2.1
There are many components to preparing for and addressing natural disasters. The primary responsibility for managing natural disasters rests with the states and territories; however, jurisdictions can request assistance from the Commonwealth Government, and the Commonwealth Government can play a key role in the coordination of an emergency response.
2.2
This chapter will examine issues relating to the existing arrangements for disaster response, between the Commonwealth, states and territories. The areas discussed include:
the work of the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements;
existing disaster management frameworks;
the role of Emergency Management Australia (EMA);
the effectiveness of the disaster management frameworks during the
2019–20 bushfire season, including Australian Defence Force (ADF) support;
the work of the National Bushfire Recovery Agency (NBRA), including the expenditure of the National Bushfire Recovery Fund; and
existing disaster recovery funding, including the Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements (DRFA), Commonwealth recovery payments to individuals, and the Emergency Response Fund (ERF).
Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements
2.3
The Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements (Royal Commission) was established on 20 February 2020 in response to the 'extreme bushfire season of 2019–20 which resulted in devastating loss of life, property and wildlife, and environmental destruction across the nation'.
2.4
The terms of reference for the Royal Commission focus on three core areas:
the responsibilities of, and coordination between, the Commonwealth and state, territory and local governments relating to preparedness for, response to, resilience to, and recovery from, natural disasters;
Australia’s arrangements for improving resilience and adapting to changing climatic conditions; and
whether changes are needed to Australia’s legal framework for the involvement of the Commonwealth in responding to national emergencies.
2.5
The Royal Commission received a large volume of evidence, comprising over 1700 submissions and 290 witness appearances. On 31 August 2020, the Royal Commission released its interim observations which set out 'preliminary views' ahead of its final report and recommendations, due on 28 October 2020.
2.6
The Royal Commission also released draft propositions, prepared by Counsel Assisting. The work and observations of the Royal Commission are referred to throughout this report.
Existing disaster management frameworks
2.7
This section will provide a broad overview of the existing disaster management frameworks in Australia, including:
the role of state, territory and local governments;
the role of the Commonwealth Government; and
2.8
Natural disaster arrangements vary across Australia, and each jurisdiction has a different level of responsibility in regard to disaster management and response. However, disaster arrangements are viewed as a 'shared responsibility' across all levels of governments and individual communities affected by disasters.
2.9
A background paper prepared by the Royal Commission described natural disaster arrangements in Australia as:
[A] layered and matrixed system of governments, organisations and communities, where roles and responsibilities are shared between public and private entities. While states and territories have primary responsibility for emergency management in their jurisdiction, every level of government has some role in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from natural disasters.
Local governments
2.10
All states and territories have delegated significant responsibilities for aspects of managing natural disasters to the local governments within their jurisdictions.
2.11
According to the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA), local governments make a 'substantial contribution' to disaster relief, recovery and management, including through direct financial support and in-kind support and assistance.
2.12
There are 537 local governments within Australia and each has differing roles and responsibilities in regard to preparing for, responding to, and recovering from natural disasters. These differences are due to factors including jurisdiction, geography, demographics, council capacity, and the natural disaster risks particular to their communities.
2.13
The kinds of responsibilities local governments may hold include:
elements of the emergency planning processes (for example, risk mitigation, land-use planning and land management);
the delivery of community services (for example, evacuation and relief centres) during and after a natural disaster; and
the restoration of community infrastructure after a disaster.
2.14
The Queensland Local Government Association (QLGA) advised that the Queensland system allows for an escalation of requests from the local government to the state government. It noted that the Queensland Disaster Management Arrangements are 'uniquely different' from other states in the positioning of local government as holding a primary responsibility for disaster events in their local government area. QLGA advised that this model had proven successful over the past decade through multiple, large-scale disasters.
2.15
The Royal Commission highlighted that the capability and capacity of local governments to manage natural disasters is dependent on their relative size and resources. It noted that although states and territories may delegate to their local governments, it would expect that they retain 'oversight and understanding' of the capabilities and provide additional support as necessary.
2.16
The Royal Commission also noted:
Coordination and resource sharing between local governments often rely on regional arrangements, and in some cases, informal understandings. Current processes to facilitate sharing resources between local governments during natural disasters appear beneficial, and warrant greater support.
State and territory governments
2.17
During a natural disaster, state and territory governments carry the primary responsibility for the protection of life, property and environment within the bounds of their jurisdiction. Additionally, only state and territory premiers or chief ministers have to power to declare a state of emergency or disaster in their jurisdiction.
2.18
As the interim observations of the Royal Commission explained:
State and territory governments have primary responsibility for managing natural disasters – that is, for preparation, mitigation, response and recovery – for their respective jurisdictions. 'Combat agencies', such as rural fire services and state emergency services, lead the response to natural disasters.
2.19
The interim observations also outlined that state and territory governments can request Australian Government assistance for support of these primary responsibilities. In addition:
State and territory governments also have a number of other responsibilities, including managing most public lands within their jurisdictions, such as national parks and state forests.
Commonwealth Government
2.20
In its submission, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) emphasised that states and territories have primary responsibility for the protection of life, property and the environment within the bounds of their jurisdiction. It further stated:
The Australian Government provides assistance only if requested or if states do not have the capacity to respond.
The Australian Government supports state and territory governments by coordinating national efforts during a state-led response to a crisis and by building resilience through disaster research, information management, and mitigation policy and practice.
2.21
Apart from some specific legislative provisions (for example, activating disaster recovery payments under the Social Security Act 1991), the Commonwealth Government's involvement in natural disasters is largely reliant on its relationships and engagement with states and territories.
2.22
The Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs) advised that there is no specific, consolidated legislation for emergency management at the Commonwealth level, and noted:
This has historically meant that while the Commonwealth has had a role in shaping emergency management policy, its response to unfolding disasters has been 'waiting to be asked'.
2.23
The Royal Commission found that the Commonwealth Government had an 'important role' to play in natural disaster management. It noted that while state and territory governments can cooperate among themselves, there is scope for the Commonwealth Government to play an important 'national coordination role'.
2.24
Additionally, the Royal Commission observed that conducting its inquiry during the COVID-19 pandemic had highlighted the importance and feasibility of, and public expectation for, national coordination in response to a national crisis.
2.25
Home Affairs also observed that the Australian public expects 'national leadership and a unified response' in addressing national disasters.
2.26
The Royal Commission noted that the Commonwealth Government has 'capability and capacity' not available to states and territories, and can also 'encourage and facilitate' consistency across jurisdictions.
Emergency Management Australia
2.27
As set out earlier in this chapter, state and territory governments carry the primary responsibility for dealing with disasters within their jurisdictions. However, the Commonwealth Government is able to assist, coordinate and collaborate with state and territories through EMA.
2.28
EMA is a division within Home Affairs. It is the Commonwealth's disaster management organisation with approximately 100 staff, and the Crisis Coordination Centre (CCC) is a key business unit within the division.
2.29
The responsibilities of EMA span:
critical incident planning;
crisis and security management; and
2.30
EMA administers, activates and operationalises the Australian Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN). The authority for COMDISPLAN is drawn from the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework (AGCMF), which is the authorising policy for national crisis management.
2.31
The AGCMF is designed to enable a 'flexible, whole of government approach' to all crises. It outlines the arrangements for 'all hazard' crisis management 'across the continuum of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery'.
2.32
Through COMDISPLAN, EMA coordinates requests for Commonwealth Government non-financial assistance, including requests for ADF support. Matters relating to ADF support during the 2019–20 bushfire season are addressed in a subsequent section in this chapter.
Disaster management arrangements during the 2019–20 bushfire season
2.33
This section examines the effectiveness of the various elements of disaster management arrangements during the 2019–20 bushfire season in regard to:
the processes surrounding ADF support.
Work of EMA
2.34
Home Affairs advised that between 1 July 2019 and 16 March 2020, the CCC within EMA undertook the following work:
coordinated 76 requests for assistance from states and territories;
issued more than 1,100 incident notifications and updates, and 115 detailed Incident Briefs to provide situational awareness to key stakeholders;
deployed 25 individuals, for a total of 149 days, to State Emergency Operations Centres in New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, Western Australia and South Australia;
activated and maintained a Crisis Coordination Team for 82 days, including liaison officers and surge staff from across the Commonwealth;
activated the Australian Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN) for six states and coordinated international offers of assistance;
facilitated 29 senior level meetings of national coordinators through the Australian Government Crisis Committee (AGCC), National Crisis Committee (NCC), and the Commissioners and Chief Officers Strategic Committee (CCOSC) of the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council (AFAC);
worked with state and territories and supported the NRSC to ensure that emergency service capabilities could be shared across the country based on need; and
coordinated 155 offers international offers of assistance from 70 countries.
Legislative frameworks
2.35
Home Affairs asserted that the 'core elements' of the architecture in the AGCMF 'worked effectively' during the 2019–20 bushfire emergencies, and that communication and coordination between the states, territories and the Commonwealth 'generally operated well'.
2.36
However, it identified that there may be a need for legislative reform to amend the current approach (i.e. the Commonwealth must 'wait to be asked' to assist with emergency management). It broadly outlined a proposal for a proactive 'legislative footing':
Before the Black Summer bushfires, the Department [of Home Affairs] was considering the need to reform this long-standing approach [of the Commonwealth 'waiting to be asked'], including considering proposing a legislative footing to entrench specific Commonwealth emergency management functions. The Department considers that 2019-20 bushfires graphically demonstrated the benefit of the Commonwealth being proactively involved, integrating both coordinated Commonwealth and national response and recovery measures.
2.37
Home Affairs provided further rationale for the need for a legislative footing as follows:
The Department [of Home Affairs] considers that to avoid the potential for competing or confusing points of control, and to ensure rapidity in delivering response and recovery measures to impacted communities, resource and capability coordination should be formally – preferably with a clear legislative footing – centred within government, with the attendant accountability that entails.
2.38
Emergency Leaders for Climate Action (ELCA) asserted that in the absence of agreed national emergency management legislation to outline accountability and establish key appointments with specific responsibility, it 'remains unclear' who currently leads any Commonwealth response. ELCA stated that this absence made it difficult to meet community needs as part of any response and recovery situation.
2.39
ELCA argued that EMA is 'arguably buried and subsumed' within Home Affairs and 'has no mandate, legislation or Cabinet endorsement' with which to coordinate. It emphasised that the delivery of EMA functions is 'for the most part' the result of goodwill on behalf of other agencies, state and territories, an arrangement which it considered 'clearly unsatisfactory'.
2.40
ELCA further argued that during an emergency it is 'crucial' that in addition to strong political leadership there is 'open, clear, no-nonsense' operational leadership and communication which is not 'hobbled by political considerations'.
2.41
As a solution, ELCA asserted:
EMA should be a statutory authority with legislated capability to provide nationwide assurance to Cabinet that Commonwealth mitigation efforts along with policy, planning, response and recovery resources have been applied as efficiently, expeditiously and effectively as possible.
2.42
ELCA further stated that EMA needed 'more than the current case-by case acceptance of its role by other Commonwealth and state agencies'. ELCA suggested that EMA needs a mandate from Cabinet in order to:
… lead the Commonwealth's response to significant crises. It requires the power and authority to ensure that all Commonwealth agencies are properly coordinating planning for disaster mitigation and the monitoring, testing and exercising of their emergency response plans as part of the government’s broader crisis-management responsibilities, coordinated with state and territory emergency management agencies. This will also minimise duplication of effort.
COMDISPLAN
2.43
The interim observations of the Royal Commission noted that although existing disaster plans such as COMDISPLAN recognise that the Commonwealth Government can assist when a state or territory government becomes significantly incapacitated or its resources are exhausted, there is 'clearly an opportunity to refresh and strengthen national disaster planning'.
2.44
To this end, the Royal Commission's draft propositions argued for the COMDISPLAN to be 'reviewed and updated as a matter of urgency', in order to:
… clarify its operation in the event of a natural disaster and to ensure that there is consistency between its terms and current practice.
Australian Defence Force support
2.45
Under Operation BUSHFIRE ASSIST 2019-20, established on 31 December 2019, the ADF established three state/territory joint task forces to support state and territory management authorities. Additionally, on 4 January 2020, the Governor General initiated a compulsory call out of ADF Reserves to enhance the deployed joint task forces as part of a wider activation of the ADF.
2.46
Between September 2019 and March 2020, approximately 8000 ADF personnel assisted with the bushfires, including more than 2500 ADF reservists.
2.47
The Royal Commission observed that the ADF contribution to response and recovery efforts during the 2019-20 bushfires was 'without parallel in peacetime'.
2.48
The New South Wales (NSW) Bushfire Inquiry found that ADF assistance 'complemented' NSW's emergency response capability and that ADF personnel and reservists worked 'exceptionally well' with NSW combat agencies on the ground.
2.49
In its final report the Inquiry outlined the process that NSW took to call upon ADF assistance:
Requests from NSW to the ADF are made under the Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) arrangements. The ADF, via SEOCON [State Emergency Operations Controller] as the NSW jurisdictional authorised officer, receives requests for assistance where the natural disaster exceeds or exhausts the State's capabilities or where the resources cannot be mobilised in sufficient time. These requests are through Emergency Management Australia (EMA) within the Department of Home Affairs, which is responsible for planning and coordination through the COMDISPLAN. There are two types of DAAC requests: local emergency assistance requests (category 1) and significant emergency assistance requests (category 2).
Challenges with ADF engagement
2.50
Evidence before the committee indicated that there was scope for improvement in several elements of ADF involvement, including the process for requesting ADF assistance.
2.51
For example, the Tasmanian Government informed the committee that there was scope for the ADF roll-out process to be improved in order to provide state governments with greater clarity in relation to what resources and capabilities the ADF can provide, and the estimated costs associated with deployment.
2.52
The Tasmanian Government advised that some elements of ADF deployment costs may need to be covered by the requesting jurisdiction, and noted that:
These costs are not always made available at the time of the request and the scale of expense is not always anticipated. Work to provide guidance on scenarios where costs will be waived or incurred by the jurisdictions before ADF resources are committed would be of value.
2.53
In making this suggestion, the Tasmanian Government advised that the potential costs for ADF support in response to the COVID-19 pandemic were clearly articulated as part of the Memorandum of Understanding signed as part of each request for assistance.
2.54
The NSW Bushfire Inquiry took the view that the process for requesting ADF assistance could be improved. The concerns raised in the evidence it received are broadly summarised as follows:
The established arrangements to facilitate the NSW Government requesting Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) can be cumbersome and slow to implement, and there are opportunities for improvement. These include streamlining approvals, providing better visibility to the State on available ADF resources/capabilities, and reviewing the need for the State to exhaust its capabilities before requesting ADF assistance.
2.55
It its interim observations, the Royal Commission flagged several challenges relating to ADF involvement that it may seek to address in its final report. These issues included:
uncertainty around the application of the 'thresholds' (set out in the national disaster plans and the Defence Assistance to the Civil Community [DACC] Manual) that must be met before seeking ADF assistance;
confusion in state government agencies and local governments as to what tasks the ADF could perform, how to seek ADF assistance, and how best to interact with the ADF once it was deployed;
questions as to the limits of the existing legal authority to support DACC tasking;
matters relating to the privileges and immunities that ADF personnel lack, compared to those afforded to state and territory emergency responders; and
the flexibility of the legislative provisions for the call-out of ADF Reserves.
2.56
The draft propositions for the Royal Commission commented that the Australian Government should provide all jurisdictions with more comprehensive information and guidance about Commonwealth resources and assistance, 'including for ADF assistance'. In addition, the threshold for jurisdictions requesting assistance from the ADF should be less than the current threshold.
2.57
Similarly, the NSW Bushfire Inquiry final report recommended:
That, in order to ensure the guiding principles and approval processes are contemporary, streamlined and more flexible, the NSW and Commonwealth Governments review the circumstances in which the State can request Commonwealth assistance, and the level of information provided by the ADF to the State on available resources and capabilities.
2.58
ELCA advised the committee that DACC arrangements needed to be 'reviewed and simplified'. ELCA recommended that the Commonwealth Government conduct a fundamental review of the DACC arrangements, arguing that the current arrangements were 'slow and cumbersome' and needed to be simplified. It argued that the lack of an overall plan for the ADF to support civilian operations and civilian emergency services in response and recovery 'ultimately proved to be an impediment to the eventual ADF deployment'.
2.59
In regard to the priorities for any review of DACC arrangements, ELCA suggested:
The focus should initially be on simplifying processes for requesting, approving and sustaining support, and simplifying DACC2 [Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Level 2], which essentially always emerges as an ad hoc (unplanned) arrangement. It is time to modernise the processes and increase interaction with state and territory emergency services as a routine role for the ADF.
National Bushfire Recovery Agency
2.60
The committee received evidence on the operations of the NBRA. The NBRA was established on 6 January 2020 and coordinates Commonwealth support for bushfire impacted communities, businesses and individuals.
2.61
Core activities of the NBRA include:
administering the National Bushfire Recovery Fund (NBRF); and
providing direct, 'on the ground' assistance to impacted communities.
2.62
Mr Andrew Colvin, National Coordinator of the NBRA, provided the committee with a detailed overview of the role and function of the NBRA:
It's to, firstly, provide strategic leadership and coordination for Commonwealth-supported recovery and rebuild activities in communities affected by bushfire. We're particularly talking about the 2019-20 bushfire season… We are to build on the effective working relationships with state, territory and local governments, including their recovery and reconstruction bodies. We are to work with stakeholders in bushfire affected communities and relevant Commonwealth agencies to inform and integrate recovery and rebuild activities. We are to consult directly with communities, to understand their needs and aspirations and to communicate this back to government. We are to ensure affected communities have ready access to meaningful support and are aware of all available support services, including by providing clear, effective and visible communication on the Commonwealth support available. We are to provide advice to the Prime Minister, the Minister for Water Resources, Drought, Rural Finance, Natural Disaster and Emergency Management and other relevant ministers on the administration of the National Bushfire Recovery Fund on how existing and new Commonwealth policies and programs can best contribute to the recovery and rebuilding efforts in bushfire affected areas and on the economic and social impacts of bushfire on affected communities in consultation with relevant agencies across all levels of government. We are to design, develop, consult on and coordinate the delivery of a long-term plan for the recovery, rebuild and resilience of bushfire affected communities. We are to monitor the progress of recovery and rebuild efforts nationally and report regularly on progress, obstacles and solutions to ensure the rebuild progress is effective. And our final function is to undertake other tasks as directed by the Prime Minister.
National Bushfire Recovery Fund
2.63
The Commonwealth Government has committed 'more than $2 billion' to the NBRF and allocated the funding to numerous bushfire recovery programs.
2.64
The NBRA advised that in order to 'help get this money to people fast', it had 'in many instances' asked state and territory governments to use the systems and processes they already had in place to implement the programs on behalf of the Commonwealth.
2.65
The following table summarises the funding status of each bushfire recovery program, using data available on the NBRA website as at 18 September 2020.
2.66
The NBRA website stated that the figures are based on reporting provided to the NBRA as at 31 August 2020, and that the figures do not reflect final end of financial year reconciliation for 2019–20.
Table 2.1: Summary of funding status of bushfire recovery programs, as at 31 August 2020
|
|
|
|
|
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SOCIAL AND COMMUNITY
|
|
Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements (including debris clean up)
|
$445.9 million initially (demand driven)
|
Invoices for work completed will keep flowing through from states and territories
|
Yes
|
|
|
Immediate bushfire assistance to Local Governments
|
$62 million
|
$62 million
|
Yes
|
Funding for this program finished in 2019–20.
|
|
Support for the mental health of Australians affected by bushfires
|
$53.4 million
|
$20.6 million
(39 per cent of total)
|
–
|
Funds will continue to be spent in 2020–21 and 2021–22.
|
|
Extra emergency relief delivered by charities, plus financial counselling
|
$50 million
|
$50 million (provided to charities and providers)
|
–
|
Funding for this program finished in 2019–20.
|
|
Back-to-school support
|
$34 million initially (demand driven)
|
$35.3 million
|
–
|
Funding for this program finished in 2019–20.
|
|
Assistance for families in bushfire-affected areas (through cancelling the Child Care Subsidy [CCS] activity test debt in the 2019–20 financial year)
|
Up to $25.9 million
|
CCS activity test is worked out at the end of each financial year
|
–
|
|
|
Mental health support for emergency services workers
|
$15.9 million
|
$11.6 million
(73 per cent of total)
|
–
|
Funds will continue to be spent in 2020–21.
|
|
Compensation for volunteer firefighters
|
$15 million initially (demand driven)
|
$12.0 million
|
Yes
|
Funding for this program finished in 2019–20. Allocation has been adjusted to reflect demand to 30 June 2020. Unspent funds have been reallocated to support the Emergency Bushfire Response in Primary Industries Grants Program.
|
|
More community wellbeing support
|
$13.5 million
|
$5.1 million
(38 per cent of total)
|
–
|
Funds will continue to be spent in 2020–21.
|
|
Legal assistance services to support bushfire relief and recovery
|
$8.7 million
|
$8.7 million
|
Yes
|
|
|
Mental health support for early learning and school communities
|
$8 million
|
$6 million
(75 per cent of total)
|
–
|
Funds will continue to be spent in 2020–21.
|
|
Wellbeing support for school communities
|
$2 million
|
$2 million
|
Yes
|
Funding for this program finished in 2019–20.
|
|
ECONOMIC
|
|
Local Economic Recovery and Complementary Projects Fund
|
$448.5 million
|
$9.9 million
(2 per cent of total)
|
Yes
|
|
|
$10 000 grants for small business
|
$234 million initially (demand driven)
|
$209.9 million
|
Yes
|
The amount spent so far is the total amount of funding spent from the NBRF. If state/territory contributions are included, the total amount of funding released through this program is $226.5 million.
|
|
Emergency Bushfire Response in Primary Industries Grants Program
|
$141 million initially (demand driven) *
|
$118.3 million **
|
Yes
|
*This allocation has been increased to take into account an updated estimate of demand.
** This is the total amount of funding spent from the NBRF. If state/territory contributions are included, the total amount of funding released via this program is $156.8 million.
|
|
Bushfire recovery in the tourism sector
|
$76 million
|
$18.1 million
(24 per cent of total)
|
–
|
Spending has been interrupted due to COVID-19, but funds will continue to be spent in 2020–21.
|
|
$50 000 small business grants and concessional loans up to $500 000
|
Grants: $68.4 million initially (demand driven)
Loans: no allocation as the money will be repaid
|
Grants: $39.2 million*, 'plus more invoices from the states coming soon'
Loans: $32.8 million**
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Yes
|
*This is the total amount of funding spent from the NBRF. If state/territory contributions are included, the total amount of funding released via this program is $55.8 million.
**This is total loans approved, not direct and immediate payments from the NBRF.
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|
Forestry Recovery Development Fund
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$41 million
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–
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–
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Funding started on 1 July 2020.
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Bushfire-affected apple growers
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$31 million
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–
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Yes
|
Funding started on 1 July 2020.
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Rural Financial Counselling Service
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$15 million
|
$11.3 million
(75 per cent of total)
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–
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Funds will continue to be spent in 2021–22.
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|
Forestry industries
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$15 million
|
–
|
Yes
|
Funding started on 1 July 2020.
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Expert business facilitators
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$12.8 million
|
$0.5 million
(4 per cent of total)
|
–
|
|
|
|
$5.7 million
|
–
|
Yes
|
Funding started on1 July 2020.
|
|
Financial counselling for small businesses in bushfire-affected communities
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$3.5 million
|
$1.0 million
(29 per cent of total)
|
–
|
Funds will continue to be spent in 2021–22.
|
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INFRASTRUCTURE
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Strengthening telecommunications against natural disaster
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$27.1 million
|
–
|
–
|
Funding started on 1 July 2020.
|
|
Additional fire-fighting aircraft
|
$20 million
|
$20 million
|
–
|
Funding for this program finished in 2019–20.
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ENVIRONMENT
|
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Bushfire recovery for native wildlife and habitats
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$149.7 million
|
–
|
–
|
Funding started on 1 July 2020.
|
|
Immediate wildlife rescue and recovery
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$53.4 million
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$41.8 million
(78 per cent of total)
|
Yes
|
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LESSONS AND INSIGHTS
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Evaluation and lessons learnt
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$1.3 million
|
–
|
–
|
Funding started on 1 July 2020.
|
2.67
The committee raised concerns during Mr Colvin's testimony that NBRF funds provided to local and state governments, and other external organisations (such as charities) were not adequately monitored to ensure that the funds were reaching bushfire victims 'on the ground'.
2.68
The committee sought clarification from the NBRA about its visibility over NBRF funds once the money was delivered to external agencies. Mr Colvin responded that:
We have visibility of some of that. For instance, the charities report to us quite regularly on the money that we have provided to them. Close to $40 million has been provided to them. On money that has been provided to, for instance, a wildlife organisation or to a primary healthcare network that has then found its way to a community group for the services of mental health, no, I wouldn't have visibility on whether that particular organisation on the ground has spent all of the money that's been provided to it.
Charitable donations
2.69
The NBRA noted that it had asked charities to distribute some of the funds to communities as emergency relief. Mr Colvin noted that $40 million had been provided 'in immediate relief to charitable organisations, and they are disbursing that money on our behalf'.
2.70
In addition to the $2 billion committed to the NBRF by the government, there was an unprecedented amount of money donated from both domestic and international donors in response to the 2019–20 bushfires. Donations exceeded $500 million, with over $51 million raised by comedian Celeste Barber for the NSW Rural Fire Service—this being the second largest single source of donation. Given the magnitude of the donations, there was some public discussion about how the money was being distributed and spent.
2.71
The Red Cross did not discuss the progress of the distribution of donated funds in its submission, but noted that it raised $216 million in donations in the period 1 July 2019 to 30 April 2020, which it continues 'to expend and distribute'.
2.72
In its submission, the St Vincent de Paul Society National Council of Australia Inc. (St Vincent de Paul) called for a review of the fundraising laws in each state and territory 'with a view to streamlining compliance processes for national charities', observing that the existing laws were 'no longer fit‑for‑purpose', on the basis that these laws:
…were enacted at a time when appeals were conducted jurisdiction by jurisdiction, often door to door, or through charity shops or local events. They do not accommodate national, cross-jurisdictional online appeals that are now common.
2.73
In July 2020, the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) informed the committee that as part of its regulatory work it would be undertaking a review of 'three major charities' involved in the bushfires, and this work would be 'starting very soon'.
2.74
The ACNC Commissioner, the Hon Dr Gary Johns, advised that the review would focus on the following three core questions, based around the legislation the ACNC administered:
Is the charity spending bushfire donations on bushfire response activities?
Is the charity taking a 'strategic and reasonable approach' to the disbursement of funds?
Is the charity taking adequate steps to protect the funds against fraud?
Disaster recovery funding
2.75
This section provides an overview of current disaster recovery funding, including:
Commonwealth recovery payments to individuals.
Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements
2.76
The Commonwealth Government established the DRFA in 2018 in recognition of the significant cost of natural disasters. The DRFA is administered by Home Affairs and operates as a joint Commonwealth-state cost sharing arrangement to alleviate the financial burden on states and facilitate the early provision of disaster relief to affected communities. Through the DRFA, the Commonwealth reimburses state governments for a proportion of their eligible expenditure on relief and recovery, including expenditure by their local governments. The DRFA is intended to act as a 'safety net against large, unexpected fiscal impacts' from natural disasters.
2.77
The DRFA allows state and territory governments to activate relief and recovery assistance immediately following a disaster without the need to seek approval from the Commonwealth Government. States and territories are also able to determine the type and level of assistance to make available.
2.78
Home Affairs commented:
This [arrangement] recognises that states are best placed to identify the type and level of assistance to make available, in accordance with their responsibility for disaster management. This also means that arrangements can be inconsistent across the states and territories, and for national scale disasters, communities in different jurisdictions are afforded different types and levels of assistance.
2.79
There are four categories of assistance measures under the DFRA, as set out below:
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Category
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Overview
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Category A
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Assistance to individuals to alleviate personal hardship or distress arising as a direct result of a disaster
|
|
Category B
|
Assistance to the state, and/or local governments for the restoration of essential public assets and certain counter-disaster operations
|
|
Category C
|
Assistance for severely affected communities, regions or sectors, and includes clean-up and recovery grants for small businesses and primary producers and/or the establishment of a Community Recovery Fund.
Only made available when the impact of a disaster is severe and is intended to be in addition to assistance under Categories A and B.
Requires agreement from the Prime Minister.
|
|
Category D
|
Assistance for exceptional circumstances beyond Categories A, B and C.
Generally made available once the impact of the disaster has been assessed and specific recovery gaps identified.
Requires agreement from the Prime Minister
|
Source: Department of Home Affairs, Submission 68, p. 8.
2.80
The committee considered evidence that raised concerns regarding the operation of the DRFA in the aftermath of the 2019–20 bushfire season.
2.81
The Red Cross observed that the DRFA is implemented in different ways across state and territory borders, a problem particularly pressing for those communities that straddle borders. It explained:
During the recent bushfires there were numerous cross border communities impacted. We had anecdotal reports some struggled to access recovery supports, as their normal geographic service centre is across the border from where they reside. We also heard of instances where people weren't able to access financial assistance being provided from their nearest recovery hub as they were not residents of that state. This caused undue stress, potential for conflict within communities and meant that some had to travel longer distances to access support. Similarly, government assistance measures available vary significantly between states. Solutions promoting equity are needed.
2.82
During a public hearing of the Royal Commission, Mr Colvin, in his role as National Coordinator of the NBRA, observed that there were inconsistencies between the DRFA programs and offerings based on jurisdiction. He explained:
…the reality is that there are differences across jurisdictional boundaries, and the experience of an Australian recovering from this event can vary depending on which side of an artificial line that you sit. And I'm not just talking about State lines, it can also vary at times from local government boundaries as well. And everyone is working very hard with good endeavour to address that.
2.83
In light of these views, the Red Cross recommended that the DRFA be 'reviewed or adjusted' to be more flexible for people who live in 'cross border' communities.
2.84
Evidence received by the Royal Commission also flagged several other limitations of the DRFA encountered in the aftermath of the 2019–20 bushfires. These included:
the inadequate scope of the DRFA to fund betterment initiatives;
confusion over the different types and levels of DRFA assistance, meaning bushfire victims were forced to retell their story multiple times; and
inconsistency in relation to the declaration of disaster areas by states and territories.
2.85
Each of these matters will be briefly discussed below, drawing on the evidence received by the Royal Commission.
Scope for betterment initiatives
2.86
In his witness statement to the Royal Commission, Mr Colvin observed that the DRFA is 'limited in its focus on reinstatement with betterment'.
2.87
When asked during a public hearing of the Royal Commission to expand on this statement, Mr Colvin elaborated:
So the DRFA, while it does contemplate rebuilding infrastructure in a way that improves on where it was, I don't think that the principle of betterment is as strong a philosophy in our recovery frameworks as I believe it should be. So if a structure burns down, a bridge, a public toilet facility at a park, of course we want to rebuild that facility, but we want to rebuild it to create the intent, not necessarily the bricks and mortar. And betterment should be factored into all of our recovery so that we're learning the lessons of the recovery, we're learning the lessons of the disaster. And, to the extent that we can, we are building back in a way that hopefully mitigates the potential for it to happen again. The DRFA, I wouldn't say it doesn't contemplate betterment but there is a stronger emphasis on reinstatement, not necessarily improvement.
Confusion over types of assistance
2.88
Evidence received by the Royal Commission indicated that one of the biggest issues for individuals and businesses impacted by the 2019–20 bushfires was confusion over the DRFA payments and mechanisms, which negatively impacted those seeking assistance.
2.89
In her witness statement to the Royal Commission, Ms Michelle Lees, Deputy Chief Executive Officer of Services Australia noted:
Multiple avenues for individual financial assistance require separate applications to multiple agencies. The application process requires Australians impacted by a disaster to repeatedly tell their story in order to meet similar eligibility requirements. This can be cumbersome, confusing and stressful to those who are vulnerable in an already challenging time.
2.90
At a Royal Commission public hearing, Ms Lees further advised that there may be a benefit to eliminating the need for individuals to apply to a Commonwealth, as well as state or territory body to access payments:
…there are different provisions under the Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements that mean that there are some payments that are made by State and Territory governments for, what I would consider to be, similar reasons to the Commonwealth payments that are made. And at the moment there are there's a requirement for individuals to apply to the different jurisdictions for those different payments. It does get confusing for people because there are different amounts, and obviously the need to complete different application forms, there's different waiting periods, etcetera. So, in my opinion, there may be some benefit to looking at whether those arrangements are consolidated in some way or reviewed in some way to consider whether it might be beneficial for individuals and more efficient to have one entity administer the payments; for example, could a similar payments be administered by, you know, either State or Territories or Commonwealth on behalf of the other entity?
2.91
Mr Colvin also informed the Royal Commission that it would be beneficial for a 'no wrong door' or 'one stop shop' principle to be adopted when designing a recovery response in order to avoid re-traumatising individuals through requiring them to recount their stories repeatedly. He commented:
The NBRA has observed the frustration, confusion and trauma caused by having to navigate multiple service providers and provide the same information repeatedly. Greater coordination and information sharing to support the individual’s experience when engaging with the recovery mechanism would be beneficial.
Declaration of disaster areas for the purposes of the DRFA
2.92
The Royal Commission heard that not all bushfire affected Local Government Areas (LGA) had been declared for the purposes of the DRFA, a situation which was frustrating for some Royal Commission submitters.
2.93
Mr Colvin explained the declaration process for the Royal Commission, emphasising that it is the state that triggers the declaration on behalf of the LGA:
Effectively, the State writes to the Commonwealth particularly for categories C and D, and triggers the local government area for support under the DRFA. So the Commonwealth doesn't trigger them. The State has to trigger them, and that will be on behalf of the local government area; and that's appropriate given that they are in a much closer situation to assess the damage and assess the need.
Review of the DRFA
2.94
In June 2020, Commonwealth, state and territory emergency management ministers agreed to undertake a review of the DRFA. The Commonwealth Minister for Emergency Management noted that the review would seek to ensure that 'assistance under the [DRFA] program is fair and equitable for Australians living in different states'.
Emergency Response Fund
2.95
The ERF was established on the commencement of the Emergency Response Fund Act 2019 on 12 December 2019.
2.96
Home Affairs advised that the ERF is a dedicated Commonwealth Government investment fund credited with approximately $4 billion on establishment providing:
$150 million each financial year to fund emergency response and recovery following natural disasters in Australia that have a significant or catastrophic impact, when the Commonwealth Government determines that existing recovery programs are insufficient to meet the scale of the response required; and
up to $50 million each financial year to build resilience to, and prepare for or reduce the risk of future natural disasters, when the Commonwealth Government determines that funding over and above its existing suite of arrangements is required.
2.97
The ERF may also include additional recovery grants, economic aid, and support for affected communities and industry to help build resilience to future disasters, as well as pre-disaster preparedness initiatives.
2.98
Home Affairs informed the committee in May 2020 that 'given the scale of dedicated recovery funding through the NBRA', the Director General of EMA had recommended that the ERF not be accessed.
2.99
At a public hearing on 27 May 2020, the committee queried the reason behind why the ERF had not been accessed at that point in time. Mr Robert Cameron, Director General of EMA responded:
The reason is that the funding mechanisms put in place to deal principally with the series of bushfires and the Bushfire Recovery Fund that I've already mentioned have been put in place. So, through the disaster recovery funding arrangements and through the Bushfire Recovery Fund, that's [the ERF], at the moment, in my judgement, not warranted to be accessed. That may change, but, at the moment, that's the case.
2.100
On 30 June 2020, it was reported that EMA had confirmed that 'no engagement on expenditure' had occurred, and that the unspent money remained in the ERF's investment account.
2.101
At a public hearing on 13 August 2020, the committee again queried whether the ERF had been accessed. Mr Cameron confirmed that no funding had been released at that point in time.
2.102
At the August hearing, the committee sought evidence on whether steps had been taken to determine potential mitigation projects or measures that could be funded through the ERF. Mr Cameron advised that EMA was 'working on that' and that advice would be provided to the Commonwealth Government 'in the not too distant future'.
Commonwealth recovery payments to individuals
2.103
The Commonwealth Government provides financial assistance directly to individuals affected by major disasters. This is done through the Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment (AGDRP) and the Disaster Recovery Allowance (DRA). Both payments have a legislative basis in the Social Security Act 1991 and are administered by Services Australia.
Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment
2.104
The AGDRP is provided to individuals who have been severely affected by a major disaster, including where:
the individual is seriously injured;
the individual is an immediate family member of an Australian who is killed; or
the individual's principal place of residence has been destroyed or has sustained major damage.
2.105
Home Affairs advised that in recognition of the 'significant impacts' the 2019–20 bushfires had on affected communities, the Commonwealth Government broadened the eligibility for the AGDRP to cover major asset loss at a person's principal place of residence (greater than $20 000 in value). As a result, assets such as sheds, machinery, fencing and motor vehicles were covered. Additionally, AGDRP recipients received an additional one-off payment of $400 per child to further help with recovery needs.
2.106
Home Affairs informed the committee that AGDRP payments had been made to individuals in NSW, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania in response to the 2019–20 bushfires. Services Australia stated that these individuals were in 59 LGA.
2.107
The Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) asserted that the AGDRP for adults remains 'seriously inadequate', particularly for people with low incomes and few resources from which to draw. ACOSS recommended an urgent increase to the AGRDP, observing that the rate has remained unchanged since 2006. It recommended that the payment be indexed annually in line with wage growth.
Disaster Recovery Allowance
2.108
The DRA came into effect on 1 October 2013, replacing the former ex gratia Disaster Income Recovery Subsidy. The DRA provides short-term income support for up to 13 weeks to people with a demonstrated loss of income as a direct result of a major disaster. It is taxable and subject to beneficiary tax offsets, consistent with other social security payments.
2.109
The Commonwealth minister responsible for emergency management can activate the DRA for events of national significance where assistance in the form of income support is required, taking into account the extent to which the nature and scope of the event is unusual, and the extent of workforce disruption.
2.110
An individual may be eligible to receive the DRA if they:
are over 16 years of age;
are not receiving another income support payment; and
have suffered a loss of income as a direct result of the disaster.
2.111
Home Affairs advised that in response to the 2019–20 bushfires, the Commonwealth Government 'enhanced the DRA's administration', by:
increasing the income cut-off threshold to enable more individuals to qualify;
simplifying the way the DRA is calculated;
streamlining the application process to enable quicker process; and
making DRA non-assessable, non-exempt income (i.e. tax free).
2.112
Home Affairs informed the committee that DRA payments had been made to individuals in NSW, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory in response to the 2019–20 bushfires. Services Australia stated that these individuals were in 108 LGA.
2.113
ACOSS noted that it welcomed the Commonwealth Government's announcement in January 2020 that the DRA would not be taxable. However, it argued that the DRA was still inadequate to cover basic living costs and needed to be increased. ACOSS emphasised:
We call for an increase to these allowances to help people recover from natural disasters, also recognising that many people who have lost their paid work will need more than 13 weeks of assistance.
Committee views
2.114
The committee understands that bushfires and other natural disasters do not respect state and territory borders, or local government boundaries and is cognisant of the evidence presented to it that points to the need for consideration to be given to strengthening the national framework for natural disaster planning and response.
2.115
The committee notes the observation from the Royal Commission that there is an opportunity to refresh and strengthen national disaster planning. The committee is respectful of the work of the Royal Commission and does not wish to pre-empt the final analysis and recommendations that will be contained in the final report, although some indication of the Commission's approach has been put forward in its draft propositions.
2.116
Given that the Royal Commission is considering the legal framework for Commonwealth involvement in responding to national emergencies, the committee considers it prudent to wait for the final report before making any recommendations in order not to pre-empt or duplicate findings.
2.117
The committee acknowledges Home Affairs' proposal to enable proactive Commonwealth involvement in natural disaster response and recovery via a clear legislative footing which would entrench specific Commonwealth emergency management functions. The committee considers that such a major reform would require extensive exploration and comprehensive consultation with all stakeholders before being progressed in order to ascertain that the approach would deliver benefits.
2.118
The committee recognises the evidence and suggestions from ELCA in regard to the role and operation of EMA and the need to revitalise its authority and, by extension, effectiveness. The committee is open to considering this matter further in its final report.
ADF support
2.119
The committee considers that the ADF assistance during the Black Summer bushfires was incredibly valuable, and recognises that Operation BUSHFIRE ASSIST was unprecedented in its scope, scale and duration.
2.120
The committee is cognisant of the findings of the NSW Bushfire Inquiry and the views expressed in the Royal Commission interim observations in regard to the involvement of the ADF.
2.121
The committee notes that a bill currently before the House of Representatives – the Defence Legislation Amendment (Enhancement of Defence Force Response to Emergencies) Bill 2020 – does address streamlining the process for calling out ADF Reserves, including for the purposes of responding to natural disasters or emergencies.
2.122
Noting that future bushfire seasons may require similar ADF involvement as was required in 2019–20, the committee considers that there is merit in the Commonwealth engaging with the stakeholder feedback provided after the 2019-20 season, including that provided by state governments and ELCA.
2.123
The committee notes that it is open for it to explore this matter further in its final report.
National Bushfire Recovery Agency
2.124
The committee recognises the work being done by the NBRA is essential to helping Australians recover from the Black Summer bushfires. As such, it considers it is important to understand and assess the operations of the NBRA.
2.125
In particular, the committee has a specific interest in the administration of the NBRF, and how the $2 billion in funding is allocated and dispersed. In this regard, the committee is primarily concerned with whether the NBRF funding committed by the Commonwealth Government is adequate and reaching communities 'on the ground' in a timely manner.
2.126
The committee is extremely interested in understanding whether NBRF funds are being spent efficiently and effectively. It is keen to find out whether the funds and programs are providing tangible relief and recovery to those individuals, organisations and communities impacted by the Black Summer bushfires. In this regard, the committee also has an interest in the forthcoming work of the ACNC as it undertakes reviews into charities involved in the bushfires.
2.127
To ensure that the recovery funding administered by the NBRA is reaching communities on the ground, the committee considers that the NBRA should introduce monthly reporting requirements for state, territory and local governments and other organisations (such as charities) who receive NBRF funding.
2.128
The committee considers the administration of the NBRF to be a significant issue that warrants further exploration. It intends to continue to monitor and seek further information on the progress of the NBRF funding roll-out, and may address the matter further in a future report.
2.129
The committee recommends that the National Bushfire Recovery Agency introduce monthly reporting requirements for state, territory and local governments and other external agencies that receive funding through the National Bushfire Recovery Fund.
Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements
2.130
The committee notes that a review of the DRFA commenced in June 2020 and is currently underway. The committee encourages the review to consider a number of measures relating to concerns it received in evidence about DRFA.
2.131
Given the concerns raised in evidence to both this inquiry and the Royal Commission regarding limitations with the DRFA, the committee anticipates the final analysis and recommendations of the Royal Commission with interest.
2.132
The committee notes that the interim observations of the Royal Commission made specific reference to a number of issues regarding the DRFA, including the scope of 'betterment' initiatives, the eligibility of certain public assets, and administrative requirements (such as preparation of a business case for new recovery programs). The committee therefore recommends that the current review into the DRFA take these matters into consideration as part of its work.
2.133
The committee recommends that the current review into the Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements (DRFA) consider the following matters:
the need to streamline application processes for DRFA assistance and provide additional case management assistance for individuals, local, and state and territory governments during and following natural disasters;
the need to harmonise eligibility criteria across jurisdictions to ensure equitable access to support; and
the need to remove impediments to applying for betterment and mitigation initiatives.
Emergency Response Fund
2.134
The committee was surprised to learn that as at August 2020, the Commonwealth Government had not allocated or spent any of funds from the ERF. The committee considers this outcome to be disappointing, particularly given that each financial year there is up to $50 million available for mitigation projects.
2.135
It does not seem acceptable to the committee that a fund to which $4 billion has been allocated, and was established nearly a year ago, has had no allocations made from it—despite the significant impact of the 2019–20 summer bushfires.
2.136
The committee is of the opinion that ERF funds should be allocated and dispersed as a matter of priority in order to fund mitigation projects that will build resilience to, prepare for, and reduce the risk of future natural disasters.
2.137
The committee recommends that, as a matter of priority, the Commonwealth Government release funding for mitigation projects through the Emergency Response Fund.
Commonwealth recovery payments
2.138
The committee considers that Commonwealth recovery payments play a vital role in helping individuals severely impacted by disasters.
2.139
The death of an immediate family member, serious injury, and the loss of property or livelihood through a major disaster are all extremely traumatic events. Commonwealth financial assistance can be imperative to helping individuals cope with the aftermath of a major disaster, such as the 2019–20 bushfires, and rebuild their lives.
2.140
The committee agrees with the recommendation from ACOSS that going forward the AGDRP and the DRA need to be increased in order to provide adequate support to those that need it. Therefore, the committee considers that the government should immediately review both payments, with a look to increase them as soon as possible.
2.141
The committee recommends that the Commonwealth Government review, with a view to increase, the rate of the Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment and the Disaster Recovery Allowance as a matter of priority.