Chapter Three - Intelligence reports, threat assessments
and travel advice
My son, Scott, was killed in that
tragedy. I would like you to know that neither I nor any member of my family
consider that the Governments travel warnings were in any way inadequate. We
do not feel there was any lack of advice that contributed to Scotts
death. Furthermore, Scott was employed by
international SOS Pty Ltd in Jakarta,
a company involved in, amongst other things, international security. Through
his company, he was acutely aware of security risks and had commented prior to
his trip that Bali was considered one of the safe havens
in Indonesia.
(Extract from letter to DFAT tabled during the inquiry.)
3.1
The Committee has discussed elsewhere in this Report
the inherent problems that arise when reinterpreting intelligence after the
factthe hindsight phenomenon labelled connecting the dots.[193] If one looks back at the
intelligence applying to Indonesia,
with the knowledge of the Bali bombing as the vantage
point, the events of 12 October may look probable or even inevitable.[194]
3.2
In hindsight, one can home in on and extract the relevant pieces of intelligence, while
ignoring the background noise of the time that was created by irrelevant intelligence (i.e.
intelligence relating to threats that were either false, or did not come to
fruition).[195] With the luxury of
hindsight all uncertainty is swept away, the pieces of the puzzle fit perfectly
together, and a clear picture of threat surfaces.[196]
3.3
Similar cautions must be observed in the analysis and
description of links between threat assessments and the development and
formulation of Travel Advices. ASIO's Dennis
Richardson alerted the Committee to the
difficulties associated with looking back at travel advisories in the light of
what is now known about Bali.
I can only repeat that I think it is very
difficult to make that retrospective judgement. It would be very easy for a
person in my job to say, Yes, it [the travel advisory] should have been this
or it should have been that, but I cannot say that, and I think it would be an
unreasonable and unfair thing to do. What I can say, as I have said
previouslyand I have sought to be as frank as I
can with the committeeis that I believe the threat assessment process and the
travel advisory process were too compartmented prior to Bali. While there was
close interaction, and while it was effective in one sense, the mere fact that
we have reviewed it and the mere fact that we have changed it highlights the
fact that we did not have those two processes interacting to the best effect.[197]
3.4
The Committee is nevertheless obliged to consider what
lay behind the Travel Advices prepared by DFAT, and there is an inevitable
juxtaposition of those advices with the threat assessments that informed them.
3.5
DFAT addressed the issue of the relationship between
travel advisories and threat assessments on several occasions before the
Committee.
In drafting advisories for Indonesia or any other country, the only proper source of advice under
the arrangements established at this stage regarding terrorism is ASIO, as the
organisation charged with, and equipped to assess threats. No proper advisory
process can be based on untested raw intelligence. No proper advisory process
can be based on speculative comment from individual analysts. There are many
hundreds and hundreds of intelligence reports each month suggestive of some
threat or another in some location around the world, each of which is subject
to proper testing by ASIOIf we broadcast every untested thought through the
advisory process, the process would be unmanageable.We can only respond to
considered analysis or intelligence that has been tested. No considered
analysis, no intelligence, was ever made available to DFAT by any agency
suggesting a terrorist attack in BaliWe wish, as individuals who have had
daily contact with the victims' families, that we had prior warning of the Bali
attack. We did not.[198]
3.6
It is worth noting here also the remarks made by
British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw
in his statement to the House of Commons concerning the UK
parliamentary report on intelligence and travel advisories prior to Bali.
The purpose of Travel Advice is to
provide reliable information to British travellers and residents overseas. It
is vital that our advice is based on the assessments made by the Security
Service. The intelligence agencies are best placed to evaluate the terrorist
threat to British nationals both at home and overseas. That often involves
difficult judgements, where we have to ensure that travellers are warned of
threats which we assess to be credible, whilst not causing panic by
over-reacting to unsubstantiated pieces of information.
It is worth underlining that this
often requires very difficult judgements. The safety and wellbeing of our
nationals abroad is our prime concern. But as my RHF the Prime Minister said
last month, we must aim 'to take preventive measures without destroying
normal life'. If rather than properly seeking to separate truth from fiction
the Government treated every terrorist threat as accurate, then on many occasions
in recent months we would have had to shut down roads, shopping centres,
airports, factories and military installations. This would serve only to cause
panicprecisely the circumstances which the terrorists are striving to create.[199]
3.7
The intelligence gathered and reports produced by the
Australian intelligence community are one of the important sources upon which
DFAT draws when preparing its Travel Advice, along with 'on the ground' advice
from its overseas posts and input from its Consular Branch.
DFAT gives particular weight to the threat assessments issued by
ASIO in considering the implications of intelligence for our advisories.[200]
3.8
This weighting of advice in favour of ASIO was
confirmed by ONA, who told the Committee that:
DFAT do not seek our views on their travel advisories and we do
not, as a normal practice, seek to monitor them. They make their judgements on
the bases they make them on. The interaction is much closer between ASIO and
DFAT on travel advisories, because ASIO does the threat assessments and the
threat assessments feed into the travel advisories. So they have the discussion
about those issues; it is more remote from our activities.[201]
3.9
ASIO's DirectorGeneral (Mr
Richardson) described to the Committee how
he saw the relationship, preBali, between ASIO threat assessments and DFAT
travel advisories:
I said in our submission to the committee andin my opening
comments to the committee on 19 Junethat before Bali
the threat assessment process and travel advisories were more compartmentalised.
We prepared the former and DFAT the latter. While we discussed and explained
our threat assessments to DFAT, we were not involved in the preparation of the
travel advisories. We did not seek input into the travel advisories and DFAT
did not seek comment from us. I think this was a weakness in the system that
operated before Bali and it has now been rectified.[202]
3.10
DFAT initially expressed to the Committee a somewhat
different assessment of DFAT's arrangements with ASIO preBali.
We do not believe these arrangements were inadequate prior to Bali;
and we certainly do not think that improved arrangements would have made a
difference to the overall approach taken in our travel advice. Having looked
closely at our processes following the Bali attacks,
however, we have taken a range of steps to strengthen them further to ensure we
stay at the leading edge of international practice and to provide additional
assurance to Government and the public about these important processes.[203]
3.11
Improvements in the arrangements for ensuring that
threat assessments and travel advice are in harmony are welcomed by the
Committee, which notes also the following remarks by DFAT's Ian Kemish towards
the end of the Committee's inquiry.
[I]t is now almost two years since, in the context of an
emerging threat, we were making difficult judgements about travel advice for
Indonesia and other countries in SouthEast Asia and we were moving to
highlight the risks to Australians in our public statements and travel
advisories. When we look back at that period and discuss in constructive spirit
the management of these complex issues by the governmentI would like to join
[ASIO's] Mr Richardson in calling for greater rigour in the examination of
these issues, particularly in public statements and media coverage, and greater
honesty and accuracy and higher standards of research in supportive work
relating to public statements. The committee itself, I know, has a serious
responsibility in this regard as well.[204]
3.12
DFAT's submission to the Committee stated that its
Travel Advice was at all times commensurate with the threat assessments and
related product delivered by Australia's
intelligence community:
We can see no point where the settings in our SouthEast Asian
advisories were inconsistent with those threat assessments. We have also
undertaken comprehensive searches of the assessments and reports provided
during the period under review by other agencies, including particularly ONA.
While this material was helpful to us in ensuring appropriate references to the
regional risk of terrorism in the travel advisories, we can see no analysis
among these many reports indicating signs of a potential attack in Bali.[205]
3.13
In oral evidence, DFAT officials repeated their
insistence about the appropriateness and commensurability of their travel
advisories:
Our comprehensive examination of ASIO threat assessments and
other analytical reports provided by assessment agencies, including
particularly the Office of National Assessments, given the level of public
attention in recent days, has led to the firm conclusion that at no point did
the government miss any information or considered analysis pointing to signs of
a potential attack in Bali. We did not fail to put such
information or analysis into the public domain because there was no such
information or analysis available to us. What we did have was advice,
information and assessment from intelligence agencies and our mission in Jakarta
about two issues. Firstly, there wasand I need to emphasise thisthe risk of
civil unrest, demonstrations and harassment directed at Westerners and Western
interests in Indonesia.
Secondly, there was a nonspecific risk of terrorism in the region. Our record
in putting information into the public domain about both issues is clear and
consistent.[206]
3.14
The Bali tragedy, however,
galvanised a new approach to regional security advice, and with it came changes
to the procedures and relationships that shaped DFAT's Travel Advice activity.
It was desirable that, in view of such a calamitous event, the procedures
concerning the preparation of Travel Advice would be reviewed and tightened.
One would be concerned had they not been.
We [DFAT] haveconcluded that in the security environment
following the Bali tragedy, there was scope to
strengthen further the consultative arrangements between DFAT and ASIO on these
issues. This has been reflected in new rules of procedure governing theand in
the institution of a fortnightly meeting between the two agencies to review how
these arrangements are working.[207]
3.15
The Committee has earlier set out in some detail the
pattern of pre-Bali intelligence about the nature and extent of regional
security threats, as well as a comprehensive and comparative account of travel
advisoriesAustralia's and those of its consular partners. The task now is to
bring these together and, with special regard for the risks of a hindsight
perspective, assess their commensurability.
3.16
The Committee went to considerable lengths during
hearings and via questions on notice, to explore with DFAT officials the
relationship between threat assessment inputs and travel advice outputs. The
following analysis and review of that relationship seeks to reflect faithfully
all the relevant considerations.
3.17
The Committee has already opined that at least from
1999 and possibly earlier, the Australian intelligence community had on its
radar screen the threat of transnational, bin Ladeninspired terrorism and its
implications for SouthEast Asia.
3.18
There was not a lot of detail available, links between
regional and international groups were not clear, and the domestic Indonesian
political environment was not receptive to foreign pleas and criticisms about
the transplantation of international terrorism onto Indonesian soilespecially
when its Islamic dimensions were emphasised.
3.19
Tension between Indonesia
and Australiaespecially
over East Timorwas also not conducive to the
collection, by Australian agencies, of information about the various extremist
groups that had been identified. This was a particular problem given the
fragmented, cellbased structure of many of these groups, made worse by the
porous regional borders through which individuals could transit either
undetected or ignored by local authorities.
3.20
By 2000 the Australian intelligence community seemed to
be in no doubt that there was a rise, essentially unchecked, of militant
Islamic groups in Indonesia,
that the influence of al-Qaeda on these groups was becoming apparent, and that
the prospect of these groups conducting terrorist attacks could not be denied.
By early 2001, for example, ONA had convened a meeting of collection agencies
to seek a more concentrated intelligence effort on Indonesian militants and
their international terrorist links.
3.21
The position around this time was summarised by the
head of one intelligence agency as 'clear agreement across the [intelligence]
community about extremism and the capacity for terrorist attacks within South
East Asia'.[208]
3.22
DFAT's Travel Advice by mid-2001 was employing the
language of a level 3 Advice. (There are 7 levels or categories of advice,
each of which tends to use certain key phrases and terminology.) Level 3
advices often have some reference to the risk of terrorism. For example, the
'headline' summary of DFAT's 27 August
2001 Advice used fairly standard level 3 phraseology. The Safety and Security section drew
attention to US and UK
warnings about heightened terrorist threats, referred to explosions in Jakarta,
and warned Australians to take bomb threats seriously. The General section gave the standard advice about tourist services
'operating normally in Bali'.
3.23
Because of the inclusion in all DFAT's Travel Advices
of a statement about the 'normal' operation of tourist services in Bali
(and elsewhere), and because it was mentioned frequently during the course of
the inquiry, the Committee has paid particular attention to all such
references.
3.24
DFAT told the Committee that the constant inclusion of
advice that Bali tourist services were 'normal' was a
response to the numerous phone calls that DFAT was receiving from the public
about the tourist situation in Bali. DFAT told the
Committee it was a statement of fact.[209]
3.25
The Committee remains concerned, however, that the
regular and prominent assurance that tourist services were operating normally
in Bali may have inadvertently conveyed to those
inquirers, including those who had heard about violence in Indonesia,
a sense that Bali was somehow insulated from the high
level of threat that existed across the entire country. Bald facts, while being
true, may nevertheless mislead through being inadequately contextualised or
caveated. This is discussed further by the Committee later in this report.
3.26
The Australian Jakarta Embassy Bulletin of 15 August
and dates thereafter, with respect to advice specifically about Bali
added to the basic information that Bali was calm and
normal:
Bali is calm and tourist services are
operating normally. Australian tourists on Bali should
observe the same prudence as tourists in other parts of the country.
3.27
The terrorist attacks in America
on 11 September 2001 were
clearly a watershed event in reframing Western countries' approaches to both
international and regional security issues. From what was to prove to be about
a year before the Bali bombings of 12 October 2002, there seems to have been a
distinctive shift in the intensity of the security intelligence and threat
assessments emanating from Australia
agencies.
3.28
As noted earlier, the first DFAT Travel Advice after
the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre was issued on 20 September 2001. It stated that the
Advice 'contains new information or advice but the overall warning level has
not changed.' The headline advice remained identical to that of 27 August, and
the body of the advice was almost soincluding the reference to 'explosive
devices...detonated recently in Jakarta
[so] take seriously any bomb threats'. To the body of the advice was added the
sentence:
In view of the heightened tension associated with the recent
terrorist attacks in the United States of
America, Australian travellers are advised
to be especially alert to their own security at this time
3.29
The general advice about Bali
was repeated:
Tourist services are operating
normally on Bali and Lombok.
Travellers to other regionsare advised tomaintain a high level
of personal security awareness
3.30
DFAT issued a Travel Advice on 26 September 2001:
in light of protest activity in Indonesia, to note existing US
advice to its citizens to defer nonessential travel, and to convey a warning
of a heightened threat to US interests in Indonesia. The key concern at this
time was the threat of demonstrations and civil unrest directed at US and other
western interests. ASIO also responded to a similar set of concerns[210]
3.31
The 26 September Travel Advice had the leader: 'This
advice has been reviewed. It contains new information or advice but the overall
warning level has not changed'. It seems, however, that DFAT nevertheless did change the warning level from
previous advices. The warning was upgraded, because the boxed, 'headline'
summary introduced the additional phrase 'and exercise great caution at this
time'. This is typical of level 4 terminology. Level 4 terminology in a Travel
Advice is DFAT's standard setting if ASIO's threat assessment for politically
motivated violence against Australians is HIGH.
3.32
The Safety and
Security section advised about explosive devices being detonated in Jakarta,
and told Australians to take any bomb threats seriously. This advice, or
warnings very similar, appeared in the body of all later Travel Advices. The
only explicit mention of Bali in the 26 September Advice
was in the General sectionthe
standard remark about tourist services operating normally on Bali.
3.33
An important reference point is the decision by ASIO,
on 28 September 2001, to
raise the assessed threat level for Australian interests in Indonesia
to HIGH. This was a significant move, predicated on publicity in Indonesia
about arson attacks on mosques in Australia, reports that extremist groups were
taking a unified approach against USled actions directed at al-Qaeda, and that
these groups regarded Australia as antiIslamic and a 'soft target' alternative
to the US.
We did not just put it up to high on
28 September 2001 and then
leave it at that. A lot of information was put out following that, and we
regularly updated the threat assessments to the best of our ability[211]
Because that was raising it to high, we [ASIO] certainly would
have drawn DFATs attention to the threat assessment in addition to sending it
to them.[212]
3.34
At the same time, ONA issued a report warning that
extremists' threats 'against the citizens and assets of the US and its close
allies must be taken seriously'. DFAT told the Committee that the department
'would have been in receipt of an ONA assessment. There is certainly no doubt
about that'.[213]
3.35
This 27
September 2001 ONA report also contained the subsequently much
remarked upon reference to tourist hotels in Bali. The
ONA report said that while there were no signs of plans by Laskar Jihad 'to
target tourist hotels on Lombok or Baliextremists
see them as havens of Western decadence' and that 'a tourist hotel in Bali
would be an important symbolic target, damaging Indonesia's
standing and its debilitated economy'.
3.36
This report was discussed on several occasions during
the Committee's hearings. The intelligence agencies stressed that Laskar Jihad
had a domestic, rather than an overtly antiWestern, focus, and that at that
time JI was yet to be recognised as a terrorist organisation. For example, DIO
had stated in a 19 September 2001
report that 'Laskar Jihad will take an active role in any antiUS protests, but
we have no indications that it is planning any coordinated violence against
Western interests'.
3.37
A subsequent DIO report did, however, include the alert
that 'Any form of antiUS demonstrations involving large crowds has the
potential for violence to be directed at Westerners...The possibility of
Australian nationals being targeted cannot be discounted'.
3.38
The Committee heard no evidence that, and is not in a
position to conclude that there were links between Laskar Jihad and JI at that
time. Certainly Australian intelligence agencies appear to have had no
contemporaneous knowledge of the existence of any such links.
3.39
With regard to this particular report (ONA 27 September
2001), DFAT supported the views of the intelligence agencies in the following
terms:
First of all, you are referring to a
report that had to do with Laskar Jihad and, as we all know, Laskar Jihad did
not perpetrate the Bali bombings. Second, I have today
reviewed again what that report said and I have found the reference towards the
bottom of the last page of the document in question. It is about a range of
other issues. The operative point is this: ONA had seen no sign that Laskar
Jihad plans to target tourist hotels in Lombok or Bali.
There is a subsidiary dash point below that and it says, even so, a tourist
hotel in Bali would be an important symbolic target,
damaging Indonesias
standing and its debilitated economy.[214]
I rang, in the leadup to this appearance, the individual who
was in my position at the time of this statement coming out He has absolutely
no recollection of seeing this reference in the report and, frankly, I am not
surprised, given the thousands of reports and the fact that the reference is
very deep in the document and is preceded by no sign that Laskar Jihad plans
to target tourist hotels in Lombok or Bali. He says, when asked about it, that
it would not occur to him that that was sufficient to change the basis of the
travel advice. He said: Whats this about? Our reference point for these
issues is the threat assessments produced by ASIO anyway.[215]
3.40
This response is consistent with DFAT's earlier
insistence that it relies primarily on ASIO's threat assessments for its Travel
Advice, and to a far lesser extent the general reporting of other agencies.
3.41
The Committee considers that ONA's warning that
extremists' threats 'against the citizens and assets of the US and its close
allies must be taken seriously' would have been taken into account by ASIO in
the preparation of its own threat assessment advice. It is consistent with the
dramatically heightened awareness of the seriousness of security threats to the
US and its
allies ushered in by the September 11 attacks.
3.42
It is worth reiterating at this point that DFAT always
regarded ASIO as the prime source of advice on security issues and threat
assessments when it comes to the preparation of DFAT Travel Advice. Reports
distributed from other agencies fulfilled a subsidiary purpose.
The main reference point for DFAT is
the body which assesses threat [ASIO]. We do not go looking for raw
intelligence or raw comment ourselves.ONA might be a useful, very much
secondary reference point but the process can only make sense if we rely and
focus on the body in the Australian system [ASIO] that is responsible for
formal threat assessment.[216]
When we say that our key reference point for these issues is the
ASIO threat assessment it means something quite significant. There is an
organisation in the Australian government system which is responsible for
assessing threat. There is a great deal of informationliterally thousands and
thousands of reports, some of it utterly boguswhich is available in the broad
to the Australian government. There needs to be an organisation which considers
all that material and does its best professional job in assessing that
information to assist us. We do not have the expertise to judge what is real
and what is not. ASIO does that, and it does it exceptionally well. I hope that
helps you understand the way we would have treated the ONA reports.[217]
3.43
Notwithstanding these remarks, which tended to relegate
ONA's advice to a fairly low order of significance, the Committee notes that in
other evidence much was made of how DFAT and ONA were working very closely as
each strove to come to grips with the terrorist threat in SE Asia.
There was an extraordinary range of contacts with them
[DFAT] during this whole period. We [ONA] were in fact particularly keen,
especially as our own thinking evolved, to keep DFAT abreast of it and not to
rely on the impression that our written word only would have conveyed. We were
quite active throughout this whole period in seeking to ensure that DFAT
understood our perspectives.[218]
I think he [Mr Paterson] was concerned in this case over some time that we were on
the same wavelengththat they [DFAT] fully understood the basis on which we
were shifting our analysis of the nature of the threat. That was a process, as
you would recall from our initial statement that went over a period of three to
four months even. I think it was in about April [2002]
that we became more definitive, as my recollection goes...[219]
3.44
The next event
of significance was the commencement of USled military activity in Afghanistan on 8 October, prompting new DFAT
Travel Advice headlined:
Australians should consider deferring all holiday and normal
business travel to Indonesia,
excluding Bali. Australians in Indonesia
are advised to monitor carefully developments that might affect their security
and exercise great caution at this time.
3.45
The 8 October DFAT Advice also said 'It is highly
likely that there will be further demonstrations in a number of cities in
Indonesia which could have antiWestern overtones' and that Australians were
advised to take 'special care' and 'exercise sensible precautions'.
3.46
Given
DFAT's insistence that its travel advisories were always commensurate with
ASIO's threat assessments, and that the Committee had been advised repeatedly
that Bali could not be separated from the overall 'high' threat applying to
Indonesia as a whole, the Committee sought an explanation as to why the 8
October advice to 'defer travel' excluded
Bali.
As to the upgrade, it is sometimes hard to convey this: yes,
these travel advisories reflect the threat assessments but they also draw on
what is actually happening on the ground. In particular they rely on input from
the relevant embassy and our knowledge of the experience that Australians are
having in these countries through consular work. The key focus in the period
you are talking aboutand actually it is the key focus for the ASIO threat
assessment as wellwas the possibility of protest action, civil disorder and in
particular protests outside our embassy in Jakarta in the context of the
coalition attacks in Afghanistan. That is what the advice was about. The
situation in Bali was calm. That was the fact of the
matter[220]
3.47
The focus of DFAT on protest-related violence is
consistent with DIO and ONA reports at that time which highlighted the threats
of opportunistic street attacks on foreign nationals and 'sweeping' activities
by militant groups.
3.48
DFAT also issued a global Travellers Bulletin on 11 October 2001. This was explained
by Minister Downer in the following terms:
...[On] 10 October the Americans
issued a worldwide caution which was focused on a specific threat made against
American interests as contained within the then most recent Osama bin Laden
tapewhich members will recall, I am sure,
because it was substantially in the media. The bin Laden threat was reflected
in the US caution of 10 October and a US FBI alert of 9 October, and these
were then reflected in a DFAT travel bulletin [global Travellers Bulletin],
which is the equivalent of the US worldwide caution, issued on 11 October
Australian time. It was entitled, 'Terrorist threat to United States interests in United States and overseas'. That bulletin was, as these bulletins are,
posted on the DFAT web site. It said: In light of the warnings by the United
States Government, Australian travellers and residents overseas are advised to
remain alert to their own security.[221]
3.49
The announcement of the deployment of Australian forces
to Afghanistan
on 17 October 2001 was
deemed by ASIO to have raised Australia's
profile as a terrorist target, but in the absence of specific information
indicating a threat, the announcement itself did not, in ASIO's view, change
the threat of terrorist attack in Australia
or against Australian interests abroad.[222]
3.50
DFAT's subsequent Travel Advice (23 October 2001) did
not explicitly mention the proposed deployment of Australian troops, and
continued to focus on the risks to Australians arising from protest
activitywhich it saw as diminishingto the extent that 'the Government no
longer judge[d] it necessary to advise Australians to consider deferring normal
business or holiday travel to most parts of Indonesia, although continued
vigilance is recommended'. The body of the advice continued to refer to
explosive devices and the need to take bomb threats seriously.
3.51
The logic pursuant to an ASIO report advising that
Australia's profile as a terrorist target had been raised might make it seem
strange that the Travel Advice should have been somewhat softened. The
Committee notes, however, that ASIO expressly advised that the situation had
not changed the threat of terrorist attacks against Australian interests
abroad.[223]
3.52
The Committee is less comfortable with the Travel
Advice that was issued after Osama Bin Laden's 3 November broadcast referring
to 'crusader' forces and mentioning Australia
by name.
3.53
ASIO considered the statement to be of 'particular
significance' and issued a Threat Assessment on 9 November 2001 which noted that:
-
.the statement must be seen within the context
of UBL statements since 1996, which consistently have laid down general markers
for subsequent terrorist action.
-
apart from sporadic references to the United
Kingdom, previous statements have referred to the US and its allies. UBLs
specific reference to crusader Australian Forces thus represents a
significant upgrading of Australias profile. Looked at against UBLs track
record, ASIO considers this statement will have force, and significance, for at
least the next 18 months.
-
the statement will be seen as particular
encouragement for individuals or groups in Indonesia who are followers of UBL,
and who may have the capability to commit violent acts. More importantly
however, UBLs alQaeda network does have the capability and means to carry out
an act of terrorism in Indonesia. The only question in respect of Australian
interests there, is one of intent. In this context, since at least 1998, UBL
has been explicit in stating there is no distinction between military personnel
and civilians; both Australian Official representation in Jakarta and other
identifiable Australian interests certainly would be seen as extensions of the
Australian crusader forces.[224]
3.54
The Committee was advised by ASIO that there was 'no
specific oneonone meeting between ASIO and DFAT to discuss the threat
assessment issued on 9 November
2001.'
The statement made by Bin Ladenwhich was the subject of the
9 November Threat Assessment, however, was discussed at meetings of the
Special Incident Task Force which were held daily at that time. Both ASIO and
DFAT were represented at the Task Force meetings at which ASIO provided briefings
on the Bin Laden statement'.[225]
3.55
ASIO told the Committee that they 'certainly drew
[DFAT's] attention to [the bin Laden statement] and spoke to it'. In ASIO's
view:
The word crusader is very deliberately used. It is a very
definite throwback to earlier timesIt was the first occasion on which
Australia was specifically mentioned by Osama bin Laden and he was signalling
us out and clearly making a play in terms of individuals, groups et cetera in
South-East AsiaHe is using a code word which paints us as a definite enemy.[226]
3.56
In its written submission, DFAT stated that it had
reviewed the travel advisory following the bin Laden 'crusader forces' speech,
and 'determined that the advisories did not need further strengthening'.[227] The Department did not, in that
submission, elaborate upon its reasons for not strengthening the advisory. The
Committee therefore sought further information from DFAT about that decision.
Our [DFAT's] travel advice of 7 December 2001 for Indonesia
urged heightened vigilance and personal security awareness, relating this
advice to the possibility of further protest activity against the War on Terror
and civil unrest, and a range of serious threats across Indonesia. The 9 November ASIO threat assessment did not
raise the threat level for Indonesia,
nor did it identify any specific threat in that country.
UBLs 3 November statement was widely reported and common public
knowledge. Travel advisories do not
perform the function of a running media commentary on developments that, in the
view of the threat assessment agency (ASIO), do not change the threat level for
a particular country.[228]
3.57
After 7
December 2001, DFAT Travel Advice remained the same until 28 March 2002. Intelligence
agencies, meanwhile, continued to report on developments.
3.58
For example, ONA stated that United
States agencies had become quite rapidly
convinced that there were significant links between alQaeda and regional and
domestic radical Islamic groups in Southeast Asian countries. Amongst the
factors that led them to such a conclusion was evidence given in a trial in Spain
of alQa'ida operatives to the effect that there was an alQaeda training camp
in Poso on Sulawesisomething that ONA was unable to
substantiate.[229]
3.59
The activity of Australian intelligence agencies was
stimulated significantly by the receipt by Australian agencies in midDecember
2001 of information emerging from investigations into the Singapore
bombings and what they revealed about Jemaah
Islamiyah.
[F]rom December 2001 we [ASIO] and others worked very hard to
get on top of JI and a lot of progress was made.[230]
3.60
ONA finalised a substantial report reviewing what was
known of 146 different organisations. It included such judgements as external
influences having increasingly inspired and shaped Indonesian radicals'
behaviour; and that many younger Indonesian Muslims have been attracted to the
ideas of Osama bin Laden about the legitimacy of engaging in jihad or violent
struggle for international causes, including within Indonesia's
borders. [231]
3.61
A 6 January
2002 report by DIO declared that SE Asia
offered 'a range of soft and symbolic targets for antiWestern Islamic
terrorists' and that the most 'vulnerable and numerous of Western interests in
the region are tourists and expatriate business people'.[232]
3.62
On 16 January
2002, ONA and ASIO published a joint report based on information
flowing from the Singapore
arrests. This report revealed that it was not known when before 1999 the JI
first made contact with outside terrorists, but this contact appears to have
marked the group's transition from militant organisation into terrorist group.[233]
3.63
Notwithstanding the alQaeda connection identified from
the Singapore
investigation, DIO doubted in February 2002 that alQaeda had active operation
cells beyond the Singapore-Malaysia-Philippines footprint.[234]
3.64
What was clear to the intelligence agencies by the time
the next DFAT Travel Advice was issued in March was that the terrorist threat
in SE Asia had been rather starkly confirmed by the
outcomes of the interrogations of operatives in Singapore,
especially the evidence revealing JI as an active terrorist group.
3.65
Indeed it was this December 2001 discovery in relation
to JInamely that it had transitioned from extremist to terrorist group some
years earlierthat ASIO's Mr Richardson
identified as a most significant one.
The intelligence failure in Bali was the
failure to identify the transition of Jemaah
Islamiah into a terrorist organisation some
time after 1996. It was not on our radar screen as a terrorist organisation
before December 2001. And, combined with the differences within Indonesia about
JI, there was insufficient time before Bali to do what might have been able to
have been done if JI had been identified as a terrorist threat a year or two
earlier. We will never know if earlier identification would have made a
difference.[235]
3.66
The first DFAT Travel Advice of 2002, issued on 8
March, was virtually identical to the December 2001 Advice, which had been
issued a week before the receipt by Australia
of the information about JI. In the 8 March Advice there was no reference to
the new information and intelligence reporting about increased security risks
arising from the Singapore
investigations and the discovery of JI's terrorist credentials.
3.67
ASIO, as well as reporting jointly with ONA in January
2002 a 'good deal of information on the nature of the regional operations of
Jemaah Islamiyah and its historical evolution'[236], issued 'a number of threat
assessments which covered Indonesia' between December 2001 and December 2002.
None had 'any specific information relating to Bali.'[237]
3.68
DFAT's written submission to the Committee included a
section discussing the Travel Advisory settings for SE Asia
between 11 September 2001
and 12 October 2002. That
discussion, however, did not convey any description or explanation by DFAT of
the travel advisories it issued during the nine months from December 2001 to
the end of August 2002.
3.69
The Travel Advice of 28 March 2002 was a substantially re-written advisory, and
drew attention to the fact that the advice had been 'reviewed ..[and]..contains
new information or advice'. Its headline opened with advice to Australian's
travelling to, or resident in, Indonesia
to register with the Jakarta Embassy or Bali Consulate, and concluded with
advice against travel to certain regions, and a caution about travel in Irian
Jaya and North Sulawesi.
3.70
The body of the advice elaborated on the hot spots of
ethnic and separatist violence, and discussed the risks to foreigners in the
light of kidnappings conducted by the Abu
Sayyaf terrorist group in locations near Indonesia.
No other terrorist or extremist group was specified.
3.71
This particular advice did not refer to explosions and
bomb threats, although it repeated the warning to 'maintain a high level of
personal security awareness'. This advice remained extant until 12 July 2002.
3.72
Between March and July 2002, intelligence agencies'
activities and reports dealing with terrorist threats in Indonesia
and the region took various forms.
3.73
The agencies became more confident that alQaeda had
links into Indonesia,
with ONA saying that alQaeda had:
a presence in Indonesia
which gives it the capability to conduct terrorist acts in and from Indonesia.
But the extent and nature of alQaeda's presence are unclear and hard evidence
remains elusive.[238]
3.74
By June 2002, ONA had reached a point where the agency
'felt it desirable to draw to the Government's attention by means other than
written reports its conclusions on the existence of a regional extremist
network with connections to alQaeda'.[239]
3.75
To that end, ONA officials sought a meeting with
Foreign Minister Downer to 'set out the intelligence onradical Islamic
movements andconclusions on their interconnections and the potential for
terrorist activity. The discussions focussed broadly on the terrorist threat in
the region and that from JI in particular'.[240]
We were trying to make the impact on the minister of our
knowledge up until then and explain the danger of the organisations and explain
our developing concepts of the way in which these organisations were planning
and were capable of carrying out operationsMuch, but not all, of the briefing
was confined to Indonesia.We said that basically they had the intention, they
had the capability, and getting access to the kinds of equipment they needed
would be no problem.[241]
This meeting and its
consequences are addressed in some detail elsewhere in this Report.
3.76
By the end of June 2002, information progressively
available from detainees confirmed for ONA that 'alQaeda has a longstanding
presence in Indonesia'.[242] It reported that 'alQaeda is
actively supporting extremists who are prepared to conduct terrorist acts in
support of global jihad while advancing their own agendas; in particular,
alQaeda has been active in fostering a relationship with Jemaah Islamiyah
(JI)'.[243]
3.77
A week later, on July 3, ASIO issued a statement in
relation to QANTAS operations in Jakarta
and Denpasar. It stated the following:
The
general threat to Qantas interests in Indonesia cannot sensibly be differentiated from the
general threat to Australian interests in Indonesia; currently assessed as HIGH.
-
Australias
profile as a potential target of terrorist attack by Islamic extremists has
been raised by our involvement in the War on Terrorism
-
Islamic
extremists in the region have shown a capability and intent to conduct
terrorist attacks, including against aviation interests
-
They have
also shown great flexibility in regard to location, method of attack and type
of target.
ASIO
is unable to specifically comment on the areas around Denpasar and Jakarta
airports other than to note that Islamic extremists associated with Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) and/or alQaeda are known to have transited both airports in the
past.
Senior Indonesian JI figure,
Riduan bin Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, was involved in Oplan Bojinka. He is still at large in Indonesia. Another senior JI member, Mas Selamat bin Kestari, who
threatened to hijack an aircraft and crash it into Changi airport fled Singapore after escaping arrest and is likely to be in Indonesia with other JI members. Given the JI presence in Indonesia, neither Jakarta nor Bali could be considered exempt from attack.[244]
3.78
The DFAT Travel Advice of 12 July 2002 (updated last on 28 March 202) was, according to its introductory
line, 'reviewed and reissued with no substantive change to the information or
advice provided'that is, apparently no substantive change to the advice
disseminated three months previously.
3.79
On the face of it, it would seem that the intelligence
agencies' actions and reports during the intervening three months outlined in
the paragraphs above would have warranted a 'substantive change' in the travel
advisoryespecially given that DFAT stressed the commensurability of its travel
advisories with ASIO's threat assessments, and ASIO told the Committee that its
assessments during this period were 'well founded'.[245] Yet, according to the advisory's
introductory line, there was no 'substantive change' made to the reissued
advice of 12 July 2002.
3.80
The introductory line, however, was misleading, and did
not indicate that there had actually been a change in the Travel Advice. The
Travel Advice was in fact noticeably strengthened, opening its headline summary
with the warning that:
Australians in Indonesia
should monitor carefully developments that might affect their safety and should
maintain a high level of personal security awareness.
3.81
This message was repeated in the first paragraph of the
main body of the advice. Bali was mentioned in the
context of tourist services operating normally. There was no warning equivalent
to ASIO's 3 July statement that 'Given the JI presence in Indonesia,
neither Jakarta nor Bali
could be considered exempt from attack'. There was, however, an extra warning
that expanded on the standard reference to bombs having exploded in areas
frequented by tourists: 'Further explosions may be attempted'.
3.82
From midJuly, the intelligence agencies continued to
assess and report on the terrorist threat in Indonesia
and elsewhere, paying particular attention to JI and the extent to which
alQaeda may have established links with local extremists.
3.83
ONA advised, among other things, that:
(a)
reports of planned terrorist violence in Southeast
Asia are coming more frequently;
(b)
that no good estimate yet exists of alQaeda's
strength in Southeast Asia, but that it was likely to grow; and
(c)
that suicide attacks have not been part of
militants' modus operandi in Southeast Asia, but that
may be changing.[246]
3.84
In a second report, ONA said that 'we have no
collateral for but cannot dismiss reports that Indonesian Islamic extremists
intend to launch attacks in Indonesia in August and in Southeast Asia in
September' and included warnings that 'raids on brothels and nightclubs, bomb
attacks, or terrorist attacks on US or other Western targets are all possible'.[247]
3.85
These increasingly frequent reports of planned
terrorist violence, and outcomes from interrogation of alQaeda operative Umar
Faruq, triggered DIO also to publish a
number of products warning of increasing evidence of capability and intent to
mount terrorist attacks against Western interests in Indonesia.
3.86
DIO's report on 5
August 2002 drew attention to JI, advising, for example, that:
(a)
there was increased threat of a terrorist attack
against Western targets;
(b)
that despite unreliable or contradictory
information, the remnants of JI continued to possess the capability and intent
to undertake future attacks; and
(c)
that groups like JI posed a greater threat to
foreigners in Indonesia
than domestic extremist groups.[248]
3.87
Similar advice was also issued four days later
by ASIO, warning that Indonesianbased
Islamic extremists may be planning a series of coordinated actions across
Indonesia in the August/September period.
The
nature of the action was not well defined but appeared likely to range from
demonstrations to terrorist attacks. ASIO assessed the threat of terrorist
attack against Australian interests in Indonesia remained HIGH and noted the following:
-
the reports suggested Western interests, principally US,
but also British and Australian, were among the intended targets.
-
the information was fragmentary, uncorroborated and of
unknown credibility. Some aspects possibly reflected circular reporting of
earlier discredited threats.
-
the number
and nature of the reports, however, taken in the context of the raised threat
in Indonesia, collectively warranted updated threat advice.[249]
3.88
DFAT issued a further Travel Advice on 13 August which
was prefaced by the statement that, while there was new information added, the
'overall level of advice has not been changed'.
3.89
The bolded and boxed summary or 'headline' section
opened with the warning that Australians in Indonesia
should 'monitor carefully developments that might affect their safety' and that
they should 'maintain a high level of personal security awareness'. It
concluded with the statement: 'Tourist services elsewhere in Indonesia
are operating normally, including Bali.' This statement
was repeated in the Safety and Security
section of the Travel Advice.
3.90
The Safety and
Security section retained the July warning that bombs had exploded,
including in areas frequented by tourists, and that further explosions may be
attempted.
3.91
Apart from an additional warning against bus travel in Central
Sulawesi, the 13 August advice remained essentially unchanged from
its 12 July predecessorits 'overall level of advice [had] not been changed'.
Given that DFAT stressed the commensurability of its Travel Advice with the
threat assessments of ASIO, the 13 August advisory does not seem to square
with ASIO's advice four days previously that 'the number and nature of the reportscollectively
warranted updated threat advice'.[250]
3.92
DFAT, pressing its belief that at all times its travel
advisories were commensurable with the corresponding threat assessments, told
the Committee that:
The focus of the advisories on terrorism sharpened furtherin
particular, from the middle of 2002 as intelligence agencies came to understand
this phenomenon better. In particular, ASIO threat assessments and our
advisories gave a much stronger focus to terrorist threats generally from
mid2002 onwards. That is a matter of public record, and it was at the time a
matter of very considerable media coverage.[251]
3.93
The next Travel Advice, issued on 10 September 2002, was noticeably strengthened,
even though it was still prefaced by the statement that 'the overall level of advice
has not been changed' and to that extent was again misleading. The headline
boxed summary now opened with the statement: 'In view of the ongoing risk of
terrorist activity in the region, Australians in Indonesia
should maintain a high level of personal security awareness.'
3.94
The advisories of 13 and 20 September were essentially
the same as the 10 September Travel Advice, also retaining, in the Safety and Security section, the
reference to bombs exploding 'periodically in Jakarta
and elsewhere in the past, including areas frequented by tourists. Further
explosions may be attempted'.
3.95
The Travel Advice of 20 September was the advisory
extant at the time of the Bali attacks. That Advice, as
discussed above, opened its headline summary statement with the sentence 'In
view of the ongoing risk of terrorist activity in the region, Australians in
Indonesia should maintain a high level of personal security awareness' and
concluded with the sentence 'Tourist services elsewhere in Indonesia are
operating normally, including Bali'.
3.96
The Safety and
Security section in the body of the advisory also contained the paragraph:
Bombs have been exploded periodically in Jakarta
and elsewhere in the past, including areas frequented by tourists. Further
explosions may be attempted. In view of the ongoing risk of terrorist activity,
Australians should maintain a high level of personal security awareness at all
times.
3.97
While the 20 September 2002 Travel Advice was the one
extant at the time of the Bali bombings, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta had,
on 3 October 2002, issued a Bulletin to
Australian Citizens Living in Indonesia. It contained much of the advice
and warnings that it had issued in
previous Bulletins, but in the second
paragraph of the 3 October 2002
issue there was a warning that made reference to clubs and bars:
As in the past around religious holidays, militant groups may
conduct intimidatory activity against night clubs, bars and other places where
expatriates are known to gather. Australians are advised to take particular
care in this period prior to religious holidays, and during Ramadan.
3.98
As discussed earlier, the debriefing of alQaeda
operative Umar Faruq
reinforced that alQaeda had access to the extensive JI network crisscrossing Southeast
Asia and that alQa'ida had a longstanding presence in Indonesia
and close relations with local extremists.[252]
3.99
DIO still had doubts about JI's organisational
robustness and capability to execute antiWestern attacks without external
help, but in what subsequently proved to be a prescient assessment of
unconfirmed reports of the possibility of a JI attack against Westerners, DIO
reported on 26 September 2002 that:
We assess that local JI
capability will restrict any attack to small arms or improvised explosive
devices. Although this might obviate masscasualties, if timing and location come together a large number of
casualties could result.[253]
3.100
The final reports to emerge before the Bali
bombing were issued by ONA and ASIO on 10
October 2002barely two days before the event itself.
3.101
ONA reported that despite some recent arrests,
substantial numbers of terrorists remain free in Southeast Asia,
capable of and intent on further attacks. The report went on to say that
further similar attacks are on the cards including against US targets in Indonesia.
It noted that weapons and explosives are still easily available in Southeast
Asia, and that many potential attackers with the requisite skills
remain active. The report also said key JI leaders, who have even bigger plans,
including those who plotted the Singapore
operation, are still free.[254]
3.102
On 10 October
2002 ASIO issued a Threat Assessment against the background of
statements by Osama bin Laden on 6
October 2002 and by Ayman alZawahiri on 8 October 2002. The assessment advised that the
statements suggested that somewhere 'another large scale attack or attacks by
alQaeda are being prepared'
3.103
The ASIO assessment noted that:
-
the attacks
may be imminent
-
both bin
Laden and alZawahiri talked of targeting key sectors of the US economy but
attacks may not be limited to traditional financial or economic interests
-
the planned
attacks may not necessarily be in the US and could be against US interests
abroad, including against US allies
-
no
information on the timing, location or method of the attacks was available
-
no
information specifically related to Australian interests but Australias
profile as a potential terrorist target had increased since 11 September 2001.[255]
3.104
In a speech to the Australian Homeland Security
Conference on 31 October 2002,
ASIO's Dennis Richardson
included the statement that: al Qaedas intent was unambiguous
in bin Ladens statement of 6 October and in alZawahiris interview of 8
October'. He also stated to the conference, and in ASIO's subsequent submission
to the Committee: 'We do not know whether the statements by bin Laden and alZawahiri
foreshadowed the Bali attacks'.
3.105
The Committee notes that on the day before the Bali
attacks, DFAT issued a worldwide Travel Bulletin in which it set out the
details of an FBI release warning of potential terrorist attacks against US
economic interests. This was a universal alert, and not specific to Indonesia.
The release said that 'US authorities are unable to provide further information
on specific targets, timing or method of attack'. The DFAT Travel Bulletin
closed with the lines:
In light of the warnings by the United States Government,
Australian travellers and residents overseas are advised to remain alert to
their own security. They should monitor local developments and news broadcasts
carefully and follow the advice of local authorities.
Concluding remarks
3.106
The Committee
agrees with DFAT that travel advisories are not solely about security risks and
terrorism, although it is imperative that Travel Advice is commensurate with
threat assessments. Travel advisories must deliver an account which is faithful
to the known conditions in, and risks associated with, a particular travel
destination in language which is clear and accessible.
3.107
It will necessarily be a summary account, but must be
rendered in a way that highlights the important considerations, and has as its
sole focus and intent the wellbeing and safety of the Australian traveller.
3.108
It is not simply a list of unadorned facts. Those facts
are expertly appraised, interpreted and meaningfully conveyed. Advice is, in
the Committee's view, best described as a series of statements that have been
judiciously assembled, supported by the assessments and judgements of those who
are best placed to make them, and expressed in a manner which conveys those
judgements as unambiguously as possible. The authors of such advice must also
be mindful of the characteristics of the audience to whom the advice is
directed.
3.109
DFAT travel advisories, particularly from July 2002
advised people to 'maintain a high level of personal security awareness' and
included references to the risks to tourists arising from protests and civil
disturbance, from bombs, and from violent clashes between ethnic and religious
antagonists. From that period, too, the body of the advisories always warned
about bombs exploding periodically, including in areas frequented by tourists,
and warned that further explosions may be attempted By September 2002, the
advisories consistently opened their headline summary with reference to the
ongoing risk of terrorist activity. This advice concerned a generic terrorist
threat, and did not specifically advise that Australians themselves were, for
JI, alternative soft targets to Americans.
3.110
The Committee agrees that, in its travel advisories
DFAT employed the relevant level of warning and language that corresponded to
the threat being conveyed by the intelligence agencies. Whether particular
phrases that were used were optimal in conveying to the average reader what
they sought to convey is not a matter to which the Committee has turned its
mind. It is obvious that Travel Advice must be written in plain, comprehensible
English and must not be too long, particularly given the objective of conveying
an appropriate caution to members of the public who are unlikely to be affected
by nuanced language. It is, however, an important consideration, and one which
the Committee urges DFAT to examine thoroughly.
Recommendation
3
3.111
The Committee recommends that DFAT subject a
representative selection of its Travel Advice to examination by an independent
assessor with qualifications and experience in linguistics, literacy and
communication. The assessor shall report to the minister on the intelligibility
and accessibility of the language in which information is conveyed in travel
advisories.
3.112
In the Committee's view, the information and warnings
contained in the travel advisories for Indonesia during the month or so before
the Bali attacks, while warning of an increased generic terrorist risk,
nonetheless did not adequately reflect the content of the threat assessments
that were available by that time that specifically warned that Australians in
their own right were now seen as terrorist targets in Indonesia. ASIO's threat
assessments had made plain that Australians were potential terrorist targets
not just because they were 'westerners', but because Australia
itself had become a focus of al-Qa'ida / Jemaah
Islamiah terrorist attention.
3.113
In the Committee's view it would have been better for
this additional piece of information to have been provided through DFAT's
travel advisories so that potential Australian travellers would have been aware
that Australians in their own right were now the objects of specific terrorist
interest in Indonesia.
3.114
Furthermore, while DFAT's travel advisories warned of a
generic terrorist threat 'in the region', the ASIO threat assessments had
referred to Australians becoming potential terrorist targets specifically
within Indonesia
(as well as elsewhere in the region). Again, it is the Committee's view that it
would have been better to tell the Australian travelling public that
Australians in Indonesia
(rather than simply westerners within the region) were of potential interest to
al-Qa'ida / JI terrorist organisations.
3.115
It would be reasonable to assume that anyone reading
the Indonesian Travel Advice even just the headline summary and Safety and Security section - would
understand that there was a generic terrorist risk, that bombs had exploded in
the past, including where tourists gathered, and that further explosions may be
attempted.
3.116
However, the Committee is of the view is that there was
one significant fact that did not find its way into the Travel Advice which it
would have been very important for tourists to know. This fact was insisted
upon by almost all the government officials who appeared before the Committee,
and apparently a fact understood by all the relevant agencies in the period
leading up to the Bali attacks. This fact was that Bali
was no less vulnerable to terrorism, at no less at risk of attack, than
anywhere else in Indonesia.
3.117
The Travel Advices made no attempt to counter the
widespread belief of Australian tourists to Indonesia
that Bali was somehow a safe haven, a 'place apart' from
Indonesia in
terms of the risk that pervaded the rest of the country. And this when ASIO was
not only holding its threat assessment at HIGH for all of Indonesia, but was
becoming increasingly alarmed by JI; had specifically reported in July 2002
that Jakarta and Bali could not be considered exempt from terrorist attack; had
warned that extremists planned coordinated actions, that targets could include
Australians, and that the number and nature of the reports warranted updated
threat advice.
3.118
The Committee has already expressed its views on the
vulnerability of Bali elsewhere in this Report. Given
the special place that Bali held in the Australian psychethat of a safe haven
somehow set apart from the rest of Indonesia, advice about its being 'calm' and
with tourism 'normal', while being literally correct, reinforced the benign
(and erroneous) view at precisely the time when the security threats to
Westerners from terrorists were unprecedentedly high. What tourists really
needed was to have their pervasively inappropriate views challengedwhich does
not mean being alarmist.
3.119
In the Committee's view, the explicit reference to
Bali's normality, coming as it invariably did, hard on the heels of a list of
places to be avoided, gave comforting signals about Bali precisely when efforts
were needed to jolt Australians out of their 'Bali comfort zone'.
3.120
The failure to make explicit to unwittingsome would
say nave and ignorantAustralian travellers that Bali was no less at risk than
the rest of Indonesia, combined with unadorned facts about 'normal' tourist
services, reinforced the prejudice of the entrenched view that 'Australians, as
a whole, thought of Bali as the safest place on earth to be'.[256]
They went to Bali,
which was a safe haven,[257]
But for this [Senate] inquiry, I would never have known the
following: the airline upon which my son flew to Bali,
Qantas, had, prior to taking my son to Bali, asked a
specific question of ASIO: How safe are our fleets and our equipment in Bali?
Nor would I have ever known the answer: No safer in Bali
than in any other part of Indonesia.
I would never have known that.[258]
3.121
A suitable piece of advice during 2002 could have taken
the form: "Bali has long been considered a safe
haven, but the risks of terrorism are as high there as elsewhere in Indonesia".
This is not necessarily the wisdom of hindsight. It is a properly
contextualised, relevant and measured piece of factual advice, entirely
consistent with ASIO's perspective and its uniformly high threat assessments,
and with the general intelligence picture. Importantly, it takes into account
the mindset of those travellers to whom it is directed.
3.122
In making these remarks, the Committee is not saying
that if DFAT had written differently during this period then the tens of
thousands of Australians going to Bali would have
cancelled their trips. But the Committee's task is to examine the performance
of agencies during this period, not to assess the responsiveness of Australian
tourists to government warnings.
3.123
In short, in the months immediately preceding the Bali
attacks, DFAT's Travel Advice for Indonesia
was not adequately commensurate with the level of threat that existed there. In
its specific references to Bali, moreover, the advice
reinforced rather than challenged erroneous beliefs about Bali's
security status.