2.1
This chapter will examine the following matters related to the operation and management of the Department of Parliamentary Services (DPS):
the ICT capabilities provided by DPS;
the workplace culture within DPS;
matters relating to the Parliamentary Library; and
security arrangements within Parliament House.
2.2
The chapter then sets out the committee’s concluding views.
ICT capabilities
2.3
Two submitters to the inquiry raised concerns with the information and communications technology (ICT) capabilities and services provided by DPS.
2.4
The United Services Union (USU) represents workers employed in clerical and administrative services. It argued that the parliamentary workplaces of its members were ‘not fit for purpose in the 21st century’. It stated that issues surrounding DPS internet connectivity and inadequate download/upload speeds have a ‘significant impact’ on the work that its members conduct in parliamentarian’s offices.
2.5
The USU provided detail on the DPS rollout of Windows 10/Office 365 in parliamentary workplaces as an example:
This process was disruptive and at times duplicative in nature and placed significant pressures on our members and their ability to perform their duties.
2.6
The USU also commented that DPS’ handling of ICT outages, apparent cyber attacks on the parliamentary computing infrastructure, and provision of remote access had been ‘disruptive’ to its members.
2.7
The USU noted that its members often experienced ‘lengthy waits’ when seeking ICT assistance from the DPS ‘2020’ helpline. It indicated that this caused members to rely upon their own private resources to fulfil their work duties, given that their ICT concerns remained unresolved for periods of time. The USU argued that DPS should ‘more adequately’ resource the IT division in order to provide better service to members.
2.8
The USU also argued that the increased reliance on videoconferencing and telecommunications facilities as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic made it ‘increasingly apparent’ that its members are not provided with adequate ICT in their workplaces by DPS.
2.9
The Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU) asserted that the inadequacy of the ICT (in particular broadband) capacity provided by DPS is ‘well known’ by occupants of Australian Parliament House (APH).
2.10
It stated that the COVID-19 pandemic had ‘further demonstrated’ the importance of ICT to the effective functioning of workplaces and concurrently highlighted the inadequacy of the ICT provided by DPS.
2.11
The CPSU submitted that more funding needed to be invested in ICT at APH and explained:
DPS is upgrading its ICT security system, however, this has not resulted in extra resources for all branches implementing such a significant change. More resources are needed, [with] a member stating that ‘team effort is needed to develop, test and hand-off automation solutions to one-off changes that used to be done more simply by one technician’.
2.12
The CPSU also argued that the lack of resourcing was impacting adversely on DPS staff in ICT by causing stress and anxiety.
2.13
DPS informed the committee that it had undertaken significant work on its ICT services during the COVID-19 pandemic as the number of users who needed to work remotely increased exponentially. It highlighted its efforts as follows:
DPS IT staff worked around the clock to expand the capacity of the existing remote access solution from 200 to several thousand concurrent users (as required) while developing and implementing a secure cloud-hosted remote access virtual desktop. Several new enhancements to cyber security capabilities were also delivered to support remote working arrangements. At this time, a small team of service desk staff handled up to 730 contacts per day at the peak of this transition.
2.14
The DPS Corporate Plan 2020–21 (corporate plan) outlined that the physical distancing restrictions required as part of the COVID-19 pandemic had accelerated the strategic theme of ‘anywhere, anytime, anyhow’ contained in the Australian Parliament Digital Strategy 2019–22. The corporate plan explained:
In order to strengthen the business continuity of the Parliament in 2020–21, we will continue to transition to secure cloud platforms for business systems and expand our capability to support remote working, web-based video conferencing and virtual participation in parliamentary work.
2.15
In regard to cyber security, the corporate plan noted that the DPS Cyber Security Operations Centre will continue to develop its ‘security depth’ in 2020–21 to respond to an evolving cyber security landscape. It detailed that this would include threat intelligence capability to predict, mitigate and respond to cyber threats.
2.16
The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Appropriations and Administration (Appropriations committee) informed the committee that due to its long term interest in the security of the Parliamentary Computing Network (PCN), it received regular briefings from DPS. These briefings covered how the department was meeting the challenges of the rapidly evolving cyber threat landscape, as well as the activities of the DPS Cyber Security Operations Centre. The Appropriations committee noted that it found the briefings informative and a ‘reassurance’ that the security of the PCN is a high priority for DPS.
Culture within DPS
CPSU views
2.17
The CPSU submitted that its DPS members had indicated concerns with DPS’ workplace culture when surveyed in August and September 2020.
The survey results showed CPSU members are increasingly concerned that DPS is not a good place to work. Funding cuts have impacted negatively on DPS and over recent years, issues with accountability and transparency, bullying and harassment and questionable decisions by management regarding career advancement opportunities have increased.
2.19
The CPSU provided the committee with the following survey results:
49 per cent of respondents said their branch had suffered from budget cuts in recent years;
60 per cent of respondents reported an increase in workloads due to budget cuts;
42 per cent of respondents reported a decrease in quality of services;
51 per cent of respondents reported a lack of practical understanding of, or respect for, the value of the work by management; and
54 per cent of respondents reported an increase in bullying or inappropriate behaviour.
2.20
The CPSU noted that a number of key themes and concerns were raised by their members in the survey, including:
A perceived lack of consultation by DPS management with the CPSU and the DPS workforce more generally (leading to staff feeling there is a lack of accountability and transparency amongst management).
Allegations of bullying and harassment within DPS, including a perceived culture of intimidation from management.
A perceived lack of career progression and development opportunities (particularly in the Research branch of the Library), as well as high turnover rates within the Parliamentary Security Service (PSS).
The application of workplace policies by management in relation to the PSS (including annual leave application processes and changes to employment conditions).
2.21
The CPSU also asserted that bullying and harassment ‘continues to be an issue’ within DPS. It alleged that there was a trend of DPS management ‘weaponising’ the use of disciplinary actions (such as breaches of the Code of Conduct), particularly within the PSS.
CPSU members in PSS report the heavy-handed use of CoC [Code of Conduct]. Members hold the view that anyone who questions management or raises a complaint will be targeted and find themselves on CoC for any small breach of protocol or mistake.
Also worrying is the open threat of CoC that is wielded to prevent people speaking out and that the CoC investigations often take an unreasonably long time. Affected staff report severe mental health impacts from extended delays to knowing if they still have a job.
2.23
The CPSU further stated:
Our members express frustration and bitterness over the treatment of staff when middle management are often witnessed behaving poorly and acting inappropriately without any sanction or consequence.
2.24
The CPSU advised that according to its members there was a strong distrust of management within the PSS, and that consultative forums between the PSS and DPS management had in recent times ‘broken down’.
2.25
As an example, the CPSU drew attention to reports from its members of poor communication between PSS officers and PSS middle management. The CPSU explained its members asserted that often ‘change of shift’ briefings to pass on emerging issues or procedure changes from middle management only occurred verbally, which often led to miscommunication and misinformation. The CPSU noted that its PSS members would prefer such briefings to be coupled with email outlines in order to minimise the risk of ‘whispers around things’ and miscommunication.
DPS views
2.26
DPS directly refuted the claims of bullying and harassment made by the CPSU, with a particular focus on the validity of the data from the CPSU member survey provided to the committee.
2.27
Mr Stefanic outlined:
The CPSU makes a range of assertions about the DPS workplace culture. The submission was apparently informed by a survey or more than 50 employees, according to the Canberra Times, which is approximately five per cent of the workforce, which is not a statistically valid response rate.
The CPSU submission states that 54 per cent of respondents, approximately 27 people, reported an increase in bullying or inappropriate behaviour.
Empirical information does not support these assertions. Data collected from DPS exit surveys, employee systems program data, WHS [Work Health and Safety] Peak Committee Minutes, recent DPS consultative forum Minutes, and the 2020 survey of harassment contact officers, demonstrate that the CPSU’s claims are simply not accurate.
The CPSU itself has been unable to provide DPS with valid examples of bullying and harassment to support its claims. Actual bullying and harassment complaints have hovered between three and six complaints since 2016-17.
2.28
Mr Stefanic also gave an overview of the mechanisms within DPS for staff to raise complaints:
DPS has a number of publicised mechanisms for staff to raise complaints that is consistent with the APS [Australian Public Service]. Some are confidential or governed by protections. Bullying and harassment training is mandatory in DPS. And we have 20 harassment contact officers spread across the department.
2.29
Additionally, DPS provided the committee with a snapshot of positive results from its most recent staff survey, which had a participation rate of nearly 80 per cent of DPS staff. These results included:
90 per cent of staff indicated positive relationships with colleagues;
70 per cent of staff indicated satisfaction with the culture in their work groups;
73 per cent of staff indicated they were ‘completely engaged’ in their work;
85 per cent of staff indicated they are ‘determined to give their best effort each day’; and
82 per cent of staff indicated that they are able to ‘raise new ideas and provide innovative solutions’ to improve the workplace.
2.30
DPS also informed the committee that satisfaction levels with DPS services as recorded in the 2021 Building Occupant Survey (completed by 714 occupants) were all above target. This included an increase from 92 to 93 per cent satisfaction across services, including catering, retail, visitor, art, health and recreation, landscape, building maintenance, cleaning, security and ICT services.
2.31
Mr Stefanic commented on the results of these two surveys:
These are solid metrics that do not support the narrative that DPS is not a good place to work. It is logical that engaged and committed staff provide excellent services. The data shows that there is certainly room for improvement. But the extremely positive staff and stakeholder feedback results are a more accurate reflection of a motivated, engaged, and highly skilled workforce, representing a department that [is] committed to service excellence in support of the Parliament.
2.32
DPS directly rejected the claims made by the CPSU about the inappropriate and heavy-handed use of Code of Conduct processes, and labelled the assertions as ‘unsubstantiated’. In addressing the matter, Mr Stefanic stated:
…the data shows that codes [of conduct processes] are used sparingly, and terminations are extremely rare. The suggestion that codes of conduct take years, the data shows they do not.
2.33
DPS provided the committee with a comprehensive rebuttal of the claims made by the CPSU, as well as those made by the Electrical Trades Union, the Australian Manufacturers Workers’ Union, and the New South Wales and Australian Capital Territory Plumbing Trades and Employees Union at a public hearing. An excerpt of this document is available at Appendix 3 of this report.
2.34
When asked by the committee what assurances DPS could give staff that senior management would be receptive to feedback and work to resolve issues in the workplace, Mr Stefanic highlighted that there were many mechanisms available for staff to raise concerns. He noted that these mechanisms were available regardless of whether the concerns related to managerial behaviour, personal difficulties, or potentially unlawful actions.
2.35
Mr Stefanic emphasised that no DPS staff member had ever experienced retribution because they made a complaint about an issue, and that staff should ‘feel comfortable’ that they can raise concerns when the need arises.
2.36
Mr Stefanic also observed that DPS as an organisation is highly scrutinised, both through the parliamentary press gallery and the Senate estimates process. He commented that DPS understood that if staff felt unhappy with the ‘internal mechanisms’ available they could turn to these other avenues to raise matters. He noted that this was, however, ‘less desirable’ as it did not allow DPS to resolve the issues ‘in real time’.
2.37
Mr Stefanic continued that he was confident that DPS managed its internal mechanisms for resolving issues well because the numbers of staff resorting to airing grievances in the media and via Senators was ‘really minimal’. He observed:
I think if there was a real groundswell [of concerns], staff would be using those [alternative avenues to raise issues] more regularly, and certainly, in the previous history of DPS, that was a common feature, that staff felt that Senate estimates was the only way that they could raise concerns. I think there is little evidence of that now, apart from those [that] are reflected on some staff who have not taken lightly the disciplinary procedures and have used the opportunity to, I guess, settle a score.
2.38
DPS also acknowledged that it was ‘well documented’ that morale in its Security Branch (which encompasses the PSS) was ‘historically poor’. It highlighted that ‘considerable focus’ had been applied by the senior executive team to improve morale and team performance during 2019 and 2020.
Relationship between DPS and the CPSU
2.39
Given the disconnect evident between the views of DPS management and some DPS employees represented by the CPSU, the committee sought information on the status of the working relationship between the two parties.
2.40
The CPSU acknowledged that its relationship with DPS management had improved in 2021:
Since the CPSU original submission was made in October 2020, the CPSU would like to note that DPS has:
improved consultation with different areas within Parliamentary services
reinstated the PSS open forum which is a positive move towards open dialogue
returned to regular meetings with the CPSU
provided the long requested census data and also provided the data for PSS separately as requested
provided data on the number of Code of Conduct complaints, investigations and resulting terminations that the CPSU requested
2.41
Ms Beth Vincent-Pietsch, Deputy Secretary of the CPSU also indicated that a recent meeting with the DPS secretary was ‘positive’.
2.42
In a supplementary submission to the committee, the CPSU detailed:
The CPSU met recently with [the] DPS Secretary to discuss the discrepancy between the feedback members have given the CPSU and the feedback management have received via the staff census. We have raised our concern that people are scared to speak out and have disengaged with management feedback mechanisms. The CPSU recognises that our member concerns may not be held by all DPS staff but are concentrated in pockets such as Security and are of enough number and significance that they need to recognised and addressed.
2.43
Mr Stefanic acknowledged that the CPSU do have a remit to represent their members, and that his concerns lie more in the accuracy of the information the CPSU receives. He explained:
I am not convinced that the people complaining to them either come with clean hands or have the utmost integrity in making their complaint. So I guess, they [the CPSU] to an extent have to take at face value what is being told to them and represented. And they are conveying it. So I am not—I am not critical of the CPSU in that regard.
2.44
DPS also advised the committee that it recognises the importance of ‘good communication and consultation arrangements’ and agreed with the CPSU’s statement that effective consultation mechanisms require a ‘legitimate input from the workforce’. It emphasised:
…the department [DPS] encourages all employees and industrial organisations to genuinely engage in these processes to ensure effective consultation.
Observations from the Merit Protection Commissioner
2.45
The Parliamentary Service Merit Protection Commissioner (Merit Protection Commissioner) is an independent statutory officer appointed under section 47 of the Parliamentary Service Act 1999 (PS Act) with functions aimed at ensuring accountability and integrity in employment decision-making in the Parliamentary Service.
2.46
In particular, the Merit Protection Commissioner is responsible for providing independent reviews of employment actions, as well as providing recruitment services and Code of Conduct inquiry services to departments.
2.47
The Merit Protection Commissioner provided the committee with an overview of the Parliamentary Service case work it had completed over the past five years, which encompassed cases relating to DPS employees. The Merit Protection Commissioner observed:
In the past five years, of the seven matters reviewed [of which six related to DPS], the reviewers and delegates in my office have recommended that all decisions be upheld. This includes four Code of Conduct decisions. The absence of recommendations to set aside or vary decisions, including in significant areas of decision making such as the Code of Conduct, is an indicator of good quality decision making by managers in the Department of Parliamentary Services.
There are no patterns in the casework that point to particular areas of concerns in terms of workplace culture and the application of the Parliamentary Service Values and Employment Principles.
Parliamentary Library
2.48
The CPSU informed the committee that responses to its member survey were ‘consistently critical’ from staff in the Research Branch of the Parliamentary Library (Library). It elaborated:
Staffing numbers in the Research branch of the Parliamentary Library have been cut in recent years. This has meant the branch is struggling to retain and recruit staff with specialist knowledge in many of the areas of interest to parliamentarians. The complexity of client requests has increased meaning staff with specialised knowledge, rather than generalists, are needed to adequately answer client questions. Generalists necessarily require more time to answer some very detailed questions. This results in slower services to parliamentary clients (including queues of client requests) and thus those who are working finish tasks being stressed and overworked.
2.49
The Parliamentary Librarian, Dr Dianne Heriot, responded to the claims of insufficient resourcing:
…the CPSU notes that services to Parliamentarians had increased in complexity while resources available have been constrained. These issues are not new. I have been writing about them in my annual reports to Parliament for several years. However, we employ various strategies to minimise the impact to the extent possible. I should note that we are not unique in this either within DPS or within the Commonwealth Public Sector more broadly. DPS works within the budget Parliament appropriates and I am mindful that the library is only one call upon these resources.
2.50
The CPSU also stated that there is a lack of career progression opportunities within the Research Branch of the Library owing to its ‘flat structure’. It stated:
Members state senior management in the branch do not appear to support opportunities for acting/higher duties or secondments compared to elsewhere within DPS.
Several staff had secondments and acting opportunities rejected because management is more concerned about the impact on operational capability rather than giving staff opportunities to develop their skills.
2.51
Dr Heriot advised that the ‘flat structure’ of the Research Branch reflected the specialist nature of its work and noted:
This [flat structure] has been a characteristic of the branch since its establishment. Where possible, we have addressed lower level or entry level positions to increase opportunities for EL [Executive Level] staff, develop skills as supervisors, and to create career pathways.
Where able, we also facilitate internal and external secondments, including to other parliamentary libraries in the states and territories. Sometimes this is not possible due to the impact upon client services, which is always our priority. However, since 2017, we approved 26 such internal and external secondments and said no to four for operational reasons.
2.52
She also advised that the Library had developed a ‘rolling and tailored’ program of training and professional development for its staff, and in 2020–21 has begun developing and piloting a mentoring program in partnership with the Department of the Senate and the Department of the House of Representatives.
2.53
The CPSU additionally submitted that the Research Branch is ‘another area where lack of accountability from management in DPS is evident’ and asserted:
It has been acknowledged by management that there is no clear control over workflow, made worse because management have little visibility of it.
2.54
In regard to this claim, Dr Heriot reported the Library management had ‘quite a granular understanding’ of individual and research section workloads. She explained:
These [workloads] are the subject of regular and ongoing discussion and analysis to determine how best resources can be deployed and redeployed across and within branches across the library. Though these issues are discussed with section managers, they are not necessarily visible to all staff.
2.55
Dr Heriot informed the committee that satisfaction levels among parliamentarians and their staff remained ‘very high’ at 94 per cent, according to data from the 2021 evaluation of the Library’s services. She noted that responsiveness, professionalism and high quality research were all cited as reasons for this outcome.
2.56
Additionally, Dr Heriot advised that the evaluation found that:
trust in the Library as a source of information remains high;
the percentage of parliamentarians and staff who would recommend the Library remains high at 100 per cent; and
Library services are ‘well used’ by parliamentarians and their staff, as well as parliamentary committee staff (including research services, publications, online resources, news services and the Library collection).
Security arrangements at Parliament House
2.57
Security arrangements at APH are delivered under a Joint Security Model (JSM) between the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and DPS. DPS PSS officers are principally responsible for operations inside the building, while the AFP delivers services both inside and outside to maintain the ability to respond to an incident.
2.58
The AFP characterised the relationship between itself and DPS as follows:
The AFP and DPS PSS work collaboratively, using a single layer of operational responsibility and decision making for both day-to-day operations and incidents, including crisis responses. This includes combined arrangements for planning, preparedness and prevention, operational responses, and information management and communication. DPS and the AFP command their own resources within APH, including administrative functions, with overall control and coordination of security matters resting with the AFP.
2.59
DPS and the AFP have two memoranda of understanding (MoU) to cover the provision of protective security at APH.
2.60
The first MoU relates to the operational security and response arrangements at APH, which at a strategic policy level outlines the provision of service to be delivered by each agency. The AFP informed the committee in October 2020 that it was re-negotiating the terms of this MoU with DPS.
2.61
The second MoU relates to the provision of Use of Force training to PSS training instructors in order to guide PSS officers’ use of force in the performance of their security functions. This MoU does not create legal obligations between the two parties.
2.62
The AFP security arrangements at APH include a number of elements, including:
a dedicated AFP Security Controller Parliament House (SCPH);
enhanced protection capabilities including the presence of armed officers within the building and the parliamentary precinct;
an enhanced response capability; and
dedicated protective security intelligence and liaison teams.
2.63
During an emergency situation, the AFP SCPH or their delegate will have overall command and control of the emergency, including the directing of resources from both the AFP and PSS.
As the MOU and JSM matures, the relationship between AFP and DPS is getting stronger. Conducting security-related business at APH as partners means trust and confidence between both agencies continuously improves. The AFP and DPS have a mutual focus on improving and maintaining security arrangements at APH.
The AFP and DPS are currently developing a Joint Security Policy and Governance Framework as part of the JSM to detail the oversight and governance mechanisms for the security arrangements within the Parliamentary precincts. This will includes detail on the roles and responsibilities of the respective agencies, governance documents, a committee framework and governance review mechanisms.
2.66
At a public hearing, Assistant Commissioner Fiona Drennan APM from the AFP highlighted to the committee the cooperative working relationship between her organisation and DPS:
…the AFP enjoys a strong partnership with DPS and is committed to continuous improvement, building on the joint capabilities in place. The AFP remains focused on working with DPS to enhance safety and security within the parliamentary precinct.
2.67
It should be noted that during the period of the committee’s inquiry, elements of the security processes and safety requirements of APH occupants were examined through the recently completed Review of the Parliamentary Workplace: Responding to Serious Incidents undertaken by the Deputy Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Ms Stephanie Foster PSM (Foster Review). The initial consultation paper resulting from the Foster Review made a number of recommendations relevant to APH security and the operation of DPS.
2.68
Further discussion on security-related recommendations of the Foster Review is contained in the committee view section below.
Committee view
Culture within DPS
2.69
The committee recognises the organisational progress DPS has made since it was last reviewed in a committee inquiry setting.
2.70
The committee considers that the evidence received from DPS demonstrates the significant improvements in culture, governance, accountability, strategic direction and service delivery that have been achieved through the three stage transformation that has taken place since 2015.
2.71
Additionally, the committee appreciates the commitment from Mr Stefanic that DPS will remain receptive to feedback from staff and stakeholders in order to continuously improve the operation of the organisation as it supports the work of the Australian Parliament.
2.72
In regard to the culture within DPS, the committee acknowledges that there appears to be differing opinions between DPS and some of its staff represented by the industrial organisations, particularly within the Security Branch and the Parliamentary Library.
2.73
However, the committee notes and is encouraged by the recent positive steps and meetings between DPS and the CPSU.
2.74
The committee encourages both parties to work constructively and in good faith to resolve any actual or perceived issues that may impact on the productivity and morale of the DPS workforce.
2.75
In particular, the committee is pleased that DPS has reiterated on the public record that DPS staff should feel comfortable to raise workplace issues or concerns with management without fear of retribution.
2.76
Additionally, the committee is pleased to see that the Parliamentary Library is highly regarded by parliamentarians and their staff, and that the COVID-19 pandemic has not impacted negatively on the perceived quality of the services on offer.
2.77
The committee acknowledges the recent efforts of the Department of Parliamentary Services (DPS) to improve workplace culture. The committee recommends that DPS continues to focus on improving workplace culture and employee engagement as a high priority, and particularly ensures that all sections and employees are aware of, and have confidence in, the appropriate avenues to raise concerns about workplace and employment concerns.
ICT capabilities
2.78
In regard to ICT capabilities, the committee acknowledges the concerns raised by users both within APH and in electorate offices. The committee recognises the importance of reliable, functioning ICT services (including remote access) for parliamentary workplaces, as particularly highlighted by the remote and flexible work arrangements necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic.
2.79
The committee also acknowledges the unique nature of the ICT services provided by DPS, and the importance of these services being provided to parliamentarians and staff in a secure manner. At the same time, the threat of cyber attacks on government entities is continually evolving, and it is vital that appropriate processes are in place to protect against ICT systems against this threat.
2.80
As such, the committee encourages DPS to continue to consult with users and respond to feedback in order to ensure that the ICT capabilities on offer are adequate, secure and client-focused. On this matter the committee acknowledges that DPS has responsibility for implementing the Australian Parliamentary Digital Strategy 2019–22 which contains the guiding principles for Parliament’s digital direction.
2.81
The committee notes the work of the Department of Parliamentary Services (DPS) in protecting the security of ICT systems provided to parliamentarians and staff. In the context of constantly evolving and increasing cyber security threats, the committee recommends that DPS reviews options to further improve the security of these systems to protect against cyber security breaches.
Other inquiries
2.82
During the course of the inquiry, a number of other inquiries and investigations have been commenced by other authorities in response to an allegation of sexual assault in the ministerial wing of Parliament House.
2.83
The committee has been extremely mindful not to prejudice any law enforcement investigations or legal proceedings relating to the alleged sexual assault.
2.84
This is because there is a risk that where a witness gives evidence to a Senate committee that is subject to parliamentary privilege and that may be relevant to future criminal proceedings, this evidence then cannot be examined in any subsequent trial.
2.85
In light of this, the committee has deliberately chosen not to examine any matters related to the sexual assault allegations.
2.86
The committee considers the matters raised in the sexual assault allegation to be of an extremely serious and distressing nature. As such, the committee’s priority at all times was to ensure that its inquiry into the operation and management of DPS did not inadvertently endanger the integrity of any law enforcement investigation or legal proceedings relating to the criminal allegation.
2.87
In regard to the broader, systemic matters relating to the workplace culture within Parliament House raised by the sexual assault allegation, the committee acknowledges that these are being appropriately investigated by other bodies.
2.88
The committee notes the Foster Review, commissioned by the Prime Minister on 16 February 2021, was tasked with reviewing the procedures and processes involved in identifying, reporting and responding to serious incidents that occur during parliamentary employment.
2.89
The committee is aware that the consultation report, released publicly on 4 June 2021, makes significant findings and recommendations to improve how serious incidents are prevented and dealt with in the parliamentary workplace.
2.90
The committee understands that DPS, along with the other parliamentary departments and the Presiding Officers, engaged with the Foster Review in the preparation of the consultation report.
2.91
The Foster Review makes specific recommendations related to Parliament House security, after-hours access and serious incident responses, all of which are relevant to the operation and management of DPS.
2.92
The committee acknowledges the extensive and detailed work which informed the Foster Review and encourages all stakeholders to engage and respond to the recommendations as a top priority.
2.93
The committee heard from witnesses to its own inquiry that the architecture and operation of Parliament House, and the constantly evolving security challenge from various threats, presents a unique and challenging environment for security services within DPS and the AFP.
2.94
The committee acknowledges the consultative change process that DPS has undertaken in recent years within its Security Branch and is pleased to note evidence indicating that the AFP and DPS have a strong working relationship, and are continuously building on the joint security capabilities currently in place.
2.95
The committee is also mindful that the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) is currently conducting the Independent Review into Commonwealth Parliamentary Workplaces, led by Sex Discrimination Commissioner Kate Jenkins. This review was established by the Commonwealth Government with the support of the Opposition and crossbench parliamentarians. It will build an understanding of the culture of Commonwealth parliamentary workplaces with the aim of ensuring a safe and respectful work environment.
2.96
The committee considers that this review is best placed to examine any systemic issues relating to workplace culture in Parliament House. It understands that current and former workers in Parliament House are able to participate in the review, including but not limited to people employed under the PS Act (such as DPS employees).
2.97
The committee understands that through the departmental intranet DPS employees have been provided with information on the review by the AHRC, and also encouraged to participate by the DPS secretary.
2.98
The committee recommends that the Department of Parliamentary Services (DPS) works with the Australian Federal Police to pursue continued improvements to Australian Parliament House security. In particular, DPS should act swiftly to progress the security-related recommendations of the Review of the Parliamentary Workplace: Responding to Serious Incidents (the Foster Review).
Senator Claire Chandler
Chair