Executive Summary
This inquiry into
ministerial discretion in migration matters was established on 19 June
2003 following allegations raised in parliament in May and June 2003 about the
use of the discretionary powers by the then Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the Hon Philip Ruddock MP, stretching
back to 1998.
Four separate cases
of alleged impropriety by Mr Ruddock were raised by the Opposition and debated
in the House of Representatives between 29 May and 26 June 2003. The
allegations involved, amongst others, Mr Karim Kisrwani, a prominent member of
the Lebanese Maronite community, and a central figure in the so-called
'cash-for-visas' scandal. The allegations and parliamentary debates are
described briefly in Chapter 1.
During parliamentary
debates on the allegations, the Opposition reiterated long-standing criticisms
of the discretionary powers. It argued that the powers are open to real or
perceived distortion, political influence and corruption at the highest levels
of public office because they are too broad in scope and far removed from the
established avenues of accountability that exist across all levels of executive
decision-making.
The ministerial
discretion powers at the centre of this inquiry were inserted in to the
Migration Act during the 1989 codification reforms to provide an outlet to deal
with difficult cases that did not fit statutory visa criteria. Under sections 351
and 417 of the Act, the minister may substitute a more favourable decision than
the one handed down by a tribunal 'if the Minister thinks it is in the public
interest to do so'. Significantly, the discretionary powers are
non-compellable, non-reviewable and non-delegable within domestic law, the
minister does not have a duty to exercise the discretionary powers, and the
powers must be exercised personally by the minister and cannot be delegated.
Section 351 powers
may be exercised following a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal which
considers all cases except protection visa cases, whereas section 417 powers
may be exercised following a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal which
considers only protection visa cases.
Accountability issues
surrounding the conduct of the inquiry
Although the allegations raised in parliament in 2003 were the starting
point of the inquiry, the Committee was empowered under its terms of reference
to examine broader issues, such as the appropriateness of the ministerial
discretion powers under sections 351 and 417 within the current migration
system. The Committee was also empowered to consider the operation of the
discretion powers by immigration ministers, including the criteria that applied
(and should apply) to the exercise of the powers.
The Committee
decided during the inquiry process that it would seek access to case files,
information and documents held by the immigration department and documents kept
by a departmental liaison officer in the immigration minister's Parliament
House office. The Committee formed the view that having access to the case files
and documents was necessary to enable it to properly examine allegations
involving Mr Ruddock's use of the discretionary powers, and to address in full
the inquiry's terms of reference.
All of the
Committee's requests for detailed case file information were met with
resistance, initially from DIMIA and ultimately from the current minister,
Senator Vanstone. The Committee is left in no doubt that it was obstructed in
carrying out the task requested of it by the Senate, as provided in the
inquiry's terms of reference. The minister's disregard for the Committee's
power to obtain the departmental case files and ministerial notebooks necessary
to fully explore the minister's discretionary powers is a dominant theme that
runs through this inquiry.
The Committee concludes that Senator Vanstone's
unwillingness to provide the detailed information necessary to conduct a full
and thorough investigation of relevant cases suggests a reluctance to expose
the decision making process to close scrutiny. In particular, the refusal by
the minister and the department to provide certain key documents and case files
has resulted in the Committee being unable to form a view as to the number of
matters which were properly the subject of its inquiry. These include:
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The allegations
relating to the visa or visas that were issued to Mr Bedweny Hbeiche, as
outlined in Chapter 1;
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The basis for the
high success rate of intervention requests made by Mr Kisrwani;
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The process by
which intervention requests by Mr Kisrwani were dealt with by Mr Ruddock and by
the department; and
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The factual basis
on, and the process, by which Mr Ruddock exercised his discretion in relation
to applicants whose matters the department had determined fell outside the
ministerial guidelines.
The Committee
expresses its disappointment that the department and minister have refused to
provide certain key documents and information. It notes with concern that many
aspects of the information requested were patently within the ability of the
department to provide. For example, the Committee requested information
regarding the process by which the successful intervention requests were made
by Mr Kisrwani in its letter of 29 October 2003. Much of the information
requested by the Committee must necessarily have been in the department's hands
in order for Mr Ruddock to have responded in the terms set out in his
correspondence to Ms Gillard MP on 16 June 2003.
Despite the
obstruction by the minister, the Committee decided that the best course of
action was to report its findings and recommendations to the Senate and place
on the public record information about the operation of the minister's
discretionary power that is otherwise not available.
Ministerial
discretion in practice: patterns of use, availability of data and accountability
to parliament
There has been a gradual increase over time in the use of the
discretionary powers. The Committee is concerned by evidence from DIMIA which
shows that the discretionary powers are being used on average several hundred
times each year instead of for the few exceptional cases they were designed to
deal with. In 2002-03, Mr Ruddock used his power to intervene in some 483
cases, having presumably considered many more. As discussed in Chapter 3, Mr
Ruddock exercised his power to intervene on 2513 occasions from 1996 to October
2003, compared with Senator Bolkus’s 311 in three years and Mr Hand’s 81 in two
years. Although Mr Ruddock has obviously used the power much more than the
other ministers, there were many more cases in which he could have intervened.
DIMIA suggested that
there were three main reasons for the increase in the use of ministerial
discretion since 1996-97. First, the Government has chosen to deal with onshore
applications for visas on a case-by-case basis rather than by establishing
special visa categories. Second, there have been more requests as the workload
and decisions made by the tribunals have increased significantly. Third, there
is greater public awareness of the existence and processes of the exercise of
discretion. DIMIA also suggested that judicial review has influenced the number
and timing of requests.
The Committee finds
that the data provided by DIMIA on the use made of the ministerial discretion
powers under sections 351 and 417 are limited in respect of their reliability
and explanatory detail. The Committee is unable to draw firm conclusions about
the use of ministerial discretion from the available data. In some cases the
data seem to raise more questions than they answer, creating room for
speculation about the former minister's use of his powers. The Committee
recommends that DIMIA establish procedures for collecting and publishing
statistical data on the operation and use of the ministerial discretion powers
to improve the accountability of the system.
The sole
accountability mechanism in cases where the discretionary power is used to
grant a visa is a requirement that the minister table statements in parliament
on a six-monthly basis. According to the legislation, these statements must set
out the minister's reasons for thinking
intervention is in the public interest. While the statements made under section
351 go some way to providing case specific reasons for ministerial
intervention, those made under section 417 since 1998 provide no case specific
reasons beyond reference to the 'public interest'. The majority of witnesses to
this inquiry argued that the ministerial statements under section 417 contain
insufficient information to judge how the power is being used.
The Committee finds
that the lack of transparency and accountability of the minister's decision
making process is a serious deficiency in need of urgent attention. Section 417
tabling statements no longer provide reasons for the minister's decisions and
the pro-forma words used are not sufficient for parliamentary accountability.
Under the Howard Government, the statements have outlined only in the broadest
terms cases where the minister has intervened. The Committee finds that the
tabling statements fail to provide, as required by legislation, the minister's reasons for considering his or her
actions to be in the public interest. Meaningful transparency and
accountability in the ministerial intervention process stops at the door to the
minister's office.
The Committee makes
several recommendations that address the current 'black hole' in the
accountability of the minister's discretionary powers. It recommends that the
minister's tabling statements under sections 351 and 417 meet the legislative
requirement that the minister provide reasons why a decision to intervene is in
the public interest. It also recommends that tabling statements give an
indication of how the case was brought to the minister's attention – by an
approach from the visa applicant, by a representative on behalf of the visa
applicant, on the suggestion of a tribunal, at the initiative of an officer of
the department or in some other way. The Committee believes that these
practical measures go some distance in enabling parliament to scrutinise the
use of the discretionary powers.
Ministerial
guidelines and decision making within DIMIA
A key concern for
the Committee during the inquiry has been whether the systems currently in
place are adequate to ensure that the operation of this unusual power is
transparent and open to scrutiny. One area of interest is the department's
processes for supporting the operation of the ministerial intervention powers.
The Committee notes with some concern that DIMIA officials did not view the
department's role as including any 'decision making', despite clear evidence
that ministerial intervention requests are vetted by departmental officials in
the first instance to determine whether the minister will be briefed in any
detail on that case.
The Committee finds
it difficult to accept the department's assessment that it is not involved in
any decision making during the intervention process. The Committee is
particularly concerned that as the inquiry proceeded, the department played
down its own decision making role and stressed the importance of the final non-reviewable
'public interest' decision taken by the minister. In fact, the department
almost went as far as to suggest that only the minister's final decision
constitutes decision making while the department's role amounts to overseeing
an administrative process.
Furthermore, the
Committee finds that departmental decision making during the ministerial
intervention process does not generate adequate records or statistical data to
enable effective external scrutiny of the way the powers are operating. The
Committee also heard of aspects of the administration of the powers that appear
to create hardship for individual visa applicants.
The Committee
recommends in Chapter 4 that DIMIA take steps to ensure that its processes are
rigorous and fair to all applicants. It recommends that a system of internal
and external audit be established to scrutinise the department's decision
making processes in this area.
Ministerial
discretion and the experience of applicants
An issue which is
central to the inquiry is the operation of ministerial discretion from the
perspective of those who request that the minister exercise the discretionary
power in their favour. In Chapter 5, the Committee examines how the migration
system in general and ministerial discretion in particular is administered in
ways that may result in applicants being exploited and suffering hardship. Many
of these difficulties stem from a lack of readily available information for
applicants about ministerial discretion and its processes.
The Committee makes
a series of recommendations to address these deficiencies, namely that DIMIA
create an information sheet and application form in appropriate languages that
explains the ministerial guidelines and application process, and that a
consultative process be established between DIMIA and applicants for
ministerial intervention where applicants are shown and can comment upon
information that is central to the outcome of their case – for example, the
draft submission to be placed before the minister, and reasons for an unfavourable
decision on a first request for ministerial intervention.
The Committee also
considers in Chapter 5 other areas of difficulty experienced by applicants.
These difficulties include the unavailability of legal aid and inadequate
coverage of the Immigration Application Advice and Assistance Scheme (IAAAS),
the risk of exploitation that non-citizens face, problems surrounding the
current process for granting bridging visas, the financial hardship experienced
by many applicants, and cases in which applicants through no fault of their own
are not able to appeal to a tribunal. The Committee makes recommendations to
strengthen the current processes involved in the exercise of the ministerial
intervention powers, which have resulted in hardship for the people they are
supposed to assist.
Representations to
the minister
The Committee
examines factors that may influence a minister in the exercise of the
discretionary powers in Chapter 6. Representations to the minister made by
parliamentarians, lawyers, migration agents and community leaders can be
influential. Notwithstanding the air of suspicion and doubt which surrounds the
allegations raised in parliament last year, and the effect that the perception
of bias has on the system of ministerial discretion, the Committee finds that
support from representatives, particularly community leaders, is important for
getting applications onto the minister's desk. Beyond that, the Committee is
unable to determine the extent to which such representations influence the minister's
decision because of the limited amount of information that is publicly
available.
While the Committee
recognises the importance in a democracy of people being able to make
representations to a minister, it is concerned about the perception of bias and
favouritism that can be created when access to the minister is seen as
necessary to gain a favourable outcome. In this regard, the Committee tried to
explore any connection between Mr Karim Kisrwani's political donations and the
minister's exercise of his discretion. However, the Committee was unable to
determine the extent of community or political bias in the exercise of the
powers because there was no way it could check who or what influenced the
minister's decision to intervene.
The Committee recommends
improvements to the accountability and transparency of this aspect of the
system to address the perception of bias and favouritism. Specifically, it
recommends that the Migration Act be amended so that statements tabled in
parliament under sections 351 and 417 identify any representatives and
organisations that make a request on behalf of an applicant. The Committee also
recommends that DIMIA and the Migration Agents Registration Authority (MARA)
disseminate information sheets that explain the regulations on charging fees
for migration advice, the restrictions that apply to non-registered agents and
the complaints process.
Ministerial
discretion under minister Ruddock
A key area of
concern which is explored by the Committee in Chapter 7 is the use of the
ministerial discretion powers by the former immigration minister, Mr Ruddock. A
number of issues came to light during the inquiry. The Committee heard evidence
from DIMIA that Mr Ruddock used the intervention powers in ways not suggested
by departmental staff. From mid 2000 to mid 2003, Mr Ruddock requested full
submissions on 105 cases that the department had placed on a schedule,
presumably as they were assessed as not falling within the ministerial
guidelines. Likewise, Mr Ruddock would on occasion choose to grant a visa class
outside the range presented by the departmental submission.
The Committee is
concerned that when Mr Ruddock chose to act outside the scope of departmental
advice, and when he appeared to act contrary to his own published guidelines,
he was not required to provide any explanation for doing so. The Committee's
frustration at the lack of reasons provided by the minister is compounded by
the present minister's refusal to provide it with case files that might cast
light on individual cases where Mr Ruddock may have acted contrary to his own
published guidelines. The Committee is therefore unable to form a conclusive
view on exactly what may have prompted the minister to seek further information
about cases placed on a schedule.
The Committee also
heard evidence from a number of stakeholders which suggests that Mr Ruddock's
open door policy appears to have added to the perception that direct access to
him could assist a case gain ministerial intervention. Mr Ruddock does not seem
to have taken steps to contain this perception by, for example, insisting that
all cases should be processed on equal terms by the department before being
brought to his attention. Mr Ruddock's willingness to discuss individual cases
at community events and other functions may also have encouraged a climate in
which community leaders could assert that their links with the minister could
help individuals known to them get visas through the ministerial intervention
process. Again, without access to individual case files, the Committee has been
unable to examine the extent to which the media allegations of undue influence
of certain community leaders on Mr Ruddock's decision making are justified.
Another feature of the operation of the ministerial discretion powers
during Mr Ruddock's tenure that is of concern to the Committee is the
comparatively large number of cases in which intervention was both sought and
granted. As observed in Chapter 3, use of the minister's discretionary powers
has gradually become more frequent since they were inserted in the legislation,
going from 17 cases in 1992-92 to 483 cases in 2002-03, to 597 cases in three
months from July to October 2003. The sheer volume of cases reaching the
minister's desk for consideration raises two related issues: can a minister
possibly give equal consideration to so many cases, and is it appropriate that
a minister's time should be spent considering the details of thousands of
individual cases rather than on overall policy development?
Many witnesses from both inside and outside the department gave
evidence that Mr Ruddock was attentive to the ministerial discretion workload
and had extensive knowledge of the Migration Act and regulations gained through
his experience and long term commitment to this policy area. They suggested
that Mr Ruddock often had greater knowledge of the Act than departmental
officers, and could think of options that departmental officers simply had not
thought about.
The Committee, however, considers that notwithstanding Mr Ruddock's
knowledge and experience in this policy area, the high volume of cases that he
dealt with in person indicates serious problems with the operation of the
ministerial discretion system. If ministerial intervention is necessary to
ensure a fair or desirable outcome in so many cases then this suggests that the
system as it exists is becoming unmanageable as the workload being generated is
too great for one minister to handle.
The evidence suggests that Mr Ruddock himself had doubts that it was
feasible for an individual minister to cope with the caseload. The Committee
finds it surprising, then, that Mr Ruddock did not take steps to investigate
the factors causing the high number of applications or find other ways to
address a situation that he recognised as problematic.
The Committee considers that ministerial discretion should be a last
resort to deal with cases that are truly exceptional or unforeseeable. No
immigration minister should be left in the position of micro-managing the
immigration system. Where a series of interventions in similar cases suggests a
recurring problem, a preferable approach would be to amend the regulations or
institute a group visa class so that such cases can be dealt with under normal
administrative processes.
International
humanitarian obligations
In the absence of an
onshore humanitarian visa class, ministerial discretion is the only mechanism
by which Australia can discharge its obligations under certain international
conventions not to return people to the countries from which they have fled
(non-refoulement). These conventions include the Convention Against Torture
(CAT), the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC).
The Committee heard
from a number of refugee advocacy groups that protection from refoulement
should not be left solely to the minister's discretionary powers under sections
351 and 417 of the Migration Act, given that the powers are non-compellable, non-reviewable
and non-delegable. The Committee also heard from witnesses that reliance on the
discretionary powers places considerable burden on Australia's migration system
and results in non-Convention asylum seekers being detained for extended
periods in order to request the minister's intervention at the end of a
determination process which is not relevant to them.
The Committee does
not accept assurances from DIMIA that the minister's discretionary powers always
enable Australia to meet its international obligations in respect of individual
applicants. Assurances by DIMIA could not be supported by any data on the number
of occasions the discretionary powers are used specifically for humanitarian
reasons under various international treaties. The Committee recommends in
Chapter 8 that in the future DIMIA record the reasons for the immigration
minister's use of the section 417 intervention powers to enable the department
to identify cases where Australia's international obligations under the CAT,
CROC and ICCPR were the grounds for the minister exercising the discretionary
power.
The Committee heard
from a number of witnesses that complementary protection has the potential to
enable Australia's migration and humanitarian programs to be delivered with
certainty and transparency, and to assist non-Convention asylum seekers who are
in genuine need of humanitarian protection. However, the Committee finds that
complementary protection is a relatively undeveloped concept in the Australian
context. Further examination of the application of complementary protection to
Australia's circumstances is therefore required.
The Committee
recommends that the government give consideration to adopting a system of
complementary protection to ensure that Australia no longer relies solely on
the minister's discretionary powers to meet its non-refoulement obligations
under the CAT, CROC and ICCPR.
The future of
ministerial discretion in migration matters
The Committee finds
almost unanimous support for having some capacity for discretion in the
migration legislation. This seems entirely logical given the difficulty of
framing regulations capable of producing fair outcomes in the myriad of
individual circumstances to which they may be applied. Agreeing that there
needs to be capacity for the exercise of discretion, however, does not necessarily
entail agreeing that that discretion should rest solely with the minister.
The evidence before
the Committee highlights a pressing need for reform of the ministerial
discretion system. While the Committee is not opposed to maintaining the powers
in some form, it believes immediate steps must be taken to improve the
transparency and accountability of their operation. The Committee's
recommendations are therefore aimed at generating more information about the
use of the powers and improving the transparency of the decision making
process.
The Committee
concludes that the ministerial intervention powers should be retained as the
ultimate safety net in the migration system, provided that steps are taken to
improve the transparency and accountability of their operation in line with the
findings and recommendations of this report.
The Committee
recommends that the government consider establishing an independent committee
as part of the ministerial intervention process to improve the equity and
transparency of the process and restore public confidence in the system. The
purpose of the committee would be to review DIMIA's submissions and schedules
and recommend to the minister cases which it believes should receive
ministerial intervention.
In assessing the
appropriateness of the ministerial discretion powers, the Committee is
concerned that vesting a non-delegable, non-reviewable and non-compellable
discretion with the immigration minister without an adequate accountability
mechanism creates both the possibility and perception of corruption. At a
minimum, the Committee wants to see external scrutiny of decision making made
an integral part of the ministerial discretion system. This should bring a
greater degree of transparency into the decision making process and reduce the
scope for corruption of the system.