Chapter 5
Barriers to participation in procurement
5.1
This chapter discusses issues which were identified as barriers to
Australian businesses participating in procurement. Those issues were the:
-
complexity of tender documentation;
-
lack of an effective complaints process;
-
application of procurement-connected policies;
-
training and technical expertise of procurement officers.
Complexity of tender documentation
5.2
A number of witnesses and submissions commented that the complexity of
tender processes and contract documentation was a barrier to businesses
participating in procurement processes. For example, Ms Lynne Wilkinson
from the Australian Companies Institute Limited (AUSBUY) stated:
We have identified that the process of making [an] application
can be quite difficult for businesses. It is overcomplicated when it comes to
even making the application. These businesses are oftentimes hands-on
businesses. They do not have someone they are paying $300,000 a year to fill
out government procurement legalese paperwork. They do not have a problem with
that; what they have a problem with is the simplicity, not saying first up,
without going through 80 pages, 'This is what we want; this is when we want it
by.'[1]
5.3
Ms Wilkinson contended that, at least initially, businesses were only
after a limited amount of information:
[Businesses] want to know what you want, when you want it and
how many you want. If they can say that simply, it might be one or two pages
instead of 80 pages of legalese, then the business can say, 'We can do that
and, if we cannot do it by ourselves, we will work with other Australian owned
businesses so that we can help and we can supply that.'[2]
5.4
Ms Suzanne Campbell, Chief Executive Officer of the Australian
Information Industry Association, referred to the significant costs that
business can incur through participating in government procurement,
particularly if the business is involved in a panel arrangement:
The first is in relation to the cost of doing business with
no guarantee of a return. The proliferation of panels...is quite extraordinary,
with agencies typically setting up their own panels to meet their specific
needs. This undermine[s] the objective of the panel, which is to make
procurement less onerous. It is self-evidently the case that, if you have got a
whole lot of panels, that burden is very significant. They also preclude
agility and efficiency...While these [panels] are not all refreshed every year,
over a three or four-year period around 20 of these might be renewed. Each new
panel or requirement to reapply requires the investment of time, effort, energy
and a diversion of resources from the conduct of ordinary business. So, for an
individual member, this might equate to $3 million of cost per annum.[3]
5.5
Ms Campbell also referred to the costs in terms of the time for a
business to participate in government procurement:
There is also the cost of time where the nature of government
procurement, evaluation and approval processes can run into years. [Our members
have] referred to large competitive tenders that might take over two years. So
there is the iterative effort. You have been on the panel. You have renewed
your processes. Now you have got to bid and you participate in an iterative
process for up to two years where bidders are asked to respond not just to
queries but also to changes in scope from the purchaser, with multiple requests
for engagement. For a larger engagement, it has been estimated that this might
cost in excess of $10 million over two years. So there are very significant
costs.[4]
5.6
Both Mr Tony Butler, a senior procurement consultant with many years of
experience in public sector procurement, and Ms Campbell referred to the often
onerous conditions for participation in procurement faced by business. For
example, Ms Campbell explained:
There is a starting point for government in which, in all
instances, unlimited liability, high insurance level requirements and [intellectual
property] ownership create additional complexity and difficulty, in particular
for SMEs, but for all industry participants. This has no regard for the nature
of work that is to be done, or the changing nature of business and service
environment.[5]
5.7
Mr Butler noted that the issue of preconditions, such as public
liability and professional indemnity, being set too high 'has been a long-term problem'.[6]
In his view these preconditions resulted from Commonwealth legal advisers
having taken a 'very protective' or 'very cautious' approach to project risk.[7]
5.8
Mr Steve Chapman, Deputy Auditor-General, observed that different
processes between departments may create barriers to business participation in
procurement:
We hear stories about the different approaches undertaken by
different government agencies which might be simple in themselves but create a
different hurdle for small businesses who might be looking to, as you say, sell
a good product at a good price and get on with business. I think part of the
issue going forward is how, without making it bureaucratic, do you standardise
simplified processes, particularly for the smaller procurement activities, to
allow the Commonwealth to know it is getting a value-for-money outcome without
putting inappropriate hurdles in front of those small businesses.[8]
5.9
Dr Seddon stated that there is a reason that some tender processes are burdensome:
I cannot say that there should be some sort of quick and
simple process. There obviously can be a quicker and simpler process for
low-level purchasing, and maybe the threshold should be lifted from $80,000—at
the moment that is the threshold for goods and services where they must go out
to tender. But the reason that government tender processes are so burdensome is
that they are spending public money. Most of the rules are there—perhaps overdone
a bit—to reflect that basic thing, which is that they are spending public money
and they have got to make sure they do it properly.[9]
5.10
The committee was provided with examples and proposals for streamlining
procurement processes. For example, Ms Melbourne from the Canberra Business
Council described Singapore's 'GeBIZ' system as a best practice model:
All of the tenderers are pre-registered. They have already
been through a pre-authentication process for all the legal, contractual and
compliance elements of dealing with government. They only ever have to do that
once; it is all centralised. Let's say they are tendering for a $2 million
project. The procurement process has given a pricing indication. So it is set:
'We're not going to pay $10 million; we want to pay something around $2 million
or $3 million.' There are some fuzzy edges there, but it gives everybody an
indication of what they are expecting to spend.
Then, at the point when the tender closes and all the
submissions are in, there is a summary note that lists all of the tenderers and
their supply partners, the price that they have bid and the value for money
breakdown. All of the other tenderers see that at that point in time. It is all
automated. So you can see the lowest bid through to the highest bid and you can
see which of the prime contractors and their suppliers are fulfilling which
elements of the contract. Then industry sorts it out from there. Government
does not need to hide or control anything. It is open and industry gets itself
organised next time if they are not happy with it.[10]
5.11
The Australian Information Industry Association also supported a centralised
register for potential suppliers:
Revisiting tender frameworks so that it is easier and less
time intensive for firms, large and small, to respond to tenders when they are
released. For example a one-stop pre-qualification or certification process,
where matters such as insurance certificates, company ownership details and [Australian
Business Numbers] (common to all tenders) are collated so that the same
information does not need to be repeated every time a tender is submitted.[11]
5.12
Mr John Callaghan, Executive Director of the Australian Industry Group
Defence Council, recommended that incentives be built into procurement
processes, rather than relying predominately on penalties:
[F]rom my own other commercial experience I always think it
is better to reward good outcomes, preferably financially, so rather than
punish, which is the tendency in government procure, for failure to perform,
the more incentives you build into the procurement process to reward good
outcomes the better. Companies will generally perform better when they know
there is a carrot to perform to.[12]
Responses by government
5.13
Mr Michael Green, Acting Head, Industry Division, Department of Industry
noted that there is awareness of these issues and that assistance is available:
In a range of cases it is clear from the work that we have
done in that particular type of activity that they are not very good at some
basic activities—for example, understanding the tender requirements;
understanding how to put in competitive documentation that meets the
requirement. There are a range of practical activities that the department has
engaged in through those and similar initiatives to improve the understanding
between both parties of what Australian capability is and what the requirements
of the procurer are and how they can best put forward proposals that meet the
requirements. For example, we certainly have a number of cases where [the] key
reason companies were not getting work through government procurements was that
they did not submit compliant documentation. We are working with them to
understand what it is they have to do and how they have to frame their proposal
to meet the requirements of the tender.[13]
5.14
The Department of Finance (Finance) noted that in 2011, following
requests from industry and government agencies, a 'simple standardised contract
for low-risk, low-value procurements (under $80,000)' was developed.[14]
5.15
Mr John Sheridan, First Assistant Secretary, Technology and Procurement
Division, Business, Procurement and Asset Management Group, Department of
Finance, also referred the committee to the Commonwealth's recently released
contract suite of standard terms and conditions:
In regard to the Commonwealth contracts suite, [the
Department of] Finance has developed a set of standard terms and conditions for
low-risk procurements under $200,000. It was launched by the Minister for
Finance and the Minister for Small Business, on [19 March 2014]. The new
Commonwealth contracts suite replaces the old basic contract suite and
increases the threshold for eligible contracts to $200,000. In 2012-13,
84 per cent of the contracts reported on AusTender were below $200,000.
The vast bulk of government contracts thus will now be able to go through this
new simplified process.
The new contracts suite is much more user friendly, with
easy, intuitive online templates that will remove the need for legal advice
every time one tenders. It is a maximum of 14 pages long and the standard terms
and conditions fit on five pages...
A key feature of the suite is the standard liability,
indemnity and insurance clauses, which have been significantly simplified. The
contract suite is currently being rolled out across Australia to agencies and
businesses and will be operational from 1 July this year.[15]
Complexity of the Commonwealth
Procurement Rules
5.16
One specific issue raised with the committee was the complexity of the
CPRs. In his evidence to the committee, Mr Butler summarised a number of
concerns he has with the drafting of the Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs):
It is very clear that [the CPRs] are not written in plain
English as the Legislative Instruments Act requires and envisages. I have been
reading procurement rules not only in Australia but in various other countries
for well over 30 years and I have difficulty navigating the material that is on
the Department of Finance website, including the Commonwealth procurement
rules. I note that, according to the department, there was no prior
consultation with external parties, which might include industry, about the
rules before they were issued. I think [there] should have been, given the
effects that they have on business and competition. That consultation is
clearly envisaged by the Legislative Instruments Act for things of this kind.[16]
5.17
Mr Butler also noted he had found 'a variety of strange definitions,
inaccuracies and inconsistencies with the free-trade agreement with the US in
particular'.[17]
5.18
However, Mr Sheridan from the Department of Finance defended the
drafting of the CPRs:
My point would be that the Commonwealth Procurement Rules are
only 33 pages or so in length. They are not particularly long. The
language is quite clear and was rewritten in 2012 to make it more so. I do not
think that they are as difficult as, perhaps, some people suggest.[18]
5.19
At the second public hearing, Mr Sheridan again addressed the criticism
of the CPRs 'readability':
It is worth noting that the primary audience for the CPRs is
government procuring officials. Because of this, the CPRs are transactionally
focused and balance the need for clarity of rules whilst maintaining a level of
flexibility for agencies to support the CPRs with their own internal
procedures. This allows agencies to undertake processes that are commensurate
with the scale, scope and risk of the procurements involved.[19]
5.20
Mr Sheridan continued:
The most recent review of the CPRs was conducted in 2012. The
review was a collaborative process with senior procurement officials, CFO areas
from agencies and the Audit Office. The 2012 CPRs update included clarification
of mandatory requirements for all procurements to ensure consistency, clarify
certain terminology and redefine the procurement methods as recommended by the [Australian
National Audit Office (ANAO)] in their 2011 audit on direct source procurement.
Through our engagement with senior agency procurement officials, we regularly
review the content and readability of procurement related materials and improve
them as required.[20]
5.21
Mr Sheridan referred to the 'wide range of web guidance to assist
agencies to implement the procurement framework', as well as a procurement
training program for agency staff. Further, Mr Sheridan also noted that advice
for potential suppliers is available on the web in Selling to the Australian
government – a guide for business[21]
which 'provides practical advice for potential suppliers, such as how to find
opportunities and submit competitive tenders'.[22]
Committee view
5.22
The committee notes the release of the new contracting suite for
procurements under $200,000 by the Department of Finance (Finance) and
acknowledges it has been subject to a consultation process with stakeholders.[23]
The committee notes that the new contracting suite is due to commence from 1
July 2014 and expects that during the early implementation stages, Finance will
address the concerns about complexity raised during the inquiry and make any
necessary adjustments.
Recommendation 9
5.23
The committee recommends that during the early implementation stages of
the new suite of contract documents for procurements under $200,000, the
Department of Finance will address the concerns about complexity of documentation
raised during the inquiry and make any necessary adjustments.
5.24
The committee notes that in the Checklist for FMA Act agencies preparing
for the introduction of the PGPA Act from 1 July 2014, that there is a note
indicating that in relation to the CPRs 'there is a longer term process to
review and reform the procurement framework'.[24]
As part of this longer term process, the committee recommends that the
government consider best practice examples from other jurisdictions to further
simplify the tender process.
Recommendation 10
5.25
The committee recommends that, as part of its longer term process to
review and reform the procurement framework, the government consider best
practice examples from other jurisdictions to further simplify the tender
process.
Lack of effective complaints process
5.26
During the course of the inquiry the committee received substantial
anecdotal evidence where the outcome of procurement processes clearly caused
frustration for Australian-owned businesses.
5.27
For example, in its submission, AUSBUY related a case study of product
substitution from an Australian owned business which manufactures fabrics:
In recent years the business worked with the Defence
Department to develop a special tent fabric for the Defence Forces which would
camouflage soldiers especially at night. However when it came to buying product
the Government sourced the product off shore.
The imported product mimics the original and does not meet
Australian standards, or the security standards inherent original product.[25]
5.28
To be clear, the committee is not suggesting that there has been any wrongdoing
in the conduct of these procurement processes. However, this evidence clearly
begs the question of the avenues open to tenderers to seek further information
or make a complaint about a particular tender process.
Complaints processes available
5.29
In this context, the committee sought advice from officials from Finance
on the processes available to business to complain about a procurement process.
Mr Sheridan observed that an aggrieved person should raise any issues of
concern at the tender debrief to see if they can be 'satisfied by approaching
the agency involved'.[26]
By way of clarification, Ms Jan Mason, Deputy Secretary, Business, Procurement
and Asset Management Group, Department of Finance, noted that 'the agency
involved' could mean different agencies, depending on the nature of the
complaint:
They would complain to the agency undertaking the procurement
if they were concerned about whether or not the procurement connected policy
had been correctly applied. If they were critical of the [procurement
connected] policy itself they should raise that issue with the relevant
portfolio that owns that policy.[27]
5.30
In answers to questions on notice, Finance explained that in handling
complaints internally, agencies would employ 'equitable and non-discriminatory
complaint-handling procedures'.[28]
Principles agencies are required to apply when dealing with tenderers'
complaints are available on the Finance website.[29]
5.31
Mr Sheridan explained that a complaint could also be made to him in his
role as the Australian Government Procurement Coordinator:
First of all, we would recommend that people with a concern
speak to the agency involved, but as the procurement coordinator I am tasked
with addressing issues for people who have complaints. Also, if they are not
satisfied with that particular avenue, they can pursue other avenues such as
the Ombudsman and things like that.[30]
5.32
In terms of making a complaint to the procurement coordinator, Mr
Sheridan confirmed that it is not necessary for a complaint to have first been made
to the agency concerned. However, Mr Sheridan did state that if a complaint was
made to him, in his role as the procurement coordinator, 'of course I would
then go to the agency to see what could be resolved'.[31]
5.33
In answers to questions on notice, Finance provided the following
further information in relation to the role of the Australian Government
Procurement Coordinator in these circumstances:
The Procurement Coordinator has no authority to compel
agencies to reconsider the conduct or outcome of tender processes for which
that agency is accountable. Where relevant issues are identified, lessons
learned may be used to improve Commonwealth procurement policies and processes.
This includes assisting the development of policy guidance, and/or the training
and professional development of procurement officers.[32]
5.34
Complaints to the procurement coordinator can be made using an online
form.[33]
At the second public hearing Mr Sheridan noted the infrequency with which
complaints are brought to the procurement coordinator:
I note that since August 2011, the Australian government
procurement complaints function has only been utilised nine times. In providing
assistance to business [in my procurement coordinator and the Australian
Government Chief Technology Officer] roles, I meet regularly with vendors,
three to four times a week, to discuss general procurement issues as well as [Information
and Communications Technology]-specific issues. These vendors range in size
from small and medium-sized enterprises right through to large corporations.
Vendors rarely use such opportunities to raise concerns about the procurement
process.[34]
5.35
Ms Sue Weston, Deputy Secretary, Department of Industry, informed the
committee that the business.gov.au website is also being used as a means of
obtaining feedback:
[The business.gov.au website] is also asking the many people
who visit that site if they have any ideas on government procurement and it is
linking them to the Department of Finance's website to have their say if they
have any feedback on how to improve communication or other things they have
found out when they have tendered for government business.[35]
5.36
Mr Sheridan noted that the procurement blog on the Finance website is
also used to prompt discussions about how procurement can be improved.[36]
5.37
By way of comparison, Mr Butler detailed the complaints models in the
United States and Canada:
The US has an office [the US Government Accountability Office
(GAO)] which investigates complaints at length. If you look at the GAO website
you will see that they are continuously investigating complaints of one kind or
another. In another model, in Canada—which is not dissimilar to Australia in
its practices and also has a free trade agreement with the US and is a member
of the WTO procurement agreement—there is a permanent tribunal which deals with
these sorts of matters, including procurement.[37]
Legal remedies for tenderers
5.38
Dr Nick Seddon, a lawyer and academic specialising in government
contracts, provided the committee with useful guidance as to the legal recourse
available to unsuccessful tenderers:
The basic position is that a disgruntled tenderer could
complain that the government has not adhered to the [Commonwealth Procurement
Rules (CPRs)]. A breach of the CPRs does not by itself provide a 'private'
right of action under which the tenderer could seek damages. The tenderer would
have to challenge the tender process under administrative law, arguing that the
government failed to adhere to legislation (the CPRs). A successful challenge
would result in a court declaring that the government's decision to award a
contract to a particular tenderer was invalid. The government would then have
to start again. No compensation is awarded in such cases. This means that there
is little incentive to pursue a public law remedy to challenge a government
tender process, although this has happened in Australia.[38]
5.39
However, in the context of the current inquiry's focus on Australian-sourced
verses overseas-sourced goods and services in procurement, Dr Seddon noted that
not all breaches of legislation result in a declaration by a court that what
was done was invalid:
It is arguable that a failure to comply with rule 5.3 of the
CPRs [the non-discrimination principle] would not necessarily result in
invalidity of the award of a contract.[39]
5.40
Article 15.11 of the AUSFTA requires that each party to the agreement
shall:
maintain at least one impartial administrative or judicial
authority that is independent of its procuring entities to receive and review
challenges that suppliers submit, in accordance with the Party's law, relating
to a covered procurement.[40]
5.41
Dr Seddon stated that the US had 'a good system', including specialised
courts, to deal with disputes in relation to tender challenges:
[In] America, certainly at the federal level, they have
special courts for that. They have special law firms that do that and they have
a thing called a 'rocket docket', which means everything has to be done in a
fortnight or some ridiculously short time.[41]
5.42
However, Australia does not have a system which complies with this
requirement of the AUSFTA. As Dr Seddon explained, the requirement in the
AUSFTA needs to be read in conjunction with a side letter from Australia's
representative to the negotiations, the then Minister for Trade, Mr Mark Vaile
MP and the US representative.[42]
The side letter states:
[I]n respect of Article 15.11, in the case of Australia, the
Federal Court of Australia and the Supreme Courts of the States and Territories
are impartial authorities for the purposes of Article 15.11; and the remedies
available in, and the procedures applicable to, such courts, satisfy the
requirements of that Article.[43]
5.43
Dr Seddon speculated that the United States may have been amenable to
such an arrangement because of the success of an American company, Hughes
Aircraft, in a tender challenge case in the Federal Court.[44]
In answers to questions on notice, Dr Seddon provided an explanation of the
legal reasons underlying the decision in the case:
In that case [Hughes Aircraft Systems International v
Airservices Australia (1997) 146 ALR 1 (Hughes aircraft case)] Hughes challenged the award of a contract for
a new air traffic control system. Hughes' challenge was successful. Finn J held
that [Airservices Australia] was in breach of contract and had engaged in
misleading or deceptive conduct contrary to s 52 of the Trade Practices Act
when [Airservices Australia] changed the selection criteria weightings without
informing the tenderers or providing an opportunity to re-submit on the basis
of the changed criteria. The contract case was based on the proposition that
the tender process itself was a contract based on the terms in the Request for
Tender...[45]
5.44
Since the decision in the Hughes aircraft case, the two legal bases on
which the challenge to the tender was successful have been changed:
First, the Commonwealth responded to the [Hughes aircraft
case] decision by specifically excluding the possibility of a 'process'
contract governing the conduct of a tender. This is achieved by a standard
clause found in all Commonwealth Request for Tender documents. This clause is
not prohibited by chapter 15 of the AUSFTA...[and as] a matter of domestic
contract law, there is no legal impediment to specifying that the relationship
between parties is not contractual.
Secondly, court decisions subsequent to Hughes [aircraft
case] have held that the Trade Practices Act (now the Competition and
Consumer Act [2010]) does not apply to government procurement....
The Trade Practices Act and now the Competition and
Consumer Act include [section] 2A which appears to get rid of Crown
immunity. It provides that the Crown in right of the Commonwealth is bound by
the Act but then adds an important qualification 'in so far as it carries on a
business'. Case law has held that, when the government engages in procurement,
it is not carrying on a business. Thus, the section that appears to deal with
the problem of Crown immunity actually substantially maintains it.[46]
5.45
Dr Seddon observed that 'two potentially powerful legal vehicles for
tender challenge have been neutralised' and that there is 'not much' else
available by way of remedy:
In my view, the most egregious feature of government
procurement is the immunity from the operation of the Competition and
Consumer Act...
The other feature – the routine exclusion in RFTs of a 'process';
contract governing the conduct of government tenders – is, among other things,
just a very bad look. Government proclaims through various instruments,
including the CPRs, that it will act fairly and ethically. How is this fulfilled
by a process that announces detailed terms and conditions in the RFT and, at
the same time, states they are not binding?[47]
5.46
Dr Seddon concluded by recommending the definition of 'business' in the Competition
and Consumer Act be amended by adding the words '...and include government
procurement'.[48]
Committee view
5.47
The evidence to the committee suggests that the complaints mechanisms in
Commonwealth procurement processes are deficient. The committee acknowledges
that much of the evidence in relation to the number and volumes of complaints
is anecdotal. However, the committee cannot ignore the pervading sense of
dissatisfaction with the avenues for redress following procurement processes.
5.48
The committee appreciates that, as a first step, complaints should be addressed
internally by agencies. However, in the event that this avenue does not bring a
resolution to the matter, there appears to be a distinct lack of administrative
or legal steps that a person can take.
5.49
Finance encourages aggrieved persons to make complaints to the
Australian Government Procurement Coordinator and places much weight on the
fact that so few complaints have been received via that means. However, given
that coordinator has no power to compel agencies to revisit their decisions, it
is little wonder that so few complainants have made use of this mechanism to
complain.
5.50
The committee notes that in the US the Government Accountability Office
operates an investigation and decision-making function to enable challenges to
an award (or proposed award) of a procurement contract. While the committee is
not recommending that a similar operation be established in Australia, the
committee believes that, in the absence of effective legal remedies, there does
need to be some mechanism, beyond a complaint to the agency or the procurement
coordinator, available to aggrieved parties.
5.51
Therefore, the committee believes there is a need for an independent and
effective complaints mechanism to ensure appropriate action is taken in a
timely and cost-effective manner.
Recommendation 11
5.52
The committee recommends that, following consultation with stakeholders,
the Department of Finance establish an independent and effective complaints
mechanism for procurement processes.
5.53
The committee agrees with the view expressed by Dr Seddon that
Commonwealth procurement processes should be subject to the operation of the Competition
and Consumer Act 2010. However, the committee did not receive any evidence
as to why Commonwealth procurement should be immune from the operation of this
Act. The committee is therefore seeking an explanation from the government as
to any reasons why the operation of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010
should not apply to Commonwealth procurement.
Recommendation 12
5.54
The committee recommends that the government provide an explanation as
to whether there are any reasons why the operation of the Competition and
Consumer Act 2010 should not apply to Commonwealth procurement.
Application of procurement-connected policies
5.55
Paragraphs 4.6 and 4.7 of the CPRs deal with procurement-connected
policies, that is, policies of the Commonwealth for which procurement has been
identified as a means of delivery.[49]
There are currently 24 procurement-connected polices and responsibility for the
administration of those policies is spread among 11 Commonwealth
departments.[50]
5.56
Mr Butler referred to the 'proliferation of procurement-connected
policies and their distributed management and publication by a variety of
agencies' as a 'potential source of compliance risk'.[51]
Mr Butler continued:
Desirably those should be integrated, presented and
maintained with Finance's own material on a centralized portal and in common
styles and formats with which procurement personnel can become familiar. They
should also be [reviewed regularly] and amended or retired if they are
ineffective...or if their objectives are achieved primarily by other means.[52]
5.57
Ms Yvette Sims, Assistant Secretary, Procurement Policy Branch,
Technology and Procurement Division, Business, Procurement and Asset Management
Group, Department of Finance, acknowledged the additional layer of complexity that
procurement-connected policies introduced into the process:
[T]he 24 procurement connected policies, which are linked to
but not included in the Commonwealth Procurement Rules. There are 24 of them.
They all relate to different industry groups. They kick in at different
thresholds. And I completely understand that it can be very difficult to understand
how they fit in and when. Largely the Department of Finance is not responsible
for those; they are the responsibility of other agencies.[53]
5.58
Mr Sheridan advised the committee that a breach of a
procurement-connected policy is 'essentially' a breach of the CPRs, and in
turn, a breach of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997,
which would need to be reported in the annual Certificate of Compliance report
to the Parliament.[54]
Apparent confusion over role of lead
agencies
5.59
Ms Mason acknowledged there is no single department which could provide
the committee with analysis of the overall compliance with the range of
procurement-connected policies:
[Finance] are certainly responsible for the Commonwealth
Procurement Rules, but if [the committee] want to then go to the tentacles that
are attached to those rules, which are policies prepared by other portfolios,
you will unfortunately need to put questions to those portfolios.[55]
5.60
Following this advice, the committee examined the two procurement
connected policies most relevant to the procurement of paper which are the
National Waste Policy; and the ICT Sustainability Plan 2010-2015 (ICT Plan).
Both policies are administered by the Department of the Environment
(Environment).[56]
Chapter 6 of this report provides a case study of the procurement of paper.
5.61
Given the concerns as to the application of procurement-connected
policies in procurement processes, the committee questioned officers from Finance
and the Environment on the monitoring and enforcement of these two policies.
5.62
Mr Al Blake, Assistant Secretary, Information Technology Branch,
Department of the Environment, stated that Environment and Finance 'jointly'
were the lead agencies with respect to the ICT Plan.[57]
However, further information from Environment received following the hearing
indicated that Environment has responsibility for this policy.[58]
5.63
In relation to the National Waste Policy, Mr Bruce Edwards, Assistant
Secretary, Department of the Environment, stated that Environment is the lead
agency on that policy. Mr Edwards outlined Environment's role in the
implementation and monitoring of the policy:
The National Waste Policy, as the name suggests, is a
national policy. Our department is the lead agency at the Australian government
level. We do not take a compliance role as such, but we directly implement a
range of the strategies under the policy and coordinate others.[59]
5.64
In relation to compliance with standards in the procurement-connected
policies, officers from Finance indicated that the relevant standards and
certification of standards for environmental sustainability were contained in
policies which were the responsibility of Environment.[60]
5.65
In answers to questions on notice, Environment stated that it has 'no
mandate for, or resources allocated to, the assessment of overseas standards'.[61]
Questioning the application of
procurement-connected policies
5.66
It was suggested to the committee that if procurement-connected policies
were being appropriately considered and applied then procurement results were
likely to be different. For example, Mr Craig Dunn, Senior Marketing Manager
Sustainability, Australian Paper, suggested if the requirements in the procurement-connected
policies relevant to paper procurement — namely the ICT Plan for recycled
content and the aims of the National Waste Policy about waste reduction and
management — were taken into account then 'you would possibly expect that the
Australian government would be predominately using Australian-made recycled
paper because of all these benefits'.[62]
However, Mr Dunn stated that this was not the case:
[Australian Paper] surveyed the top 22 FMA Act agencies and
we found that 16 are using only imported recycled copy paper—not local but
imported. That is three-quarters of the top 22 agencies. If you take the two
largest paper users out of it, which are the Department of Human Services and
the Department of Defence, 16 of the next 20 FMA Act agencies are using
imported copy paper.
For instance, the Australian Taxation Office are using paper
from Indonesia, as are the department of immigration. Germany is where the
Australian Federal Police are sourcing their paper. The Department of Health
are also sourcing their paper from Germany. The Department of Industry are
sourcing their copy paper from Austria...
Australian Customs are buying paper from Australia; the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Germany; the Department of Agriculture, Germany;
the Department of Veterans' Affairs, Austria; the Department of Education,
Germany; the Department of Employment, Germany; the Department of Social
Services, Australia; the Department of the Environment, Germany; the Australian
Bureau of Statistics, Austria; ASIO, Australia; ASIC, Australia; the Department
of Infrastructure, Germany; the Department of Finance, Germany; the Bureau of
Meteorology, Austria; and the Department of the Treasury, Germany.[63]
5.67
Mr Sheridan, representing the Department of Finance, informed the
committee that monitoring, reporting and compliance mechanisms for each
procurement-connected policy varied:
The details of compliance would vary from policy to policy
but, essentially, the policy agency may have put in rules that require
reporting, for example, or some other form of compliance management. But there
is no hard-and-fast rule that says they must do it in a particular way.[64]
Reporting on procurement connected
policies
5.68
Using the paper related policies as an example, witnesses indicated that
the lack of reporting on sustainable procurement was a concern. Mr Ross
Hampton, CEO of AFPA, noted that Environment had previously commented on the
absence of a 'formal whole-of-government mechanism or requirement for entities
to report on the uptake of sustainable procurement'.[65]
Mr Hampton stated:
This lack of transparency or formal requirement to report back
on sustainable procurement is a significant concern, as there can be an
important range of environmental issues in the sourcing of internationally
traded goods such as paper.[66]
5.69
Mr Craig Dunn of Australian Paper, raised similar concerns:
But the area that is missing here is that it then says that
governments will report periodically on the uptake of sustainable procurement,
and that is where we believe there is something missing.[67]
Committee view
5.70
The committee notes that the National Commission of Audit recommended the
abolition of all procurement-connected policies.[68]
The committee believes that there are a number of procurement-connected
policies which provide important policy settings, and does not support the
wholesale abolition of procurement-connected policies. However, the committee
is very concerned at the lack of cohesion and direction which was clearly
evident in the application and monitoring of the relevant procurement-connected
policies.
5.71
The committee appreciates that procurement officials are responsible for
informing themselves of the specific policies which may be relevant to any
particular procurement and, further, there is some limited guidance on
Finance's website with respect to the application of procurement-connected
policies.
5.72
Given the concern expressed in the course of this inquiry as to the role
and application of procurement-connected polices in Commonwealth procurement
processes, the committee is of the view that it would be appropriate for the
Australian National Audit Office, in the course of its next procurement-related
audit, to review the application and implementation of relevant procurement-connected
policies.
Recommendation 13
5.73
The committee recommends that the Australian National Audit Office, in
the course of its next procurement-related audit, undertake an assessment of
the application and implementation of relevant procurement-connected policies.
5.74
The committee notes that lead agencies for policies are responsible for
the implementation of all aspects of their procurement-connected policies.
However, on the evidence before the committee, for example, in relation to the
ICT Plan, administered by Environment, it does not appear that there has been
an on-going involvement of that department, beyond the development of the
policy.
5.75
The committee notes the requirement that Annual Reports[69]
include an assessment of the department's performance against core purchasing
policies and principles as articulated in the Commonwealth Procurement Rules.
However, the committee notes that this does not specifically include the application
of procurement-connected policies. The committee believes a specific reporting
mechanism in relation to procurement-connected policies is required to ensure
agencies are held to account.
Recommendation 14
5.76
The committee recommends that the Department of Finance work with the
lead agencies for procurement-connected policies and the Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet to develop a whole of government annual reporting
framework for monitoring of and compliance with these policies.
Training and technical expertise of procurement officers
5.77
A number of witnesses also raised concerns about the training and
technical expertise of Commonwealth procurement officers.
5.78
Mr Butler indicated that the issue of professionalising the Commonwealth
procurement workforce had been raised almost 20 years ago.[70]
Mr Butler referred to the training and expertise which are required for
procurement officials in other countries:
In the UK, for example, it is not possible to get a job as a
professional procurement officer in the government unless you have recognised
professional credentials, which basically, at the starting level, are the MCIPS
awarded by the Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply. In the United
States, where very complicated regulations have to be understood, people who
have the authority, the warrant, to exercise purchasing decisions take a long
time to train and go through a much higher level of training and education than
anyone does in the normal course of events in this part of the world.[71]
5.79
Ms Wilkinson, representing AUSBUY, questioned how the Commonwealth
obtained the technical advice in relation to particular procurements:
[W]hen it is a highly technical area...where are [the
government] getting their technical knowledge? Sometimes it is safer for them
to go to someone they know who is a global company and say, 'You tell us what
we need, and that is what we will ask for.' So they will tell them what they need
in terms of what they can deliver but not what can actually be sourced in
Australia.[72]
5.80
In its submission Professionals Australia commented specifically on the
loss of engineering skills in government – at federal, state and territory
level – and the impact on the delivery of infrastructure projects:
The Federal Government funds States and Territories and local
government through grants for infrastructure – billions of which is now being
wasted. The facts are that governments around Australia lack the requisite
expertise to deliver projects on-budget and on-time. The key profession for
that expertise are engineers – and there just aren't enough engineers in
government to scope, design and manage projects...
What's become apparent through a vast array of research is
that government has allowed this situation to arise because they lack in-house
expertise to deliver projects.[73]
5.81 Professionals Australia argued that governments around Australia 'have
become uninformed purchasers of infrastructure and lack the necessary internal
procurement management expertise'.[74]
5.82
Ms Melbourne of the Canberra Business Council spoke highly of the
professionalism of Commonwealth procurement officers:
I think by far and away certainly all of the procurement
professionals inside government that we have dealt with have been working very,
very hard to do the right thing. They are all very professional and making sure
that [everything] is done correctly.[75]
5.83
The Deputy Auditor-General, Mr Steve Chapman, offered this assessment on
the expertise of procurement officers:
I am sure there would be instances where perhaps that lack of
expertise exists; equally, there would be instances where I think procurement
has been undertaken in a very professional way.[76]
5.84
Ms Edel Kairouz, Executive Director, Performance Audit Services Group, (ANAO),
expanded on this assessment referring to the findings of ANAO audits:
Agencies generally have central procurement units and they
provide expertise in procurement. Our audits have shown that those units have
not always been drawn on, and so there is a need, when staff are undertaking
procurement, particularly when they are not used to it, for them to draw on
both technical experts where they may for the technical aspects of the program
and also the procurement expertise that is available in central procurement
units.[77]
5.85
When the committee questioned officers from Finance about the concerns
raised on this issue, Mr Sheridan responded:
First of all I would want to see what evidence we have that
procurement is failing and evidence that suggests that we are somehow unable to
buy the things we need or meet the policies of the government with regard to
buying those things, and I do not see the evidence that something is wrong in
that regard. Notwithstanding the fact that there might be people who think we
should have other policies or do other things, as is obviously their right, I
do not see that we are failing to procure things in accordance with policy at
the moment. That said, we have a range of selection procedures for public
servants generally based on merit, we have performance management and
assessment for public servants based on their performance, and we have training
that we provide specifically for public servants in terms of procurement and
help lines and a range of those things in order to do that. I would say we do
not have necessarily or as a prerequisite particular tertiary qualifications
for particular positions, but one regularly sees the notion that such
qualifications or their equivalent might be required for certain positions. I
am not saying that we might not or could not have such things, but my view is
that I am struggling to see...what the problem is here.[78]
5.86
To address the particular view that governments around Australia 'have
become uninformed purchasers of infrastructure and lack the necessary internal
procurement management expertise'[79]
the committee wrote to the Department of Infrastructure which rejected this
assertion. The Secretary, Mr Mike Mrdak, responded that his department:
[H]as a solid track record of working with state, territory
and local governments to deliver significant and complex land transport
infrastructure project procurements across Australia, including for example:
the $1.7 billion Hunter
Expressway, a 40km expressway link between Newcastle and the Upper Hunter in
New South Wales;
the duplication of the Hume
Highway between Sydney to Melbourne which was recently completed;
the duplication of 381 kilometres
(58 per cent) of the Pacific highway with full duplication expected by the end
of the decade; and
the Victorian Regional Rail Link
project that is running ahead of schedule and is expected to be delivered on
budget.[80]
Committee view
5.87
Given the proposed infrastructure agenda of the current government, the
committee is very concerned by the evidence suggesting that the Commonwealth
government is no longer an informed purchaser. The potential for the loss and
waste stemming from such a situation is significant.
5.88
The committee supports the engagement and continuing employment of
professionals with appropriate skills and training for the design and
management of large Commonwealth infrastructure projects. However, the
committee also believes that there is scope for a review of the training and
professional skills of procurement officers across the Commonwealth.
Recommendation 15
5.89 The committee recommends that the procurement-related audit by the Australian
National Audit Office to assess the application and implementation of procurement-connected
polices also include an assessment of the competencies of agencies' procurement
officers.
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