Chapter 3

Aerial firefighting sovereign fleet

3.1
This chapter provides an update, examines progress, and describes the current situation in relation to aerial firefighting, as raised by the Royal Commission and the committee. It includes the Government’s response to both the committee’s interim report and the Royal Commission.
3.2
The chapter also provides an overview of the views expressed by stakeholders.

Aerial firefighting – committee findings

3.3
The committee received considerable evidence regarding the role of aerial firefighting in the 2019-20 bushfire season. The arrangements for the provision of aerial firefighting resources, including the funding arrangements for Australia’s aerial firefighting fleet, were considered by the committee. These issues, and the arguments put forward in support of a permanent aerial firefighting fleet, were outlined in the committee’s interim report.1

Australia’s current aerial firefighting fleet

3.4
As noted in the committee’s interim report, Australia’s National Aerial Firefighting Centre (NAFC) exists as a unit of the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council (AFAC). The unit was formed in 2003 with the purpose of providing a “cooperative national arrangement for the provision of aerial firefighting resources for combatting bushfires”.2
3.5
It is the NAFC which is responsible for coordinating the leasing of a national fleet of specialised firefighting aircraft on behalf of state and territory emergency services. There are more than 140 aircraft available to the NAFC, which are operated and contracted on behalf of state and territory governments. These aircraft are in addition to the aerial firefighting aircraft owned by state and territory governments and those available to be hired from private operators when needed, to meet peak demand across Australia.
3.6
The committee was advised that the NAFC maintains a resource sharing agreement which facilitates the sharing of aircraft between states and territories throughout the fire season. The NAFC uses a public tender process to procure aircraft with a standard contract term of three years, and with options for extension. The Commonwealth, under a funding agreement, contributes approximately $15 million per year toward the fixed cost of making the contracted national fleet available. The contracted aircraft are then used by state and territory government agencies – which meet all of these aircrafts’ operational costs – for bushfire suppression.3
3.7
The committee was also advised, that of the 152 aircraft contracted for 2020-21, approximately 90 per cent usually reside in Australia.4 The remaining 10 per cent – normally large air tankers and heavy helicopters – are sourced from overseas. Stakeholders observed that the problems associated with Australia’s reliance on overseas-based aircraft had been demonstrated during the 2019-20 bushfire season. It was noted, for example, that a fleet of water-scooping planes requested by Australia in December 2019 had been grounded in Canada due to icy conditions. Tornadoes in the United States and an erupting volcano in the Philippines also delayed the arrival of two of four tankers requested from the United States. was also delayed due to tornadoes in Alabama and an erupting volcano in the Philippines.5
3.8
Stakeholders suggested that this current system, whereby NAFC are required to lease firefighting aircraft each bushfire season, was having an adverse effect in relation to resourcing levels and increasing costs. The Royal Commission also drew attention to the fact that only a small number of large, and very large, air tankers are in operation globally, and most of these are based in North America. It was noted that the NSW Government currently has the only large air tanker permanently located in Australia.6

The establishment of a permanent sovereign fleet

3.9
Stakeholders stressed the importance of aerial firefighting, and described it as one of the most significant tools available to help control and contain bushfires. It was argued that an aerial firefighting fleet can assist efforts by gathering up-to-date information on the status of a fire, dropping and spreading retardant to reduce the progression of a fire and transporting emergency responders to specific locations.
3.10
Throughout the inquiry, stakeholders pointed to the issue of climate change, and predictions of ever-lengthening fire seasons and raised their concerns about the lack of appropriate aerial resourcing during bushfire seasons. The committee agreed with this view, and found that with regard to aerial firefighting during the 2019-20 bushfire season, Australia had seemed particularly unprepared.
3.11
In the light of the horrific 2019-20 bushfire season, a number of stakeholders argued that there is an obvious need to increase Australia’s national firefighting capacity, and that it needs to be done as a matter of urgency. Noting the high costs of leasing available aircraft, a number of stakeholders expressed their support for the establishment of a permanent, Australian-based aerial firefighting fleet.7
3.12
The committee’s interim report made a recommendation that the Commonwealth develop a business case to progress the establishment of a permanent, sovereign aerial firefighting fleet, which includes large air-tankers and very large air-tankers, as well as small and medium sized aircraft, as appropriate.

Government response to committee’s recommendation

3.13
The Government’s response – provided in May 2021 – noted the committee’s recommendation that a business case be developed to progress the establishment of a sovereign aerial firefighting fleet. In addition to noting the committee’s recommendation, the response made the following points:
The NAFC, which was established by the states and territories, provides a cooperative arrangement for the delivery and sharing of aerial firefighting resources, and the Government acknowledges the maturity, experience and effectiveness of the operational response capabilities of the states and territories.
The Commonwealth has no desire to replicate or replace the capabilities of the states and territories - including in aerial firefighting.
The Commonwealth does not determine the makeup, size and positioning of the aerial firefighting fleet. These are decisions for the operational experts in the states and territories.
The Federal Government must take the advice of operational experts on future aerial firefighting options and requirements. NAFC and the Commissioners and Chief Officers Strategic Committee (CCOSC) have been asked to provide this advice to the Government.
It is imperative that the Government has a full understanding, informed by evidence, of the capability actually required – this will inform decisions on the future of aerial firefighting to deliver an operationally effective national fleet that is scalable, adaptive and provides value for money. This ensures that states and territories are able to access appropriate aerial firefighting capacity when it is needed most, and can introduce new technology as it becomes available.
The Commonwealth will continue to contribute $26 million annually to the NAFC.
The Commonwealth works with, and encourages, states and territories to work collaboratively with industry to build Australian-based aerial firefighting capacity, consistent with their sovereign obligations to maintain appropriate operational response capabilities.8

Aerial firefighting - Royal Commission findings

3.14
The Royal Commission also received evidence regarding lengthening fire seasons, which have put pressure on resources and created tensions between states sharing aerial firefighting resources, as well as northern and southern hemisphere sharing arrangements. It was acknowledged that the prospect of both lengthening and increasingly severe fire seasons will continue to increase the future demand for aerial firefighting services, and put additional pressure on resource sharing arrangements.9
3.15
The Royal Commission’s overarching view was that the Australian Government should expand its national preparedness and response functions, particularly as they relate to inter-jurisdictional cooperation, coordination and resource sharing. The Royal Commission concluded that a reassessment of Australia’s current reliance on overseas-based aviation services is required, and argued that a renewed focus on developing Australia’s sovereign aerial firefighting capability is also necessary.10
3.16
In line with this view, the Royal Commission recommended that the Commonwealth, state and territory governments develop an Australian-based and registered national firefighting capability, which would be tasked according to greatest national need. The capability, it was argued, should include:
a modest, very large air tanker/large air tanker, and Type-1 helicopter capability, including supporting infrastructure, aircrew and aviation support personnel; and
any other aerial firefighting capabilities (eg. Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), line-scanning, transport, and logistics) that would benefit from a nationally coordinated approach.11
3.17
The Royal Commission also proposed that EMA be expanded to include responsibility for coordinating the procurement of aerial firefighting services: a function currently performed by the NAFC. The Royal Commission noted that this would supplement the services owned and managed directly by state and territory governments.12
3.18
Further, the Royal Commission recommended that federal, state and territory governments should support ongoing research into, and evaluation of, aerial firefighting. It was argued that this work should assess the specific capability needs of states and territories, and identify the most effective aerial firefighting strategies.13

Government response to Royal Commission recommendation

3.19
In providing its response, the Commonwealth ‘noted’ the Royal Commission’s recommendation. The response then went on to indicate that the Commonwealth “acknowledged, before the Royal Commission, the maturity, experience and effectiveness of the operational response capabilities of the states and territories” and stated that it had “no desire to replicate or replace these capabilities, including in aerial firefighting”. The Royal Commission’s proposal regarding the role of the EMA was also acknowledged, and again, the Commonwealth indicated that it was “comfortable with the present arrangements of the states and territories” involving the NAFC. At the same time, the Commonwealth noted that it would continue its “annual contribution of $26 million to the NAFC, indexed from 2020-21”.14
3.20
The Commonwealth also stated that, in relation to aerial firefighting capability it:
… encourages states and territories to work collaboratively with industry to build Australian-based aerial fire-fighting capacity, consistent with their sovereign obligations to maintain appropriate operational response capabilities.15
3.21
The Commonwealth also provided in-principle support for additional research, and a further evaluation of aerial firefighting. The Government noted that, in July 2020, it had announced $88.1 million to extend and scale-up funding for critical research into bushfires and natural hazards. The Government noted its support for some of these funds (together with some of its annual $26 million contribution to the NAFC) for research into aerial firefighting capabilities.
3.22
The Government also argued, however, that prior to any decision or long commitment being made (regarding specific fleet aircraft, ownership and strategic operation) it is “imperative we have a full and evidence-based understanding of the capability actually required”.16

Stakeholder support for aerial firefighting fleet

3.23
The committee received positive feedback around recommendations for the establishment of a permanent sovereign aerial firefighting fleet. A number of community groups, organisations and individuals expressed their support for the recommendations made by both the committee and the Royal Commission.
3.24
Mr Jeff Organ, Director of Infrastructure Services at the Hawkesbury City Council stated, for example, that the Council would support the establishment and resourcing of additional aerial firefighting – not to replace the existing firefighting capabilities - but to complement them.17
3.25
Experts, such as the Former Regional Manager of the NSW Far South Coast National Parks and Wildlife Service, Mr Tom Shepherd, also called for an improved aerial firefighting capability. In noting his support for the Royal Commission’s recommendation, Mr Shephard added that aerial resources could be used to tackle fires earlier. For example, by winching strike teams into remote areas, as soon as ignition is detected by satellites.18
3.26
Macdonald Valley resident and Rural Fire Service Volunteer, Mr Stephen Brown, also advocated for the use of aerial resources for early suppression, and suggested that if the Gospers Mountain fire had been attended to as soon as it started, firefighters would have been in a better position. Mr Brown argued that, in contrast to the Gospers Mountain fire:
…in late October 2019, St Albans Rural Fire Service and other ground and aerial resources attended the very remote Boree Track fires for a couple of days to extinguish it and stop it growing into a bigger issue. Experience tells us aerial support is a necessary requirement for suppression in hill/inaccessible country and access to on-standby aerial firefighting resources will undoubtedly support prompt management and containment, with support of other firefighting resources.19
3.27
Blue Mountains resident, Mrs Leanne Hanvey, also suggested that the lack of available aircraft to deliver water to firegrounds was problematic. Mrs Hanvey argued that had aircraft been available to attend, it may have been possible to contain the fires at both the Gospers Mountain and Green Wattle Creek sites within the first day or two. She noted that, unfortunately, these fires quickly grew to a point where they were unable to be controlled, and they became “some of the largest and most devastating fires across the country”.20
3.28
President of the Megalong Valley Community and Landowners Association, Mr Max Horn, expressed the view that investment, at a federal level, on improved aerial firefighting support “seems to be an obvious positive”.21 At the same time, however, he argued that aerial firefighting should be viewed as only one part of an holistic approach. Mr Horn used the example of firefighting efforts on the west coast of the United States, noting that:
There, over decades, they invested in the most powerful aerial firefighting fleet in the world. They were hugely successful for a while in stopping fires. Over time, however, the fuel load only increased to a point where big fires were inescapable. It seems obvious that aerial firefighting should only be done in conjunction with serious efforts at hazard reduction. A fleet would be a significant expense and would hopefully face extended periods idle. There's an argument that if there aerial firefighting is to be used effectively, as noted earlier, it should be used aggressively and quickly to try and stamp out fires near inception.22
3.29
Mr Horn also conceded that had more aircraft been available – and if they had been used to attack more aggressively early on – there were certain fires in the 2019-20 season which may have been extinguished.23
3.30
Towong Shire Mayor, David Wortmann also advocated for increased investment in aerial firefighting capability. He stressed that extreme code-red conditions are disastrous for firefighting and necessitate the need for firefighting aircraft that can be readily deployed on either side of borders to suppress fires quickly, and argued that:
This is essential to allow ground crews to access the fireground and extinguish the fire before it can become much larger. I just want to point out here that aircraft don’t put out fires; they suppress them. This gives the ground crews a window of opportunity to put the fires out.24

Committee view

3.31
The committee is concerned that despite the findings of the Royal Commission and this inquiry, and strong support from key stakeholders and members of the community, the Government has continued to maintain the view that a sovereign aerial firefighting fleet is not required.
3.32
In its interim report, the committee highlighted the efficacy of aerial assistance in extinguishing fires and noted the importance of Australia ensuring its aerial firefighting capabilities will be sufficient in the future, especially in the context of a warming and changing climate. The committee also noted the limitations to the overseas aircraft leasing arrangements in place. Given the importance of aerial firefighting in tackling bushfires in an everchanging climate, the committee reiterates its views from its interim report.
3.33
Indeed, the evidence received since the tabling of the interim report in October 2020 has only served to fortify the committee’s view that an enhanced, permanent, sovereign aerial firefighting fleet is necessary.
3.34
Enhanced preparedness and hazard reduction regimes that properly take account of climate change, and the deployment of advanced technologies in early detection and fire modelling, are needed (a view which is supported by the matters discussed later in this report, at Chapter 7).
3.35
An enhanced aerial firefighting fleet would be a significant step forward in keeping Australians safe and minimising property damage under the frequent, extreme fire conditions expected in coming decades.
3.36
Therefore, the committee again recommends the establishment of a permanent, Australia-based aerial firefighting fleet that is resourced to the point where the reliance on overseas leasing arrangements is greatly reduced.
3.37
In addition, research and analysis should be conducted regarding the needs for a sovereign fleet, including the right mix between small and medium aircraft, and the need for a Large AirTanker and Very Large AirTanker fleet to be maintained onshore.

Recommendation 1

3.38
The committee recommends the Australian Government work with the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council (AFAC), the National Aerial Firefighting Centre (NAFC) and state and territory governments to progress the establishment of a permanent, sovereign aerial firefighting fleet, which includes Large Air‑Tankers and Very Large Air‑Tankers, and small and medium-sized aircraft as appropriate.

  • 1
    See, Chapter 6, Senate Finance and Public Administration References Committee, Lessons to be learned in relation to the Australian bushfire season 2019-20: Interim report, October 2020, pp. 103-115.
  • 2
    Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council, Submission 50, p. 10; Department of Home Affairs, Answers to Questions Taken on Notice, 27 May 2020 (answers received 19 June 2020) and Department of Home Affairs, Answers to Questions Taken on Notice, 12 August 2020 (answers received 31 August 2020).
  • 3
    Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council, Submission 50, p. 10.
  • 4
    Department of Home Affairs, Answers to Questions Taken on Notice, 12 August 2020 (Answers Received 31 August 2020).
  • 5
    ABC News: Firefighting planes from Canada iced in an unable to get to Australia, 16 January 2020, and Big water-bombing aircraft en route to Australia to fight fires delayed by international disasters, 15 January 2020, cited in Senate Finance and Public Administration References Committee, Lessons to be learned in relation to the Australian bushfire season 2019-20: Interim report, October 2020, p. 110.
  • 6
    Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Interim observations, 31 August 2020, p. 21.
  • 7
    Government of Western Australia, Submission 135, pp. 6-7; Emergency Leaders for Climate Action, Submission 36, p. 29; Mr Ange Kenos, Submission 48, p. 2 and Dr Sarah Waddell, Submission 75, pp. 3-4.
  • 8
    Australian Government response to the Finance and Public Administration Reference Committee report: Lessons to be learned in relation to the Australian bushfire season 2019-20, May 2021, [pp. 11-12].
  • 9
    Katie Burgess, ‘Bushfires royal commission findings released’, The Canberra Times, 30 October 2020 [accessed 19 October 2021].
  • 10
    Katie Burgess, ‘Bushfires royal commission findings released’, The Canberra Times, 30 October 2020 [accessed 19 October 2021].
  • 11
    Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, A national approach to national disasters: The Commonwealth Government response to the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, November 2020, p. 14.
  • 12
    Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements: Report, October 2020, p. 27.
  • 13
    Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements: Report, October 2020, p. 27.
  • 14
    Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, A national approach to national disasters: The Commonwealth Government response to the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, November 2020, p. 14.
  • 15
    Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, A national approach to national disasters: The Commonwealth Government response to the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, November 2020, p. 14.
  • 16
    Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, A national approach to national disasters: The Commonwealth Government response to the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, November 2020, p. 14.
  • 17
    Mr Jeff Organ, Hawkesbury City Council, Committee Hansard, 28 April 2021, p. 3.
  • 18
  • 19
    Mr Stephen Brown, Submission 183, p. 5.
  • 20
    Mrs Leanne Hanvey, Submission 178, [p. 3].
  • 21
    Mr Max Horn, Megalong Valley Community and Landowners Association Inc., Committee Hansard, 28 April 2021, p. 20.
  • 22
    Mr Max Horn, Megalong Valley Community and Landowners Association Inc., Committee Hansard, 28 April 2021, p. 20.
  • 23
    Mr Max Horn, Megalong Valley Community and Landowners Association Inc., Committee Hansard, 28 April 2021, p. 20.
  • 24
    Mr David Wortmann, Toowong Shire Council, Proof Committee Hansard, 29 September 2021, p. 17.

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