THE TERMS OF REFERENCE: THE SELECT COMMITTEE'S APPROACH
The terms of reference approved for the Select Committee when it was
established by the Senate on 2 May 1997 were as follows:
That the Committee inquire into and report on the environmental
impact, health and safety and other implications and effectiveness of
security agreements in relation to the mining, milling and export of
Australian Uranium.
That in considering these terms of reference the Committee is
to take into account, and where necessary report on, the following issues:
(a) The environmental impact of uranium mining and milling
in Australia and the effectiveness of environmental protection and
monitoring in relation to existing and previous Australian uranium
mining operations;
(b) The role of the Office of the Supervising Scientist in
monitoring Australian uranium mining and milling activities;
(c) The health and safety implications of uranium mining and
milling for workers at mining and milling sites and mining operations;
(d) The health, safety and other effects of uranium mining
and milling on communities adjacent to mine and mill sites and communities
on existing or planned transport routes for uranium ore and uranium
waste;
(e) The effectiveness of Australia's bilateral agreements with
countries importing Australian uranium in ensuring that Australian-sourced
uranium is not used in military nuclear technology or nuclear weapons
testing activities; and
(f) The volume and location of Australian-obligated plutonium
currently in existence in the international nuclear fuel cycle (produced
as a result of the use of Australian uranium), in what form it exists
(for example, separated or in spent nuclear fuel) and its intended
end use.
In approaching its terms of reference the Committee has given consideration
to a number of matters having a bearing on general questions of uranium
mining.
Most important of all is the fact that the Senate has not sought the
views of the Committee on whether uranium should be mined in Australia.
This is a question which has had an important place in the broad forums
of Australian national politics for nearly a generation and will continue
to be debated.
The Committee does not wish to offer a view on the matter, not least
because nothing in our investigations suggests that the question can be
answered any more conclusively now than was possible two decades ago.
Human experience with uranium is still relatively new. It is a mineral
about which humanity is still learning. For this reason the Committee
supports
the cautious approach which was favoured by the Fox Report and the
need for continuing, dedicated research into all aspects of uranium mining
and milling.
The principal Fox finding was that:
The hazards of mining and milling uranium, if those activities
are properly regulated and controlled, are not such as to justify a
decision not to develop Australian uranium mines. (RUEI, Report No 1,
1976, 185)
Indeed, this is a more practical approach than one which, in effect,
seeks to turn the clock back to a period before the capacities of uranium
were recognised. In this respect, some evidence by Mr Ian Cousins, then
of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, is clearly apostle: "The
secrets of the splitting of the atom have been unleashed and can never
be unlearned. That knowledge is now with mankind forever" (8 November
1996, 804).
It is the policy of the current Government to allow an expansion of uranium
mining and milling.
Because members of the Committee fully appreciate that much is still
to be learnt about uranium, their view is straightforward and unambiguous:
any expansion, if it is to occur, under the Government's policy, must
be within the rigorous, robust regulatory regime involving the Commonwealth
which applies to current mines and which minimises the adverse impact
of uranium mining on the environment, limits the risks to the health and
safety of employees in the industry and in communities potentially affected
by the mining and transport of uranium, and which ensures that nuclear
energy is harnessed for civil purposes and not for military objectives.
Several members of the Committee (Senators Chapman, Bishop, Ferguson,
Macdonald and Reynolds) share the conviction that all reasonable steps
must be taken to ensure that potential hazards and impacts are minimised
when uranium is mined.
Notwithstanding the special qualities of uranium, in most respects uranium
mining is not very different from any other type of mining. The mining
of any mineral in the Kakadu National Park would pose serious problems
so far as the delicate environment of the Park, the local Aboriginal community
and visitors to the Park are concerned. Likewise, concern about the use
of waters from the Great Artesian Basin by the Olympic Dam Operation would
apply even if the ODO was exclusively a copper mine and not the copper-gold-uranium
mine it is.
In general, in this report, the Committee has confined its examination
to those matters which are relatively specific to uranium. A question
often addressed in our analyses is what might be the grounds for treating
uranium mining differently from other forms of mining. In our observation
there are very few matters which arise in the context of uranium mining
which cannot be accommodated within a general framework, although radioactivity
and the management of tailings and waste, for instance, certainly call
for the closest attention.
The Committee believes that whenever a general framework is applied to
some matter relating to uranium, the manner of application should take
considerable and active account of the many public, parliamentary and
political concerns about uranium. The framework may be the same but the
manner of its application may need to be more vigorous where uranium is
involved.
We have noted that this approach is shared by the mining companies themselves.
They are conscious that public interest in uranium mining goes well beyond
interest in any other form of mining. They have responded to that interest
in terms of acceptance of more active and transparent regulatory regimes.
Great investments are at stake and they realise that the security of those
investments ultimately rests upon the confidence of public opinion as
manifested through the public policies of governments and parliaments.
The Fox Commission recorded in their first report an unusual observation
about uranium: "It seems that the subject is one very apt to arouse
strong emotions, both in opponents and proponents" (RUEI, Report
No 1, 1976, 6).
This Committee's experience has not been as extensive as that of the
Fox commissioners but we can say that not a great deal has changed. It
has not been easy to steer a course through the masses of "facts"
and opinions which rain down upon those who seek to examine and analyse
the questions referred to us by the Senate. It needs to be said that a
useful operative rule to guide such enquiry is that, as an initial first
step, opinion is desirably founded upon verifiable fact. Ultimately, of
course, as Fox contended, "when the matters of fact are resolved,
many of the questions which arise are social and ethical ones (RUEI, Report
No.1, 1976, 6).
This report essentially follows the Committee's terms of reference. The
next chapter addresses both the framework for handling questions about
the impact of uranium mining and milling on the environment and a general
appraisal of the companies' performances in achieving environmental goals.
Chapter 3 is about the role, responsibilities and functions of the Supervising
Scientist.
In chapter 4, the report examines health and safety matters as they affect
both employees in the industry and communities potentially affected by
uranium mining and milling.
Chapter 5 provides a brief review of submissions, evidence, inspections
and research relevant to the impact or potential impact of uranium mining
and milling on Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory, South
Australia and Western Australia.
International safeguards and related matters are the subjects of analysis
in chapter 6.