Chapter Four - Balian attractive soft target?
I think Australians, as a whole,
thought of Bali as the safest place on earth to be.[259]
It remains the case, though, that the intelligence
agencies did not collect intelligence that pointed specifically to Bali
as a venue, or to the fact of an attack at the time and place when it occurred.
Based on this intelligence, the government did warn Australians, through its
travel advisory process, of a somewhat increased level of risk in travelling in
Indonesia but
did not specifically identify Bali as a particular point
of risk.[260]
4.1
On numerous occasions, the Committee sought to explore
the extent to which the mere fact of there being a concentration of Westerners
in Baliparticularly Australiansshould have been taken
into account by the intelligence agencies in making their assessments of the
risks to Australians in Indonesia.
4.2
The consistent view put to the Committee by the
agencies was that the presence of large numbers of Australians in Bali did not
make Bali more vulnerable to terrorist attack than other places in Indonesia
that tourists might frequentsuch as Jakarta and Yogjakarta. The reply was
usually accompanied by the statement that the agencies did not have any
information specifically related to Bali that would justify
singling Bali out.
4.3
The majority of the Committee has some difficulty
accepting the first element of this response. The second element is accepted
and understood by the Committee.
4.4
On the matter of 'singling out' one location from
another, it is obvious that the possession of threat information specific to a
location would warrant its 'singling out'. But the Committee also considers
that it is not only the possession of 'specific information' that might justify
a differentiation between locations. Such differentiation or 'singling out' may
well occur because the overall intelligence assessment (or what ONA called
'analytical judgement') justifies it.
4.5
If one only differentiated threats according to specific information becoming available
about the realisation of that threat at place 'A' as opposed to place 'B',
differentiation of threats might be a rare event. While only specific
information could be used to identify a particular location as a definite
target and thus prompt the issuing of the highest level of threat alert, it is
perfectly proper that agencies' analytical judgements about the vulnerability
of, and risk attached to, a particular place might prompt a warning to be
issued in respect of that place.
4.6
The Committee appreciates that ASIO had a threat
assessment of HIGH across all Indonesia
(and hence Bali as well), from December 2001, and that
this meant that there was 'Current intent and capability to attack Australia's
interestsestablished circumstantially, but not confirmed by reliable intelligence'.
The Committee also knows that ASIO's next (and highest) level corresponds to
'Current intention to attack Australia's
interests is confirmed by reliable intelligence'and that such confirmation was
never available to Australian
agencies.
I would like to say very clearly that noonenot DFAT, not ONA
and not anybody elseis suggesting that there was at any time in any discussion
either with the minister or with DFAT any suggestion that there was any
specific actionable information that related to the possibility of a bomb in Bali.
It is very important that we all understand that.[261]
4.7
There nevertheless remains a considerable spectrum of
risk between the threat 'established circumstantially but not confirmed' and
the threat 'confirmed by reliable intelligence'. The parameters of 'established
circumstantially' are relatively broadthe parameters of 'reliably confirmed'
are very tight.
4.8
In the Committee's view, the boundaries of the
penultimate threat category are fairly flexible, and the existence of carefully
defined categories should not limit an agency's capacity, nor dilute its
obligation, to be as illuminating as possible about a threat, and to give
optimal guidance and information, within the envelope of that particular threat
assessment level.
4.9
This is not to invite analysts into the realm of pure
conjecture or the drawing of excessively long bows. It is merely to remind
agenciesand the consumers of the intelligence that agencies deliverthat
intelligence is not just about assembling specific information about things
that are (more or less) known. It is about analysing, contextualising and
interpreting that information in order to deliver to decision-makers a balanced
account about the way an enemy might act or a threat unfold.
4.10
No less an authority on these matters than the CIA, in
an Analytic Workbook for Intelligence
observes: 'The classical function of intelligence is to make predictions about
the future'.[262] This is not 'crystal
ball' nonsense. It is about drawing (usually very limited) pieces of information
out of the noise of data and misinformation, and relying largely on the skill,
knowledge, experience and the intheshoesoftheterrorist imagination of the
analyst to fashion sound advice about what might play out in any situation.
This advice becomes a key consideration for the policy makers or the
operational commanders who have to make the decisions about effective responses
to possible events.
4.11
So what does this mean for the way a threat assessment
might have been developed for Bali, and not just for Indonesia
as a whole?
4.12
Jemaah Islamiah
had managed to remain very much in the shadows for several years. The
Australian agencies had been very surprised at what they learned in December
2001 from the Singapore
investigations. They stressed to the Committee the near impossibility of
extracting information about (let alone from) tightly knit, cellbased groups
of carefully recruited militants, who combined modern telephony and internet
with traditional, direct wordofmouth communications.
4.13
Analysts would therefore have been very much reliant on
what they were able to glean more generally about how these groups operated;
what they knew specifically from the groups' declared intentions; what they
understood to be their links with international terrorists; what was
appreciated about the phenomenon of bin Ladeninspired 'global jihad'; what was
known about the ready availability of weapons and explosives, the porousness of
borders, and the limited domestic constraints on extremist activity.
4.14
And so throughout 2002, Australia's
intelligence agencies spent much of their time focused on the rise and rise of
regional extremism, and assessing the terrorist threat to Australians and
Australian interests. What they discerned was undoubted danger but specific
details about how that danger would be made manifest were simply not available
and could not readily be unearthed.
4.15
Australia's
growing profile as an ally of the United States,
and the ardent portrayal of Australia
by extremists as an anti-Islamic, 'crusader' country, no doubt drew both the
ire and attention of terrorist cells seeking soft targets among the USled
group of Western nations. In Indonesia
this was compounded by what was widely-regarded in that country as an
Australian betrayal with respect to its intervention in East Timor.
4.16
As well, it seems self-evident given JI's previous
history of avoiding detection and its almost familylike cell-based
structurethat it would have been extremely unlikely that agencies would find
themselves suddenly in possession of specific information about a JI terrorist
attack in any particular place in Indonesia.
4.17
The Committee has noted earlier how Osama bin Laden's
fatwahlike declarations, international developments in the War on Terror and Australia's
burgeoning anti-terrorist profile combined to prompt ASIO to issue updated
threat advice. Under these conditions it also seems inescapable that there
would sooner or later be a significant terrorist attack somewhere in the
archipelago. It was also increasingly likely given the tightening of physical
security around diplomatic and military installationsthat the attack would be
against a 'soft target'.
4.18
Thus armed with an array of what the CIA's Analytic Workbook calls 'combinations
and hierarchies of descriptive and inferential evidence' the Australian
agencies' intelligence officers would have set about their job of analysing,
weighing up, hypothesising, comparing, challenging, testing, checking,
linkingin short, carrying out all the myriad tasks of intelligence assessment.
These requirements all involve inference based upon an often
enormous amount of data. Our essential messageis that the analyst, attempting
to bring order out of chaos in such inferences, must apply both deductive and
inductive reasoning in the generation and use of the principal ingredients of
such inferences: hypotheses, evidence and assumptions.[263]
4.19
The Committee was struck by the following account, by
ONA's David Farmer,
of how intelligence analysts go about their business. He offered it in response
to a question about the way he assessed localities and institutions to be
potential targets.
The way that I developed my trade
craftI was formerly in the Army Intelligence Corpsis that we would identify
what we believed would be the most likely courses of action of our enemy. We
would try and put ourselves in the shoes of our enemy, and it was through that
trade craft that Bali and those sorts of targets were
foremost in my mind.[264]
4.20
To some extent it seems to the Committee self-evident
that an analystespecially when they were involved with assessing threats to
their country's nationals or their country's interestswould 'try and put
[themselves] in the shoes of [the] enemy'. It is from precisely this type of
analytical strategy that clubs and bars patronised by Westerners emerged - along with airports, schools and
expatriates' businesses - as the 'attractive', 'high on terrorists' lists',
'very viable' targets that they were variously labelled in Australian and
foreign intelligence reports, briefings and in evidence from analysts appearing
before the Committee.
4.21
Applying the intelligence 'trade craft' to the
circumstances and dynamics of regional terrorism, and to the 'combinations and
hierarchies of descriptive and inferential evidence' that was increasingly
available to Australian analysts from December 2001, the majority of the
Committee believes that a case can reasonably be made for assessing Bali's
vulnerability as differentiable from other possible targets in
Indonesiaincluding other soft targets. This case can be further supported by
the fact that, in Bali, there was a distinctively large
concentration of Australians and other Westerners in a place of symbolic and
economic significance. Bali was, in the words of one
witness familiar with security issues, 'the biggest soft target around if you
were after Australians'.[265]
4.22
Before pressing such a case, however, the views of the
intelligence agencies about the vulnerability of Bali
should be clearly set out.
With regard tothe likelihood of looking at soft targets, yes,
there was a likelihood, but all the information we [DIO] had up until that
stagerelated to other targets, such as Western embassies and targets of that
type, which you would not categorise as soft targets. So, whilst [one] can
speculate about the likelihood of soft targets, there was no firm information
about that[T]hroughout Indonesia and in fact throughout SouthEast Asia there
are many locations where Westerners gather at what you might call soft
targetsYou would think of Bali but you would not only think of Bali.[266]
No, we [DIO] did not discuss [Bali's]
particular attractiveness as you say. There were a range of indicators from the
intelligence which suggested that there were a range of attractive targets
across SouthEast Asia, including locations such as
embassies, a number of facilities and industrial complexes which were owned by
Western companies, and Western businesses in some of the major cities in Indonesia.
There were things like Western schools and nightclubs on that list as well. I
suppose I would disagree slightly with the implication in your question that
there was a particularly attractive target in Bali that
stood out amongst all the others. It was one of a range of attractive targets.[267]
Within the [ministerial] brief itself we [ONA] covered a range
of possible targets. Hotels, nightclubs, airlines and the airport in Denpasar
were all covered. We did not do those specifically because there were
Australians there; it was because they were seen to be very viable targets for Jemaah
Islamiah.[268]
We [ONA] gave to the officers present essentially the same brief
we gave to the Minister for Foreign Affairs....We answered the question pretty
much in the same way by addressing why we thought those sorts of targets would
be high on JIs list.[269]
[T]here were Australians elsewhere in Indonesia
too. There was nothing specific about Bali in the
intelligence that we hadThere was no basis for us [ONA] to point at Bali
as a more likely target than anywhere else.[270]
I still think that would have been giving an artificial
precision to the intelligence, which did not point specifically at Bali.
The issue of where Australians were is more in the field of threat assessment
and travel advisory activity. Our [ONA's] role is to give a reading of the
intelligence as we see it.
I [ASIO] draw attention to the fact thatthere are a whole range
of Western interests in SouthEast Asia which terrorists
could have targeted if they had so wished. It was by no means selfevident that
they would attack in Bali above other places. They could
have, for instance, targeted certain Western interests in Thailand...in
Malaysia...American
clubs. They could have targeted other clubs... (and).. businesses. So, looking
at the facts, I have some difficulty in reaching the conclusion that Bali
should have been singled out above other targets.[271]
We [ASIO] could not separate out Bali
from the rest of Indonesia.
We were very conscious of the terrorist threat posed by JI and we were very
conscious that it could pose a threat quite differently to Laskar Jihad.[272]
As I said, from a threat assessment perspective we did not
believe there was a basis for any part of Indonesia
to be less or more [at risk], and indeed we were only asked specifically about Bali
on one occasion in the leadup to Bali. We were asked quite
specifically by Qantas whether there was a basis for treating Bali separately
to the rest of Indonesiaand having a lower threat leveland the answer to that
was no.[273]
We [ASIO] made the broad judgment in respect of Indonesia.
We felt confident in making that judgment on the basis of the material we had
available. We had no material over and above that which would have enabled us
sensibly to distinguish Bali from the rest of Indonesia.[274]
I think I would today be answering different questions from you
and others if we had taken it upon ourselves to make a judgment on Bali.
If, as a result of that, a plane load of Australians had gone off to Jakarta
and had been staying at the Marriott hotel when it was blown up, I would now be
being asked on what basis we took it upon ourselves to make judgments on Bali
when we did not have any information to base them onand as a result of which
Australians changed their holiday plans and were killed. There was no basis for
us to separate out Bali from the rest of Indonesia.
The fact is that 30,000 to 40,000 Australians went to Bali
a year. It did not automatically follow from that fact alone that it was a more
likely target for an attack than another city or another area in Indonesia
frequented by westerners, including Australians.[275]
I have heard a lot of figures bandied around about Australians
in Bali at the time. The actual figures are that an
estimated 10,000 Australians were registered in Indonesia.
Of those, about 5,000 were in Jakarta
alone. In addition to that estimated number of residents, there were at certain
peak periods about 10,000 Australian visitors to Bali
prior to the attacks. It varied, depending on the season. ... Let us be very
clear about what we actually said about Bali in the
advisories. It gets misrendered a lot. We said:
Tourist services
elsewhere in Indonesiaand I will come to what that means in a momentare operating normally, including Bali.
This followed a paragraph which divided Indonesia
into certain regions which were regarded on the basis not of terrorism but of
more overt, direct threat as being particularly dangerous. This was on the
basis of the information we had. The information we had suggested that certain
regions should be off limits as far as Australians were concerned. We gave our
best possible advice on those regions. Subregional variation had nothing to do
with terrorism.[276]
4.23
The Committee notes that, according to the Bali Tourism
Authority, the numbers of Australian tourists in Bali
are much greater than the numbers conveyed above. Over 183,000 Australians
visited Bali in 2002. In 2001 it was nearly 239,000
Australians. In the six months before the Bali bombing
the average number of Australians visiting Bali each
month was in excess of 20,000.[277]
4.24
In the Committee's view, the fact that around 200,000
Australians visited Bali each year is of itself sufficient reason to pay
particular attention to Bali in the promulgation of both threat assessments and
travel advisories, and not to simply blend Bali in with the rest of Indonesia.
In the case of travel advice, high numbers of tourists travelling to Bali
requiring information justified the inclusion by DFAT of facts about the
'normal' state of tourist services there.
4.25
In the Committee's view, these high numbers also
justified the inclusion in information for tourists of facts about Bali not
being exempt from terrorist attack nor being any less at risk than other places
in Indonesiaespecially given the widely-held (and clearly inappropriate) view
of Australians that Bali was safe and
different from other places in Indonesia.
4.26
The Committee is not here pressing the case for being
more alarmist. It is rather a matter of attempting to convey the most informed
and balanced advice consistent with the prime responsibility to safeguard
Australians and Australian interests.
Intelligence and security agencies have been aware of the
potential to easily panic portions of the community and also the diplomatic
consequences that can often stem from raising threat levels in those countries
with which we might sometimes have a delicate diplomatic relationship. I
certainly think in the past that was the case, but the events of September 11
made it clear to everybody that we can no longer have that luxury and that we
should err on the side of caution whenever the need might arisewhenever there
is any credible information that suggests that there is an extant threat to
Australian civilians either here or overseas.[278]
4.27
If the task of a good intelligence analyst is to:
-
'put oneself into the shoes of the enemy'
-
'bring order out of chaos [through] deductive
and inductive reasoning in the generation and use of the principal ingredients
ofhypotheses, evidence and assumptions'
-
develop plausible, defensible narratives about
the way an enemy might act or a threat unfold
-
'look at a historical development;where a
situation has evolved from andto try and anticipate where it is going'
then it seems reasonable to the
Committee to apply itself to such tasks in the case of Balimuch
as ONA analysts did in their April 2002 seminar exercise in America,
or as any intelligence unit might do as they go about exploring scenarios and
testing hypotheses.
4.28
The Committee has already rehearsed at length elsewhere
in this report the sequence of intelligence reporting relating to the terrorist
threat in Indonesia in the twelve months leading up to the Bali bombing. In
short, the threat was highofficially so from September 2001; Australia's
profile as a supporter of US
action was growing, and Australia
was being increasingly portrayed as antiIslamic; it was increasingly clear
that JI had the intention, capability and resources to mount terrorist attacks
including against soft targets and including Australians.
4.29
One witness, whose son died in the Bali bombings,
stressed to the Committee the broader international context of Australia's involvement
in US-led actions and what he saw as the inevitable consequences.
Where my anger came from was the fact that I knew something had
to occur at some time. We had lit the flame and the pot was certainly going to
boil over somewhere at some time.[279]
4.30
Other factors were also at play. It was apparent that
JI had links with alQaeda, and that Osama bin-Ladeninspired jihadism was
energising Indonesian militants. The Indonesian authorities were either unable
or unwilling to act against them. Indeed, the secular Muslim government was
held in almost as much contempt by the radicals as their nemesis the West.
4.31
Osama bin-Laden had identified Australia
as a crusader forcea declaration of almost fatwah dimensions that, as ASIO noted,
had traditionally preceded actual attacks. And within Indonesia
there had been increasing physical violence against Westerners and their
activitiesespecially tourist and recreational activitiesthat had long been
regarded as decadent and offensive by many Muslims.
4.32
To the militants nursing their potent grievances, and
looking for suitable soft targets against which to exact their revenge, it is
likely that Bali (along with other sites) would have
been drawn into their strategic landscape.
4.33
It is worth noting at this point that at the time of
the 2000 National Census there were 214,598 nonBalinese living in Bali.
They accounted for 6.8% of the total population in Bali.[280] These figures also show that in the
previous 5 years over 50,000 people had migrated to Bali
from East and Central Java and Yogyakarta.
Muslim extremists entering Bali would therefore probably
not have had much trouble blending in with their compatriots, or finding
support and assistance.
4.34
Bali also enjoyed some qualities
that distinguished it from other tourist destinations. It was internationally
renowned as the tourist destination of choice in Indonesia
for Westerners who wanted to let their hair down. It held a special place, in
the Australian psyche at least, as a safe holiday destination, with a Balinese
(largely Hindu) population that seemed more tolerant or indulgent of Western
tourists' mores and behaviour than their Javanese Muslim counterparts.
The fact that there was
an explosionthe fact that young Australian children were killed, maimed, their lives destroyedwas not a surprise to
me at all. What was a surprise to me is that it occurred in Bali.
Joshua would never have
gonewould never have left these shoreshad I known for one moment that Bali
was a possible haven for terrorism
You can rest assured that he would not have gone. Bali
is a Hindu island, removed from the balance of Indonesia,
which is Muslim. Bali is a fun-loving haven for
Australian children.[281]
I think it needs to be understood that, in the mind of the
travelling public and in the mind of the industry, whilst Bali
is legally a part of Indonesia,
Bali was never ever considered to be part of Indonesia.
It was always out there on its own.[282]
4.35
Westerners gathered in large numbers in the clubs and
bars that were concentrated in the centre of Bali, and
there was virtually no security presence. The relatively small number of
Muslims inhabiting Bali reduced the likelihood of collateral Muslim casualties
should a strike be mounted, and in any event there was a strong sentiment amongst
Indonesian radicals, notably Laskar Jihad, that non-Muslim communities should
be cleared out of the region.
4.36
In the light of all these considerations, the Committee
finds it difficult to agree with assessments that Bali
was not 'any more vulnerable than any other part of Indonesia'.[283] It was, in the Committee's view, more vulnerable than many if not most
partsespecially given the fiercely antiWestern, jihadinspired and selfrighteous
anger of Indonesia's
Islamic extremists.
4.37
Accepting completely that there was no specific threat confirmed by reliable
intelligence that would identify Bali as a target, there
was nevertheless sufficient circumstantial evidence and analytical judgements
that would identify it as distinctly attractive to terrorists. Indeed, this
seems to have been precisely what motivated ONA analysts Farmer
and Gordon to come to their conclusions about Bali
being an attractive symbolic target that would have an impact on Westerners,
and damage Indonesia's
fragile economy and its secular government.
4.38
The Committee agrees
that there was no specific intelligence about an attack on Bali
that would have enabled countervailing measures to be taken. It agrees that Bali
was not the only soft target in Indonesia.
It agrees that it was not inevitable
that Bali would be attacked. The Committee contends,
however, that the available intelligencethe 'considered analysis of all the
information availablenot speculation'[284]was
sufficient to merit a differentiation of Bali from other
parts of Indonesia
on the grounds of its vulnerability and attractiveness.
4.39
Such a differentiation may have been able to have been
reflected, even if minimally, in the Travel Advisories issued by DFAT. The
Committee has already suggested elsewhere in this report the suggested inclusion:
"Bali has long been considered a safe haven, but
the risks of terrorism are as high there as elsewhere in Indonesia".
This would have balanced to some extent the benign projection conveyed by the
specific and headlined factually-correct advice that 'tourism services were
operating normally including Bali'.
4.40
Whether that would have made any difference to the
decisions individual travellers might have made is not the focus of concern
here. The point of this discussion is to focus on the performance of agencies
and to judge that performance against the information that was available to
agencies that would have informed their decisionmaking.
4.41
The Committee notes that on two occasions ASIO's Dennis
Richardson put the following argument to the
Committee.
Indeed, I would have had a problem in saying that in Bali
there was a greater threat than elsewhere, because we would have been doing it
on the seat of our pants, and my concern in such circumstances would be that
you could unintentionally shepherd people into an attack. My own view is that
prior to Bali there was no basis to suggest that any
area of Indonesia
was less at threat than others; equally there was no basis to judge that any
area of Indonesia
was at higher threat. If we had said, Look, theres Bali, it is an obvious
area and we should single Bali out, what questions would I now be answering if
Australians had changed their travel plans and gone to Jogjakarta or elsewhere
and terrorists who were planning things, having seen the travel advisories, also
went off to Jogjakarta or wherever and attacked there? I would be answering a
different set of questions
What is in the public domain is the travel advisories in this
context. I am talking about the threat assessments and the threat assessments
must have a certain logical and rational rigour around them, as frustrating as
that might be.[285]
4.42
The Committee agrees that threat assessments have 'a
certain logical and rational rigour around them' and in doing so disagrees with
Mr Richardson that to say Bali was at greater risk would have been a 'seat of
the pants' assessment.
4.43
Logic and reason are intellectual processes that
analysts apply to the plethora of data they are confronted with in order to
come up with considered judgements. The Committee has consistently affirmed
those processes, and believes that it is precisely those processes that justify
Bali being identified as being particularly vulnerable.
The Committee concurs entirely with the view that rejects intelligence work as
simple empiricism and defends intelligence as a work of analysis and judgement:
Frankly, perhaps there is not a more fundamental point I should
emphasise than this: there is a real difference between data, or pure
information if you like, and intelligence. Intelligence is analysed and has
judgement. It draws on professional expertise to make judgements. That is the
differenceA quality, highgrade intelligence organisation has the best
analysts and also manages those analysts. The data streams are very important,
of course, but if you do not have the quality analysts you are not really in
the game.[286]
4.44
Turning to the argument that to single out Bali
as a risk could have prompted tourists to go elsewhere and risk being blown up
at the other location, the Committee makes several points:
(i)
If the argument is
applicable here, it is equally applicable to any threat assessment including
one which highlights, on the basis of specific information, a risk at location "A". To highlight a (genuine) risk at "A" always contains
the possibility that people will go elsewhereand in a generally high
threat environment, going elsewhere may indeed also prove fatal. This is an
inescapable feature of any warning, and to that extent the argument is not as
strong as it might first appear.
(ii)
Tourists choose Bali for very
particular reasons, for a special kind of holidayfor a "Bali
experience". Should they be 'warned off' Bali, it
seems unlikely that they would simply opt for another Indonesian destination.
In any event, if having been 'warned off' Bali, tourists did choose to go to another place in Indonesia, according to the
prevailing assessment they would have been at no less (or more) a risk in that
other place anywaywhich makes the argument redundant.
4.45
The Committee understands and acknowledges that threat
assessments are not travel advisories. But the Committee reiterates two basic
points:
(i)
The threat assessment that labelled Indonesia
as HIGH, and said in the report to QANTAS that Bali
could not be considered 'exempt from attack', was correct. It could, however, have
gone further to state that Bali, because of the
concentration of Westerners there, would be a distinctly attractive soft
target, with its clubs and bars likely to be high on JI's list of targets.
(ii)
The travel advisories, along with the general
warning about the risks of terrorism, could justifiably have gone further to
highlight the fact that Bali, although traditionally regarded as safe, would be
an attractive soft target and was at no less a risk (perhaps even more at risk)
than other places in Indonesia. This fact would have given appropriate balance
to the consistently stated fact that tourist services were 'normal', which
conveyed a benign message about Bali's risk status.
Given that Bali was and always has
been clearly distinguished from the rest of Indonesia in the mind of the
ordinary Australian tourist, it is entirely appropriate for travel advisories
to similarly distinguish Bali from the rest of Indonesia and to tailor the
advice to take the confident (but misguided) disposition of the ordinary Australian
tourist into account.
Compensation for victims of the Bali bombings
4.46
One difficult issue raised before this Committee was
the unequal access to compensation or financial assistance for victims,
survivors and relatives of those killed in the Bali bombings.
Although this issue is outside the inquiry's terms of reference, it
nevertheless warrants recognition in this report. The Committee has been deeply
moved by the grief and suffering of those who were injured or lost loved ones
in the bombings, and would like their situation dealt with in the best possible
way.
4.47
The Commonwealth government has provided assistance in
kind to victims of the Bali bombing, including medical
costs, counselling and certain travel costs. Yet it has ruled out providing
compensation to victims or their families in the form of a lump sum. The Prime
Minister stated as reasoning for this stance that the Bali bombings, while
horrific, occurred overseas, and that there is no link to the direct
responsibility of the Australian government.[287]
4.48
Some victims and their families see the lack of
official compensation as an ongoing injustice. Had their injuries been
sustained in criminal attack on Australian territory, they would have been
entitled to compensation under a state 'victims of crime' compensation scheme.
In paying compensation, state governments are not admitting to liability for
crimes, but providing some recompense to crime victims for their loss or
suffering. Yet because the Bali bombings occurred
overseas, most state schemes will not provide compensation. While compensation
would obviously not bring back a loved one or heal injuries sustained in the
bombings, it could at least give some relief to those who have suffered most
from this tragedy.
4.49
It has been pointed out to this Committee that there is
an inequity in treatment across state boundaries. South Australian victims of
the Bali bombing received compensation under South
Australia's victims of crime compensation scheme,
which can compensate for crimes committed outside the state. This was not
available to Bali bombing victims in other states that
do not compensate for crimes committed outside state boundaries. Mr
Brian Deegan
told the committee that this is not fair, saying that:
There have been a number of victims who have given evidence here
today. I challenge you to tell me which ones are entitled to compensation and
which ones are not, which ones should be and which ones should not. Should my
son receive it but two beautiful girls that were burnt, their lives almost destroyed,
not receive it? No.[288]
4.50
On a later occasion, Mr
Deegan added:
It is just unfair, and it is unfair that the kids of Australia
are being denied the compensation that they are entitled to. In South
Australia we have 55 people who have been awarded
compensation, but that stops on the imaginary border. In Victoria
we have a girl who has lost an arm. In Queensland
we have a boy who has lost his legs. That boy, Ben,
wanted to be here today. Where is he? He is in hospital undergoing his 14th
operation
These people are entitled to justice. There is no doubt about
that. You might think they could go to Indonesia.
The problem is they cannot, because under international law they need the
imprimatur of the Australian government to do that, and the Australian
government are not going to provide that. The Australian government are obliged
to look after Australian children and they are obliged to give me justice.[289]
4.51
The fall-out from the Bali
bombings has highlighted the inconsistencies in the compensation available to
victims of crime across Australia.
While this is clearly outside the terms of reference of this inquiry, it is a
matter that could be considered by Commonwealth and State
Attorneys-General.
4.52
A related issue is whether the Commonwealth should
establish a national compensation scheme for victims of Commonwealth crimes,
which would include terrorist attacks. In 1980 the Australian Law Reform
Commission commented on the lack of a federal criminal injuries compensation
scheme for victims of Commonwealth offences.[290]
In 1985, Australia
endorsed a UN resolution on basic principles of justice for victims of crime
and abuse of power. This resolution encourages 'the establishment,
strengthening and expansion of national funds for compensation to victims'.[291] Yet to date there is no national
scheme in place in Australia.
Although the Committee does not take a view on this issue, it does suggest that
it warrants further consideration by the Commonwealth government.
Recommendation 4
4.53
The Committee recommends that
-
the Commonwealth government prepare a green
paper on the establishment of a national compensation scheme for victims of terrorism
related crimes that fall within the Commonwealth jurisdiction; and
-
the national council of Attorneys-General
develop a proposal for the harmonisation of state laws dealing with
compensation for victims of crimes so as to provide for circumstances such as
terrorist attack.