Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1
On 5 February 2009, the Senate referred the provisions of the following
bills to the Finance and Public Administration Committee for inquiry and report
by 10 February 2009:
- Appropriation (Nation Building and Jobs) Bill (No.1) 2008–2009
- Appropriation (Nation Building and Jobs) Bill (No.2) 2008–2009
- Household Stimulus Package Bill 2009
- Commonwealth Inscribed Stock Amendment Bill 2009
- Tax Bonus for Working Australians Bill 2009
- Tax Bonus for Working Australians (Consequential Amendments) Bill
2009.
1.2
On the same day, the Senate also referred the provisions of the Appropriation
(Nation Building and Jobs) Bill (No.2) 2008–2009 relating to the social housing
program to the Community Affairs Committee.
Conduct of the Inquiry
1.3
Details of the inquiry, the bills, and associated documents were placed
on the Committee's website. As of Monday, 9 February 2009, the Committee had
received 29 submissions which are listed in Appendix 1. Appendix 1 also
lists additional information received by the Committee. Submissions were placed
on the Committee's website for ease of access by the public.
1.4
In referring the provisions of the bills to the Committee, the Senate
directed the Committee to hold hearings on 5 February, 6 February and 9 February 2009 respectively. A list of witnesses who appeared at the hearings is at
Appendix 2.
1.5
The Committee thanks those departments, organisations and individuals
who gave evidence at the hearings at very short notice for their cooperation
and willingness to do so. The Committee is also grateful to those organisations
and individuals who made submissions within the tight timeframe.
1.6
The Committee would also like to thank the Department of Parliamentary
Services for producing the proof Hansard Transcripts in a very short time.
Context of the Inquiry
1.7
Australia faces an unprecedented global financial crisis as the majority
of countries go into recession. The massive collapse of the United States subprime
mortgage market has plunged the global economy into crisis. There is a major downturn
in world trade which has led to a slump in consumer and business confidence. Australia
is not immune to the crisis. The Government must act decisively to protect the
national interest by strengthening the economy in order to protect the financial
security of Australian families and businesses.
1.8
The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) October 2008 World Economic
Outlook described the world economy thus:
The world economy is entering a major downturn in the face of
the most dangerous financial shock in mature financial markets since the
1930s...The situation is exceptionally uncertain and subject to considerable
downside risks. The immediate policy challenge is to stabilize financial
conditions, while nursing economies through a period of slow activity and
keeping inflation under control.[1]
1.9
Dr Ken Henry, Secretary of the Treasury gave his assessment:
My assessment is that the weakness in
aggregate demand that we are confronting in Australian economy calls for both
very substantial reductions in interest rates and very substantial fiscal
stimulus. I think it is the case that—well, it is certainly the case—that these
two arms of policy are working in the same direction and complementing one
another. If your question was whether these measures were complements or
substitutes, my answer is that they are complements.[2]
1.10
Mr Klaus Schmitt-Hebbel, Chief Economist of the Organisation for
Economic Coordination and Development, stated that 'in normal times, monetary
rather than fiscal policy would be the instrument of choice for macroeconomic
stabilisation. But these are not normal times' and that central banks should also
cut rates further.[3]
1.11
Mr Greg Evans, Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI), also
commented:
ACCI strongly supports the government's stimulus package and its
attempt to lift aggregate demand across the economy. Such is the scope of our
current economic difficulties that this package, combined with monetary easing,
is absolutely essential. The size of the package at two per cent of GDP in 2009
is appropriate and in line with our own estimate of what is required.[4]
1.12
Anglicare Australia, Catholic Social Services Australia, The Salvation
Army and UnitingCare Australia, in an issues paper on the impact of the global
financial crisis on social services in Australia, noted that:
Some sectors in the financial markets have shut down altogether
and others are simply dysfunctional. The capital markets, where financial
intermediaries and companies borrow money to fund their investments and,
increasingly, their day-to-day running costs, are most notably affected. Risk
premiums demanded by lenders have jumped and even creditworthy borrowers are
having trouble obtaining sufficient funds. All companies and households are
affected.[5]
1.13
The Mid Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2008-09 (MYEFO) released by the
Treasurer and the Minister for Finance and Deregulation on 5 November 2008 commented that the global financial crisis had 'entered a new and dangerous
phase'. While Australia was better placed than most other countries to
withstand the fallout, it 'was not immune from the effects of the global
financial crisis and the global downturn'.[6]
1.14
In response, the Australian Government took action to strengthen the
economy and support Australians including the $10.4 billion Economic Security
Strategy (ESS), a $300 million program to build local community infrastructure,
a $15.2 billion Council of Australian Governments (COAG) funding package and
the Nation Building Package announced in December 2008.[7]
1.15
On 3 February 2009, the Updated Economic and Fiscal Outlook (UEFO) was
released. The UEFO noted that the outlook for the global economy had
deteriorated sharply since the MYEFO, with the IMF cutting its forecast for
global growth and now forecasting a deep global recession.[8]
1.16
In relation to the Australian economy, it was stated that 'the weight of
the global recession is now bearing down on the Australian economy. Growth is
expected to be significantly weaker than previously anticipated and
unemployment will be higher.'[9]
In addition, the sharp fall in global commodity prices is compounding the
impact on Australia.[10]
1.17
On 3 February 2009, the Australian Government announced a $42 billion Nation
Building and Jobs Plan (the plan) over 4 years to provide immediate support
for jobs and growth. In the UEFO it was stated that:
Without this significant and timely policy stimulus, Australia
would face a more severe slowdown than forecast. With the Nation Building and
Jobs Plan, economic growth is only expected to slow to 1 per cent in 2008-09
and ¾ of a per cent in 2009-10. With slower growth, the unemployment rate is
forecast to rise to 7 per cent by June 2010.
The Nation Building and Jobs Plan has been crafted to strike the
right balance between supporting growth and jobs now, and delivering the lasting
investments needed to strengthen the economy for the future.[11]
And:
Doing nothing is not an option. It is becoming increasingly
apparent that, while still important, monetary policy action alone will not be
sufficient to restore growth in demand within a reasonable time period. The
Government's swift action ensures that fiscal policy, along with monetary
policy, is clearly targeted at supporting economic growth and jobs.[12]
1.18
Key measures of the plan highlighted by the Government include:
- free ceiling insulation for around 2.7 million Australian homes;
-
build or upgrade a building in every one of Australia's 9,540
schools;
-
build more than 20,000 new social and defence homes;
- $950 one-off cash payments to eligible families, single workers,
students, drought affected farmers and others;
- a temporary business investment tax break for small and general
businesses buying eligible assets; and
- significant increase in funding for local community
infrastructure and local road projects.[13]
1.19
The following day, the six bills were introduced in the House of
Representatives to implement the plan, the objective of which is to 'support
jobs and invest in future long term economic growth':
By investing in jobs and long term economic growth the Plan
strikes the right balance between immediate support for jobs now, and
delivering the long term investments needed to strengthen future economic
growth.[14]
Key Issues
1.20
A number of concerns and questions were raised during the course of the
inquiry in relation to the Nation Building and Jobs Plan bills including:
- Australia's position in the current financial crisis;
- the size of the plan and the choice of measures;
- the multiplier effect of the plan's measures;
- the implementation lag;
- the employment effects;
- the proposed increase in the borrowing limit governing the issue
of Commonwealth Government Securities; and
- the effectiveness of cash payments as opposed to tax cuts.
1.21
The proposed increase in the borrowing limit governing the issue of
Commonwealth Government Securities and the effectiveness of cash payments as
opposed to tax cuts are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.
Australia's position in the current
financial crisis
1.22
Dr Ken Henry provided the Committee with an overview of the prospects
for the global economy:
At the time that the 2008-09 budget was released the
International Monetary Fund was forecasting world growth for 2009 of four per
cent. Less than nine months later the IMF is now forecasting world growth of
about one half of one percentage point. That is a very substantial deterioration
in forecast growth. It is the largest downward revision to forecast growth by
the IMF that I can recall. Certainly it would be the largest since the Second
World War...so in that sense the global circumstances confronting Australia are
simply unprecedented.
There are other respects in which circumstances confronting Australia
are unprecedented. The forecast growth for our major trading partners is as
weak as we have seen quite possibly since the 1930s. Virtually all of the
countries that we regard as our major trading partners, when we talk about our
major trading partners in an economic sense, are growing at well below trend
rates of growth. Most of them are projected by the IMF to be in recession in
2009. Many of them, indeed, are already in recession and have been for some
period of time.[15]
1.23
Dr Henry also commented on the Australian economy:
It remains the case that, on our assessment and on the
assessments of the International Monetary Fund and the OECD, Australia's
macroeconomic performance is relatively strong both in respect of actual
performance and forecast performance.[16]
1.24
Dr Henry went on to comment that Australia's performance is due to very
careful management of the Australian economy over a long period of time with
respect to both macroeconomic policy and microeconomic reform; effective
regulation of the financial system; and the benefits which have flowed from the
run-up in commodity prices that accelerated at the end of 2003. Dr Henry
concluded:
So there are a whole range of reasons why Australia's relative
economic performance is still quite good, but in an absolute sense the economic
prospects confronting the Australian economy have obviously deteriorated very
substantially.[17]
1.25
UEFO provided a forecast of gross domestic product (GDP) of one
percentage point in 2008-9 as compared to real GDP growth in 2007-08 of 3¾
percentage points. The forecast for 2008-09 takes into account 'the very
considerable loosening in monetary policy that has occurred, the significant
depreciation in the Australian dollar that has occurred, the October
macroeconomic stimulus package and, of course, this macroeconomic stimulus
package' and 'is well below trend growth for the Australian economy and which
explains fully why, in our forecasts, we have the unemployment rate increasing'.
Dr Henry noted that in 2009-10, the forecast is for 'even weaker gross
domestic product growth of only three-quarters of one percentage point'.[18]
1.26
Dr Henry continued:
If one compares the outlook for Australia with the outlook for
the rest of the industrialised world, ours is in some respects a pleasing
outlook. The rest of the industrialised world taken together is forecast by the
International Monetary Fund to go backwards in 2009. But in other respects, and
certainly relative to Australia's trend rate of growth, the figures in the UEFO
have to be regarded as very weak.[19]
1.27
Dr Henry concluded that 'these are highly unusual circumstances and we
have advised government...that there is a need for fiscal policy action and that
it is quite urgent'.[20]
Size of the Nation Building and Jobs Plan
1.28
Given the size of the package, concerns were raised during the inquiry
that the plan was too substantial or should have been staggered over a longer
period of time.[21]
1.29
The UEFO stated that:
The Nation Building and Jobs Plan is intentionally large — it
reflects the seriousness of the challenges being faced and the need to build a
strong economy for the future. By avoiding measures that lock in long-term
spending, the Government is well-positioned to take action to begin to return
the budget to surplus as soon as the economy starts to recover.[22]
1.30
The Australia Institute put the plan's size into the international
context:
While in absolute terms the $42 billion package (over 2.3 years)
is very large, it is less than two per cent of GDP in 2009 and 2010. It is
important to view projected government deficits in relation to both the size of
the Australian economy (the total deficit is 2.8 per cent of Australia's $1.2
trillion GDP in 2009–10) and the size of the fiscal deficits in the US (eight
per cent) and the UK (8.5 per cent). Most EU member countries will also have
deficits well in excess of three per cent of GDP due to the adoption of
stimulus packages and the average for advanced economies in 2009 is seven per
cent.[23]
1.31
Similarly, Mr Greg Evans of the Australian Chamber of Commerce and
Industry noted:
In looking at this issue, we reviewed what was happening
internationally and the size of various fiscal packages. We looked at the UK
and the USA, which are partly analogous, although the depth of their economic
decline has certainly been a lot greater than ours. Indeed, their fiscal
stimuli has been greater than ours. So we thought, on balance, around two per
cent of GDP was appropriate and, in 2009, that is basically what this package
delivers.[24]
1.32
The Committee heard evidence from a number of economists who provided a
range of views to the Committee.
1.33
In response to questions as to why the package was substantial when Australia
is in a much better financial position in comparison to other countries Mr David
Tune, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, stated that:
I guess it is a matter of trying to think forward. The objective
of the package is to get in ahead of the game, in a sense. Looking at the
projections that the Treasury had produced on where they thought the Australian
economy was going, the view was taken that it would be sensible to get in ahead
rather than wait and see what actually happens. Those forecasts may or may not
turn out to be correct; we will see. But, based on the best information that
was available to us in the department, that was the basis of the advice that we
were giving to the government around that time in conjunction with the other
central agencies. Really, it is a question of whether you wait and see or
whether you get in ahead of the game. On this occasion, the government
obviously decided to get in ahead of the game.
The size of the fiscal stimulus and the period of time over
which it occurs are also very important here. If you take into account what the
government did in December last year in the ESS, the economic stimulus package,
and what is being done in the current package, you are probably looking at up
around three per cent of GDP. It is in line with the sorts of averages there in
other countries that you have been talking about. I think it is really a matter
of trying to act in advance of need. It is preventative to a large extent.[25]
1.34
Mr Tune also noted that most advanced countries are doing 'fairly
substantial fiscal stimulus programs at the moment'. The IMF recommendation or
view is that fiscal stimulus should be at least two per cent in calendar year
2009, which is around the figure of Australia's package.[26]
1.35
Officials were questioned as to whether a smaller package, $12 billion
or $21 billion, would not have achieved the same outcome. In response,
Treasury Secretary, Dr Ken Henry stated that the proposed $42 billion plan
would result in GDP growth whereas a smaller plan may well leave GDP contracting
in 2009–10:
... we estimate that as a result of this package...GDP growth will
be around half a per cent higher in 2008-09 and around ¾ to one per cent higher
in 2009-10. It follows, I think, that a smaller package, even a smaller package
with the same profile, would contribute smaller amounts to GDP growth in
2008-09, and with a package that had the same profile and the same composition
as this package—I know those are two big qualifications—but that had a lower
level, a lower aggregate amount, there would be some point at which GDP growth
in 2009-10 in particular might well have been negative.[27]
1.36
On the other hand, doubling the package amount would not necessarily
result in a doubling of the impact on GDP. Dr Henry also commented that 'one
would have to start worrying about the capacity issues':
As I indicated, this particular package takes account of
judgements that we and Finance have made about the capacity of the economy to,
if you like, digest these programs. If these programs, for example, were to be
doubled, maybe we would make different judgements about the capacity of the
economy to digest those programs in that same time profile. I suspect we would
and for that reason we should not expect the multipliers to be constant.
Therefore, you should not expect a linear impact.[28]
Government's Balance Sheet
1.37
A number of senators raised questions about the impact of borrowing on
the Government’s balance sheet. The Government will need to borrow to fund the Nation
Building and Jobs Plan to support the economy and jobs. However, the
Government's balance sheet remains in sound shape, particularly when compared
to other comparable economies.
1.38
As economist Mr Saul Eslake, stated 'the levels of public debt projected
in the Updated Economic and Fiscal Outlook are not excessive or alarming by
either Australian historical or international standard'.[29]
1.39
The UEFO forecasts that general government net debt will rise to 5.2 per
cent of GDP in 2011-12. This is around the average net debt levels that have
prevailed over the past three decades and compares to an average net debt
across OECD member countries of more than 45 per cent of GDP.
Composition of the package
1.40
The UEFO provided a chart showing the projected impact of the package on
aggregate demand as well as the relative contributions of earlier stimulus
measures.[30]
1.41
The UEFO stated that as a result of the plan, GDP growth will be around
half per cent higher in 2008-9 and around three-quarters to one per cent higher
in 2009-10.[31]
1.42
There was considerable discussion during the inquiry concerning the
composition of the package. This went to the use of a tax bonus instead of tax
cuts (this is discussed in chapter 5) and the balance between the various
elements of the plan, including the timing of the impact.
1.43
Dr David Gruen, The Treasury, commented on the way in which the plan has
been framed:
We are in a very unusual situation, which is that Australia is
suffering from insufficient aggregate demand for the whole economy. So the
package has been framed with the thought in the backs of our minds that it is
important to come up with spending plans that will deliver stimulus to the
economy quickly—let us say over 2009 and perhaps into 2010. That is based on a
current assessment of what we think is the nature of the global recession;
namely, we think it is deeper, and will be longer, than we thought several
months ago. So we are focused on spending that will have a material effect on
demand within the economy over that sort of time frame. In assessing the
spending in this package, an important criterion is spending that will actually
have an impact on the economy relatively quickly, because that is the nature of
the problem that we are facing.[32]
1.44
Dr Henry reinforced the need for the plan to address immediate problems:
The problem we are dealing with at the moment...is that we are in
very unusual circumstances, quite unlike the circumstances we have been in the
last 10 years, in which the aggregate demand in the Australian economy is about
to fall dramatically below potential gross domestic product. This package is
about trying to minimise the extent to which aggregate demand falls below
potential gross domestic product. The reason for that is that... if aggregate
demand falls markedly below the potential level of gross domestic product, then
so too will the actual output in the Australian economy fall markedly below its
potential, and many people will end up unemployed.[33]
And:
The thinking that informed the development of this package was
that the current calendar year, 2009, is likely to be in the absence of any
fiscal stimulus a particularly weak year and to some extent also 2010. These
are the key years. That is true globally. You can see that in the IMF's
forecasts for world growth. Particularly 2009 is anticipated to be the weak
year but with some risk on 2010. So the advice that we provided to government
was that it would be appropriate to have a fiscal stimulus which in calendar
year 2009 was at least, at a bare minimum, one percentage point of GDP and
considerably more than that if it were feasible to develop a package that would
have that impact on government spending in calendar year 2009 with some amount
being spent in 2010. I guess it was that thinking about the shape of the
package which ultimately determined the size of its budgetary cost in each year
and its profile.[34]
1.45
This point was also noted by Mr David Tune, Department of the Prime
Minister and Cabinet:
The key focus was to try and get immediate stimulus. That is
what it is about, and that is why there was a mix there of cash payments,
including a tax offset, and infrastructure—mainly community infrastructure
because it is very fast to get going. The whole intent of this package is to
try and get stimulus during the course of 2009.[35]
1.46
Table 2.1 of the UEFO provides the key components of the plan and impact
for the years 2008-09 to 2011-12. The impact of the capital projects lifts
after 2009-10 while direct payments to families have an immediate impact. The
implementation lag is shorter for direct transfer payments to households and
longer for direct government spending.
1.47
Dr Ian Watt, Secretary of the Department of Finance and Deregulation,
commented on the table and stated that:
The top group is the direct government spending. As you can see,
very little direct government spending occurs in 2008-09. With the best will in
the world, with the fastest-acting infrastructure, capital or repair and
maintenance programs that we could find, it was still extremely difficult to
spend much money in the next five months.
...
As you can see in the bottom panel on that table, the direct
payments to families and individuals impact on 2008-09 disproportionately by
comparison. So they give you the relatively rapid stimulus in 2008-09. The
capital projects, the repairs and maintenance projects, pick up steam through
2009-10.[36]
1.48
Dr Henry also explained:
The implementation lag is somewhat shorter for direct transfer
payments to households and somewhat longer for direct government spending. So
if one were to decide that on this occasion one was going to reserve for a
future period any decisions about measures impacting in, let us say, 2009-10,
for example, then when one came to make those decisions, one would be
confronting precisely this problem again. The problem with sequential decision
making is that it will never prove efficacious to deciding to undertake
activities that have an implementation lag longer than the period of time
between the two decision making points.[37]
1.49
In answer to questions on why there was a need to implement the plan in
one stage, rather than some parts at a later time if required, Dr Henry
commented:
Were decisions not taken now, very little of the impact that you
see in 2009-10 would be there. So if you want to have a fiscal impact in
2009-10 and you want that fiscal impact to be through direct government
spending—the measures which are in the top part of this table—then you have to
take the decisions now. If you leave it for another 12 months, for example, you
will not be able to have an impact in 2009-10 in respect of those measures.
Well, you will not be able to have much of an impact. The earliest you will be
able to have much of an impact will be 2010-11 and so on. You will be
continually pushing out for about a year the time at which those measures would
have an impact on the economy. There is an inevitable implementation lag. Is that
sufficiently clear—an inevitable implementation lag. You have to take the
decision and you have to be prepared to live with the implementation lag.[38]
1.50
A number of Senators raised the question of whether cash vouchers would
be a more effective means of ensuring immediate cash flow into the economy as
opposed to one-off cash bonuses.
1.51
In response, Dr Henry stated:
I am just trying to illustrate why there is a difficulty with
the voucher proposal—then surely a household that could only access the $950
through a voucher arrangement would simply spend that $950 and reduce spending
by an equivalent amount elsewhere in their income. That is, if you thought that
the whole $950 was going to be saved unless you had a voucher mechanism then
surely what the household would do is take the voucher, spend all the money and
save another $950 part of their income. To put it another way, money is
fungible.[39]
1.52
Treasury officials were questioned on the choice of measures in the
plan, particularly in relation to infrastructure projects including why
infrastructure projects that would overcome bottlenecks for the export industry
and spending on the Murray-Darling Basin were not included while spending has
been directed to assembly halls and sports centres. In response, Dr Henry highlighted
that such projects would not enable prompt infrastructure expenditure required
to address the deficiency of aggregate demand which the plan was specifically
designed to address.[40]
He further noted that:
I think rather the issue is: in dealing with the very rapid
decline in aggregate demand that we have in our forecasts, can that form of
infrastructure spending be brought online in a sufficiently timely fashion that
it can impact on aggregate demand now? Those infrastructure bottlenecks are worth
addressing, no matter what the macroeconomic circumstances are that Australia
is confronting. They should be judged on their merits as supply enhancement
initiatives. The government's consideration of those things, in my view—and
this is advice I would tender to any government—should not be affected by the
state of the macroeconomy. But those projects do not tend to be the sorts of
projects that can be brought on stream very, very quickly in order to address a
very rapid decline in aggregate demand. They tend not to be of that nature.[41]
1.53
Dr Henry made similar comments in relation to other infrastructure
projects raised in the evidence.[42]
Dr Henry also addressed the notion that there is 'a very large volume of
supply enhancing infrastructure projects out there on which government
expenditure could be undertaken tomorrow'. He commented that that is not the
case: 'It is obviously the case that there is a lot of infrastructure spending
that is being undertaken, but could that be doubled, tripled or quadrupled
overnight? No, I do not think it could be'.[43]
The multiplier effect of the plan's measures
1.54
Questions were raised during the inquiry as to the rationale of the
combination of measures proposed under the plan and the strength of the
multiplier effect of such measures.[44]
The Treasury indicated that the multiplier would be a half to one, but there
was uncertainty about the magnitude.[45]
Dr Gruen stated:
...our estimate of the fiscal multiplier is something like a half
to one, as in spending to GDP. We would like to be more precise than that, but
if you look at the literature, including papers produced by the IMF, that is
exactly the sort of range that people quote. We do not have these numbers to
the degree of precision that we or anyone else would like. We have estimates with
a range of the order of half to one for the multiplier.[46]
1.55
Dr Gruen continued:
We can make a broad comment on that which is that...we think it is
reasonable to expect that the multiplier on infrastructure spending is likely
to be higher than the multiplier on one-off payments to individuals. The reason
is that, if you spend a dollar, you have already put a dollar into the economy
whereas, if you hand a dollar over to someone, they may save part of that
dollar. You probably get a larger multiplier for infrastructure spending.[47]
1.56
Dr Henry noted that leakages, such as to savings and spending on
imports, occur and detract from the direct impact of the measure:
The bit that goes overseas is an income leakage. But the bit
that goes to Australian households, like the wages and salaries that go to
Australian households, some of it will be saved and some of it they will bring
back into the retail sector and you get that multiplier process.[48]
Employment
effects
1.57
Treasury officials noted that when economic growth is forecast to be
below trend, the unemployment rate is forecast to rise. The UEFO states that the
plan will help 'support and sustain' up to 90,000 jobs over the next two years
but 'notwithstanding the solid boost provided by the fiscal stimulus, the
unemployment rate is forecast to reach 7 per cent by June 2010'.[49]
1.58
Treasury indicated that the figure of 90,000 was based on 'an estimate
of how much we think the package will raise GDP and then from there we use an
employment equation to give us an estimate of what increase in employment that
will lead to, relative to not doing it'.[50]
Dr Henry commented:
...to the extent that one can minimise the number of people losing
a job, the better the prospects are of those people going forward being able to
find a job—that is, the greater the extent to which one can minimise the number
of people who lose a job, the smaller the period of time for which those people
might find themselves out of work.[51]
1.59
Dr Henry concluded that the 'biggest risk to unemployment in Australia
is the deficiency of aggregate demand emerging'.[52]
The plan is aimed at increasing aggregate demand which will impact positively
on employment. Mr Tune also commented that:
This package does protect jobs; there are no two ways about
it—it supports jobs. There are issues there about other people who will lose
jobs. Yes, that is what happens in these sorts of situations. The existing
income support system is there to assist those people. The Job Network is there
to assist those people. Both those programs are demand driven, so there is no
dollar constraints on whether people can gain access to those payments or gain
access to the services of the Job Network. So all of those things are there.
The Prime Minister said yesterday that in conjunction with the states he would
like to work through what more can be done in those particular areas. So that
is an issue under active consideration at the moment.[53]
1.60
In response to concerns raised about a rise in unemployment, Mr Grant Belchamber
of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) stated:
The package as a whole is directed at supporting economic
activity and avoiding the increase in unemployment that would otherwise occur.
The cash payments are at the front end of the package, with the infrastructure
spending to follow on from them. We think both parts are absolutely critical in
assisting currently unemployed Australians to find work and in preventing job
losses amongst currently employed Australians. On the whole, the package
delivers substantially in the interests of unemployed Australians and those
employed in firms that find the going tough over the coming year.[54]
1.61
Mr Frank Quinlan representing major Church providers noted of the plan:
The Rudd Government's Nation Building and Jobs Plan is not
designed as a rescue package for the community sector or for unemployed people.
It is a rescue package for the nation as a whole which focuses on creating and
maintaining jobs.[55]
1.62
Whilst Ms Hatfield Dodds of the Australian Council of Social Service
(ACOSS) raised concerns about assistance to the unemployed, she stated that
ACOSS supports the plan for seeking to 'prevent unemployment from rising even
more rapidly'.[56]
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