Appendix 4 - Submission of the Australian Government to the Japanese Government on the Deregulation Promotion Program
The Australian
Government welcomes this further opportunity to make a submission to the
Government of Japan in preparation for the first revisions to the Deregulation
Promotion Program (1998-2000).
Australia sees the announcement of the
Deregulation Promotion Program as a demonstration of the Japanese Government's
continuing commitment to liberalisation of the Japanese economy. Liberalisation—and
the efficiency gains it leads to—has the potential to bring about significant
improvement in Japan's economic outlook, particularly in the medium and long
term. A more competitive and steadily growing Japanese economy is also an
important factor in reviving those economies in the Asian region which have
been confronted with financial and economic turmoil over the last twelve
months.
A vigorous
deregulation program is an essential complement to the Japanese Government's
macro-economic policies and can contribute directly to increases in consumer
demand.
This submission
contains details of regulatory issues which either directly or indirectly
affect access to the Japanese market by Australian companies. The Australian
Government has previously raised most of these issues with the Japanese
Government, either in its submissions to the Deregulation Committee, or in
other forums, or directly with the Japanese Government Agencies concerned. Some
of the requests have been refined to take into account improvements which the
Japanese Government has introduced—Australia welcomes all such improvements.
Australia looks once again to the Japanese
Government to continue its efforts to liberalise the Japanese economy and in
doing so, to return to a period of steady, sustainable growth. Australia hopes this will allow Australia's trade relationship with Japan to expand and diversify even further.
SUBMISSION OF THE
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT TO THE JAPANESE
GOVERNMENT ON THE DEREGULATION
PROMOTION PROGRAM
CONTENTS
- HOUSING
AND CONSTRUCTION
- TELECOMMUNICATIONS
- AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTS
- OTHER
I. HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION
1. Development
of performance-based standards
Problem
Australia notes that the Ministry of Construction
(MOC) is working to establish a new regulatory framework by 2000 that
accommodates performance based standards. The implementation and subsequent
application of these new standards will not automatically address the concerns
raised under previous submissions.
Australia would welcome the continued close
dialogue on the implementation and application of the new regulatory framework
through the Japan Australia Building Housing Committee, including areas such as
steel-framed housing.
Request
That
the relevant design guidelines and regulations under the Building Standard Law
of Japan be amended to ensure that design criteria give effect to the principle
that all houses be designed to the same performance-based standards, regardless
of construction materials used.
2. International
Harmonisation of Standards
Problem
Guidelines
issued by Japan's Government Home Loan Corporation
(GHLC) require the use of Japan Agricultural Standards (JAS) accredited
materials, or materials graded according to North American standards, in order
to qualify for GHLC financing.
Given the
important role GHLC has in providing housing finance in Japan, the current policy limits access for foreign building
products to those which have been accredited with the JAS mark.
Requests
- That Japan accept Australian timber grade stamps and quality assurance
systems as complying with the GHLC guidelines. Australia
is currently conducting a research program that will demonstrate how Australian
timbers comply with these guidelines.
- That Japan accept product certification marks from Australian
third-party product certification bodies that are accredited under the
accreditation rules of the Joint Accreditation System of Australia and New Zealand (JAS-ANZ).
3. Steel-framed
Housing
Problem
The Ministry of
Construction publication, `Performance Evaluation and Appraisal Standards for
Steel House Structures' indicates that steel with a thickness of 0.8mm to 2.3mm
will now be considered under Japanese regulations for inclusion in Japanese
houses. While this development is welcomed by Australia, Japanese regulations
still preclude from consideration many steel structural sections commonly used
in Australian framing. Many Australian companies are using new, innovative
steel technologies which allow for much lower thicknesses (e.g. 0.4 mm is used
in some frames), but exhibit the strength and quality characteristics of much
thicker steel.
The above-mentioned
publication also states that the 400 N/mm2
steel grade shall be the standard of strength classification in Japan.
These
non-performance-based restrictions decrease the range of cost-effective
building materials available to the Japanese builder and consumer, thereby
unnecessarily increasing costs.
Requests
- That the relevant design guidelines and
regulation under the Building Standard Law of Japan stipulating allowable steel
frame sections be amended to focus on the performance of steel sections,
rather than on their thickness.
- That regulations stipulating a 400 N/mm2 standard
strength classification be replaced by a performance-based assessment of steel
strength-performance.
II TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Australia welcomes the Japanese Government's
efforts to liberalise the telecommunications sector in Japan, but has identified a number of features of the regulatory
regime in Japan which make it difficult for new entrants
to do business in Japan. Following is an outline of regulatory
issues which have made market entry difficult for Australian firms.
1. Requirement
to hold two authorisations
Problem
Under the
Telecommunications Business Law (TBL) a Type 1 holder provides
telecommunications services using facilities established on its own. A Type 2
registration holder provides telecommunications services by leasing circuits
and facilities from Type 1 telecommunications businesses.
This means that
a Type 1 licence holder may not lease telecommunications lines or circuits to
provide its services. To provide Type 1 services where it does not own any
circuits, it is necessary for a Type 1 licensee to enter into an
interconnection agreement with other Type 1 licensees or to entrust such
services to other entities. However, such entrustment may be made only in
limited instances set out in Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT)
internal guidelines and requires the prior authorisation of the MPT.
In addition, a
single entity may only hold one authorisation, namely, a Type 1 licence or a
Type 2 registration.
For new entrants
these requirements create market access barriers. Most new entrants would seek
to provide services using facilities they would purchase, lease or access from
other telecommunications operators. Under the current regulatory regime, such
operators would be required to obtain and maintain two authorisations, namely,
a Type 1 licence and Type 2 registration (and current regulations would not
permit holding both authorisations, in any event).
Request
That Japan eliminate the Type 1/Type 2 distinction, so that a
telecommunications operator only had to obtain and maintain one licence. This
could be achieved by allowing the holder of a Type 1 licence to carry out all
the activities a Type 2 registration holder can, including leasing facilities.
The Type 1 licence holder would still be required to establish some facilities
of its own but would be allowed greater flexibility in establishing, as opposed
to leasing, its facilities. The Type 2 registration could remain unchanged,
allowing those operators which do not wish to establish facilities to provide
services through the facilities of others.
Alternatively,
if the more expansive rights under a Type 1 licence were not granted, it would
assist if one entity could hold 2 authorisations, a Type 1 licence and Type 2
registration. Maintaining two separate entities so that each one can hold one
authorisation is a significant barrier to entry into the market.
2. Subsequent
MPT approvals and requirements
Problem
Under the TBL
range of agreements, customer contracts and procedures require either
notification to or approval by the MPT prior to the commencement of services.
The requirements vary according to the type of authorisation the provider of
the services holds. However, these requirement create another administrative
layer for operators, and potentially can delay service offering and service
innovation.
Request
Australia
recommends that the MPT review these requirements and their objectives with a
view to reducing and streamlining the requirements.
3. Guidelines
not centrally located or indexed
Problem
Australian
industry considers that the TBL , and the guidelines issued by the MPT to assist
in explaining the TBL are often difficult to understand. Moreover, it seems
that-in addition to the written rules - there are a large number of unwritten
internal MPT guidelines which are not promulgated.
The MPT
guidelines are not centrally located or indexed. Australian industry has often
proceeded with its analysis of the TBL, ignorant of relevant MPT guidelines. It
has often found out about guidelines from third parties, and at a late stage of
its analysis of the TBL.
In addition,
Australia would encourage transparency in the review of the TBL and in
its implementation. The Australian government recommends that the Japanese
Government adopt "notice and comment" procedures for proposed changes
to the TBL and its implementation. Such mechanisms should be open to all
interested parties, including existing and potential operators and consumers.
To ensure that all interested parties are aware of proposed changes, Australia
recommends that a variety of notice procedures be used, e.g., web sites, industry
circulars, direct notice to registered operators. This should help to ensure
that the needs of all interest groups are met and that the regulatory regime
encourages innovation, competition and consumer benefits.
Requests
- That the guidelines explaining
the TBL should be centrally located, indexed, and readily available, e.g., on
the MPT web site. It would be helpful if an English version of the guidelines
or an index could be provided.
- That the Japanese
Government adopt transparent procedures in reviewing the TBL and its
implementation.
4. Problems
in communicating with the MPT
Problem
The process for
communicating with the MPT and seeking industry views on the TBL is costly and
causes delays. The MPT usually prefers that formal meetings are arranged at
the MPT in Tokyo to discuss issues and lodge documents. Such procedures are
especially cumbersome for foreign companies whose regulatory teams are based
overseas.
Request
That the MPT
provided a telephone, fax or email service where operators could ask
questions. This would assist both local and foreign operators.
5. Unclear
administrative requirements
Problem
Representatives
of Australian companies in Japan have frequently encountered considerable
difficulty in obtaining clear advice from the MPT. For example, under the TBL
a Type 1 licence holder provides telecommunications services using
"facilities established on its own". Australian industry is not
certain what "established on its own" means, despite considerable discussion
with the MPT. Australian industry has also heard conflicting views on the
requirement that an entity may only hold one authorisation. This has created
considerable uncertainty in respect of Australian industry's network and
regulatory requirements.
In response to inquiries
through its local lawyers, the MPT has recommended that Australian carriers
submit draft applications for the MPT to review. The MPT would then respond by
indicating whether the application is satisfactory or by pointing out what is
wrong with it. This is not entirely satisfactory. Operators need to
understand the regulatory regime so they can make business decisions about what
network infrastructure they require, what services they can provide etc., ahead
of submitting a licence application.
Request
That the MPT
issue written responses to inquiries. Such responses would assist in
clarifying the operation of the TBL. The Australian government acknowledges
that a formal written response to all inquiries could place a large strain on
MPT resources. However, some capacity for formal responses on key issues would
assist operators.
6. Interconnection
Problems
Under the TBL,
approval for interconnection arrangements and obtaining a Type 1 licence are
interdependent, i.e., you can not obtain one without the other. This
requirement causes administrative difficulties.
Under the
current interconnect arrangements, NTT requires that operators establish
separate interconnect lines for separate services.
Requests
- Australia recommends
the removal of the interdependency of agreeing interconnect arrangements and
holding a Type 1 licence. The same effect could be achieved by providing that
an operator could only provide services under an interconnect agreement if it
holds a valid licence or registration.
- That the Japanese government
permit an operator to establish a single interconnect line with NTT for a range
of services. These services would be mixed and then split into separate
services at the NTT exchange.
III AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTS
1. Rice
Problem
Australia is concerned at continued difficulties faced in
obtaining commercial access to the Japanese market.
Australia acknowledges that Japanese officials have
increased the quantity available under the May 1998 SBS tender which allows
Japanese consumers greater access to fresh Australian rice. However, this
represents only a small proportion of Japan's WTO import commitments (10% of
total imports in 1997).
A further increase in the quantity available under SBS
tenders conducted early in the Japanese fiscal year and the earlier scheduling
of some minimum access tenders would provide benefits for Japan and Australia.
It would provide more orderly distribution and allow Japanese consumers access
to fresh new season rice twice in the same year. It would also benefit
Australia, which is the only supplier with freshly harvested rice available
early in the marketing season.
The potential for regular use of imported minimum access
rice to meet Japanese Food Aid commitments is also a major concern. While the
Australian government appreciates the humanitarian reasons involved, the
agreement by WTO members to allow Japan to delay implementation of
tariffication of its rice policies during the Uruguay Round was on the
expectation that imported rice would gain genuine access to the Japanese
market, i.e. private consumers. The use of imported rice for Food Aid shipments
without ever having genuine free access to the Japanese market undermines this
outcome, and is contrary to the spirit of the Uruguay Round agreement.
Requests
- That
Japan review its timing, pricing and distribution arrangements for imported
rice, particularly under minimum access tenders, to provide a reasonable level
of access to the domestic market across the Japanese fiscal year. As part of this
process, the Japanese Government should further increase access under SBS
tenders conducted early in the Japanese fiscal year.
- That
Japan reconsider its policy of using minimum access rice in its food aid
program.
2. Sugar
Problem
The wedge between world prices and the Japanese domestic
price is supported by the Sugar Price Stabilisation Law, which features levies,
a sliding scale of surcharges and rebates. This is used to support domestic
prices.
For imported sugar, each importer is required to sell all of
the imported sugar to the Agriculture and Livestock Industries Corporation
(ALIC) at the average import price current at the time an import declaration is
made. Simultaneously, the Corporation sells the same sugar back to the same
importer at an adjusted price, after the addition of levies and surcharges, or
the deduction of rebates. This places sugar at a price disadvantage
compared to non-sugar sweeteners.
Request
That Japan
make further general reductions in its domestic target price for domestic sugar
through reductions in the tariff, rate of surcharge and rate of levy. This
would stimulate Japanese consumption and benefit the Japanese refinery and
Australian raw sugar industries.
3. State
Trading
Problem
State trading
monopsony importers such as the Food Agency have price setting authority
(including import mark-ups) and shield consumers from the potential benefits of
liberalised trade. Moreover, the Food Agency and, to a lesser extent, the
ALIC, continue to administer "in-quota" imports with wide
discretionary powers following the Uruguay Round agreements. In particular,
these include direct control over all staple foods, including rice, wheat and
other grains through the Japanese Food Agency and quota controls (for example,
on dairy products) through the ALIC.
The intervention
of these agencies in the market place adds an unnecessary barrier between
foreign suppliers and the consumer market, and maintains an often large gap
between domestic consumer prices and world prices.
Requests
- That Japan deregulate further
the operations and management of agricultural trade by the Food Agency and,
where relevant, the ALIC.
- In the interim, that
Food Agency activities should reflect, to the fullest extent possible,
prevailing market forces. Specifically, they should take steps to eliminate
the gap between domestic consumer prices and world prices.
4. Recognition
of further non-quarantine pests
Problem
Australia
welcomes changes to the Japanese Plant Protection Law that provide for
recognition of non-quarantine pests of plants and plant products. This is
consistent with Japan's obligations under the International Plant Quarantine
Convention and relevant international phytosanitary standards recognised by the
WTO/SPS Agreement.
The legislation
currently includes a list of 36 pests, although the Japanese government has
recently proposed to add a further 27 pests by the end of this year. Japan's
1998 Deregulation Promotion Program acknowledged the need to expand further the
list of non-quarantine pests. Australia endorses this initiative, and believes
that further expansion of the list will assist in relieving unjustified
technical restrictions (i.e. unnecessary commodity treatments) currently placed
on certain imports of plants and plant products from Australia and elsewhere.
However,
Australia believes that the current legal and administrative arrangements for
expanding the list are too inflexible. An appropriate administrative mechanism
should be adopted to enable the non-quarantine pest list to be updated easily,
without requiring a ministerial directive and subsequent changes to the Plant
Protection Law. In Australia's case, the plant quarantine law provides for a
codified process to be administered by officials in identifying candidate
non-quarantine pests. Officials are required to use pest risk analysis
procedures, which are technically based, transparent, and subject to comment by
interested parties.
Requests
- That Japan review the legal
and administrative procedures currently used to expand the non-quarantine pest
list. Specifically, that Japan remove the requirement for a ministerial
ordinance to change the list, and adopt a codified and transparent
administrative mechanism for this purpose.
- Australia encourages Japanese
officials to use internationally accepted pest risk analysis standards to
identify further non-quarantine pests and to examine the current list more
efficiently and in a publicly available format.
IV OTHER
1. Access
for Australian Thoroughbred Racehorses
Problem
Access to the
Japanese market for Australian race horses is restricted in a number of ways,
including by the application of discriminatory (non-national treatment)
policies by the Japan Racing Association (JRA).
The authority of
the JRA to implement such policies stems from a statutory delegation of power
by the Japanese government in accordance with the provisions of the Japan
Racing Association Law. According to Article 8 of this law, rules concerning
implementation of horse racing and registration of horse owners must be
approved by the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. Also, Article
18 (2) of the Horse Racing Act stipulates that the Minister for Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries may order the JRA to suspend "central horse races"
in the case of violation of the Act or the relevant orders under the Act.
JRA policies are
in effect government regulations, and as such, should be subject to the same
basic principles favouring deregulation and market access which have been
announced by the Japanese government.
JRA policies
currently limit the number of races which are open to foreign-bred horses.
Under these policies, in 1998 foreign-bred horses:
- which were stabled in
Japan and which had not raced overseas were only allowed to race in 52% of JRA races
("mixed races"), which should increase to 55% in 1999;
- which had raced
outside of Japan were only allowed to participate in 11 races
("international races") per year.
Race horse
owners who are not residents of Japan are prevented by JRA policies from
registering with the JRA. Under Article 13 of the Horse Race Act, owners who
are not registered with the JRA are not able to enter their horses in races
organised by the JRA ("central horse races").
Requests
- That Japan eliminate all
restrictions on foreign-bred racehorses' participating in races controlled by
the JRA.
- That the JRA review the
rules concerning the registration of racehorses in Japan in order to allow
foreign owners to set up and operate stables in Japan. Specifically, that the
JRA eliminate the rules preventing non-residents from registering with the JRA
and the rules preventing the racing of horses in Japan by non-residents.
2. Legal Services
A: Restriction on advising on third country law
Problem
As a result of recent changes to Japanese legislation,
registered foreign legal consultants are permitted to advise on third country
law with written advice from foreign lawyers qualified in that third country.
These recent amendments were intended to liberalise the rules governing the
provision of advice on third country law by foreign legal consultants.
However, it is not clear why foreign legal consultants should be subject to any
restrictions on advising on third country law to which Japanese lawyers are not
subject, particularly as neither may have qualifications in the law of that
third country. Accordingly, the conditions for foreign legal consultants to
advise on third country law should be made the same as the conditions for
Japanese lawyers.
Request
That registered foreign legal consultants be permitted to
advise on third country law on the same basis as Japanese lawyers.
B: Experience requirements for foreign legal
consultants
Problem
Recent legislative changes reduced the experience required
to register as a foreign legal consultant from five to three years, while at
the same time reducing the amount of time spent in Japan that would count
toward meeting that requirement from two years to one year. In gaining the
experience necessary to qualify as a foreign legal consultant, lawyers can
benefit from working under the supervision of a lawyer from their home
jurisdiction, regardless of whether they are working in their home jurisdiction
or elsewhere. For this reason, people attempting to qualify as registered
legal consultants in Japan should be given credit for all experience
gained working under the supervision of a lawyer from their home jurisdiction.
Recent amendments to Japanese legislation permit a foreign
lawyer to count toward meeting the experience required to register as a foreign
legal consultant the time spent practising the law of the lawyer's home
jurisdiction in a third country. Against this background, the one year maximum
now permitted for work experience in Japan should be removed, and all
experience gained working in Japan under the supervision of a lawyer from a
person's home jurisdiction should be able to be counted.
Despite these changes, however, it would seem that the
additional experience requirements in Japan to practise home country law should
be removed, particularly where there is no such requirement in the foreign
legal consultant's home jurisdiction. In the case of Australia, if a lawyer
has an unrestricted practice certificate to practise the law of Australia, it
does not seem reasonable that there should be further experience requirements
to practice that same law, regardless of where that law is being practised.
Requests
- That
Japan recognise the experience gained in a foreign lawyers' home jurisdiction
to acquire an unrestricted practising certificate as sufficient for the
purposes of gaining registration to practice the law of that home jurisdiction
in Japan.
- Failing
such recognition, that where a lawyer applies for registration in Japan to
practice law which applies in a foreign country then that lawyer may be
credited with experience gained in Japan under the supervision of a lawyer from
that foreign country.
3. Financial Services
Problem
Australia welcomed the commitments on market access made by
Japan at the conclusion of the 1997 WTO financial services negotiations.
However, a number of requests made by Australia remain unaddressed by Japan.
There are also existing impediments to competition by foreign firms in the
Japanese market which are largely the result of slow and cumbersome Japanese
regulatory processes.
Requests
- That
Japan meet Australia's outstanding requests, and formalise the results of
regulatory reform of the financial system including on the following matters:
- Deregulation of
foreign exchange controls.
- Moves to remove
barriers to banks, securities and insurance companies competing in each others'
main business areas. The law to implement these reforms was passed on 5 June
1998 and the reforms will come into effect by the end of March 2001. At
present there is some scope for these financial services companies to enter
each others' business areas through financial holding companies.
- Moves to lower
barriers separating commercial banks, long term credit banks and trust banks. A law which will permit each type of bank to possess subsidiaries that are
engaged in other banking business will come into effect from 1 December 1998.
- The
Australian government also seeks further improvements to the product approval
process. Although it appears that applications are now to be processed within
90 days from the date of acceptance, clear criteria nonetheless need to be
developed as to what constitutes "acceptance" in the opinion of the
relevant authorities. To date Japan has not responded to this request.
- Finally,
that Japan make a real and substantial commitment to competition principles,
taking appropriate measures to prevent anti-competitive practices.
4. Fast Ferries
Problem
Approximately 90 per cent of Australian production of high
speed aluminium ferries is now exported with Australia holding 40 per cent of
the world market.
Despite its success, Australia has sold very few high speed
fast ferries to Japan. While it is the leading supplier to the international
car ferry market, Australia has not been successful in winning any tenders in
Japan in this category. At the same time, Japan has not been able to sell a
single domestically-produced car ferry overseas.
The Australian marine industry and the Australian Government
obtained significant dispensation from the requirements of the Japanese
Maritime Credit Corporation (MCC, as it then was) during 1996-7. While these
concessions are welcome, it would appear that non tariff activity in the
Japanese market remains.
This is evidenced in non-tariff `disincentives' administered
by Japanese regulatory bodies for example:
- no mutually agreed English
translation of the Corporation for Advanced Transport and Technology (CATT)
quality standards
- difficulties have arisen when
relying on translations that the CATT has not verified;
Request
That the CATT
provide a standard English translation of all contractual documents, including
the relevant quality standards.
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