Chapter 11 - Australia
and China's
foreign policy
11.1
East Asia is of fundamental
importance to Australia:
it is where Australia's
immediate interests and responsibilities reside.[722] Australia
faces many challenges in managing its relations with countries in East
Asia particularly as China's
rapidly growing economic and strategic influence reshapes the neighbourhood.
This chapter begins with a review of China's
foreign policy before looking at Australia's
unilateral, bilateral and multilateral approach to dealing with the changing
environment in the region.
China's
foreign policy
11.2
Three major forces shape China's relations with the
outside world—the need for domestic harmony and regional stability to ensure
China's continued economic development, the drive to secure energy supplies and
its national identity as a good neighbour and responsible world citizen. They
have given rise to a foreign policy whose first principle is 'peaceful
development'. In keeping with this stated policy, China is deliberately
cultivating friendly relations with its ASEAN neighbours, with countries rich
in the natural resources it needs to sustain economic growth and is presenting
itself to its citizens and the outside world as an advocate of global accord.
It wants to reassure the world that its rise is peaceful and does not pose a
threat to any country.[723]
11.3
Although China
clearly enunciates its wish to develop friendly and cooperative relations with
the outside world, doubts about its intentions persist.[724] Many countries publicly praise and
welcome China's
friendly foreign policy yet some remain unsure of its long-term designs.[725] Smaller countries, especially those
with important economic links with China,
such as Australia,
are keen to strengthen their political and diplomatic relations with China
but are aware that the relationship is not risk free.
11.4
A number of witnesses questioned the extent of
influence that China
may exert over Australia.
In his submission to the inquiry, Professor
Colin Mackerras,
emeritus professor of Asian Studies at Griffith
University, noted that:
Given the size of China
and its economy compared to Australia,
it is hardly surprising that China
matters much more to Australia
in trade terms than the other way around.[726]
11.5
A common concern is that Australia
may compromise on matters of principle so as not to upset the relationship and
the maintenance of good trading links with China.
Professor Stuart
Harris from the Research School of Pacific
and Asian Studies at the Australian National University (ANU), has referred to
economic coercion, which could include the withdrawal of economic
relationships, as an important potential weapon in itself and 'a factor in
Chinese thinking'.[727] Professor
John Fitzgerald,
professor of Asian Studies at La Trobe University, made a similar observation:
Generally speaking it is reasonable to say that in the
contemporary world order countries get their way by pushing people around. It
is not unusual for...cultural representatives of one country to intimate to
business leaders of another that they would lose a contract unless something
was done about some other totally unrelated issue; like you might go to wage
war in order to win a trade concession. This linkage of trade with other issues
is now quite widespread. China
does not hesitate to use that kind of intimidation with anyone in relation to
business. There is nothing that is unique to Australia
about that. It is unfortunate, but it strikes me as fairly commonplace.[728]
11.6
Mr Peter
Jennings, Director the Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, suggested that Australia
and China have
'sought to secure their economic relationship by tacitly agreeing not to stress
the issues that either party finds difficult to handle'.[729] Professor
Bruce Jacobs,
professor of Asian Languages and Studies at Monash
University, was of the view that Australia
chooses to play down or ignore troubling aspects of China's
development because of China's
influence. He asked, 'Why do we feel a need to kowtow to China’s
leadership even before they say anything? Is it because in the past the Chinese
have thrown a few hissy fits?'[730] Dr
Stephen Morgan,
a research associate of the Australian Centre for International Business,
argued that Australia
should not let short-term developments get in the way of Australia
upholding principles related to democracy and economic institutions.[731]
11.7
The Prime Minister of Australia, the Hon.
John Howard,
recently commented on Australia's
approach to managing tensions in its relations with China.
In an address to the Asia Society, he stated that 'Australia's
relationship with China
further illustrates what can be achieved when countries focus on the substance
of common interests'. He told the audience that Australia
seeks to build on shared goals and not 'become obsessed by those things that
make us different'.[732]
11.8
Despite diplomatic efforts to remain on friendly terms
with China,
there are circumstances where Australia
may be in a situation requiring choices involving competing interests. Indeed,
many analysts have noted that Australia
has a difficult task in charting a careful diplomatic course that would avoid
any confrontation with China
while remaining on good terms with a major regional partner who may be in
dispute with China.
11.9
The following section looks at China's
engagement with particular organisations or countries and its significance for Australia.
China and
ASEAN countries
11.10
A number of regional fora designed to improve economic,
political, security, social and cultural cooperation between its members have
come into existence over recent decades. China
is actively cultivating friendly relations with countries in the region and
participating constructively in regional multilateral fora, such as ASEAN and
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), often taking a leadership role in initiating
projects or programs.[733]
11.11
ASEAN is one of the most important regional fora,
promoting cooperation and building a broad community base in East
Asia. Although Australia
is not a member of ASEAN, it became ASEAN's first dialogue partner in 1974 and
is currently one of ASEAN's 10 dialogue partners. The committee believes that
it is important for Australia
to continue to show an interest in ASEAN and to demonstrate a willingness to
cooperate in furthering its aims to improve regional cooperation. The committee
would like to see Australia
strengthen its relationship with the ASEAN Secretariat (see recommendation 1 at
paragraph 3.90).
ASEAN Regional Forum
11.12
Both China
and Australia
participate in the ARF which is concerned with key regional political and
security issues of consequence to the region. The committee recognises that the
ARF plays an important role in facilitating dialogue on regional security
issues, as well as more generally assisting to foster mutual understanding in
the Asia-Pacific region (see paragraphs 3.44–3.52). It creates an atmosphere of
cooperation and confidence building that enables countries in the region to
address, and even resolve, issues that they might not otherwise discuss (see
recommendation 1 at paragraph 3.90).
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC)
11.13
APEC is another important regional forum and one that Australia
strongly supports. The committee recognises the significant role that APEC has
in the region, not only in facilitating trade, but in promoting regional
cooperation, goodwill and security. It is important for Australia
to ensure that APEC remains relevant to its members and active in pursuing
regional goals.[734] The committee
believes that Australia
should take a lead role to ensure that APEC remains relevant and on track by
revitalising the process. Having said so, the committee supports equally the
work being done in other regional fora such as ASEAN, ARF and the East Asia
Summit. It believes that they also have an important place in developing a
sense of regional community and warrant the strongest support from Australia
(see recommendation 1, paragraph 3.90).
The East Asia
Summit
11.14
Although a strong advocate of the EAS, China
has made clear that it supports ASEAN's leading role in the Summit.[735] Australia's
policy makers are of the view that the East Asia Summit has the potential to
build a stronger and more cohesive East Asian community. Furthermore, they
acknowledge that it is in Australia's
long-term interests to be an active participant in the Summit
and the growing regional community. After indicating its intention to sign the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, Australia
was invited to attend the inaugural meeting of the East Asia Summit (see
paragraph 3.69–3.82).
11.15
Australia's
acceptance into the EAS marked a general recognition by East Asian countries,
including China,
that Australia
has an important and constructive place in the region. The exclusion of the United
States from this summit has, however, raised
concerns and ignited debate about the role of the United
States in the region.
11.16
The committee believes that Australia
must remain engaged in the EAS and that it acknowledge that the Summit
is as important as other major regional fora such as ASEAN and APEC (see
recommendation 1, paragraph 3.90).
Summary—regional fora
11.17
Although sometimes criticised for their failure or slowness
in producing positive results, ASEAN, the ARF and APEC provide an ideal
environment in which Australia,
together with other smaller like-minded countries, can pursue their interests.[736] ASEAN, the ARF and APEC allow
countries in the region that are in dispute, or whose relations are strained,
to resolve their difficulties with the support and encouragement of their neighbours.
The recently formed EAS also has the potential to promote the goodwill needed
to foster greater regional cooperation.
11.18
The committee believes that Australia
must continue to participate actively in regional fora and encourage other
countries, especially the U.S.,
to demonstrate its support for the broader objectives of ASEAN, including the
ARF. The committee believes that Australia
must do its utmost to encourage the U.S.
to remain constructively engaged in the region (see Recommendations 1 and 2,
paragraphs 3.90 and 5.26).
China and
the United States
11.19
Australia
has made clear that it is a strong and staunch ally of the United
States. The Australian Prime Minister, the Hon.
John Howard,
has stressed the importance of Australia's
friendship with the United States:
America
has no more reliable ally than Australia,
and I'm not ashamed to say that because in the long run it's only America
that could be our ultimate security guarantee. But we have interests in Asia.
We have a separate, strong growing relationship with China
and it is not in Australia's
interests for there to be conflict between America
and China, and
I will do everything I can, and Mr Downer
will do everything he can, to discourage that ever occurring.[737]
11.20
He has stated, however, that Australia
is not an agent of the United States
and that it does not have a role as a mediator or regional broker. Both the
Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have made it clear that Australia's
primary role in the region is to help friends.[738]
11.21
The health of the Sino–U.S. bilateral relationship is
of vital importance to Australia,
as it is to every other nation in the region. The U.S.
has provided a strong security presence in the region, while China's
rapid economic development will be of enormous benefit to other regional
economies hoping to 'piggyback' on China's
successes. This dual benefit—stability and growth—depends, however, on the U.S.
and China remaining on relatively good terms, thus negating the need for other
countries in the region to choose between them, and by extension, the benefits
each provides. As Mr Peter
Jennings has written, 'we have not yet been
forced to choose between Beijing
and Washington'.[739] So long as the relationship remains
friendly and mutually beneficial, Australia
can pursue relations with China
and maintain strong alliance with U.S.
11.22
As discussed in Chapter 5, China
has publicly indicated that it is comfortable with Australia's
long and continuing alliance with the U.S.[740]
There are a number of plausible explanations for this mentioned in earlier
sections of this report. The U.S.
has helped provide the relatively stable regional security environment that has
underpinned Chinese economic growth. Furthermore, the Chinese are aware that
the U.S.–Australia alliance is Australia's
most important strategic partnership for ensuring Australia's
own security, one that Australia
will not contemplate compromising. China
understands Australia's
security priorities and does not reject their legitimacy. It may also value Australia's
closeness to the U.S.
as a means by which to press a positive, moderate view of China
within Washington
policy-making circles (see paragraphs 5.44–5.53).
11.23
Australia
is also in a sound position in terms of avoiding U.S.
concern over Australia's
increasingly close relations with China.
The U.S. has
enjoyed unwavering Australian support for its activities in Iraq
and Afghanistan
in the face of widespread disquiet elsewhere over U.S.
foreign policy. Both the Australian and U.S.
governments have commented on the strength of the contemporary alliance. Citing
the international editor of the Australian,
Mr Paul Kelly,
Dr Peter Edwards
has suggested that the assuredness of the alliance may provide Australia
with the diplomatic leverage to pursue closer relations with China.[741] There is no indication that Australia
is maintaining the U.S.
alliance as an insurance policy against a Chinese misadventure or catastrophe. Australia
has a longstanding and solid alliance with the U.S.
that predates any concerns about China.
Rather than 'hedging' on the U.S.,
Australia has
used its warm relations with Washington
to broaden its relationship with, and secure opportunities from, China.
In addition, the U.S.
welcomes having a close ally that can advocate the U.S.
view in the EAS and other regional fora (see paragraph 5.14).
11.24
While these satisfactory diplomatic conditions prevail,
Australia will
not be required to 'make a choice' between U.S.
strategic benefits and China's
economic magnetism. The committee indicated in Chapter 5 that Australia's
relationships with the U.S.
and China
largely depend on how those two nations handled their own bilateral
relationship. To help avoid a Sino–U.S. fall-out, Australia
should, through its favourable access in Washington,
continue to remind the U.S.
of the positive aspects of China's
rise and discourage confrontational rhetoric. Australia
should also use improving relations with China
to convey U.S.
concerns over the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) modernisation, actively
encouraging the Chinese authorities to undertake this process with greater
transparency and openness.
China's
military modernisation
11.25
The committee notes that China's
leaders are working assiduously to enhance China's
position as a world leader, using a mix of trade incentives, confidence
building measures and development aid. It recognises the particular efforts
that China has
made to reassure the world that it is acting with the best of intentions.
11.26
Even so, some commentators have raised fears about the
intentions underpinning China's
military expenditure.[742] The lack of
transparency in both China's reporting on its military expenditure and its
military intentions creates the confusion and uncertainty that has given rise
to speculation and heightened anxiety about China's ultimate ambitions.[743]
11.27
As a country that openly reports on its growing
military expenditure, Australia
can encourage China
to improve the transparency of its reporting regime on its military
modernisation program (see recommendation 4, paragraph 6.88). Military
exchanges and joint exercises with China
also provide an ideal mechanism for Australia
to encourage China's
military leaders to report more openly on China's
defence spending and military intentions. The committee commends the exchange
programs.
11.28
Alongside its bilateral endeavours, Australia
can also work through regional political and security structures to reduce
anxiety about China's
strategic ambitions. Like-minded countries, intent on maintaining and securing
a stable and peaceful region, could work through the ARF to formulate, propose,
and initiate measures designed to improve regional security, such as
encouraging greater transparency in reports on military spending. The first
step in this regard is to generate interest in, and discussion on, such
measures (see recommendation 3 and 5, paragraphs 6.80 and 6.95).
China and Taiwan
11.29
The committee agrees with Australia's
current position that supports the one-China policy and continues 'to urge
restraint and a peaceful resolution of issues across the Taiwan Straits'.[744] The Prime Minister stated that Australia
sees itself as:
...having a role in continually identifying, and advocating to
each, the shared strategic interests these great powers have in regional peace
and prosperity.[745]
11.30
Furthermore, the committee endorses the approach taken
by the Australian government in declining to speculate on hypothetical
situations involving conflict between China
and Taiwan. The
committee believes that the Australian government is right in declaring Australia's
strong alliance with the U.S.
and its desire to deepen diplomatic ties with China.
11.31
The committee recognises the importance for China
and the U.S. to
offer each other greater assurances that both want the peaceful reunification
of China and Taiwan.
Australia has
shown itself a friend to China
and the U.S.
and is well placed to encourage all parties involved to act in a manner that
will promote peace in the region, particularly between China
and Taiwan.
Again, the committee highlights the important role that regional fora have in
helping countries resolve difficulties.
China and Japan
11.32
The committee understands that China
and Japan have taken
positive steps to strengthen diplomatic ties, improve mutual understanding and
to achieve greater cooperation between them. Even so, the committee notes that
there are a number of unresolved and long-standing irritants in the
relationship that have the potential to undermine good relations between them.
The committee believes that it is important for both countries to arrest any
further erosion of their relationship
11.33
The committee agrees, however, with Australia's
approach not to interfere in the disputes between China
and Japan. Mr
Downer has stated that while Australia
hopes that both countries are able to work through their differences, the
quarrels are 'a matter entirely for China
and Japan'.[746]
11.34
It should be noted, however, that there are a number of
regional fora that create opportunities for leaders of countries whose
relationships are strained to seek cooperative means to resolve their
differences and repair damaged relations. Regional fora such as APEC are ideal
for members such as the United States,
Japan and China
to manage their relationship in a spirit of cooperation. It is uniquely suited
to deal with complicated and sensitive strategic interactions in the
Asia-Pacific region and help defuse tensions that exist between members.
11.35
The committee recognises that Australia's
role in influencing relations between China
and the U.S.
and the triangular relationship between Japan,
China and the U.S.
is limited. It does see a role though for APEC in providing a forum that can
facilitate or promote a cooperative approach by these countries, not only
toward achieving the goal of free and open trade and investment in the region,
but to assist the countries toward cooperative agreement in securing a stable
and safe regional environment.[747]
11.36
Dr Peter
Van Ness from the Research School of Pacific
and Asian Studies at the ANU also saw a role for members of the broader
community, especially academics, to work together toward improving relations
between Japan
and China. He
told the committee:
One thing that my colleagues are planning to do at the ANU as
academics is to set up a workshop next year on reconciliation between China and
Japan, because we think the hostility between them is counterproductive to
everything that might move the region in a positive direction. Thus far, in
beginning to organise that workshop, the responses from both the Chinese colleagues
and the Japanese colleagues have been overwhelmingly enthusiastic. Another
point they make is that this is something Australia
can do, because Australia
is neutral ground for something like that. Australia,
again, wants to cooperate with both China
and Japan and
with both the United States
and China. As
the Prime Minister has said, China
is an opportunity. There is a lot we can do on the positive side—which is not
to ignore the downside of things and, in the worst-case, the dark side of
things. I think we have a responsibility to look in both directions.[748]
11.37
The committee welcomes initiatives such as that taken
by the ANU in arranging a workshop on reconciliation between China
and Japan that
includes both Chinese and Japanese academics. It believes that the government
should lend strong support to Australian institutions using their resources to
bring together colleagues from the region to discuss problems such as
disagreements between regional neighbours.
Recommendation 8
11.38
The committee recommends that the Australian government
support Australian institutions that are using their initiative and resources
to bring together colleagues from the region to discuss means to reconcile
differences that exist between countries such as those currently between China
and Japan.
The North Korean nuclear issue
11.39
China's
leadership in the Six-Party talks has been a constructive process in Sino–U.S.
relations. China
fully deserves praise for its role in drafting the September 2005 statement of
principles according to Washington's
insistence on 'complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement'. However, the
committee notes that the North Korean plan proposed in November 2005 has
stalled. The main area of contention continues to be the sequence of
disarmament and reward. North Korea
is adamant it will not freeze its nuclear weapons program without first
receiving a concession. It is currently boycotting the Six-Party talks.
11.40
The committee found that the details of a successful
disarmament strategy will be a significant test for multilateral diplomacy. China
and South Korea
favour an aid-based approach to North Korea.
The U.S.
prefers to isolate North Korea
through sanctions, although there remains a preparedness to engage Pyongyang
in the Six-Party process. The committee emphasises that the successful
disarmament of North Korea
is a long-term goal and that China
should not be burdened with international expectations. China
clearly has a vested interest in reviving the Six-Party process. It is
understandably concerned that social instability in North
Korea does not spill over its border and
that a nuclear arms race does not develop in the region. Beyond these
imperatives, however, the committee recognises China's
genuine willingness to make a contribution to multilateral security efforts.
11.41
The committee endorses the Australian government's
approach in supporting the Six-Party process and using its bilateral
relationship with North Korea
to encourage dialogue and an agreement on disarmament. In light of North
Korea's latest boycott of the talks, these
efforts must continue (see recommendation 6, paragraph 9.56).
Southwest Pacific
11.42
The committee found that the small island states of the
Southwest Pacific have much to gain from the development assistance offered by
countries such as China.
However, the relative poverty of Pacific
Island nations, and their lack of
appropriate institutional mechanisms to ensure political and bureaucratic
accountability, leaves them prone to financial influence and corruption.
Without appropriate safeguards, aid assistance may not be directed to where it
is most needed or it may find its way into the hands of local politicians or
officials or other improper beneficiaries.[749]
11.43
The committee noted that amongst some Pacific
Island nations, competition between
the PRC and Taiwan
for diplomatic recognition has, on occasion, appeared to take on the
characteristics of a bidding war, conducted mainly through bilateral 'aid'
payments. This problem can be exacerbated when the practice of gift giving, an
important aspect of many Pacific Island
cultures, is exploited.[750] The
committee recognises the potential for serious corruption or political unrest
to occur as rival factions bid for increased untied grants in return for promises
of diplomatic recognition.
11.44
The committee was of the view that aid support to the
islands must be constructive, with the primary goal of improving their welfare.
Clearly, the political rivalry between China
and Taiwan in
the Southwest Pacific does not provide an environment conducive for the most
effective use of development assistance (see paragraphs 10.51–10.52).
11.45
The committee recommended that Australia,
through the Pacific Islands Forum and Post Pacific Islands Forum, encourage
members to adopt the OECD principles on official development assistance for the
islands of the Southwest Pacific. The committee also recognised the benefits
that could result from China and Australia engaging in joint ventures to
deliver development aid to the Pacific Islands (see recommendation 7,
paragraphs 10.63–10.67).
11.46
Furthermore, Australia
cannot afford to become complacent in the attention it gives to the Pacific
Island community. The committee
believes that it is vital to Australia's
interest for Australia
to continue to take a lead role in the Pacific Island Forum and to demonstrate
that Australia
is committed to the ideals and aspirations of its members (see recommendation
7, paragraph 10.63).
Need for skilled diplomacy
Trained analysts
11.47
In the first part of its report on Australia's
relationship with China,
the committee found that Australia
should have skilled analysts monitoring developments in China,
predicting trends in the market and forewarning of problems. It was of the view
that 'such a body of experts would be an invaluable asset for Australian
businesses and Australian leaders'.[751]
The committee now considers whether the same conclusion applies to strategic
considerations.
11.48
The East Asia region is
characterised by political, ethnic, cultural and religious diversity. This
report has highlighted the complex and changing web of relations that exists in
East Asia and some of the tensions that threaten to
disrupt this network, particularly those existing between an increasingly
influential China
and the U.S. It
has shown that Australia's
interests are very much caught up in this web. To safeguard its own economic
and security needs, Australia
relies heavily on the region remaining politically stable and economically
healthy. It does not want to be drawn into disputes between powerful neighbours,
especially any confrontation between the U.S.
and China.
11.49
As noted by Mr Allan Gyngell, Director of the Lowy
Institute for International Policy, Australian leaders 'will need all their
resources of strategic foresight, diplomatic skill and political cunning' to
deal with the challenges facing Australia.[752]
Mr Reg Little and Mr James
Flowers highlighted the need for Australia
to have 'an astute understanding of regional interactions and regional
sensitivities about the influence on non-regional and alien cultural norms'.
They stated:
It is apparent that Australian policy cannot afford to be
ill-informed about powerful, deep-rooted cultural qualities, largely suppressed
and disguised over much of the past century, that direct behaviour among its
most powerful neighbours.[753]
11.50
Professor Hugh
White of the ANU's Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre wrote of the critical importance of having a 'more active,
imaginative and effective diplomacy than we have shown so far'.[754]
11.51
The importance of effective diplomacy assumes even
greater significance in light of China's
skills in this area. A number of commentators, including those participating in
the committee's inquiry, remarked on China's
growing and impressive diplomatic performance. Dr
Brendan Taylor,
a post-doctoral fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
acknowledged that China's
use of soft power in the region had become 'significantly more adept' and its
new diplomacy 'more adroit'.[755]
11.52
The building block for good diplomacy is sound
intelligence. Professor Paul
Dibb, however, questioned whether Australia
put 'enough effort into analysing and studying China'.[756] Professor
William Tow,
Director of the International Studies Program at the University
of Queensland, suggested that Australia
could begin to train more strategic analysts. He stated:
Paul [Professor
Dibb] talked about this earlier: to what
extent now are the vagaries of the day essentially dominating, if you will, our
perceptions and our thinking about international security and security studies
in general? I think I can state with a high level of confidence—being a veteran
of tertiary teaching over the past decade and a half in Australia and for 10
years prior to that in the big place across the Pacific—that Australian universities
right now are remarkably deficient in addressing the need to train motivated,
bright young people in the security studies field. I am talking not just about
the traditional strategic studies approach; I am talking about peace and
conflict resolution and so forth. There is no systematic equivalent in Australia
today to the national security programs that emanated in the United
States, following Sputnik, in the late
fifties and early sixties...
I think the government has to take a good hard look at this now.
The Australian Research Council is not doing it, we know that, in terms of the
types of topics that they fund. While it would be nice to think that there
might be corporate support for this type of thing, it is not happening. This is
a field that has a paucity of support at a time, frankly, when support is
needed more than ever before...Train a new generation, so that this committee can
reconvene in 15 or 20 years and have young people come in and address it.[757]
11.53
As noted earlier, the region is of critical importance
to Australia's
economic prosperity and national security. The quality of Australia's
diplomacy relies on good, sound, accurate and incisive analysis that is able to
take account of developments and trends that will influence Australia's
long-term interests in the region. Because training and experience takes time,
the committee believes that this is an area that cannot be neglected.
11.54
The committee also believes that Australia
needs skilled and well-trained analysts with a thorough understanding of China's
security priorities and the complexities of relationships in the region. In
light of the importance of East Asia to Australia
and the rapid and complex changes taking place in the region, the committee
makes the following recommendation.
Recommendation 9
11.55
The committee recommends that the Australian
Government:
-
place a
high priority on building-up a pool of highly trained, skilled and experienced
analysts specialised in East Asian affairs, and
-
review
the incentives it now has in place to attract and train highly skilled
strategic analysts to ensure that Australia's current and future needs for such
trained people will be met.
SENATOR STEVE HUTCHINS
CHAIRMAN
Navigation: Previous Page | Contents | Next Page