5.1
This chapter provides an overview of the process of the final Australian withdrawal from Afghanistan during 2021, including preparations made for withdrawal, the closure of the Australian embassy in Kabul in May 2021, and events leading up to and during Australia’s evacuation efforts in the wake of the Taliban seizing control of the country in August 2021.
Australia’s preparations to withdraw from Afghanistan
5.2
The committee took evidence relating to Australia’s withdrawal preparations and planning through 2021, with a particular focus on the timing and rationale for the closure of the Australian embassy in Kabul in May 2021.
Closure of the Australian embassy in Kabul
5.3
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) provided a range of information to the committee about the reasons the Australian Government took the decision to close its Kabul embassy in May 2021, and outlined the timeline of these events and decisions.
5.4
As background, DFAT noted that it has led Australia’s diplomatic and policy approach on Afghanistan since diplomatic relations were established between the two countries in 1969. DFAT described Australia’s diplomatic relationship with Afghanistan over the two decades since 2001:
…when Australia went into Afghanistan in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks with the United States and [North Atlantic Treaty Organisation] NATO allies, our diplomatic relationship changed focus. Our diplomatic coverage had been on a visiting basis from the Australian High Commission in Pakistan, until 2006 when we established a resident Ambassador and Embassy in Kabul. Nine Ambassadors have led the whole of government presence in Afghanistan since 2006, with the Embassy team including officials from a range of government agencies and locally engaged staff.
5.5
DFAT stated that the government had 'carefully monitored the security situation in Afghanistan' since the opening of the Kabul embassy in 2006, and outlined the risk mitigation strategies necessary for the operation of the embassy:
DFAT, in consultation with [the Department of Defence] and intelligence agencies, regularly assessed and mitigated the range of security risks to Australia’s diplomatic presence in Kabul, including from terrorism, insider attacks, and general violence. This necessitated significant investment to mitigate risks to the lowest level practicable. This included managing the largest number of contracted security guards of any post in our network, extensive building infrastructure, a large fleet of armoured vehicles, armed security, and detailed tactical security measures such as intricate security planning for every movement of personnel. Notwithstanding all of this investment in a broad range of protective security measures, since its establishment, the Kabul Embassy remained one of DFAT’s highest security risk posts.
5.6
DFAT 'conducted a program of regular internal security reviews of Australia's diplomatic presence in Afghanistan' from 2016 onwards, which 'took careful account of the wider Coalition footprint in Afghanistan'. DFAT noted that all its diplomatic posts, including the Kabul mission, have a Crisis Action Plan, which covers contingency planning, and which is subject to regular review.
5.7
DFAT noted that it chaired a monthly Inter-Departmental Committee (IDC) on Afghanistan through 2020 and 2021, attended by representatives from the Department of Defence (Defence), the Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs), the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the Attorney-General’s Department, the Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet, and intelligence agencies, which addressed issues including embassy security:
The focus of the inter-departmental meetings was information sharing to maximise our situational awareness on security, security threats, the peace process, partner actions, and political, economic and humanitarian issues. The meetings helped shape our awareness of security threats to the mission. DFAT held a separate fortnightly [virtual] meeting between DFAT Canberra and the mission focused exclusively on embassy security.
5.8
DFAT commissioned an internal review of embassy security in September 2020 'to assure contingency arrangements and necessary security enablers to support our continuing diplomatic presence', in light of the worsening security outlook in the country and the extensive drawdown of coalition forces.
5.9
DFAT made a submission to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 12 January 2021 outlining progress on the review, 'noting the rising risks in Afghanistan and that consideration of closure of the embassy may be required if risks became unacceptably high'.
5.10
DFAT stated that contingency planning meetings ‘were taking place at the mission several times weekly in 2021—both internal meetings and with other embassies in Kabul’, and a practice exercise was undertaken in January 2021 which helped inform the findings of the internal review that had been commissioned in September 2020.
5.11
This review reported its findings in March 2021, with DFAT explaining:
The March 2021 report factored in the actual and potential impact of the February 2020 announcement by the US Administration of a political settlement with the Taliban and a timetable for further drawdown and withdrawal of US and coalition troops. It included concerns that a coalition military withdrawal and a reduction in NATO oversight in country would affect key security and medical enablers, increasing the security risk to our mission in Kabul.
5.12
On 12 April 2021, DFAT provided a brief to the Foreign Minister advising on the increasing security risks in Kabul. After the announcements in mid-April 2021 that the withdrawal of United States (US) and Australian Defence Force (ADF) troops was scheduled to be completed in advance of 11 September 2021, intelligence agencies and Defence advised DFAT on a number of occasions in late April that 'the departure from Afghanistan of international forces and the ADF, and the expected deterioration in the security environment would lead to a significant increase in risks to our embassy' that may necessitate its closure. Further:
[T]here was a real risk that the security and medical enablers considered critical to our contingency planning would be absent. In short, we faced growing risks which could no longer be mitigated by the physical security measures implemented successively over many years since the establishment of our embassy.
5.13
Defence informed the committee that its advice to DFAT in late April was that Defence 'would not be able to guarantee Embassy security once drawdown was complete and responsibility for security of the diplomatic zone transferred from NATO to Afghan forces'.
5.14
General Angus Campbell AO, DSC, Chief of the Defence Force, expanded on the advice Defence provided in relation to closing the embassy:
[T]he deteriorating security situation was…deteriorating [our] capacity to understand the security situation and to respond to it, and to be confident that we had both a local military capability, in the Afghan national army and security forces, and coalition partners who would similarly be able to respond. Remember: to function effectively, an embassy needs its own local security, needs to move around the green zone, needs to get people to a hospital facility in [extremis] and needs to move back and forth to an airhead at Kabul airport.
As we were planning and drawing down the force, while it's always a contested view—and it was a contested view—and there are absolutely good reasons to maintain an embassy, from Defence's perspective the inability to be confident to understand the security situation, which is always volatile in Kabul and the rest of Afghanistan on any good day, as much as there was an inability then to respond and do something about that security situation, was what we were concerned about. We were concerned about it with regard to the full suite of the green zone, the embassy compound, the airport, the hospital facility and the transit routes in between. While you could hold on and just 'see how she goes', the advice from Defence was that the embassy ought withdraw when Australian forces were withdrawing, because that gives us confidence that we would not have an embassy team isolated in [extremis] if the worst were to happen.
5.15
General Campbell advised that Defence were not asked to scope the possibility of ADF personnel providing security services to the embassy in place of the existing contracted security arrangements. General Campbell noted that the ADF ‘had ceased to have a combat force in Afghanistan some years previously’.
5.16
DFAT officials noted that options for co-locating Australia’s embassy, potentially with the US or the United Kingdom (UK), were considered but were ultimately assessed as unviable.
5.17
DFAT recommended in a submission to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 4 May 2021 that the Kabul embassy be closed by 28 May, with Australia-based staff to depart by 15 June. The timing of the embassy closure was linked to timelines for the ADF’s withdrawal. DFAT stated:
Drawing on advice from Defence and Australian intelligence agencies and our own assessment of the increasingly uncertain operating environment, DFAT judged that all reasonable security mitigations to reduce the risk to an acceptable level had been exhausted.
5.18
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Marise Payne, visited the Kabul embassy on 9 May 2021 in order to consult directly with Afghan leaders and the most senior like-minded military and diplomatic officials. On 13 May, the government made the decision to close the embassy. The government decided that Australia would 'maintain non-resident representation, with diplomats visiting Afghanistan—where possible—until circumstances permitted a return to resident representation'.
5.19
Embassy staff and locally engaged employees were advised of the decision to close the embassy on 21 May 2021. Coalition partners were also informed of the decision on that day. Once the decision to close the mission was taken, ‘a daily drawdown meeting was held between DFAT and the mission to ensure an orderly closure of the mission’, with Defence in attendance.
5.20
On 25 May 2021 the government publicly announced that the embassy would close on 28 May. DFAT stated that the timing of the announcement and closure 'was informed by security and operational considerations'.
5.21
The joint statement from the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs announcing the embassy closure stated:
In light of the imminent international military withdrawal from Afghanistan, Australia will as an interim measure revert to the model of visiting accreditation for our diplomatic representation to Afghanistan, which we used from the opening of diplomatic relations in 1969 until 2006. Our residential representation in Afghanistan and the Australian Embassy in Kabul will be closed at this time.
We will close our Embassy building on 28 May 2021. DFAT officials will visit Afghanistan regularly from a residential Post elsewhere in the region.
It is Australia’s expectation that this measure will be temporary and that we will resume a permanent presence in Kabul once circumstances permit.
This form of diplomatic representation is common practice around the world. It does not alter our commitment to Afghanistan or its people.
The departure of the international forces and hence Australian forces from Afghanistan over the next few months brings with it an increasingly uncertain security environment where the Government has been advised that security arrangements could not be provided to support our ongoing diplomatic presence.
On the Foreign Minister’s recent visit to Kabul, we reaffirmed Australia’s support for the Afghanistan Government during this time of change for the country. Australia remains committed to the bilateral relationship with Afghanistan, and we will continue to support the stability and development of Afghanistan in concert with other nations.
5.22
DFAT also updated its travel advice for Afghanistan on 25 May, to advise that 'Australia’s ability to provide consular assistance would be severely limited after the embassy closure'.
5.23
DFAT noted that at the time of embassy closure in May 2021, the Kabul post directly employed ‘24 Locally Engaged Staff, and there were around 280 contracted staff’.
5.24
Following the closure of the embassy in Kabul, Australia's diplomatic mission to Afghanistan was moved to be co-located with the Australian Embassy in Qatar, where it will be located 'for the foreseeable future'. DFAT stated that this mission 'is helping to deepen our cooperation with partners, many of whom also moved their missions to Afghanistan from Kabul to Qatar'.
Impacts of the embassy's closure
5.25
The committee heard that the embassy closure created impacts for various groups, including visa applicants, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) associated with Australia, and local Afghan staff involved with the embassy.
Impact on NGOs and visa holders
5.26
The committee heard that the embassy closure created difficulties for visa applicants and NGOs in Afghanistan. Ms Sarah Dale, Principal Solicitor and Centre Director, Refugee Advice and Casework Service (RACS), commented on the impact as follows:
In terms of the impact of the embassy closing, I think it's important that the embassy closing had an impact not only on the NGOs but also on many visa holders, Australian citizens and permanent residents also in Afghanistan. As I mentioned in our opening remarks, the issue with the fall of Kabul was that people were calling RACS, asking us: 'Who do we call? Who do we contact?' Our natural response as legal advisers in this process is to contact the embassy of Australia in Afghanistan or the country in which you are remaining. The fact that the embassy was closed, the fact that there wasn't an alternative and the fact that we as legal representatives didn't have a contact point or someone to speak to when this hit is a real issue. I think that the point of the embassy closing is a really important one because it had repercussions for many, and I believe that it had repercussions in terms of the evacuation and why it was so chaotic.
5.27
Mr Nawad Cina, Acting General Manager, Mahboba's Promise, commented on the embassy closure and its impacts on the safety of NGO staff who had links with Australia:
I think the closure of the embassy ended the communications, really. Our people on the ground had been in good contact with the Australian embassy, and so that was the primary contact. It speaks also to [the] question regarding potential preparation. But, yes, we didn't receive much comms from the embassy prior to its closure.
Senator LAMBIE: You didn't receive an alternative contact then?
Mr Cina: Not from what I know. I could be incorrect in saying so. But I would just like to add that it has been the support of the previous ambassador and a lot of embassy staff with our case that has propelled the seriousness of it, so I am grateful for that. But no alternative contact that I know of was provided.
Impact on local embassy staff, the Locally Engaged Employee program and contractors
5.28
GAP Veteran and Legal Services (GAPLS), a legal and advocacy organisation has assisted ‘Afghan Nationals who worked with the Australian Government and its contracting partners’. GAPLS asserted that the embassy closure had significant impacts on security staff associated with the embassy:
[The embassy closure] left thousands of Australian passport and visa holders at considerable risk and at the mercy of hostile forces and other belligerents occupying Afghanistan at the time. Those particularly at-risk were over 200 individuals who worked for the Australian Embassy as Security Guards and Contractors, inclusive of their families, which brings their total to at least 1000 individuals left with no support from the Australian Government.
On 15 June 2021, the Australian Embassy Security guards were served Employment Termination Notices by hand. The advice to them and those terminated prior to this date was 'due to the project reduction and downsizing of personnel requirements, as notified by GardaWorld's client’.
5.29
GAPLS contended that ‘[a]t no time leading up to the fall of Kabul were the Australian Embassy security guards and other contractors notified that the Embassy was closing permanently’, and submitted further:
The closure of the Australian Embassy may have been the right thing to do to protect the lives of Australian diplomats and locally engaged staff, many of whom were evacuated well ahead of the 31 August deadline. However, it had devastating consequences for the Australian Embassy guards, contractors and their families (the Embassy Group) who were deemed ineligible to apply for a humanitarian visa under the 'At Risk Afghan Employees Visa Scheme.' This scheme was reserved only for those who were directly employed by the Embassy or other specified agencies, not contractors.
The denial of responsibility for the Embassy Group was evident in media statements, particularly at a Ministerial level. Whilst it is true that the Australian Embassy group were the direct (employee) responsibility of the Private Security Company GardaWorld, arguably, there was a moral responsibility on the part of the Australian Government to afford the Embassy Group a duty of care. The Government was well aware that the Embassy Group was at risk due to their service to the Australian Government. The rhetoric at the ministerial level stating that the Private Security Companies and other Australian contractors were coordinating the evacuation of the Embassy Group is false.
There can be no denying that the sudden closure of the Australian Embassy denied thousands of vulnerable individuals and groups of people the critical time they needed to create emergency contingencies and move themselves and their families to safety. As a result, those Australian visa holders remain in Afghanistan and face the likelihood of brutal reprisals.
5.30
Support Association for the Women of Afghanistan (SAWA) Australia asserted:
The closure of the Australian Embassy in May 2021 contributed to the chaos, fear and anguish experienced by the Afghan people immediately following the Taliban takeover in August. Desperate for their lives and safety, people had little or no recourse to diplomatic assistance or advice as to how to apply for humanitarian assistance or visas to seek refuge in Australia.
In the ensuing 2–3 months (between May and August) hundreds of Afghan nationals previously employed by the Embassy, along with interpreters, translators, drivers etc who had supported Australian troops, were left stranded. SAWA considers that Australia had a moral responsibility to assist these people, as well as many thousands of others who sought to escape the prospect of a tyrannical regime.
A delay in the closure of the Embassy, and the retention of some Australian staff in Kabul, might have enabled more evacuation flights to be arranged and better management of granting of visas, advice and assistance.
5.31
In July 2021, Former Prime Minister John Howard also said that Australia has a moral responsibility to assist Afghan interpreters and other staff who worked with Australian agencies, urging the government to do more to assist Afghans who assisted Australia.
5.32
Departmental officials were asked about what advice was provided to government about the impact of the embassy closure in relation to the visa processing of locally engaged employees, and what action was taken about this. Mr Geoff Tooth, Assistant Secretary, Afghanistan and Regional Branch, and former Head of Mission Kabul, DFAT, stated that embassy employees ‘were advised of all their rights under the LEE [Locally Engaged Employee] visa scheme, we provided them all the detail of that and they were continually engaged in the process’.
5.33
Home Affairs noted that it did not have a presence in Afghanistan in 2021, and that it did not have an immigration office at the Australian embassy in Kabul. As such, there were no staff undertaking visa processing and assessment work at the embassy prior to its closure on 28 May 2021.
5.34
Chapter 6 contains further evidence on the Locally Engaged Employee program.
Impact on AFP operations
5.35
AFP representatives advised the committee that it was consulted about the closure of the embassy on 3 May 2021, the day before DFAT recommended to government that the embassy be closed. When asked about whether the embassy closure had any impact on AFP operations, Mr Ian McCartney, Deputy Commissioner, AFP, told the committee:
I think it's fair to say we had used the embassy in Afghanistan in terms of visits from Pakistan to assist with some of our inquiries, so it has had a potential impact. It did have a potential impact at the time.
Reputational impact
5.36
Dr Sayed Amin, Zoe Safi, Naseer Shafaq, Tamkin Hakim, Raz Mohammad and Atal Zahid Safi, commented in a joint submission that Australia’s decision to close its embassy, being the first coalition partner of significance to do so, had a negative impact by ‘giving the impression to fellow diplomatically involved missions and organisations that the security situation in Afghanistan is extremely dire’ and caused others to contemplate either evacuating or closing their missions in the country. The joint submission argued that the embassy closure was also ‘critical in terms of conveying a message or warning that Afghanistan will be abandoned’ and was ‘a vital factor to embolden Taliban and their supporters’. Further:
In the end, though, the early withdrawal for Australia was a positive decision as we saved further loss of life. The negative impact however was on the Afghan nationals, making them feel ‘abandoned.’
5.37
Rural Australians for Refugees submitted:
Australia’s reputation has been severely damaged by the sudden decision to close its Embassy, and then withdraw with a lack of humanitarian consideration for Afghan nationals and apparent lack of planning in this hasty retreat and evacuation from Afghanistan.
Evacuation of Australian citizens, permanent residents and visa holders
5.38
The committee received detailed evidence about the evacuation operation undertaken by the Australian Government during August 2021. The timeline of events and actions taken by the Australian Government is presented here from evidence received by the committee.
Evacuation planning and communications with Australians prior to the fall of Kabul
5.39
Defence was asked what contingencies and operational plans it had in place when the ADF withdrawal was announced on 15 April 2021, in the event that the Taliban took control of Kabul while troops remained. Defence stated:
As at 15 April 2021 prudent planning options existed to cover contingencies in Afghanistan, and the 80 ADF personnel remaining were within scope for extraction in one airlift should the need have arisen. These remaining 80 ADF personnel were located at Kabul and therefore had significant force protection from US and NATO forces. ADF personnel were withdrawn in line with the NATO Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan.
5.40
In relation to planning at this time for DFAT staff in Kabul, Defence stated that the ‘DFAT Kabul Crisis Action Plan [CAP] identified options for DFAT staff to withdraw from Afghanistan that could be supported by ADF’. DFAT elaborated:
The CAP for Afghanistan considered all medium to high risks posed to Australians and Australian interests, and detailed evacuation plans should these be required, including for the staff at the mission as well as Australian citizens, permanent residents and their immediate families. Embassy staff held regular contingency planning meetings and maintained a working copy of the CAP. Following the Embassy closure, staff retained responsibility for the CAP while working remotely.
5.41
When asked whether Defence had a specific plan for a non-combatant evacuation operation from Afghanistan as at 15 April 2021, Defence stated:
There was no specific plan for a non-combat evacuation operation (NEO) from Afghanistan as at 15 April 2021. However, Defence maintains a NEO contingency plan that can be rapidly applied to any country. The ADF [Headquarters Joint Operations Command] commenced specific and detailed Afghan NEO planning in May.
5.42
Defence noted that it provided intelligence advice to DFAT regularly on the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, with the Defence Intelligence Organisation giving advice 39 times to DFAT through 2021 on these issues.
5.43
In its submission to the Foreign Minister on 4 May recommending closure of the Kabul embassy, DFAT stated that the Embassy estimated that there were up to 500 Australian citizens in Afghanistan at that time. DFAT did not recommend any assistance or evacuation of Australian citizens and permanent residents prior to the closure of the Embassy, with DFAT explaining:
As at 4 May, the security situation had not yet deteriorated to the point where an evacuation of Australians needed to be considered. Regular commercial flights were operating, and the Australian Government continued to provide up-to-date travel advice to Australians in Afghanistan, with clear advice on security risks.
5.44
DFAT commented further on the communication and travel advisories it provided in the leadup to August 2021, stating that it 'has communicated regularly and clearly with Australian citizens and Permanent Residents' in Afghanistan:
Through travel advisories and direct communication, DFAT has been advising Australians not to travel to Afghanistan for many years. Afghanistan has been a ‘Do Not Travel' location since before 2001, due to the extremely dangerous security situation and very high threat of terrorist attack.
5.45
DFAT noted that it had provided several updates to its country Travel Advice for Afghanistan during 2021:
On 15 May 2021, DFAT reissued travel advice advising Australians to leave as soon as possible by commercial means, if it was safe to do so.
On 25 May 2021, travel advice was updated noting that there was an increased risk of attacks, and advising that Australia’s ability to provide consular assistance to Australians in Afghanistan would be severely limited after the Embassy closure on 28 May.
On 1 July 2021, DFAT strengthened its advice to urge Australians to depart the country, with the advice stating: “If you’re still in Afghanistan, you should leave as soon as possible by commercial means if it’s safe to do so. Do not delay."
On 13 August 2021, DFAT advised Australians to leave now, noting the airport may close or commercial flights may cease with little warning. Commercial flights from Kabul Airport continued until Kabul fell to the Taliban on 15 August 2021.
Interaction with evacuation planning of other nations
5.46
Submitters and witnesses discussed how Australia's evacuation program in August 2021 operated alongside the evacuation programs of other nations.
5.47
When asked about which international partners Defence engaged with on the evacuation mission prior to 16 August 2021, Defence advised that it engaged 'closely and regularly with the United States' in the lead up to the evacuation, and that it 'worked closely with New Zealand, the US, UK and UAE [United Arab Emirates] during the evacuation' as well as holding discussions with Japan.
5.48
In July 2021, the Biden Administration announced that it would begin Operation Allied Refuge flights out of Afghanistan during the last week of July for US visa holders. Media reporting at that time quoted Australian Government sources stating that Australia would not join the US operation and that Australia had no plans to mount a similar operation.
5.49
Defence was questioned whether it had been asked for advice, or provided advice, to the Australian Government on how Defence could assist the US operation, including to enable the inclusion of Australian citizens, permanent residents, visa holders and visa applicants in the US program. Defence responded that it was not asked for advice, nor provided advice on this matter. Defence stated further:
In July 2021, the Afghan government remained in power and Kabul airport remained open. Australians and Australian visa holders were able to leave Kabul by commercial means. There was no requirement for a military evacuation.
…
The Government evacuated Australian passport and visa holders from Afghanistan via commercial flights during July 2021. Australia was not invited to join US facilitated movement of its citizens during this period.
5.50
DFAT stated that it ‘spoke with the US in mid-July about its evacuation planning’. Mr Gary Cowan, First Assistant Secretary, North and South Asia Division, DFAT, commented further about the US operation Allied Refuge:
We're not aware that there was any potential at that time to open the initiative to extract Afghan nationals with connections to other countries. That was really a US initiative to manage the process for US special immigration visa applicants to go to the US mainland. It wasn't something that applied to us, and it was very different to the separate operation that occurred in mid-August—the special military evacuation air bridge with partner governments for mass evacuations.
5.51
In relation to the UK’s program, including the following UK statement in late May 2021 that it would ‘accelerate the relocation of those who may be at risk of reprisals’, Defence stated:
Defence was not asked by the UK for advice or assistance with respect to its evacuation operations.
But both countries routinely assist each other in operational environments. UK and Australian officials and military assets cooperated closely on local security requirements and evacuee coordination in the conduct of their respective national evacuation operations when in Kabul.
5.52
Mr Hugh Jeffrey, First Assistant Secretary, International Policy, Department of Defence, commented on Defence’s engagement with alliance partners on potential evacuation contingencies:
[W]e engage closely, particularly in defence circles, with the United States and the UK on what we would call non-combatant evacuation operations on a regular basis. We do it not just with Afghanistan but with any other country where we have nationals or equities involved, or where we might be responsible for moving people quickly in the event of a contingency. For example, we have a non-combatant evacuation discussion on countries beyond Afghanistan, but it is true to say that those engagements occurred increasingly urgently as the security situation deteriorated in Afghanistan. The US had its own very detailed and very complex evacuation process for its own personnel.
Evacuation efforts in the immediate aftermath of the Taliban takeover of Kabul
5.53
DFAT outlined when it gave advice to the Foreign Minister in relation to the need for an evacuation operation from Kabul:
On 14 August, DFAT provided advice to the Minister that DFAT, Defence and Home Affairs agreed it could be necessary, to expedite the uplift of Australian nationals, permanent residents and immediate family members who may wish to leave Afghanistan, along with humanitarian visa holders, including former Locally Engaged Staff. DFAT also advised of its support for Defence evacuation contingency planning.
On 16 August, DFAT provided advice to the Minister of the need to expedite the uplift, via emergency evacuation, of the above cohorts.
5.54
In relation to the number and location of Australian citizens, permanent residents, visa holders and visa applicants in Afghanistan at that time, DFAT stated:
DFAT was in contact with the 57 Australian citizens, PRs and family members registered with DFAT at 14 August 2021. 75 per cent of those registered resided in Kabul; none resided in Oruzgan. As at 12 August, Home Affairs had advised DFAT that there were around 425 Afghan LEE with visas, or on hand visa applications, in Afghanistan. DFAT does not hold a record of the location of where visa applicants lived in Afghanistan.
5.55
DFAT explained that these numbers informed the expected scope of Australia’s evacuation operations:
On 14 August the estimated number of citizens, permanent residents, visa holders and visa applicants expected to be eligible for evacuation was 550, including 57 people registered with DFAT (40 citizens, 13 permanent residents, four family members). The remaining number was an estimate drawn from Home Affairs information on the pipeline of locally engaged employee visa applications. We anticipated those numbers would change over time. The final number evacuated far exceeded our expectations of what would be possible.
5.56
Following the Taliban taking control of Kabul on 15 August 2021, the Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs issued a joint public statement on 16 August, as follows:
The situation on the ground in Kabul, as in the rest of Afghanistan, is evolving rapidly.
As in any crisis situation, the Australian Government’s priority is to ensure the safety of its citizens. We have over 130 Australians in Afghanistan, working in the UN, NGOs, and elsewhere, and we are working to bring them and their families home.
We are also assisting those who have been granted humanitarian visas, and others who are in the process of applying for protection.
We are closely connected to the US, UK, Canada, and other allies and partners.
As a partner committed for many years to helping Afghanistan build its future, we are deeply concerned at the potential for further loss of life and suffering.
The Taliban must cease all violence against civilians, and adhere to international humanitarian law and the human rights all Afghans are entitled to expect, in particular women and girls. The Taliban will be held fully accountable for any killing or other mistreatment of Afghan military and other security forces who have surrendered or been captured. Afghan Government officials and elected political leaders are fully entitled to be treated with safety, respect and dignity.
The Taliban’s leadership is responsible and accountable for the conduct of its forces.
Those preparing to leave the country must be able to do so without threat or hindrance. We will continue to work with key partners in the days ahead to enable this safe passage.
5.57
The Australian Government undertook an immediate process to evacuate people from Kabul between 18 and 26 August 2021. DFAT led the Australian Government evacuation effort, and chaired an Inter-Departmental Emergency Taskforce (IDETF) to coordinate the response which met daily from 13 August 2021 and 'supported a high tempo of government consideration'. DFAT elaborated:
Ministers met daily to take decisions. Ministers, the IDETF and the Head of the Crisis Response Team on the ground in Kabul made operational decisions. The IDETF met 19 times, daily and sometimes twice a day, during the operation (13–31 August, and on 2 September) and was attended by senior officials from: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet; Department of Defence; Department of Home Affairs, Australian Border Force; Australian Federal Police; Emergency Management Australia; Department of Health; Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications; Office of National Intelligence, Defence Intelligence Organisation; and overseas posts.
5.58
The government took a decision on 17 August to utilise Humanitarian Stay (Temporary) subclass 449 visas to help expedite the evacuation process, rather than requiring Afghan evacuees to hold a permanent Australian visa. The use of subclass 449 visas is discussed further below.
5.59
DFAT led 'a team of DFAT, Home Affairs and ADF personnel into Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) from 17 August 2021, under ADF force protection to ensure the safety of government personnel'. The ADF 'brought in food, water and basic shelter to Kabul international airport during the evacuation operation'.
5.60
Evacuees flown out of Kabul were flown to a staging area that had been established at Al Minhad Air Base (AMAB) in the UAE, which is the ADF's main logistics support base in the Middle East. Defence submitted that the use of Australia’s main logistics hub at AMAB involved the 'short-notice establishment of temporary facilities to accommodate, feed, and provide medical care for several thousand evacuees, before moving to Australia'.
5.61
Defence noted that in support of the evacuation effort, it deployed 'over 300 additional personnel to the Middle East to support those personnel already deployed at our main logistics hub and to work alongside our allies and partners'. One hundred and forty-seven ADF personnel were deployed to HKIA in Kabul. In addition to aircrew, Defence provided personnel who undertook security, liaison, and medical roles.
5.62
DFAT deployed 51 officers to Kabul and the UAE during the evacuation operation, among the total of 345 DFAT officers ‘who staffed the evacuation operation around the clock’. DFAT deployed 15 officers to Kabul during the evacuation operation.
5.63
Eighteen Home Affairs and 20 Australian Border Force (ABF) officers were deployed to HKIA in Kabul and AMAB during the evacuation effort, along with four additional locally engaged staff. It expanded on its role:
In close consultation with DFAT and ADF, Home Affairs and ABF officers worked to assist evacuation efforts by facilitating border clearance of evacuees. This included performing face-to-passport checks, document verification, identity verification, bona fides assessments, biometrics collection, confirmation of visa status and security checking before travel to Australia. The ABF also played an integral role in escorting a small number of passengers presenting potential risk to other passengers. Home Affairs and ABF teams based in Australia and around the globe also worked to provide assurance on the visa and MAL [movement alert list] status of evacuees, establish support arrangements for unaccompanied minors and vulnerable evacuees, and facilitate arrival [and] clearance at Australian airports.
5.64
When asked how many Home Affairs staff were assigned to processing Afghan visa applications during the evacuation operation, Home Affairs provided further information:
Between 19 August 2021 and 10 September 2021, the Department’s efforts during the evacuation period included multiple onshore and offshore work sites. Work was distributed using our global network 24/7 and for Subclass 449 visa processing, 30 full time equivalent staff undertook processing with an additional (approx.) 1000 overtime hours. There were also 12 staff located in Canberra who worked around the clock in the migration stream. These staff were supported by a team of Executive level and Senior Executive Officers. There were also staff on the ground in Kabul and the UAE.
In Canberra, various areas of the Department undertook activity supporting the evacuation in various areas of intelligence, biometrics, corporate, health, legal, [information technology], international, social cohesion, Australian Border Force and executive and senior executive support.
5.65
Between 18 and 26 August 2021, a total of 4,168 people were evacuated from Kabul under the Australian Government effort, including: Australian nationals; other foreign nationals; and Afghan visa holders at risk in Afghanistan, including former locally engaged employees and their families. Approximately two thirds of the evacuees were women and children. Defence provided the following breakdown of the evacuee cohort:
2,984 Afghans with approved visas;
310 New Zealand sponsored Afghans;
18 US citizens and US sponsored Afghans;
1 Singaporean citizen; and
5.66
Over this nine-day period, the ADF flew 32 evacuation flights from Kabul. Defence force assigned two C-130J Hercules, two C-17A Globemasters, and one KC-30 Air to Air refuelling aircraft to the evacuation efforts.
5.67
Once evacuees from the Australian effort reached the staging area at AMAB in the UAE, Australia coordinated flights to bring evacuees to Australia. DFAT stated that, as of 8 October 2021, 27 flights had brought evacuees from AMAB to Australia. This comprised 17 flights operated or chartered by the ADF, seven Qantas charter flights, and three Etihad flights. As at 8 October 2021, Australia had brought around 3,950 people from AMAB to Australia on these flights.
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Home Affairs provided a further breakdown in the composition of arrivals on repatriation flights to Australia between 20 August and 1 October 2021, stating that this consisted of 495 Australian citizens and 3,507 Afghan nationals, including the following:
2,844 Humanitarian Stay (Temporary) subclass 449 visa holders;
Approximately 260 permanent refugee visa holders;
113 permanent partner visa holders, and 26 provisional partner visa holders; and
73 permanent resident visa holders.
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Home Affairs noted that the repatriation effort to Australia was undertaken through the activation of the Australian Government Plan for the Reception of Australian Citizens and Approved Foreign Nationals Evacuated from Overseas (AUSRECEPLAN). This mechanism, which was activated on 26 August 2021, is a standing arrangement that outlines the process that 'enables the safe repatriation of Australians, their immediate dependants, permanent residents and approved foreign nationals (evacuees) following an Australian Government led evacuation in response to an overseas disaster or adverse security situation'. Home Affairs stated:
The objective of this AUSRECEPLAN activation was to coordinate the repatriation of all appropriately screened evacuees from Afghanistan into quarantine facilities in Australia, and have them connected with humanitarian settlement and immigration services.
The Department, in close consultation with the Department of the [Prime Minister & Cabinet], DFAT, ABF and Defence, utilised the National Coordination Mechanism which is designed to bring together relevant stakeholders from across the Australian Government, state and territory governments, and [industry] to manage resolution to a concern of national significance, and to coordinate quarantine arrangements for evacuees being repatriated from Afghanistan.
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Under this arrangement, Australian States and Territories supported quarantine arrangements for evacuees from Afghanistan above the incoming passenger caps in place at that time due to COVID-19 travel restrictions.
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DFAT commented that the military air evacuation operation from Afghanistan 'was one of the largest humanitarian airlift operations in Australia’s history', stating further:
Our priorities were to evacuate Australian citizens, permanent residents and their families, former locally engaged employees and their families, and other visa holders, who could safely make their way to HKIA in Kabul. Every effort was made to assist as many from these cohorts as possible to leave Afghanistan, working with our allies and partners, particularly the United States, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. This included supporting the departure of citizens and visa holders from partner countries, as they did for us.
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Defence also highlighted the scale of the operation, submitting that the evacuation of over 4,100 people from Kabul was 'a much greater number than initially thought possible'. Defence commented further on Australia's role within broader evacuation efforts:
The United Kingdom and the United States enabled Australia’s efforts through their coordination of the evacuation, and we could not have evacuated those that we did without their support, nor could we have continued evacuation operations after their departure. Australia worked closely with partners throughout the region as well as with the New Zealand Defence Force.
Impact of bombing at HKIA on 26 August 2021
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On 26 August 2021, a suicide bombing took place at HKIA which killed 13 US service members and at least 169 Afghans, with many more wounded. On 27 August 2021, the Prime Minister announced that 'during the course of the previous day, Australia’s evacuation operations from Kabul had been completed and all Australian official personnel supporting the evacuation operations had departed'.
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Home Affairs noted that on 29 August 2021, a Joint Statement on Afghanistan Evacuation Travel Assurances was issued by 102 countries including Australia:
The statement outlines that assurances have been received from the Taliban that all foreign nationals and any Afghan citizen with travel authorisation from the 102 countries will be allowed to proceed in a safe and orderly manner to points of departure and travel outside the country.
Evidence relating to the Australian evacuation effort at HKIA
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The committee heard a range of evidence about difficulties encountered by individuals attempting to access the Australian evacuation effort at HKIA, the processes in place at the airport, and the scope and scale of the Australian evacuation effort.
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Officials acknowledged the extreme difficulties that faced those attempting to access the evacuation at HKIA. Mr Simon Newnham, Acting Deputy Secretary and Crisis Coordinator, DFAT, commented in evidence to the committee:
DFAT also acknowledges the desperate circumstances of those who went to the airport in Kabul seeking to depart, very many of whom feared for their lives, and those of their loved ones, for the fact of their beliefs, their employment, their ethnicity or their gender. They suffered crushing crowds, heat, illness, violence and the depraved terrorist attack of 26 August as the evacuation window closed. We recognise the dedication of the Australian personnel deployed to Kabul and those supporting the evacuation operation in the UAE and in Australia.
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Mr Daniel Sloper, DFAT’s Special Representative on Afghanistan and the head of the Crisis Response Team (CRT) during the evacuation effort, described the efforts made at the airport during the evacuation:
I think it's fair to say it was a complex, fluid and sometimes chaotic environment, particularly outside the perimeter of the compound of the airport. Necessarily, that meant there were challenges to both security and logistics but also communications, housing and sanitation. So I think, broadly speaking, we can say it was challenging. In terms of sleep through that period, most members of the CRT probably slept between two and four hours each day—some less, some more on other days. If I could just note that part of the success of that operation—and it was relatively successful; we acknowledge there were people left behind—is very much due to the people who we were helping and the calm and the dignity they showed under very extraordinary circumstances. For example, many were sleeping in outdoor areas, on stones, and were supported with food and water supplies from the ADF but actually going through quite difficult circumstances.
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General Campbell provided an assessment of Australia’s evacuation effort as follows:
[A] little over 50 countries participated in the coalition campaign in Afghanistan, and we were routinely described as the largest non-NATO contributor and typically about the 10th largest contributor…Australia in its contribution to the non-combatant evacuation operation lifted the fifth-largest number of people out of Kabul. It's worth remembering that the city is regarded to have fallen on the 15th, when the president fled. On the 16th the government collapsed and the airport was flooded with Afghans, but there were no flights. On the 17th our first people went in and, very late on the 17th and landing back at AMAB on the 18th, the first people were lifted out. I think that's a pretty impressive record.
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Mr Sloper commented on the range of countries operating evacuation missions through the airport, and the difficulties for those presenting for evacuation:
There were many different claims there. They were predominantly Afghan people coming forward but there were also other nationalities and permanent residents. It was very evident on the tarmac how many countries were involved, with the airspace being heavily controlled. In the last few days in particular, that became more and more congested. On most days, we had a thousand people, if not more, in turmoil at the gates, and most of them were sleeping overnight as time went on. Taliban checkpoints were operating quite close to those as well. It was a very concerning and hard situation for those who were trying to get through. When they did get through, they were often dehydrated and very tired, but we were able to assist them from that point.
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Officials emphasised the close cooperation of the Australian evacuation effort with other coalition partners. Security and management of the gates at HKIA was managed by US and UK military personnel. Defence stated that both Australian Government officials and the ADF ‘were integrated into coalition control and communications nodes to enable evacuation operations’. DFAT provided further information about communications and operational planning at the airport:
All Australian agencies in Kabul met at least twice a day to review planning and operations. While communication links were not always stable, the ADF and APS agencies worked to maintain communication between Australian teams at each stage of the operation.
Head of DFAT’s Crisis Response Team (CRT) or his representative and ADF staff each attended coordination meetings hosted by NATO, which were held at least once daily and sometimes more frequently. These meetings covered the security situation, logistics and issues relating to the evacuation.
The Australian Government’s primary communication with people seeking to depart was the smartraveller consular travel advice. As information became available concerning specific cases, Australian staff would identify potential evacuees, provide advice on the situation at the gates, or respond, where possible, to questions.
ADF, DFAT and Home Affairs staff were positioned as close as possible to the gates, and worked with US and UK military personnel at the gates, in order to identify Australians, permanent residents, visa holders, and other Afghans eligible to travel.
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Defence stated that ADF personnel were deployed to the perimeter of the airport during the evacuation operation. When asked about whether ADF personnel worked with private security forces outside HKIA and whether ADF personnel worked at airport checkpoints to help identify Australian evacuees, Defence responded:
The ADF did not work with private security operating outside HKIA.
The ADF received no requests from allied countries to help at airport checkpoints and the ADF largely operated within the airport. At times there was a requirement for the ADF to facilitate movement of Australian passport and visa holders through checkpoints into the airport, to then be processed by Home Affairs and DFAT officials.
Process for individuals to access Australian evacuation flights at HKIA
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DFAT provided the following overview of the process for an Australian evacuee to get into the airport during the evacuation:
Those individuals registered with DFAT were sent an email with advice on proceeding to the airport, prioritising safety, and providing clear advice on risks, along with instructions on the best way to be identified by those at the gate. Smartraveller was regularly updated with advice for Australian citizens, permanent residents and their immediate families, as well as Australian visa holders on travel to the airport.
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DFAT noted that the emails sent by DFAT were individually addressed, but did not contain the names of individuals in the body of the email. When asked how people with electronic visas could prove their validity to Taliban and allied forces at various airport checkpoints, DFAT stated:
Names of Australians and visa holders eligible for evacuation were provided to the US and UK in the early stages of the evacuation but were of limited utility due to the chaotic environment at the airport gates. Any communication with the Taliban on airport access was coordinated by the US and UK. ADF personnel worked with these forces at the gates to identify potential Australian evacuees out of the crowd and passed information through to Home Affairs and DFAT who then assessed the validity of documentation being presented.
Process of prioritising evacuees
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When asked what the process was for deciding who could board departing flights for those inside HKIA during the evacuation operation, DFAT responded that the 16 August statement by the Prime Minister, Minister for Defence and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the decisions taken by the Minister for Immigration, informed assessments of people seeking to evacuate. DFAT elaborated further:
On 19 August, Minister Hawke agreed to arrangements for managing the issuing of emergency visas in Afghanistan. The Minister for Immigration delegated authority to the senior officer on the ground, the Head of the CRT [Crisis Response Team] to authorise uplifts from Kabul in extremis and balancing the best information available. This was on the basis that all required checks and reviews would occur in the UAE or a third location before a visa was issued and onward travel to Australia occurred.
…
The evacuation needed to take place during the period of allied forces controlling Kabul airport and ahead of the 31 August final withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan.
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DFAT stated that decision-making by the most senior DFAT officer on the ground, the Head of the Crisis Response Team, for the evacuation of non‑citizens and non-permanent residents was guided by the following principles defined by Minister Hawke:
against granting visas to a person who was not directly connected to Australia through being a certified locally engaged employee, or as a family member of an Australian citizen, permanent resident, LEE or Australian visa holder;
in favour of providing visas to spouses, children (including under guardianship arrangements), parents and grandparents;
against providing visas to more distant relatives including siblings of the primary visa holder and their families;
against splitting family groups; and
against granting visas to single men of fighting age.
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When asked how people in the airport were assessed and prioritised, DFAT stated:
Home Affairs and Australian Border Force staff initially assessed people as they were presented from the gates. As numbers in the staging areas grew during the week potentially threatening the operation’s capacity to assist more, on a limited number of occasions, Head, CRT directed Home Affairs and Australian Border Force staff to prioritise assessment of Australian citizens and permanent residents and their families in the staging area to relieve pressure due to a likely faster processing time. This and identification of an additional staging area during the week relieved this pressure.
…
In instances where we were aware of individuals or family groups immediately outside the gates, this information was passed to ADF and Home Affairs and Australian Border Force and DFAT staff near the gates who attempted to positively identify people within the crowd.
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DFAT stated that its officials in Kabul 'were provided names of individuals requiring assistance from Canberra, and directly from Afghans and Australians, including from community groups and political representatives'.
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The names of Australian Citizens, Permanent Residents and their families who had registered with DFAT were also shared with the US and UK (via Australia's diplomatic missions in Washington and London) at the commencement of the evacuation 'to assist with gaining access through the US controlled airport perimeter'. DFAT noted however, that this was 'of limited utility due to the chaotic environment at the airport gates'.
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In relation to the process for deciding who could board the next available evacuation flight once individuals had been cleared by Australian officials, DFAT advised:
In accordance with consular practice during an emergency, we assisted Australian citizens and Australian permanent residents and their immediate families (spouse and dependent children). Home Affairs and Australian Border Force in line with the decisions taken by the Minister for Immigration, assessed non-Australians for uplift, in consultation with the Head of the CRT on sensitive or highly complex cases. Home Affairs and ADF then determined boarding for the next flight in order of processing and taking into account the seating configuration of a plane, medical or other conditions (such as pregnancy), and a desire to keep families together where possible.
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When asked how many people that made it into the airport were subsequently rejected from boarding an Australian evacuation flight, DFAT responded:
All of the people approved for uplift departed Kabul airport on flights. Australian government agencies did not record the number of people not approved for uplift.
Difficulties gaining access to the Australian evacuation effort at the airport
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The committee heard evidence of the difficulties associated with safely accessing HKIA during the evacuation window. Mr Nawad Cina, Acting General Manager, Mahboba's Promise, commented:
The evacuation efforts began from the first day ... we attempted to get over 100 orphans, widows and staff out through the airport. It was an impossibility, unfortunately. Visas were a critical issue in that moment. Seventeen 449s, the emergency visas, were granted, but we had a tremendous amount of goodwill from different layers of government, which encouraged an evacuation attempt. However, to secure a security escort to the gate—there were many companies that were doing this, and one was helping us pro bono—we required visas, to provide them an assurance, to get them through the gate. Unfortunately, that didn't happen.
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The Support Association for the Women of Afghanistan (SAWA) Australia submitted:
One example, among many thousands, of the failure of the Australian Government to assist more people seeking evacuation flights is the case of the former Director of the women’s training centre which SAWA has supported for over 10 years. As a prominent women’s rights activist, she faced a high risk of danger from the Taliban.
In the immediate aftermath of the Taliban takeover, a Special Humanitarian Visa was obtained for this young woman and her family. However, they were unable to get through the crowds at the Hamid Karzai airport in the ensuing chaos, despite making multiple attempts. They witnessed people being crushed in the crowd and the death of a young child, exacerbating the personal distress they were experiencing in their flight from their home country.
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The Asylum Seeker Resource Centre provided another case study, highlighting family separations that occurred during the evacuation:
After the Taliban took control of Kabul, those agencies (Home Affairs, DFAT and Defence) working to evacuate people faced a worst case scenario for the conduct of evacuations under extraordinary pressure. The chaos and panic which ensued as individuals and families struggled for their lives to get close to and through the airport barricades, resulted in a significant numbers of family units being separated.
We have been in contact with a young [woman] from Afghanistan who was literally pulled through the barricade into the airport, granted a 449 visa on the spot and then evacuated and brought to Australia. While she is one of the “lucky ones” to have made it out, she remains highly distressed, as her husband and two young children, aged 8 and 10 were left behind at the airport. They are now in hiding in Kabul moving from house to house as her husband has been told by his former employer that the Taliban has threatened him and is looking for him.
While family separation was inevitable in the chaotic and dangerous situation at Kabul airport, now more than six weeks later, there is still no clear communication from the Government, process or pathway by which she can put forward her case and no assistance being provided to her to help her be reunited with her husband and two children in safety.
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GAPLS submitted that some of its clients, a group of Australian Embassy guards, contractors and their families, were not granted entry at the airport gates despite holding subclass 449 visas:
The Embassy group was repeatedly rejected at the airport gates by ADF and foreign soldiers. They did not accept the digital e-Visa or the Australian Evacuation Flight offer issued by DFAT. DFAT expressly stated in the Australian media that these facts were false. This messaging was inconsistent with the evidence coming out of Afghanistan from our clients, including photographs [audio and video sent via WhatsApp] taken at the gates by LEEs desperate to prove they held Australian visas.
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GAPLS submitted further:
DFAT had sent e-Visas to thousands of people who were clinging to them with every hope of evacuation, but for the fact, those papers were worthless because time and time again, the soldiers rejected anyone who didn't have an actual visa in their passport, or who was trying to enter the airport with an Australian or US (or other coalition) passport. Again, with the benefit of hindsight, it was clear that DFAT had not considered some of the critical dilemmas Australian visa holders would face while waiting to be pulled from the canal of human sewage. For one, there was no phone charging facilities in 'the ditch', which countered the advice DFAT had issued in the email that directed people to 'keep your telephone charged.' Fortunately, the Embassy Group had the foresight to take multiple phone chargers with them and were wisely conserving the life of each battery. Their problem was that when they showed the soldiers their e-Visas, those soldiers told them to leave the area.
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In response to reports of ADF personnel turning people away at the airport or refusing to accept their Australian visas, Defence stated:
No-one with an Australian passport and visa was turned away by ADF personnel at [HKIA]. To the best of their ability, ADF personnel brought individuals with any form of recognisable documentation through airport checkpoints for evaluation by Home Affairs and DFAT officials.
DFAT and Home Affairs managed the passport and visa processing at [HKIA]. ADF did not assess passports, documentation or emails.
DFAT is the lead Agency on international crises coordination. At the request of DFAT the ADF continues to facilitate the movement of evacuees to Australia on regularly programmed sustainment flights.
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When Defence was asked if it has investigated or sought further information about allegations that ADF personnel ignored visas or insisted they were not real and refused to facilitate access to Australian aircraft, Defence responded that ADF personnel did not assess visas, with DFAT and Home Affairs being responsible for evaluating the eligibility of visas before evacuees were granted access to aircraft.
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Dr Kay Danes OAM, Senior Humanitarian Advisor for GAPLS, also commented about how difficult it was for groups trying to assist evacuees to communicate with Australian officials:
The greatest challenge we had was not from the Taliban. Granted, getting through those checkpoints was not easy, and at times our people were beaten quite savagely. But our main problem was the lack of communication with DFAT and less communication with our ADF. It felt very much like we were outsiders, not to be trusted or even eligible to evacuate. I felt extremely frustrated by the fact that whilst I had contact with the DFAT [point of contact], they seemed to be completely overwhelmed. The lack of information to Australian visa holders was extremely poor.
Use of temporary subclass 449 visas during evacuation operations
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As noted earlier, in addition to other visa types, short-term Humanitarian Stay (Temporary) (subclass 449) visas were also utilised during Australia's efforts to evacuate people from Kabul in August 2021.
Background to the Humanitarian Stay (Temporary) (subclass 449) visa
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This visa is a subclass of the Temporary Safe Haven (Class UJ) visa, which can be utilised to respond to emergency humanitarian situations 'where people face, or have faced, a strong likelihood of being displaced from their residence, and are in grave fear of their personal safety because of their personal circumstances'.
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Home Affairs noted that the Temporary Safe Haven (Class UJ) visas were introduced and first used in 1999 to evacuate nearly 4,000 Kosovars from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and some 2,000 East Timorese from East Timor, and explained further:
These visas facilitate the movement of large numbers of people under imminent threat of harm. Application for this visa is made by accepting an offer from the Australian Government (usually made by the Minister responsible for immigration) for temporary stay in Australia.
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Home Affairs submitted that subclass 449 visas have a number of unusual features:
they are not part of the Humanitarian Program nor any other visa program;
application is made by accepting the Australian Government’s offer of a temporary stay in Australia and an authorised officer endorsing, in writing, the acceptance of the offer;
the period of stay is set by the visa decision-maker in each case;
holders are barred by operation of law from applying for another visa (other than a further subclass 449 visa) unless the Minister lifts the bar; and
holders in Australia are eligible for certain payments and concession cards, including Special Benefit, Family Tax Benefit, Dad and Partner Pay, and Parental Leave Pay, and the Health Care Card.
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Home Affairs stated that the relatively flexible criteria for this visa 'comes at increased risk as the Department has less information about applicants on which to base assessments of eligibility for grant of the subclass 449 visa, relative to standard processes'. It noted:
This risk is accepted when the Government agrees to make offers of stay for the purposes of this visa subclass, however it can be mitigated by other security processes, such as the collection of biometrics, as deemed to be appropriate in the circumstances which prompt its use.
Use of subclass 449 visas in relation to Afghanistan
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On 17 August 2021, the government agreed to use the Humanitarian Stay (Temporary) subclass 449 visas 'to facilitate the urgent evacuation of priority Afghan nationals'. Home Affairs stated that this visa was used because of 'the rapidly changing security circumstances in Afghanistan, the urgent and exceptional humanitarian nature of the evacuation operation and the limited window for people to depart Afghanistan through Kabul airport'. These visas were issued for a period of 90 days.
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Mr David Wilden, First Assistant Secretary, Refugee, Humanitarian and Settlement Division, Home Affairs, elaborated on why the decision to utilise subclass 449 visas was made at the time it was:
[At that time] it became clear that the ability of Home Affairs to process permanent protection visas, which can take several months, was going to be insufficient. We needed a vehicle to be able to get people out—not just, obviously, the locally engaged staff and their families but other people at risk who might enter through the normal humanitarian program. The 449 visa was seen as the best vehicle to get people through the security at the airport, where people were having trouble, and get them lawfully into Australia.
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In total, 6,294 persons 'were invited to apply for subclass 449 visas' between 19 August 2021 and 1 October 2021, of which approximately 500 were partner or other visa applicants. From these invitations, 5,636 individuals were ultimately granted subclass 449 visas.
Process for issuing subclass 449 visas
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Ms Cheryl-anne Moy, Deputy Secretary, Immigration and Settlement Services Group, Department of Home Affairs, commented on the process for issuing 449 visas during the Afghanistan evacuation:
The subclass 449 visa process was a time-critical and resource-intensive process that was undertaken due to the rapidly changing security circumstances and the limited window for people to depart Afghanistan. It allowed the department to balance Australia's humanitarian obligations with the integrity of Australia's migration and border management priorities against the backdrop of a dynamic threat landscape. To support this operation, the department utilised our global network to assist in the processing of subclass 449 visas. A linked global network was stood up to ensure the department was able to extract the greatest possible capacity in a short time frame. This network, spread across six state and territory offices, and 13 offshore posts, effectively enabled a 24-hour processing capacity, therefore maximising the visa outcomes.
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Home Affairs submitted that the subclass 449 visa process required each person to be invited, and accept, an invitation by the Minister for Immigration for temporary stay in Australia. When asked why not all of those invited to apply for a 449 visa did apply, Home Affairs stated:
At the peak of the evacuation from Kabul, to ensure that as many people as possible had the opportunity to access an evacuation flight, the Department was providing notification of the invitation to apply which enabled people to pass checkpoints and access the airport. Visa grants were subsequently processed within departmental systems as the notification holders presented to Officers.
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Home Affairs provided the following information about how it communicated with prospective subclass 449 invitees and what information was provided with the invitation to apply:
Contact details were provided to the Department of Home Affairs and the Department emailed individuals considered for Humanitarian Stay (Temporary) subclass 449 visa grant… Information provided included:
visa grant notification to facilitate urgent travel to Australia;
the names of the persons granted visas;
current DFAT information on the Australian evacuation flight offer should the visa holders decide to travel to Hamid Karzai International Airport;
visa expiry date and bar on applying for any other visa without the permission of the Minister for Home Affairs;
conditions attached to the subclass 449 visa; and
contact details for the Department.
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Home Affairs expanded on the way this process of granting subclass 449 visas worked during the evacuation from Afghanistan:
It was also necessary for the application for a subclass 449 visa to be a valid application [and] that each acceptance of an offer to be endorsed, in writing, by an authorised officer. Responding to the time-critical environment, emergency verbal visa grant processes were implemented to facilitate the evacuation of eligible Afghan nationals.
These processes allowed for the offer to be made verbally and, once the offer was accepted and endorsed in writing by an authorised officer, the applicant to be verbally advised of the grant of a subclass 449 visa. Home Affairs officers then recorded those grants through an approved template. This process increased the capacity and speed in which eligible Afghans could be evacuated.
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Home Affairs continued that processes were put in place 'to issue letters, as evidence of visa status, to facilitate people's travel through check points to HKIA'. Further:
Officers recorded subclass 449 visa grants in the Immigration Records Information System, which is normally used for processing paper visa applications lodged overseas. Data input included the results of Movement Alert List (MAL) checks, biometrics data collected from visa applicants or holders and the results of [Public Interest Criteria] checks in which an applicant's identity and available documentation were reviewed. To support visa grants, the Department deployed five mobile biometric collection units, at both HKIA and the ADF's main logistics hub in the Middle East, and subsequently in Pakistan.
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Home Affairs expanded on the processes utilised to conduct character and security checks:
Fingerprint enrolments collected through the biometric collection process were reviewed against the holdings of Five Eyes counterparts using the Secure Real Time Platform (SRTP). In addition to Australia, other countries currently utilising SRTP include Canada, United States of America and New Zealand. Using an anonymised fingerprint, the responses from Five Eyes counterparts were received and processed by the SRTP in near real-time and provided valuable identity and criminal history data for decision-makers. Once a match/no match is determined, the anonymised fingerprint is deleted. Facial images were only shared on a match if available and required.
When expediting visa processes there is a real and unavoidable risk, arising from the possibility that visas may be granted to persons who are not who they claim to be, or who subsequently are found to be of character concern. While every effort is made to undertake the best available checking of identity, relationships and backgrounds, and any indication of known of likely threat to Australia, absolute certainty cannot be guaranteed. On balance, it was agreed that the risks to individuals being left in Kabul outweighed the potential hazards associated with visa grants of this nature.
No person of known national security or serious criminality concern was brought to Australia on evacuation flights.
Groups issued with subclass 449 visas
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DFAT submitted that the subclass 449 temporary visa was made available at that time to facilitate evacuations from Afghanistan 'for those with a strong association with Australia and facing serious threats to their safety in the current environment'.
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Home Affairs outlined that subclass 449 visas were issued to several categories of individuals during the evacuation process, including:
certified Locally Engaged Employees (LEEs) who had not yet completed the application process for a humanitarian visa;
extended family members of LEEs settled in Australia, or others with a strong connection with Australia;
particularly vulnerable or high profile people that may have come to the attention of the Taliban; and
individuals with existing but un-finalised applications in other visa subclasses (for example, partners in the Family visa steam).
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Home Affairs detailed that subclass 449 visas were used for certified LEEs and their families, to quicken the evacuation process (compared with the standard process for certified LEEs of applying for a humanitarian visa):
With the fall of Kabul, the Government decided to utilise subclass 449 visas to expedite the evacuation process. Given the urgency, subclass 449 visas were granted to certified LEE and their family to facilitate their departure, on the basis that the permanent visa application process could occur once they were safely in Australia. As is possible under the visa criteria for the grant of subclass 449 visas, the general requirement for health checks was waived before the subclass 449 visas were granted so that people did not undergo health checks before they were uplifted to Australia. However, the subclass 449 visa holders are subject to a condition on their visa that they complete health checks on arrival. These health checks will also be considered as part of any permanent visa application processes.
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Home Affairs submitted that DFAT and ADF provided it with 'lists of LEEs previously refused certification under the LEE program for consideration for subclass 449 visas', and stated:
This, along with the identification of previously refused or withdrawn family members of LEE applicants identified by Home Affairs resulted in over 2,500 invitations for subclass 449 visas being issued between 19 August 2021 and 25 August 2021.
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Home Affairs highlighted that visas were also issued to individuals at particular risk of being targeted by the Taliban:
In addition, subclass 449 visas were issued to particularly vulnerable or high profile people that may come to the attention of the Taliban, including locally engaged staff of Australian media organisations and humanitarian service providers, female sporting teams, academics who had previously studied in Australia and human rights advocates. These cases were brought to the attention of the Government and the Department through a variety of means given the exceptional and time-critical circumstances. These channels included members of parliaments, industry and sporting organisations, charities, and the direct approaches by family members in Australia. The Department established dedicated reception and triage processes, and extended the operation of its Global Service Centre (call centre) to support this process.
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Home Affairs stated that during the evacuation period, 'individuals with existing but un-finalised applications in other visa subclasses (for example partners in the Family stream) were also supported through the provision of a subclass 449 visa'.
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Once in Australia, subclass 449 visa holders are assessed against the criteria for a permanent humanitarian visa. Outcomes for these visa holders are discussed further in Chapter 7.