Chapter 8
Sailors' legal representation and chain of command
Alleged undue influence on the senior sailors' legal representative
8.1
Under its terms of reference the committee is to consider the facts and
circumstances of the treatment of the Legal Officer (the lawyer) assigned to
the management and defence of the case of the senior sailors. The committee is
to include in its consideration, any threats, bullying, adverse conduct and
prejudice generally, including any threat of posting to Western Australia, and
whether any such conduct constituted an attempt to compromise the lawyer’s
capacity to represent the best interests of the senior sailors without fear or
favour.
8.2
On 21 October 2009, an article critical of Navy’s handling of the Success
matter appeared in the Sydney Morning Herald. It reported claims that the
lawyer for the landed sailors had been called aside by his superiors and told
that he worked for the navy command and should not consider the senior sailors
his 'clients'. The article also suggested that the lawyer had since been posted
to Western Australia, even though his wife worked in NSW.[1]
The same matters were raised that day during a Senate Estimates hearing.[2]
8.3
The contents of the newspaper report were referred for a quick
assessment. The assessment recommended that a suitably qualified independent
person be formally appointed as an investigating officer to review certain
matters relating to whether LCDR Bainbridge was the subject of improper
influence from his chain of command. That recommendation was accepted. Subsequently
on 25 November, Mr John Weber was appointed an Inquiry Officer to inquire into
the reports of improper influence from the chain of command on LCDR Bainbridge
in respect of the assistance he provided to the senior sailors.[3]
Mr Weber, who was the Chief Executive partner of MinterEllison Lawyers,
reported on 15 February 2010.[4]
8.4
Before considering this inquiry, the committee outlines the main matters
connected with the possible undue exercise of influence over the senior sailors'
legal representative, LCDR Bainbridge.
Disagreement with Fleet Legal over role
8.5
LCDR Bainbridge was posted as the Legal Officer Advocacy and Counselling
(LOAC), a standalone legal billet located at HMAS Kuttabul. His direct
supervisor was the Fleet Legal Officer (FLO) who was CMDR Bowers during 2009 up
til October 2009. LCDR Swanson was the Deputy Fleet Legal Officer for most of
that year and the acting FLO between October and December 2009.[5]
8.6
According to LCDR Bainbridge there was 'a genuine risk of a conflict of
interest in the LOAC position as it was then structured within the chain of
command. In his view, the Fleet Legal Officer is the adversary of the LOAC in a
legal sense:
The conflict arises because the FLO is responsible for
advising the Fleet Commander, Fleet staff and Commanding Officers, whereas the
LOAC position is responsible for advising individual Defence members (usually
against the actions of command).[6]
8.7
In his view, the Success case illustrated the issue of conflict
where he perceived 'a certain level of antagonism'. Fleet Legal provided advice
in respect of the decision to remove the sailors from Success, the quick
assessment, the appointment of the Inquiry Officer, the preparation of the TOR
and the drafting of the adverse administrative notifications against the senior
sailors. On the other hand, LCDR Bainbridge was providing legal advice and
services to the senior sailors which entailed among other things:
-
seeking a statement of reasons for their landing;
-
seeking to obtain disclosure of any evidence which was relied
upon in resolving to land the senior sailors;
-
making Freedom of Information (FOI) requests;
-
making a formal complaint to the CO of HMAS Kuttabul
regarding the treatment of the senior sailors;
-
assisting with the drafting of redress of grievances and other
correspondence;
-
advising in relation to media reporting and the media's access to
their personal contact details;
-
legal representation during recorded interviews with ADFIS;
-
seeking rescission of an order that the senior sailors were not
to have contact with any member of the ship's company; and
-
responding to notices of potential adverse findings from CMDR
Wark and other matters concerning the Wark inquiry.[7]
8.8
Before the Commission, LCDR Bainbridge described one such instance of
tension between himself and FLO. On 8 October, he met CMDR Bowers and LCDR
Swanson to discuss CMDR Brown's statement of reasons that had been provided to
the senior sailors. LCDR Bainbridge was concerned that the reasons did not
'appear to be based on any evidence that was logically available at the time
the senior sailors were landed.' He suggested to CMDR Bowers that perhaps the
statement was 'invented after the fact; that the statement of reasons was based
'on information that could not have possibly been known to CMDR Brown at the
time'.[8]
8.9
They went through the allegations raised in the notices of potential
adverse findings and CMDR Bowers attempted to correlate them with the purported
reasons for landing the sailors.
8.10
After approximately 10 to 15 minutes, CMDR Bowers left to attend another
meeting and LCDR Swanson and LCDR Bainbridge continued the discussion during
which LCDR Bainbridge referred to the senior sailors as his 'clients'. LCDR
Bainbridge recalled that LCDR Swanson took exception to the term and said to
him something along the lines of: 'they're not your clients, be careful about
calling them your clients, they're not'.[9]
According to LCDR Swanson, during that meeting he said to LCDR Bainbridge words
to the effect that he should not be referring to the senior sailors as being
his clients:
I indicated to him that he should understand and make sure
that his language was correct, that they were not his clients, but rather, they
were members that he provided advice and guidance to at the best of his
ability.[10]
8.11
In his view, no solicitor/client relationship existed.[11]
LCDR Swanson later told the Commission that, while there is no issue with legal
privilege existing, there is no solicitor/client relationship between ADF
members and the advocacy and counselling lawyer.[12]
In his words, 'it is almost quasi legal aid in that you provide guidance and
direction as to what options they might have open'.[13]
8.12
LCDR Bainbridge disagreed with LCDR Swanson and sensed that LCDR Swanson
felt that he was 'going too far'.[14]
At the meeting, LCDR Bainbridge suggested to LCDR Swanson that if he thought
that LCDR Bainbridge 'was overstepping' his position, he should put it in
writing. LCDR Bainbridge informed the Commission that he did not receive any written
correspondence to that effect.[15]
8.13
According to LCDR Bainbridge, while the exchange was 'certainly a
disagreement' it was not an argument.[16]
LCDR Swanson was of the view that the conversation with LCDR Bainbridge was not
a heated discussion nor did he recall LCDR Bainbridge taking exception to what
he was told.[17]
8.14
LCDR Bainbridge accepted that some level of tension was 'a natural
occurrence within an adversarial system and, in the circumstances, can be an
indication of a healthy and productive relationship between opposing
advocates'. He explained:
...there's always some level of tension that I've seen between
fleet and myself. I mean, even today, you know, there's always a bit of toing
and froing between advocates. But at that time I could sense by phone calls
with the fleet legal officer that there was underlying tension. And clients
when they come would often, you know, say to me just in passing, 'You're not a
popular person at fleet at the moment'.[18]
8.15
LCDR Bainbridge indicated that during 2010, 'the level of tension
between the FLO and the LOAC appears to have returned to normal'.[19]
8.16
Mr Weber acknowledged there may be 'an amount of tension between the
Fleet Legal Office and the person who occupies the LOAC role, because of the
likelihood of the LOAC's representation of people who are in adverse interest
to those whom Fleet legal officers are advising.' In his view, LCDR Bainbridge
stood in a solicitor/client relationship with the three sailors explaining:
Such a relationship is categorised by personal trust and
confidence as well as the capacity of the sailors to claim legal professional
privilege over any communications (including documents evidencing
communications) entered into for the purpose of LCDR Bainbridge providing legal
advice to them.[20]
8.17
He formed the view that on 8 October 2009 LCDR Bainbridge and LCDR
Swanson had 'a frank and even tense discussion' about whom the LOAC position
owes primary duties and the scope and extent of LCDR Bainbridge's representation
of the three sailors'. In his view:
That discussion was nothing more than an exchange of
different views by two officers of the same rank. There is no evidence that Lieutenant
Commander Swanson acted in any way that was improper or attempted in his
discussion to improperly influence Lieutenant Commander [Bainbridge] in his
representation of the three sailors.[21]
8.18
According to Mr Weber, it appeared that LCDR Bainbridge was frustrated
with the length of time taken to respond to some of his requests. He also noted
the frustration within the Fleet Legal Office, 'concerning the zeal with which
LCDR Bainbridge represented the sailors'. Nevertheless, he concluded that 'save
that some correspondence sent by Lieutenant Commander Bainbridge used an
emotional tone which may not have been warranted in the circumstances', he did not
consider any of the communications to be improper.[22]
Proposed posting to Western Australia
8.19
LCDR Bainbridge informed the Commission that on or around 12 October 2009,
he received a phone call from LCDR Mark Bunnett, his career manager at the
Directorate of Naval Officers Postings (DNOP). This directorate is generally
responsible for the postings and promotions of RAN officers. LCDR Bunnett
suggested the possibility of a posting to HMAS Stirling in Western
Australia because of a short posting of the incumbent on compassionate grounds.
LCDR Bainbridge indicated that he was not keen on the posting because it would
have required him to leave his family in Sydney and proceed unaccompanied to
Perth.
8.20
Later on, LCDR Bunnett contacted LCDR Bainbridge and explained that it
may be possible to have the posting reduced to 12 months. LCDR Bunnett noted
that there were limited options available to fill the billet and it was likely
LCDR Bainbridge would be posted.
8.21
At that time, LCDR Bainbridge advised the senior sailors of the
likelihood that he would have to find them alternative representation and
informed his friends and family of the possible posting to Western Australia.
He told the Commission that he did not speak to the media about the proposed
posting.[23]
8.22
About ten days later, CAPT Rob McLaughlin, Director, Naval Legal
service, called LCDR Bainbridge in relation to the media articles which stated
that the navy legal officer running the Success case had been posted to
Western Australia. LCDR Bainbridge recalled that the media articles 'were
implying that the posting may have been an attempt to compromise the
representation of the senior sailors'.
8.23
CAPT McLaughlin informed LCDR Bainbridge that there was no correlation
between the proposed posting to Perth and his representation of the senior
sailors. He told LCDR Bainbridge of the decision not to post him to Western
Australia. According to LCDR Bainbridge, CAPT McLaughlin stated that the
decision had been made prior to the publication of the media articles. CAPT
McLaughlin told the Commission that there was 'absolutely no pressure' on him,
nor on DNOP as far as he was aware 'to contemplate posting LCDR Bainbridge for
reasons other than normal operational requirements'.[24]
LCDR Bainbridge informed the Commission:
I have seen no evidence to establish that the proposal to
post me to Western Australia was linked to my representation of the senior
sailors. I accept that this may simply be an unfortunate coincidence.[25]
8.24
LCDR Bunnet's account is consistent with LCDR Bainbridge's: that is,
that he spoke with LCDR Bainbridge on 12 October about a possible posting to
Western Australia because of the requirement of short notice posting:
While it was initially contemplated that LCDR Bainbridge may
be posted to Stirling, on or about 16 October 2009 a decision was made
within the then DNOP that he would not be posted to WA.
This decision was made due to LCDR Bainbridge's personal
circumstances and family situation. DNOP did not support the transfer of LCDR
Bainbridge to WA and another officer was subsequently posted to this position.[26]
8.25
In complete accord with CAPT McLaughlin's account, LCDR Bunnet indicated
that LCDR Bainbridge's proposed move to Western Australia and the subsequent
decision not to post him to this position was taken in the course of normal
operational requirements.[27]
8.26
Mr Weber accepted the evidence of CAPT McLaughlin and LCDR Bunnett:
The possibility of the transfer of LCDR Bainbridge to HMAS Stirling
arose in normal operational circumstances. That he was at one stage considered
for that posting was reasonable and appropriate, as was the final decision not
to post him. Nothing arising from that matter constituted an attempt to
improperly influence LCDR Bainbridge in his representation of the three
sailors.[28]
8.27
He also accept the evidence of LCDR Bainbridge that he did not believe
there was any correlation between his possible posting to Western Australia and
the discussions he had with CMDR Bowers and LCDR Swanson on 8 October 2009.
8.28
Overall, Mr Weber found no conduct on the part of the Navy 'constituted
an attempt to improperly compromise Bainbridge’s capacity to represent the best
interests of the landed senior sailors without fear or favour'. Mr Gyles agreed
with the conclusions reached by Mr Weber about the conversation between
Bainbridge and the Deputy Fleet Legal Officer on 8 October 2009 and about the
potential posting to Western Australia (which did not occur). In his opinion,
neither suggested an attempt to improperly influence LCDR Bainbridge.[29]
8.29
Mr Weber made four recommendations designed to give 'greater clarity to
the following aspects relating to the LOAC position:
-
the duties of the occupant of the position;
-
supervision of and peer support for position;
-
the reporting chain for the position; and
-
the nature of the legal relationship between the LOAC officer and
the members he or she advises.[30]
Media report—October 2009
8.30
On 23 October 2009, Mr Andrew Bolt, a journalist, wrote an article that
was extremely critical of the handling of the sailors. It stated that one of
the sailors was a family man and holder of several commendations from the Navy
for his leadership and 'devotion to duty'. In part, it then went on to say:
Why he and the two petty officers with him were now being
thrown off their ship, after a cursory 'equity and diversity health check', was
a mystery to him, and a savage humiliation.
The officers herding them off were yelling at the crew to 'clear
the passageways and do not look at this person'. Their captain later said 'a rotten
core' had been 'removed'.
...
Even worse was to follow, in an extraordinary saga that shows
how some allegations are too politically loaded now for even sensible people to
question, let alone laugh off.
For weeks the Navy would not tell the men their alleged
crimes. But in July, and to the trio’s astonishment, Channel 7, clearly briefed
by a Navy source, announced they’d run a 'sex ledger'.
...
The Navy, asked to comment, refused to confirm or deny the
allegation, but gave the media all that was needed to assume the story was spot
on.
It's not just that the three men deny there was any 'sex
ledger,' and that no proof of one has ever been produced.[31]
8.31
The Chief of Navy (CN) responded by way of a letter to the editor that
was drafted by Defence Public Affairs. He maintained that the article was
'misleading, emotive and inaccurate'. He also indicated that the CO had landed
the sailors to ensure the welfare and safety of his crew, whilst ensuring that
subsequent inquiries would not be prejudiced and procedural fairness was
afforded to all personnel involved. The Chief of Navy then went on to say among
other things:
...it is also important to note that the existence of a ‘sex
ledger’ was speculation generated by the media from late June 2009, well after
the positive actions taken in HMAS Success. Navy made that point quite
clear when responding to these media inquiries, advising that the veracity of
such allegations was yet to be confirmed and that all issues raised were being
considered in the investigations that were underway at the time.[32]
8.32
LCDR Bainbridge wrote to the Chief of Navy asking him to consider the
effect that any further media comment would have on the three senior sailors.
He said:
The purpose of my letter is to appeal to you to remain
cognisant of the fact that the three senior sailors at the centre of this
matter are in an increasingly vulnerable position whilst the morality of their
conduct is debated in a public forum.
As I have informed command previously, the media has obtained
the private mobile phone numbers of all three members and has approached them
for comment on their treatment throughout this ordeal. At all times these men
have acted with the integrity and loyalty to the Service that one would expect
from personnel of their rank and experience; and despite the tremendous urge to
comment publicly in order to defend their honour they have maintained their
composure and declined to comment.
...
Whilst I accept that the recent media coverage has been
reasonably critical of the conduct of the RAN, with somewhat adverse comments
made by the public on both talk back radio and certain internet forums/blogs, I
would point out that the navy's reputation is not the only reputation that has
been adversely affected throughout this proceeding.[33]
8.33
LCDR Bainbridge explained that he sent the letter to the Chief of Navy
because he felt that certain comments by the CN to the media 'put my clients in
a difficult position'.[34]
In response to LCDR Bainbridge's letter, the Chief of Navy wrote:
My letter was written to correct misleading, emotive and
inaccurate information that was contained within Andrew Bolt's article of 23
October 2009. I have a responsibility to Navy's people and to the Australian
public more generally, and it is entirely appropriate for me to respond to
articles of this sort in a careful and measured manner in order to ensure
inaccuracies are properly corrected.[35]
8.34
Mr Gyles observed that the approach evident in the Chief of Navy's
statement should have governed the Navy's position on this matter from the
first communication from Mr Greene onwards. In his view, 'It did not'.[36]
The committee agrees with this statement.
Inspector General ADF inquiry
8.35
Within a matter of weeks, in November 2009, the Chief of Navy requested the
Inspector General ADF (IGADF) to inquire into aspects of legal advice that LCDR
Bainbridge had given in the course of his duties. According to LCDR Bainbridge,
the inquiry was to consider in particular, allegations that he 'engaged in
inappropriate discussion of current legal processes with other Navy lawyers'. In
addition, it was to inquire into an allegation that LCDR Bainbridge had 'given
inappropriate advice to members by encouraging them to take their grievances to
external authorities'.[37]
LCDR Bainbridge told the Commission:
I am aware that a person in Canberra, whose identity was not
divulged to me, raised an allegation regarding my involvement in the Success
case and, in particular, that I may have leaked information regarding the case
outside of Defence. I believe that this allegation may have been one basis for
CN to refer my conduct to IGADF for inquiry.[38]
8.36
On 15 December 2009, the IGADF found that LCDR Bainbridge 'did not
discuss any matters with other legal officers that were inappropriate in the
circumstances'. Further, that he 'did not give inappropriate advice to members
by encouraging them to take their grievances to external authorities'.[39]
8.37
Despite the closeness in time to his letter to the Chief of Navy, LCDR
Bainbridge's indicated that he had seen 'no evidence to suggest that CN's
decision to refer his conduct to IGADF for inquiry was linked to that
correspondence'. He accepted that the initiation of the IGADF's inquiry may
simply have been 'an unfortunate coincidence'.[40]
With regard to LCDR Bainbridge's correspondence to the Chief of Navy, Mr Gyles observed:
This letter from LCDR Bainbridge illustrates the breadth of
his understanding of his role in acting for the senior sailors and the strength
of his determination to take on all comers, including the Chief of Navy, in
that endeavour. He was far from intimidated by the discussion with LCDR Swanson
and the potential posting to Western Australia. And he was, without doubt, a
thorn in the side of Navy in general, and Fleet Legal in particular, and had
been for some time.[41]
8.38
Overall, Mr Gyles formed the view that 'no conduct on the part of Navy
constituted an attempt to improperly compromise LCDR Bainbridge's capacity to
represent the best interests of the landed sailors without fear or favour.'[42]
Conclusion
8.39
Both Mr Weber and Mr Gyles came to the conclusion that there was no
attempt to improperly influence LCDR Bainbridge in respect of his assistance to
the senior sailors. The committee agrees with this finding. It notes, however,
Mr Weber's finding that 'there may be an amount of tension between the Fleet
Legal Office and the person who occupies the LOAC role, because of the likelihood
of the LOAC's representation of people who are in adverse interest to those
whom Fleet Legal Officers are advising'. He made recommendations addressing the
need for greater clarity relating to the LOAC position.[43]
The committee endorses the recommendations.
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