Chapter 6
Response team and interagency coordination
6.1
The government is confronted with two major considerations when it first
learns that an Australian has been taken captive overseas—mobilising its
resources to effect the safe and expeditious release of the captive and
assisting the family and friends of the kidnapped victim.
6.2
In this chapter, the committee looks at the government's immediate
response to reports of an Australian kidnapped overseas and its subsequent
actions to secure the victim's release. In the following chapter, the committee
considers the manner in which departments liaise with, and support, family
members during the captive's detention.
Consular Response Group (1996)
6.3
In cases of kidnapping abroad, Australia's no-ransom approach limits its
options. Even so, DFAT informed the committee that it has 'clear and
established procedures' that govern its response to any incident involving the
kidnapping of an Australian overseas.[1]
6.4
In May 1996, DFAT established the Consular Response Group (CRG) to
manage major or complicated consular cases that 'entail particular difficulties
for the department', including hostage cases.[2]
At the time, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon Alexander Downer, described
this initiative as 'giving a powerful boost' to the government's ability to
handle sensitive and complex situations.[3]
The group comprised three officers at differing levels, 'combining skills for
varying backgrounds'.[4]
Soon after it was established, the group had a key role in negotiations when an
Australian pilot was detained in Somalia for four months by militia forces.[5]
On his release in October 1996, the minister praised the group for performing 'admirably
in exactly the role for which it was created'. In this case an officer from within
the department travelled to Nairobi to work directly on the case.[6]
6.5
In its 1997 report on consular services, the committee recognised that
the only feasible and appropriate way to handle a crisis such as a kidnapping
was through 'a specialist unit'. It commended DFAT for establishing the CRG but
recommended that the department ensure that the group was adequately resourced
and that the optimal level of expertise was maintained within it at all times.[7]
6.6
Although no longer named the Consular Response Group, DFAT has people in
the department ready to respond to an overseas incident such as the kidnapping
of an Australian citizen. For example, in the case of Mr Wood, the department
dispatched promptly a sizable task force of senior level personnel to Baghdad,
led by a Deputy Secretary, Mr Nick Warner.[8]
At that time, Australia's diplomatic and military presence in that country was
already high due to the Iraq war, which made this particular response possible.
6.7
It should be noted, however, that the government’s ability to dispatch a
team to another country in response to a kidnapping is severely constrained by
a number of factors. Kidnappings may occur in a remote and lawless region of a
country with which Australia has no diplomatic ties. Even where friendly
relations exist between the two countries, Australia must respect the other’s
sovereignty. In such cases, Australia may offer to assist in resolving the
hostage situation, usually through the offices of its Embassy or High
Commission. But that decision and the extent to which the country would accept
Australia’s involvement rests with the local authorities. In other incidents,
the Australian victim may be part of a larger hostage group requiring complex
negotiations and liaison with the respective governments. The cases of
kidnappings cited in chapter 2 demonstrate the limitations placed on
Australia’s ability to send a response team into the country where an
Australian may be held captive or indeed the wisdom in doing so. These
considerations are taken into account when an emergency response team meets to
determine the best means of securing the safe return of the victim.
Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force
6.8
DFAT informed the committee that it undertakes contingency planning
across all aspects of consular operations, which takes account of the
government’s preparedness to deal with major international incidents and crises
overseas such as the kidnapping of an Australian citizen. According to DFAT,
its contingency planning includes information gathering and analysis; desktop
and scenario exercises; liaison with other Australian government agencies; and
consultations with partner governments and governments in high-risk locations. DFAT
participates in the contingency planning exercises of other countries.[9]
The committee now looks in greater detail at the government's response to a
kidnapping incident overseas.
6.9
Despite the differences and specific circumstances of each kidnapping,
DFAT informed the committee that ‘there are core principles that can be
applied’ in determining its response to any kidnapping situation and these
protocols reflect DFAT's experience.[10]
Ms Bird informed the committee that first and foremost, the government would do
everything it could within the bounds of the no-ransom policy to help secure
the release of any Australian kidnap victim.[11]
For example, DFAT explained that some incidents of kidnapping require a more
comprehensive response that draws on the expertise of a range of government
agencies.[12]
In such cases, a number of key government departments or agencies swing into
action when an Australian citizen is kidnapped overseas, including DFAT; the
Attorney-General's Department; intelligence agencies, such as ASIO; the AFP;
and Defence.[13]
The extent of their involvement depends on the nature and circumstances of the
kidnapping.
6.10
DFAT leads the whole-of-government response through an Inter-Departmental
Emergency Task Force (IDETF) which assumes a coordinating role across
government covering all relevant government agencies.[14]
This response draws on every available source of information and assistance to
contribute to resolving the kidnapping and to support the kidnap victim and
their families.[15]
Once alerted to an incident, the task force will proceed straightaway to
examine the issues.[16]
DFAT explained:
As a first step, DFAT will activate and chair an
Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF). This is supported by a
dedicated unit within the Consular, Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs
Division. Membership of the IDETF will be broad, including not only core
agencies with specific expertise and information but all agencies that can
contribute to an effective whole-of-government response. This is an important
element in ensuring that every possible lead, suggestion or offer of assistance
or information is fully explored.[17]
6.11
As an example of the expertise provided by specific agencies, Ms Bird cited
the AFP which handles hostage negotiations—DFAT do not get involved in the
actual conduct of the negotiations, the details and how that is done.[18]
The AFP explained that its response to an incident would be in support of the
IDETF and typically 'comprise investigative, negotiator and intelligence
capability'. It would also work to achieve full cooperation, on a
police-to-police basis, with any relevant foreign law enforcement agency.[19]
Assistant Commissioner Ramzi Jabbour explained that the AFP's role is normally
one of working through its international network:
...to liaise and provide support, if appropriate, to local law
enforcement authorities in that regard. We could also potentially provide
intelligence to them from the families and other next of kin to be able to
assist in the negotiation process.[20]
6.12
Australia's intelligence community would also become involved. The Australian
Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) highlighted the importance of
indentifying a lead intelligence agency at the earliest stages of a kidnapping
to support the work of DFAT and the AFP. It explained:
A lead agency fulfils the important role of driving and
coordinating the whole-of-intelligence community effort, as well as providing a
single point of contact on intelligence issues for DFAT and the AFP.[21]
6.13
ASIO recognised the necessity to determine the lead agency on a
case-by-case basis, taking account of the circumstances of the kidnapping and
responsibilities of the various Australian Intelligence Community (AIC)
agencies:
It would be appropriate, for example, for ASIO to act as lead
agency when a kidnapping involves individuals or groups engaged in activities
relevant to security. Absent a link to security issues for which ASIO has
mandate—for example in the case of a criminally-inspired kidnapping—the lead
intelligence agency role would fall to another AIC agency.[22]
6.14
The Attorney-General's Department noted that on being informed about the
kidnapping of an Australian overseas, its Office of International Law would not
wait to be asked to get involved but would immediately commence looking at the
issues. Mr Geoffrey McDonald, First Assistant Secretary, National Law and
Policy Division, Attorney-General's Department, explained that the advice his
department could offer in the first 24 hours could be provided very quickly:
...if that happened [need for advice on a kidnapping], the
phone would be ringing at six o'clock in the morning or something like that. We
can provide advice quickly about what the scope of the law is, but to apply it
to a particular circumstance depends a lot on the facts, which are not clear.[23]
6.15
In some cases ADF capabilities may be called on to assist in resolving
an overseas kidnapping (see paragraphs 4.28–4.32).
Government-to-government assistance
and links with non-government organisations
6.16
In the international context, DFAT indicated that it would cooperate
with the government of the country in which the kidnapping happened:
...to ensure all appropriate action to resolve the situation is
pursued actively, while maintaining the safety interests of the Australian who
is kidnapped. This generally involves significant representations and liaison
at various levels of government.[24]
6.17
In addition and where appropriate, DFAT would work closely with
colleagues from other governments, including but not limited to Australia's key
consular partners: New Zealand, the United States, the United Kingdom and
Canada.[25]
DFAT Acting First Assistant Secretary, Consular, Public Diplomacy and
Parliamentary Affairs Division, Mr Jon Philp, stated as an example:
I should also point out that the Canadians do, unfortunately,
have a great deal more experience than us on these sorts of issues and they
will closely engage with us and we listen very carefully to what they have to
say. [26]
6.18
DFAT would also liaise with other foreign services that may have 'detailed
on-the-ground knowledge or influence' and directly or indirectly, draw on the
assistance of Australian and international non-government organisations that
may have particular skills or expertise in the relevant location'.[27]
According to DFAT this liaison and cooperation with countries:
...can be invaluable in providing access to additional
information or insights, including into the circumstances of the location
concerned and the group or organisation responsible for the kidnapping or
adding pressure or influence on the kidnappers. Other countries may also have
direct experience of kidnappings in the same region.[28]
6.19
According to DFAT, in some cases, it may work with local intermediaries,
able to provide further information or insights, or bring influence to bear.[29]
As part of this action, the department would make use of intelligence networks.
Overall, DFAT would seek information from 'any avenue possible to support a
comprehensive, whole-of-government response'.[30]
6.20
The success of the task force depends, by and large, on the extent to
which the respective agencies work in unison toward the protection and safe
release of the hostage and the assistance they can elicit from overseas
countries and organisations well placed to assist in achieving this objective. The
experience, expertise and preparedness of the members of the team will also
determine the effectiveness of their performance.
Family views on the response
6.21
The experiences of the Brennan family and to a lesser extent the Wood
family do not match the description provided by the government agencies which contemplates
a prompt, focused and well coordinated response to kidnappings. According to Dr
Wood, the foreign affairs officials generally were savvy. He felt that they
were 'very alive to the implications of a kidnapped citizen and the kinds of
demands that would be placed on the family'.[31]
Overall, he described the contingency planning for the crisis and the speedy
actions of the task force as 'impressive'.[32]
Dr Wood indicated that although DFAT did not have a role in securing his
brother's release, it managed to 'keep the lines of communication open' and
possibly delayed what might have been an execution.[33]
He stated:
From the first traumatic day, I felt very strongly that there
was a structure. It was impressive that Nick Warner, with a team—I knew it
included police and I took that it included intelligence—flew off that very
day. They were prepared for a contingency such as happened. They had no
foreknowledge of who exactly would be involved. But they were prepared for such
a contingency. That was impressive. Such a response may have applied, I guess,
only to someone kidnapped in Iraq, of all places.[34]
6.22
Dr Wood was critical of the AFP, however, whose role within government was
to advise the family on negotiation strategies. In his view, the AFP officers
did not seem to have the same degree of savvy as DFAT: the officers' 'expertise
in negotiation strategies was limited'.[35]
He stated that the recording equipment installed in his and his brother's home
to record all phone conversations appeared 'antiquated':
My wife and I had a recording device put into our home within
days of the crisis outset, which was adequate; it recorded phone conversation,
incoming and my own voice or my wife's voice, so there was that sort of very
technical somewhat clunky assistance.[36]
6.23
He also suggested that the AFP's briefing of the family, and him, in
particular, was not particularly sophisticated:
Officers provided briefing of a standard nature on what to
note and say in the event of a call. Higher-level officers, of the
Counter-Terrorism Unit, briefed me on negotiation strategies. Apart from the
proof-of-life question, the strategies seemed basic. Our impression was that
the officers' expertise in negotiation strategies was limited.[37]
6.24
An interagency team was also formed during the early days of Mr
Brennan's kidnapping which included DFAT, the AFP and the Queensland Police.[38]
According to Mr Brennan:
Four special operational units were set up to support what
became known as 'Operation Mane'. Three were established in Australia, one at
my family home in Moore Park, one in Brisbane and the other in Canberra. The
fourth was based in Nairobi, Kenya to more readily facilitate direct
negotiations with the kidnappers in neighbouring Somalia.[39]
6.25
Mr Brennan noted that no government agency explained to him or his
family which departments or agencies, aside from DFAT and the AFP, were
involved in the operation, how they interacted and coordinated their activities,
their role, functions and strategies.[40]
Mrs Bonney indicated that after some initial confusion, the family was informed
that although Nigel's kidnapping was a matter under DFAT's jurisdiction, the
AFP would be the lead investigative agency.[41]
She noted further that the AFP were 'unable to mobilize rapidly enough' so the
Queensland Police were called on to assist.[42]
6.26
Based on his and his family's experience, Mr Brennan suggested that the government
departments 'did not work together at all'.[43]
He noted that the Queensland Police Service were there from the start but that
one of their best negotiators was tasked out in the first week because of
jurisdictional issues.[44]
Mr Brennan explained:
He was someone that had bonded with the family as well. He
was teaching my sister, Nicole, how to basically negotiate with the kidnappers.
My family loved the idea of community policing, and then this government
department was thrown into the house and those guys were basically told to
leave without even saying goodbye to my family. And it was only the Queensland
police guys that actually pulled my family aside and said, 'We have been told
that we have got to go'.[45]
6.27
Furthermore, the various government agencies were providing conflicting
information to the Brennan family indicating a breakdown in communication
between them. As an example, Mr Brennan informed the committee that DFAT made
clear that it would not pay a ransom or facilitate a ransom while, at the same
time, the AFP was asking his family 'its net worth and was telling them to
liquidate assets to pay a ransom'.[46]
Indeed, Nicole Bonney told the committee that on day 7 of her brother's incarceration,
the family received a directive through the AFP negotiators stationed in the
family home 'to acquire as much instant cash as possible'.[47]
Such action directly contradicted advice given to the family 'clearly and
repeatedly that the Australian government does not pay ransoms'.[48]
6.28
Not only did there appear to be a confused understanding of this no-ransom
policy across agencies, but a lack of consistency or, at the very least,
clarity in its application.
6.29
As the kidnapping also involved a Canadian citizen, the Australian and
Canadian governments worked in conjunction.[49]
Again there is evidence of inconsistency in policy. Nicole Bonney told the
committee that at a meeting about six weeks after the kidnapping, family members
were informed about the 'joint governments' mechanics of a kidnapping'.[50]
It was explained to them that continuous communication with the kidnappers was
essential to establish a rapport with the kidnappers. Both the next of kin
negotiator and government negotiators in Nairobi had this role. She then
explained that without their knowledge or discussion the Australian government
in conjunction with the Canadian government implemented a strategy of not
communicating with the kidnappers at all.[51]
In her view, this approach was 'the polar opposite to what had been previously
described as essential kidnapping negotiator techniques'.[52]
Moreover, according to Mrs Bonney this strategy was eventually discarded three
weeks after the family raised their serious concerns with the Minister about
this strategy.[53]
Managing a hostage crisis
6.30
Mr Brennan was of the view that the Australian government's management
of his case for 10½ months may have prolonged his period in captivity.[54]
His sister believed that the strategies implemented by the Australian
government were ineffective and that Nigel's kidnapping 'was beyond the realm
of the Australian government's knowledge and capabilities'.[55]
She told the committee:
The Australian government had the finances and resources but
not the ability to facilitate Nigel's release. We had none of that and achieved
what the Australian government could not do—his freedom.[56]
6.31
A member of a response team dealing with international kidnap for ransom
and threat extortion for the insurance sector for 18 years was of the same
opinion. In his estimation, Australia's response to Nigel Brennan's kidnapping
was naïve and:
...the actions or lack thereof taken by the Australian
Government were directly responsible for increased suffering and prolonging the
time in captivity of Nigel Brennan.[57]
6.32
The committee understands that DFAT officials do not have a great deal
of long-term practical expertise with kidnappings abroad. Mr Philp informed the
committee that following the Wood kidnapping, some of the members of that team
were immediately put onto the Brennan case after his kidnapping. [58]
He also noted that in terms of obtaining expertise at the outset of, and
throughout, the case, particularly on the ground in Nairobi where DFAT's
forward team was based, DFAT spoke to private companies that specialise in
hostage release. According to Mr Philp, the discussions involved the companies'
'experience in Somalia, how they dealt with it and what they could suggest to
us about methods, operations, tactics and so on'. [59]
6.33
Considering the department's access to countries such as Canada and the
private companies, Mr Philp was of the view that despite the intermittent
requirement to respond to a hostage situation in a practical sense, DFAT
officers 'upskill very quickly as it happens'.[60]
He noted that, since the Brennan case, DFAT have not had specific discussions
with the specialist K&R groups about how to create a degree of expertise that
would take the department through to the next incident. In his view, consular
people undertake a lot of training that is relevant but not specifically with
the private sector.[61]
6.34
Ms Bird noted, however, that the role of specialist K&R companies was
to negotiate ransoms. She reminded the committee that the 'basic starting point
is that the government will not negotiate a ransom payment'. She explained:
We do not do that; that is not our role. So we have talked to
other governments and others who are involved in kidnapping about how they
handle the case and what you can do short of facilitating a ransom payment.
Since we are not going to pay a ransom, that particular expertise is not
relevant.[62]
6.35
The committee is of the view that the department may not have fully
appreciated the work and extent of expertise of those engaged in this K&R activity.
The committee took evidence in camera from people active in this field of managing
a release through the payment of a ransom. DFAT's lack of understanding means that
its officers are missing out on a vital source of intelligence and not tapping
into a wealth of practical experience. Consequently, they are not well placed
to provide advice to families who may wish to go down the path toward paying a
ransom.
6.36
If private companies are to continue to assume a role in securing the
release of hostages, it is imperative that DFAT have a sound understanding and
appreciation of their work. One of the kidnap and ransom consultants informed
the committee that he would 'relish the opportunity to run simulation based
training for crisis management teams' and have more dialogue and interaction to
demonstrate the expertise that exists.[63]
6.37
The committee is of the view that government agencies handling a hostage
situation could benefit from obtaining intelligence and advice from such
consultants to assist in their assessment of the situation and analysis of
options. Keeping in mind, DFAT's statement that it would seek information from
'any avenue possible to support a comprehensive, whole-of-government response',
the committee believes that the department should be more open to engaging with
K&R companies.[64]
6.38
Clearly, if the government's policy is no ransom and no concessions to
kidnappers in a situation where the payment of a ransom offers the safest and
quickest route to freedom, then it must accept its limitations and assist
others more suited to the task as best it can.
A specialist unit in DFAT
6.39
Despite the rapid response by a specialist team to his brother's
kidnapping, Dr Wood was of the view that there is a role for a special unit or
special training for people in the Public Service who would be ready for any
future kidnapping. He believed that such a capacity should exist and would like
to think that 'there are people in the consular branch of Foreign Affairs and
police who might [have] greater expertise' than he felt they had six years ago.[65]
Mr Martinkus 'wholeheartedly endorsed' such a proposal for a specialist team.[66]
6.40
The findings of the McCarthy review suggested that the present day equivalent
of the CRG, needed to be reinvigorated and improved. It recommended the
establishment of a regular, high level and whole of government coordinating
group to ensure a core group remains abreast of kidnapping issues and to form
the nucleus of a future response. DFAT informed the committee that an interdepartmental
emergency task force (IDETF) of key agencies has met to discuss the
recommendations of the McCarthy Review. This group will form the nucleus of a
regular coordinating group.[67]
6.41
The committee believes that the need for a specialist group designed to
respond to incidents such as kidnapping remains as strong now as it was when
the CRG was established in 1996. It fully supports the establishment of a regular,
whole of government coordinating group. It recognises, however, the difficulty
keeping a team well trained and prepared to manage a crisis such as an overseas
hostage situation when such incidents occur infrequently. The main concern is
that staff rotations and the irregularity of incidents may erode the enthusiasm
and support for the team over time. A second important matter that the
committee believes that DFAT needs to consider is the management of a protracted
hostage situation such as the Brennan case.
Recommendation 2
6.42 The committee supports the establishment of the regular, whole of
government coordinating group and recommends that DFAT give close consideration
to how it can maintain the high level of skills that members of an
interdepartmental emergency task force require to respond effectively to a
kidnapping incident overseas.
Recommendation 3
6.43 In particular, the committee recommends that the coordinating group:
- commits to regular meetings and keeping up-to-date with global
developments in kidnapping and hostage taking;
- assumes responsibility for ensuring that there is a pool of
specially trained personnel across all relevant agencies ready to respond to an
incident such as a kidnapping abroad;
- oversees the training regime of this pool of specialists that
places a high priority on continuous improvement in interagency coordination
and cooperation through joint training programs and workshops;
- in consultation with other countries and organisations
involved in resolving hostage situations, explores and develops strategies for
dealing with protracted hostage episodes; and
- gives special attention to developing a pool of personnel
ready to take on the functions of family liaison and ensures that this sub
group is seen as an integral part of any interdepartmental emergency task force
(see recommendation at paragraph 7.52).
6.44
The McCarthy review also suggested that the government consider
establishing a bipartisan convention on handling of abductions, particularly
those with a national security element.[68]
DFAT informed the committee that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has directed
DFAT to provide further recommendations on establishing a bipartisan convention
and the Opposition have indicated that they are supportive in principle.[69]
6.45
Finally in this regard, the McCarthy review recommended the
establishment of a regular consultative mechanism with partner countries, to
discuss the broad complexities of kidnapping cases and opportunities for
cooperation. DFAT informed the committee that it would be meeting with partner
countries as part of regular consular talks soon. According to the department,
kidnapping is one agenda item and the government will look to develop further
cooperation with our partners on this issue.
6.46
The committee welcomes these initiatives and would like to be kept
informed of developments toward the bipartisan, or more appropriately multi-partisan,
convention and the consultative mechanism with partner countries.
Conclusion
6.47
The committee recognises the need for DFAT to have a small specialised,
highly trained unit ready to be activated should a crisis such as a hostage
situation develop overseas. The small group should have the knowledge,
experience, skills and institutional linkages to be able to marshal the
resources of relevant agencies to deal with the matter. It should also be aware
of its limitations, especially in respect of Australia's no-ransom policy, and
be ready and willing to provide assistance to others who may be in a better
position to secure the release of a hostage.
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