required before Australian-obligated nuclear material was transferred to a third country.
• Uranium supplied by Australia for peaceful purposes would not be enriched beyond 20 per cent Uranium-235 without prior Australian consent. (The figure of 20 per cent was chosen as representing a level of enrichment below the practical requirements for a nuclear explosive, while being above the enrichment level required for most peaceful uses, excepting, for example, some research and radioisotope production reactors (ibid., 1703).
• Any reprocessing of nuclear material supplied by Australia could only occur with the prior consent of the Australian Government, pending the outcome of current activity concerning reprocessing (ibid., 1704).
• Nations concluding bilateral agreements with Australia would need to include an assurance that adequate physical security will be maintained on their nuclear industries. Agreements would specify that minimum standards of physical security would be based on those of the IAEA (ibid., 1704).
• All contracts would specify that uranium exported from Australia is subject to safeguards as agreed between the importing country and the Australian Government (ibid., 1704).
• Reprocessing would be permitted only for legitimate energy purposes combined with intensification of safeguards as a defence against diversion of plutonium to non-peaceful purposes and to ensure plutonium was not stockpiled excessively in a manner which could pose future proliferation problems. (Malcolm Fraser, House of Representatives, 25 August 1977, quoted S 60, 39-40)

Late in 1980 the Government announced that it would be prepared to consider granting its consent to reprocessing Australian-obligated nuclear material in the following circumstances:

• agreement in advance to reprocessing for the purpose of energy use;
• agreement in advance to reprocessing for the purpose of the management of materials (plutonium, fission products and unused uranium) contained in spent nuclear fuel;
• case by case consideration of requests for consent to reprocessing for other peaceful non-explosive purposes including research;
• storage and use of plutonium of Australian origin separated from spent fuel to be in ways that do not cause proliferation dangers;
• provision for consultation and review of the operation of the agreement conditions; and
• commitment by customer countries to support the development of more effective international control measures relevant to reprocessing, including an international plutonium storage scheme. (A. Street, House of Representatives, 26 November 1980, quoted S 60, 41)

In accordance with this policy Australia has granted prior consent to reprocessing on a programmatic basis for energy use and spent fuel management to Euratom, France, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland.