CHAPTER 3 – THE OUTCOMES AND OUTPUTS FRAMEWORK
Introduction
In 1985 with the introduction of Program Management and Budgeting (PMB),
the first steps were taken to move the focus of attention of parliamentary
scrutineers from inputs to results of expenditure. The committee's predecessor
reported twice in that year on the change in the first agencies to trial
PMB, and was cautiously optimistic, noting however the need for reconciliations
between the Appropriation Bills and the programs. [1]
When PMB was well established and its intricacies somewhat understood
by agencies and senators alike, the explanatory documentation served more
or less adequately as budget scrutiny documents and agendas for estimates
hearings. `Programs' or `sub-programs' often equated to agencies (such
as the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, the Navy, the Federal Court
or the National Gallery of Australia ) or distinct chunks of departmental
activity (such as `tourism' or `consumer affairs'). What PMB did not provide
was a full price for these activities, encompassing corporate overheads,
allowances for superannuation liabilities, depreciation and so forth.
Nor did it disclose in a transparent fashion what might be termed `sensitive'
expenditure, which could be, and frequently was, buried undisclosed in
a broader category of expenditure or moved from agency to agency. And
while it could not be said that the format precluded an examination of
the outcomes of expenditure, as any reading of the interchanges, for example,
between former Senator Peter Baume and officers of the then Department
of Health on the subject of the then government's drug offensive will
show, the committee accepts that PMB did not lend itself particularly
well to such an examination.
So a new outcomes and outputs framework has been introduced, with the
aim of sharpening the focus on the use of government resources and the
outputs produced. Instead of programs, sub-programs and components, we
have moved, broadly speaking, to outcomes, outputs, or output groups and
outputs.
Key components of the new framework are as follows:
- agencies are to specify the outputs they will deliver and describe
the planned government policy outcomes to which the outputs will contribute;
- specifying outputs will involve identifying price, quality and quantity
and other key attributes;
- specifying outcomes will involve providing performance information
on the achievement of planned outcomes and the contribution of outputs
and administered items to those outcomes; and
- there will be a clear distinction between outputs produced by agencies
and over which they have control, and items they administer on behalf
of the government. [2]
Advisory documentation from DOFA indicated that no set number of outcomes
were required but that ministers and their agencies could select the number
and level of outcomes that were most relevant and practical for their
management and reporting needs. Similarly, outputs were to be defined
in a way that was most meaningful for key stakeholders. [3]
This approach recognises what the committee and others have pointed out
over the years, that one size does not necessarily fit all. It further
recognises the reality of the devolution of control from central agencies
to individual agency CEOs under the Financial Management and Accountability
Act 1997. But the results have nevertheless been quite dramatically
different from portfolio to portfolio and it appears that not all PBS
structures meet the needs – or preferences - of some parliamentary
stakeholders.
In the remainder of this chapter the committee will consider separately
outcomes, outputs, administered items, the overall outcomes/outputs frameworks,
how they relate to organisational structures, how stable they might be,
and then will draw certain conclusions from the evidence in the PBS to
date.
Outcomes
The first issue to be determined by portfolios for the new reporting
framework was the selection of outcomes. Outcomes are defined by DOFA
as `the results, impacts and consequences of actions by the Commonwealth
on the Australian community'. [4] They are ministerially
endorsed and funding via the Appropriation Bills is to outcomes. Agencies
must report in their annual reports on actual outcomes against the desired
outcomes specified in the PBS.
From the committee's point of view, examples of good, clear outcomes
from the 1999-2000 PBS included the following:
- Attorney-General's Department outcome 1: `an equitable and accessible
system of federal law and justice';
- Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission outcome: `An Australian
society in which the human rights of all are respected, protected and
promoted';
- National Native Title Tribunal outcome: `Recognition and protection
of native title';
- Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts
outcome 1: `A cultural environment that enriches the lives of all Australians';
- Department of Defence outcome: `The prevention or defeat of armed
force against Australia or its interests';
- Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs outcome 2: `A
society which values Australian citizenship, appreciates cultural diversity
and enables migrants to participate equitably';
- Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies
outcome: `Promotion of knowledge and understanding of Australian indigenous
cultures, past and present'.
These outcomes share a number of desirable characteristics. They are
aspirational; they are likely to have wide general support; they are succinct;
they do not attempt to explain how the outcome is to be achieved; and
they are not hedged about with terms and conditions. The committee accepts,
however, that there is scope for both narrow, short-term outcomes as well
as high-level aspirational ones.
It has been argued that many of the `outcomes' formulated for these first
outcomes/outputs reporting frameworks could as realistically be termed
`objectives'. Some are very general indeed and it is hard to see how accountability
could possibly be enhanced in any reporting against them. Also, the limitations
of the portfolio structure ensure that there are no cross-portfolio outcomes.
Communications, health and transport activities directed to regional Australia,
for example, are all dealt with separately in the individual PBS. Significant
cross-portfolio issues are drawn together in ministerial statements, but
translating from those statements to the PBS has caused problems. [5]
No set number of outcomes per portfolio or per department or agency was
required in the new framework. By the committee's calculation, outcome
numbers in fact ranged from one to ten, and averaged at three for departments.
The level of appropriation they represented varied per outcome from a
high of $17 509 082 000 for the single outcome for Defence, `The prevention
or defeat of armed force against Australia or its interests' to a low
of $271 000 for the single outcome of the Criminology Research Council,
`Criminological research which informs the Commonwealth and the states'.
Sixteen outcomes enjoyed appropriations of over $1 000 000 000, while
five had appropriations of less than one million dollars. The committee
is not necessarily convinced that materiality is of paramount importance
in outcome definition, but it does note the extreme range and will consider
the matter further in subsequent reports.
As noted previously, outcomes could be formulated at portfolio level
or at departmental or agency level. Portfolio structures, themselves sometimes
accidents of history, play a part in outcomes gestation. The Finance and
Administration portfolio, comprising inter alia such strange bedfellows
as the Office of Asset Sales and IT Outsourcing, the Australian Electoral
Commission and Commonwealth Superannuation Administration as well as the
department, wisely elected not to devise a single portfolio outcome. By
contrast, the Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry portfolio deemed that
all of its general government sector agencies actually contributed to
a generic outcome, `more sustainable, competitive and profitable Australian
agricultural, food, fisheries and forestry industries'. The Health and
Aged Care portfolio developed ten outcomes, shared by the department and
all portfolio agencies. On the other hand, many of the agencies within
the Attorney-General's portfolio could be said to contribute to one or
other of the departmental outcomes, and yet they have discrete individual
outcomes.
As mentioned above, and as a cursory glance at the outcomes defined in
the 1999-2000 PBS will show, they are for the most part not likely to
be `achieved' in the short term. They represent continua along which progress
can be charted in successive PBS and annual reports. In many cases, public
sector agencies will have little to no control over some of the factors
which might affect the outcome. Agencies should be able to define and
measure a number of practical contributions to those outcomes, however,
in the form of outputs.
Outputs
Outputs are defined as `the goods and services produced by agencies on
behalf of government for external organisations or individuals ... Agency
outputs ... are funded by government, throught the Budget process, on
the basis of agreed output prices. Outputs are then produced using departmental
expenses.' They are to be clearly linked to intended outcomes. And they
are distinct from administered items, such as benefit payments, grants
to other levels of government and transfer payments, which are managed
but not controlled by agencies.
The success or failure of an outcomes/outputs reporting framework depends
in part on the choice of outputs and whether as a whole they contribute
to an adequate measure of the outcome to which they relate. There is a
risk, as was pointed out to the committee, that only measurable outputs
will be defined and reported on.
Depending on circumstances, outputs can be stand-alone or grouped for
management and reporting purposes. DOFA-provided guidance suggested that,
in deciding whether to group outputs, issues to consider included the
homogeneity of outputs within a group, the adequacy of the information
for performance monitoring, materiality, measurability and accountability.
[6] In describing his department's choice of
five output groups, Peter Shergold of the Department of Employment, Workplace
Relations and Small Business stressed that the aim had been to allow clear
distinctions to be made between key roles and functions of the department.
[7]
By the committee's rough calculation, slightly more than half the outcomes
were supported by direct outputs rather than output groups. Direct outputs
per outcome ranged from one to eleven; output groups per outcome ranged
from one to nine; while the greatest number of outputs (via output groups)
per outcome was 58, for outcome 1 of the Department of Environment and
Heritage, `The environment, especially those aspects that are matters
of national environmental significance, is protected and conserved'. Interestingly,
the Environment and Heritage portfolio was commended in estimates hearings
for its detailed approach. [8] There was little
to no correlation between the price of outputs, where specified, and breadth
or narrowness of output definition.
Steve Gurr of the Victorian Treasury described that state's experience
in output definition:
our outputs are fairly highly aggregated bundles of services. There
is a school of thought that says that we ought to be taking them to
a much lower level to make them more understandable, more readily identified
as discreet goods and services that you can pick off the shelf and buy.
We have avoided that because, to take it to that next level, we would
need to perhaps have 1,500 to 2,000 outputs, which might be more confusing
or, at least, more voluminous in the budget papers and less useful.
[9]
In its report on the Victorian 1998-99 budget estimates, that Parliament's
Public Accounts and Estimates Committee reflected the process of consolidation
of outputs across most departments and concluded there was still room
for improvement in output specifications to ensure that they reflected
appropriate and meaningful outputs. [10]
At a federal level, the 1999-2000 PBS revealed some outputs which were
very highly aggregated and others which were quite specific. Sometimes
the choice for agencies appeared logical and straightforward; in other
cases, agencies went to some lengths to cater for the known predelictions
of scrutinising senators. As Martin Dolan of AFFA explained,
in the past we treated various elements of the former Department of
Primary Industries and Energy, now Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Australia, effectively as separate entities. The guidelines we are working
to say AFFA is AFFA, and it has a set of outputs. We have tried ...
to work within that framework by attributing specific outputs to the
elements of the organisation where we know there has been historical
interest in individual entities. That is why we have an output called
scientific advice, which largely relates to the Bureau of Rural Sciences.
That is why we have two outputs – 4 and 5, Export certification
and Quarantine services – covering the activities of AQIS ... we
tried by constructing our outputs in this way to at least go some way
to to revealing previously existing and still existing entities within
the department. [11]
Administered items
For financial management purposes, a distinction has been drawn between
`departmental' items, which an agency controls, such as salaries and allowances,
and `administered' items, such as benefit payments and grants to other
levels of government, which the agency administers but does not control.
Accountability for admininistered items differs as agencies have a more
limited influence over them.
The definition of control is crucial to the distinction between administered
and departmental items, but it has proved difficult for agencies to apply
and even more difficult for senators to understand. Because the end result
affects the nature of an agency's responsibility for the item in question,
the reasons for the judgment one way or another must be robust and transparent.
The estimates hearings illustrated many cases in which senators did not
appreciate the distinction between departmental and administered items,
and the resultant accountability consequences. Workplace reform secret
ballots and the Tasmanian Freight Equalisation Scheme were but two cases
of confusion. The committee believes that with time, the distinction will
become clearer and no particular additional measures need to be taken
in the PBS to accentuate the distinction. If, however, decisions are taken
to redefine a given item, its changed status should be highlighted in
the overview.
Outcomes/outputs framework
In the move to an outcomes and outputs reporting framework, no particular
outline was mandated. This is consistent with the devolution of responsibility
for such matters to agency heads, but has inevitably resulted in a most
inconsistent picture when viewed across the board. While broad guidelines
were provided by DOFA, portfolios were given the freedom to chose a framework
which suited their particular circumstances and many acknowledged to the
committee their appreciation of this flexibility. [12]
Whatever the merits of an outcomes/outputs framework in clarifying what
should be produced, at what price and how efficiently – and the committee
considers these and other issues associated with the new framework in
the following chapter – the basic issue for senators using the PBS
in estimates hearings remains whether the framework is meaningful to them.
And just as the program structures before them were criticised, so too
were the initial outcomes/outputs frameworks.
Portfolio or agency outcomes?
The first obvious difference in the chosen frameworks was the selection
of portfolio versus agency outcomes. As indicated previously, some portfolios
– Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Health and Aged Care, Treasury,
and Transport and Regional Services – had one or more portfolio outcomes,
while the remainder chose to define their outcomes at departmental and
agency level. One agency – ATSIC – developed sub-outcomes. Portfolio
outcomes were always an option [13] and their
use is not of itself a problem but it does constitute one more nail in
the coffin of PBS consistency.
The Transport and Regional Services portfolio's rationale for a single
portfolio outcome was as follows:
the government recognises that, in addition to services specifically
aimed at communities in regional, rural and remote Australia, transport
facilities and options play an integral part in fostering the social
and economic capacity of regional Australia and in maintaining its links
to the rest of the country. In recognising these priorities of the government,
all agencies in the Transport and Regional Services portfolio deliver
services to assist the minister in pursuing a single outcome for the
community, which is described as 'linking Australia through transport
and regional services'. [14]
The Health and Aged Care portfolio adopted ten across-portfolio outcomes.
This approach was explained by the departmental secretary, Andrew Podger,
as `a best attempt at classifying our activities according to objectives'
and one which was an improvement on the previous arrangement. [15]
But did the Senate scrutiny committee think so? The Community Affairs
Legislation Committee, which examined the estimates of two portfolios
– Health and Aged Care, and Family and Community Services - with
quite differing approaches to structuring outcomes and outputs, was critical
of the differing formats. [16] Apart from its
10-outcome structure for the whole portfolio, Health and Aged Care adopted
seven categories of output for use across all outcomes where applicable,
while the Family and Community Services portfolio produced separate outcomes
for Centrelink and the Australian Institute of Family Studies and integrated
outcomes for the Department, the Child Support Agency, the Social Security
Appeals Tribunal and CRS Australia. Officers representing the Department
of Family and Community Services at the committee's public hearing explained
that, as a new combination of agencies following the changes to the administrative
arrangements in October 1998, they had to define from scratch what they
wanted to achieve, then determine their outcomes/outputs structure and
organise the department around it. [17]
Level of specificity of outcomes/outputs
In its submission to the committee, DIMA described the development of
its broad outcomes and outputs framework, of two outcomes and seven outputs,
noting however that many other agencies had taken a much more specific
and detailed approach, even identifying policy advice and ministerial
services as separate outputs. The committee agrees with DIMA that these
types of services are, generally, processes in delivering outputs and
not of themselves outputs. It is not unduly concerned at the lack of consistency
in level of specificity in the outcomes/outputs frameworks devised. Over
time, and with experience, it is probable that a greater level of consistency
will evolve without being mandated. Even if it does not, the committee
takes the view that portfolios have the right to be flexible in defining
their outcomes and outputs, provided that they remain responsive in estimates
hearings to requests for differing levels of aggregations.
This committee has wrestled with the issue of whether the reporting framwork
really matters a great deal per se and whether, with more familiarity
with it, we and our senatorial colleagues might find the present variety
less problematic. A number of not necessarily distinct issues are involved
here: ministerial preference; the internal diversity of each portfolio;
the stability of the administrative arrangements; and even senatorial
notions of accountability. Does the outcome structure matter? After all,
it merely replaces a program structure which was variously divided on
agency or on thematic lines, and at differing reporting levels. And just
as the previous variations irritated some scrutinising senators, [18]
so did the new, aided and abetted by `the shock of the new'.
Failure to disclose discrete entities
Where the framework clearly does matter to scrutinising senators is where
the output structure is framed so as to obscure the impact, or even existence,
of quite discrete entities. The exchanges in this committee's estimates
hearings over the Office of the Status of Women (OSW) are a case in point.
To Senator Crossin's comment, `I have to tell you that I feel like I was
playing “Where's Wally”. I could not actually find the words
OSW', the head of the OSW replied that the department had made the decision
a couple of years ago to treat its financial statements by group and that
the OSW was part of the social policy group. [19]
To the committee's mind, the lack of homogeneity of that group, which
also encompasses the Office of Indigeneous Policy, is striking and should
perhaps be avoided or at the very least, specific performance indicators
should be produced.
Senator Forshaw also articulated this problem with the Agriculture, Fisheries
and Forestry PBS:
for what I might call discrete entities or agencies such as AQIS, ABARE,
BRS, you cannot actually go to one section of the statements and find
an overview of the figures for revenue, expenditure, item expenses,
other sources of income and so on. [20]
To which the officers responded by describing the change of philosophy
in a budget that focuses on outcomes and outputs. The committee discusses
the question of output pricing, and cost allocation to outputs, in Chapter
4.
In the committee's view, the individual contributions of discrete administrative
bodies such as AQIS, whether or not they contribute to a more aggregated
output, should at the very least be disclosed by way of performance indicators.
To argue that this would subvert the change in emphasis to outcomes is
unhelpful, particularly for statutory bodies which are creatures of Parliament
and in which Parliament can be reasonably expected to wish to take a close
and continuing interest.
Enabling services as separate outputs?
Several senators were puzzled by the absence of what used to be termed
`corporate services' in the new structures. The logic of appropriations
to outcomes dictates that enabling services such as personnel management
and IT provision are attributed to outputs which in turn contribute to
outcomes. The enabling services are not an end in themselves and, in the
committee's view, need not be separately identifiable in the PBS. This
is not to say, however, that agencies should not be responsive to questioning
about enabling services in estimates, merely that information about them
in the PBS could be at the discretion of agencies.
Relationship of the outcomes/outputs framework with the organisational
structure
Experience in other jurisdictions has shown that where the outcomes and
outputs structure reflects the organisational structure, the system works
more smoothly. Steve Gurr, representing the Victorian Treasury, indicated
that in that state, they were working with departments to encourage them
to better reflect the the output structure in their organisational structure,
so that management decision-making could be aligned with outputs. [21]
The committee has noted how the Finance and Administration portfolio,
having of course been in the best position to see the changes coming,
revised its own organisational structure in line with its present outcomes
and outputs well in advance of the first accrual budget so that it had
an apparently relatively seamless transition to the new framework. As
Steve Bartos of DOFA explained,
making the organisational structure line up with the outputs that we
are delivering enhances accountability. It means that we know clearly
who is responsible for delivering what. [22]
The concept of outputs or sub-outputs to which contributions come from
many workgroups or even agencies came as a surprise to many senators.
In considering the Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small
Business output 2.1.1, policy advice and advocacy, for example, the following
exchange took place:
Senator O'Brien: Where do the staff sit within the department that
are costed for the $11.47 million?
Mr Hoy: They are across a range of organisational units. [23]
Similarly in the estimates for the Transport and Regional Services portfolio,
Senator Mackay, noting that the outputs in the PBS did not reflect the
departmental structure, was told:
this is an output based budget which shows the outputs delivered by
the department as a whole. How the secretary determines the structure
of his department and which organisational units will deliver which
segments of those outputs is an internal business planning and allocation
process. [24]
The committee believes that where possible – and it concedes that
it is sometimes neither possible nor desirable – the preferred framework
should reflect the organisational structure of the agency. It is of the
view that where agency outputs do not reflect the organisational structure,
a clear description in the PBS of the method used to allocate costs to
outputs is required.
Stability of the outcomes/outputs structure
In estimates hearings, in the committee's public hearing and in submissions
to the committee, one theme which emerged loudly and clearly was the issue
of the stability of the present outputs and outcomes structure. Mr Gurr
described the Victorian experience:
There is, and there is likely to continue to be, significant movement
as departments refine their output structure, change outputs –
substitute one for another - and change the output performance measures.
As we work with these things we find that they are often not adequate
for the task, so we need to change them. Every time you change them,
you obviously lose comparability with previous years. [25]
The Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee explored
this question in some detail in its examination of the estimates and concluded
that it would be concerned if major changes were to take place as `it
would make it difficult to keep track of expenditure from year to year'.
[26] Joanna Hewitt of the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade assured the committee that that department was hoping
that the present structure would give it a stable platform from which
to work and report over time and one which would give meaningful quantitative
data over time. She added that organisational change was being considered
to align parts of the department that contribute to a particular output.
[27]
Greg Harper presented a different picture from the perspective of the
Transport and Regional Services portfolio, which had developed its PBS
on an outputs basis for 1998-99 as well. In that year, there were nine
output classes, organisationally based and Mr Harper acknowledged that
`we may have shaped the outputs which we were to deliver to the organisation
which then existed'. [28] However, following
the administrative arrangement changes, they had recast their output structure
along broad functional lines.
Other agencies indicated that they were still engaged in bedding down
their outcomes/outputs structure following the experience of the first
year. The Australian Federal Police, with five outcomes, 19 output groups
and about 40 outputs, was considering rationalising for 2000-2001; the
Australian Customs Service in contrast deliberately set out to have a
simpler structure, with one outcome and five outputs, but with the view
that `there would be a period of some years before the output-outcome
structure would really shake down'. [29]
This pattern was repeated across many estimates hearings, corroborating
the experience reported by the ACT and Victorian representatives that
the frameworks and associated issues could take up to five years to stabilise.
Administrative arrangement changes always disrupt reporting frameworks.
There is a reasonable expectation on the part of senators that when a
function is moved from one portfolio to another, it is slotted transparently
into the new framework and at a similar reporting level from whence it
came. Should changes be required, including changes to performance information,
they should be clearly disclosed in both the former and the receiving
PBS and justified in the latter.
Steve Gurr, the director of budget reform in the Victorian Treasury,
in describing that state's first accrual budget, commented:
We definitely need to drive the framework more deeply into departments.
At this stage, I characterise what we have put in place as the superstructure.
We have the relationship between government and departments in place
but, in terms of the substructure at the departmental level, there is
not a lot cascading down. I think we need to have decisions aligned
from the base of the pyramid all the way up to the top before we get
the most benefits out of this. That is ... where the focus of our work
will be in the next couple of years. [30]
This was clearly evident in Senate estimates hearings as well. A given
output would be called upon, a question asked, and the officers at the
table often had little idea as to which of their colleagues was actually
responsible for the area in question, resulting in a considerable musical
chairs exercise while the appropriate person was found. This may be a
passing problem and with time and experience, it may be overcome. Or it
may require in some cases redefinition of outputs, and another settling
down period.
Conclusions
On the evidence available to it, the committee believes that an amount
of `bedding down' of the new reporting framework is required before a
definitive view on its success or otherwise can be formed. Certainly it
has the potential to provide more complete information on what has been
achieved and at what cost, and this should assist managers and governments
to take more appropriate future action. But unless that information is
comparable year on year within the one portfolio and, ideally, comparable
for like issues across portfolios, it may well be that key stakeholders
such as senators may not be appreciative.
The committee notes that DOFA has indicated its responsiveness to the
need for consistency and comparability of the financial reporting framework,
and will be taking steps to facilitate the development of best practice
in a continuing program of improvement and refinement.
The committee notes and applauds DOFA's stated intention of conducting
an analysis of portfolio outcomes/outputs frameworks and recommends
that DOFA publish and annually update for as long as necessary a best
practice outcomes/outputs frameworks guide on its web site.
Footnotes
[1] See, for example, Senate Standing Committee
on Finance and Government Operations, Second Report on Changes in the
Presentation of the Appropriations and Departmental Explanatory Notes,
1985.
[2] Department of Finance and Administration,
Specifying Outcomes and Outputs, 1998, p. 8.
[3] ibid., p. 4.
[4] ibid., p. 13.
[5] See, for example, the discussion of women's
issues in Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee,
Hansard, 2 June 1999, p. 272.
[6] DOFA, Specifying Outcomes and Outputs,
1998, p. 31.
[7] Senate Employment, Workplace Relations,
Small Business and Education Legislation Committee, Hansard, 7
June 1999, pp. 4-5.
[8] Senate Finance and Public Administration
Legislation Committee, Hansard, 31 May 1999, p. 41.
[9] Senate Finance and Public Administration
Legislation Committee, Hansard, 17 June 1999, p. 17.
[10] Victorian Public Accounts and Estimates
Committee, Report on the 1998-99 Budget Estimates, Melbourne: Government
Printer, 1998, p. x.
[11] Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and
Transport Legislation Committee, Hansard, 2 June 1999, p. 247.
[12] See, for example, Department of Immigration
and Multicultural Affairs, in Senate Finance and Public Administration
Legislation Committee, PBS Submissions, p. 53.
[13] See, for example, DOFA, Specifying
Outcomes and Outputs, 1998, p. 13.
[14] Senate Finance and Public Administration
Committee, Hansard, 17 June 1999, p. 65.
[15] Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee,
Hansard, 31 May 1999, p. 10.
[16] Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee,
Estimates Report, June 1999, p. 2.
[17] Senate Finance and Public Administration
Legislation Committee, Hansard, 17 June 1999, pp. 53, 76.
[18] Senate Finance and Public Administration
Legislation Committee, Format of the Portfolio Budget Statements, 1997,
p. 16.
[19] Senate Finance and Public Administration
Legislation Committee, Hansard, 2 June 1999, p. 68.
[20] Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and
Transport Legislation Committee, Hansard, 2 June 1999, p. 245.
[21] Senate Finance and Public Administration
Legislation Committee, Hansard, 17 June 1999, p. 20.
[22] Senate Finance and Public Administration
Legislation Committee, Hansard, 17 June 1999, p. 77.
[23] Senate Employment, Workplace Relations,
Small Business and Education Legislation Committee, Hansard, 7
June 1999, pp. 10-11.
[24] Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and
Transport Legislation Committee, Hansard, 31 May 1999, p. 35.
[25] Senate Finance and Public Administration
Legislation Committee, Hansard, 17 June 1999, p. 17.
[26] Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
Legislation Committee, Estimates Report, June 1999, p. 2.
[27] Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
Legislation Committee, Hansard, 9 June 1999, p. 300.
[28] Senate Finance and Public Administration
Legislation Committee, Hansard, 17 June 1999, p. 65.
[29] ibid., p. 73.
[30] Senate Finance and Public Administration
Legislation Committee, Hansard, 17 June 1999, p. 15.
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