Chapter Nine
Concluding Remarks
9.1
The Committee
is supportive of sensible and affordable government efforts to support the
provision of enhanced broadband services. There is, however, a great deal of
concern regarding the government's approach.
9.2
The NBN proposal
is clearly under-developed and the government's preparedness to press ahead
before impacting details are either known or finalised is not consistent with a
commitment to evidence based policy.
9.3
The lack of
clarity in relation to the overall cost of this project is disconcerting.
9.4
The
government has also taken a quantum leap in committing to a project that by its
own admission will cost up to $43 billion, with no apparent effort to explore
potentially more cost effective remedies. Part of the problem is the fact the government
has failed to clearly articulate the key problem it plans to address. For
example, if high prices are a significant issue there is no evidence to suggest
this proposition will result in lower prices.
9.5
There is
little evidence to indicate consumer demand for speeds of 100 Mbps and the
committee notes with concern that the NBN policy focus has resulted in a lack
of immediate attention in relation to enhancing services to under-serviced
parts of the country.
9.6
The committee
remains concerned about the type of services that will be delivered to rural
and regional Australians.
9.7
This report,
and the two previous interim reports, has expanded on the complexities of
interrelated issues that will require resolution to ensure the success of the NBN
project. However, the examination of these issues has at times been hampered by
a lack of information, or an unwillingness to provide it.
9.8
The committee
puts on the public record the difficulty it has experienced throughout the
inquiry due to the reluctance of key witnesses to appear before the committee
or provide written submissions. In particular, the committee highlights that,
in Tasmania where the NBN has been launched, vital witnesses that 'declined'
the committee's invitation to appear at the Hobart hearing in October 2009
included:
-
Aurora Energy
– the joint partner with NBN Tasmania responsible for the roll-out and provider
of infrastructure for the roll-out; as noted in the report, Aurora also
declined to answer basic written questions sent by the committee following
their declination;
-
NBN Tasmania;
-
Tasmanian
Skills Institute; and
-
Tasmania's
Treasurer and Minister for Economic Development.
9.9
Another key
witness that repeatedly declined the committee's invitation to appear was
Infrastructure Australia, the agency established specifically to assess and
prioritise the government's list of major infrastructure projects. Although
Infrastructure Australia endorsed the government's decision to undertake the
NBN, it was not required to place the NBN project under the same scrutiny as
other projects it had prioritised. The committee was keen to understand why
this had been allowed, but was not provided that opportunity.
9.10
At the time
of reporting, the telecommunications industry and the Australian tax payers were
still awaiting two critical sources of information that will underpin the fate
of the NBN: the final report of the Implementation Study; and a rigorous
cost-benefit analysis.
9.11
As a
consequence, speculation will continue to hamper healthy discourse until that
information is made publicly available. As long as this cloud of uncertainty
persists, confidence of potential investors, the industry and the Australian
public will continue to erode.
Government's
response to previous committee recommendations
9.12
The committee
draws attention to its recommendations and considerations documented in the two
previous Interim Reports. Although a number of the committee considerations were
made redundant when the FTTN proposal was terminated, the government has yet to
respond to the majority of relevant recommendations.
9.13
The table
below details the status of recommendations from the second interim report, as
at the time of reporting.
Table
1: Status of previous recommendations
|
No |
Recommendation |
Status |
|
1 |
That
the Auditor General conducts a full review of the RFP process, to be
commenced before the end of 2009. |
Underway |
|
2 |
That
Infrastructure Australia be involved in the NBN process to the fullest
capacity. |
Infrastructure
Australia refused any committee interaction |
|
3 |
That the government:
|
No
Action |
|
No |
Recommendation |
Status |
|
3 (cont) |
-
table
a progress report in the Senate on the implementation of the NBN by no
later than 17 September 2009, and that this progress report detail
timeframes, benchmarks and milestones for specified deliverables against
which the implementation of the project can be measured, including
costings; and
-
table further progress reports by the end of the Winter
and Spring Sittings until such time as the NBN company's annual reports are
available, which include evidence that the timeframes, milestones and
benchmarks have been reached, the reasons for any failure to do so and
remedial action to be taken.
|
No
Action
No
Action |
|
4 |
That the government provide the committee with a copy of:
-
the detailed implementation plan for the roll-out of the
National Broadband Network, to be developed as part of the implementation
study, on the first sitting day after it is provided to the Department; and
-
the risk management strategy for the NBN roll-out.
|
No
Action
|
|
5 |
That, as soon as possible, but no later than the last
sitting day of the Winter sittings, the government provide to the committee
the following:
-
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s
formal report on the National Broadband Network (NBN) proposals to the NBN
Panel of Experts
-
the
final report provided to the government from the NBN Panel of Experts on
submissions to the NBN process.
|
ACCC-only
Actioned
|
|
6 |
That
those aspects of the Expert Panel and the ACCC reports that discuss or make
any conclusions or recommendations about the existing regulatory framework
and options for its reform be provided to the committee as soon as possible,
but no later than the last sitting day of the Winter sittings. |
ACCC-only
Actioned |
Committee's
final recommendation
9.14
The committee
notes that the government advocates evidence-based policy and decision making
in its objective of achieving increased transparency and accountability.
9.15
There is no
need to further emphasise the enormity of this project – its massive price tag
of $43 billion does that well enough – nor the proportional levels of risk that
this project shoulders.
9.16
Consequently,
the committee concludes that there is an urgent need for this project to be the
subject of ongoing scrutiny and reporting requirements throughout the life of
the project.
9.17
In
particular, the committee believes that the final Implementation Report, and
the government's response to it, should be made available for public scrutiny
as soon as they are finalised. Consequently, the committee makes this final
recommendation:
Recommendation
12
9.18
That the
Senate agree to extend the Select Committee on the National Broadband Network,
under the following revised terms of reference:
a)
That the resolution of the Senate of 25 June 2008, as amended, appointing the
Select Committee on the National Broadband Network, be further amended:
-
to omit
"25 November 2009", and substitute "30 April 2010"; and
-
to add the
following paragraph to the committee’s terms of reference:
(2A) The
Committee is to examine the findings of the National Broadband Network Implementation
Study, the Government’s response to the Implementation Study and any subsequent
implications of that report for the National Broadband Network policy.
....................................
Senator Mary-Jo Fisher
(Chair)
25 November 2009
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