5.1
As detailed at the beginning of this report, the aim of the Urban Congestion Fund (UCF) is to fund urban road network upgrades to reduce congestion, and therefore to:
reduce vehicle operating costs;
deliver a more reliable road network for commuters and freight; and
address local bottlenecks.
5.2
Despite these aims, throughout the inquiry questions were asked about whether the UCF, and in turn, the National Commuter Car Park Fund (CCPF) met the Fund’s ultimate aim of reducing congestion.
5.3
As detailed in previous chapters, evidence to the inquiry suggested that the lack of proper consultation and transparency around the allocation of funding under the UCF to car parks, along with the other serious issues, resulted in CCPF projects that did not meet the needs of local councils and their priorities for planned infrastructure, nor were the projects properly funded.
5.4
This chapter considers the evidence received about whether the CCPF, and the UCF more broadly, will in reality deliver on the aims of the UCF. It will also put forward the views raised in evidence about alternatives to car parks in established urban areas for reducing congestion—primarily through enhanced public transport options.
Addressing congestion
5.5
There was some support offered for the aims of the CCPF in reducing congestion and encouraging the use of public transport.
5.6
Parking Australia submitted to the committee that the rationale behind the CCPF was sound, as increasing the usage of commuter car parks and subsequently greater utilisation of public transport would result in the government contributing less to the financing of future road upgrades. However, Parking Australia suggested that ‘more in-depth analysis of commuter behaviour would have been advantageous’.
5.7
Despite support for the aims and concepts of the UCF, emphatic views were put forward in evidence to the committee, providing negative views on the overall administration and effectiveness of the CCPF.
5.8
Ms Bronwen Clark, Executive Officer of the National Growth Areas Alliance (NGAA), told the committee that the organisation welcomed the announcement of the UCF, and thought it would go some way to fixing ‘issues in growth areas where people are really challenged by that lack of transport facilities’. Instead, the NGAA was ‘really disappointed’ with the missed opportunities, as the UCF ‘could have made significant different to growth area communities’.
5.9
The NGAA again expressed its disappointment in its submission, saying that ‘the significant amount of targeted investment’ in the UCF was not subject to ‘a transparent, consultative or strategic assessment process’. The NGAA submitted that this approach in the administration of the CCPF had resulted in ‘missed opportunities to deliver much-needed projects in an efficient and timely way’.
5.10
Similarly, SNELA recommended that projects like those under the CCPF should have full public disclosure of its merits, including ‘a benefit cost analysis, and an exhaustive comparative examination of the relative strength if alternative approaches or projects which may achieve the same objectives’.
ANAO findings
5.11
In observing that Coalition-held electorates had a higher success rate for securing funding (see Chapter 3), the ANAO did consider whether this was simply a reflection of these localities having more factors relevant to the achievement of the CCPF’s policy objectives (and the UCF’s more broadly).
5.12
However, the ANAO found that ‘the geographic distribution of projects did not reflect the distribution of key factors relevant to the achievement of the policy objectives’, and made the following observations:
the Victorian train network extends across the western suburbs where no CCPF projects were located (they were instead clustered along certain southern and eastern train lines);
Melbourne’s most congested roads in 2016, and forecast for 2031, were predominantly to the north-west of Melbourne, but only one CCPF project under the UCF had been selected on the train lines in these areas (Craigieburn—fully funded by the Victorian Government); and
projects tended to be located in local government areas with relatively low average population growth rate projections.
5.13
The ANAO found that:
Neither the department’s advice nor the recorded reasons for selection outlined each project’s merits against the investment principles or how each project would contribute to achieving the policy objective of the UCF. As a result, there is little evidence to demonstrate that the selection of commuter car park projects was based on assessed merit against the investment principles or achievement of the policy objective.
Expert views
5.14
It was made clear to the committee through the evidence of many urban planning and transport experts that the CCPF and specifically more car parks around railways stations would do little in the way of ‘busting congestion’.
5.15
For example, the Public Transport Users Association (PTUA) pointed to a large body of academic research and government reports which show that attempts to reduce congestion by expanding road capacity are ‘often ineffective at best and at worst costly and counter‑
productive’, due to ‘the encouragement of additional traffic by the new road space’.
5.16
The same findings have been made in relation to railway station car parking, as such parking can ‘draw commuters away from feeder bus services and undermine their viability’ and could even serve as ‘destination parking … if located near an activity centre, thereby encouraging car journeys and crowding out train users’.
5.17
The PTUA noted the greater potential in reducing congestion through the ‘provision of high quality public transport services and active transport facilities’, as it supports ‘more efficient commuter movements by providing access that neither exacerbates nor suffers from road congestion’ in the way that travel via private vehicle does. For example, the PTUA noted that buses could continue to deliver passengers to train services all day, ‘long after car parks would have filled to capacity’.
5.18
The PTUA also pointed to the plans of the Victorian Government to ‘approximately double bus patronage under its recently-released Bus Plan’. The PTUA said this implied ‘substantial growth in bus mode share in journeys to railway stations which is unlikely to be consistent with significant expansion of railway station car parking’.
5.19
Overall, the PTUA was of the view that success in managing congestion under the UCF would require the engagement of state and local governments during the project selection process, and congestion needs to be addressed by:
… integration and consistency with measures being undertaken by other tiers of government to integrate public transport modes and improve service quality. Expansion of car parking will rarely serve this objective.
5.20
Dr John Stone et al. questioned the negative connotations around reducing congestion, suggesting that ‘an absence of congestion implies an oversupply and underutilisation of the available infrastructure’. Dr Stone and colleagues continued that ‘congestion can be understood as the situation that arises when the demand for transport infrastructure (roads) or services (public transport) exceeds supply’. They noted that:
Australian transport agencies and governments have been pursuing policies of ‘congestion reduction’ for over 50 years. Congestion is a recurring theme in transport and urban infrastructure strategies … Yet, road congestion and public transport crowding have continued to grow and this, in turn, has given rise to many inquiries, advisory reports and academic research that have examined this area of policy failure.
The overwhelming conclusion of these investigations is that congestion reduction has failed because of the bias to ‘solutions’ based on expanding road capacity. Put simply, the experience all over the world since the 1970s confirms that that additional capacity induces new demand. This ensures congestion returns to (or exceeds) initial levels very soon after additional capacity is added. In the case of bottlenecks (a specific focus of the UCF), when one bottleneck is removed the choke point simply moves to the next.
5.21
In their submission, Dr Stone and colleagues observed that ‘simplistic notions of ‘busting’ congestion are further challenged by the direct relationship that exists between traffic volumes and relative travel times by public transport’. Because of this, ‘spending on roads … cannot solve congestion while the quality of public transport services is left unchanged’. Dr Stone et al. further noted that there was now wide acceptance by planners that a better approach to reducing congestion were ‘measures that address demand such as pricing reform and strategic land-use planning’.
5.22
In conclusion, their submission stated that the key lesson was that ‘congestion reduction is a fruitless ambition’, which ‘should be abandoned in favour of objectives more appropriate to urban prosperity and the imperatives of the climate emergency’. Further, decisions to provide parking as a solution to mobility issues was ‘typically a political decision that might win votes but displaces and exacerbates the transport problem’.
5.23
Applying this reasoning to the UCF, Dr Stone and colleagues suggested that investments in the CCPF to encourage greater use of public transport was not supported by the evidence. Dr Stone presented the following calculations in support of this view:
We estimate the CCPF would provide around 30,000 parking spaces across Australian cities. Assuming, generously, 1.5 passengers per car, the CCPF would enable access for another 45,000 passengers per day across all of Australia’s public transport networks. At the 2016 census, slightly over 1.2 million people commuted to work on public transport, so the CCPF would, at best, offer parking to 4% of Australian commuters.
…
Large parking structures and the high-capacity, high-speed roads needed to feed them create hostile environments for walking, cycling, and public transport … Adding more cars to these and other environments will act to further discourage walking, cycling, or bus travel to the station. The land around stations would be better used in almost any other way.
5.24
In appearing before the committee, Dr Stone noted that the CCPF is ‘falling into the trap that so many political processes have fallen into in the past—to take what seems an immediate, popular approach of giving people more supply but doing that in a way which doesn’t tackle ... induced demand’.
5.25
The National Growth Areas Alliance (NGAA) argued that federal government investment in growth areas has not kept pace with population growth, ‘resulting in significant deficits in transport infrastructure provision’. The NGAA argued the CCPF has not relieved congestion in ‘Australia’s fastest‑growing urban areas’, and further saw the rollout of the UCF as a missed opportunity to:
move infrastructure decision-making out of the federal government silo and coordinate project planning and investment with all levels of government; and
leverage federal government investment to maximise the impact of transport infrastructure investment on local economies and communities.
5.26
The Stop North East Link Alliance (SNELA) raised a broader point about why the Commonwealth is involved in funding state transport facilities—as land transport is a state responsibility. SNELA suggested that vertical fiscal inequality was likely the answer, and ‘an enduring issue in Commonwealth‑State fiscal relations’. SNELA continued that the CCPF projects would also not address the aims of the UCF, saying:
The four railway car parks proposed to be funded in the City of Boroondara under the Urban Congestion Fund … would each be located in activity centres of significant character and for the most part high population densities. The availability of space to meet the place-making aspirations of the City of Boroondara is in short supply.
Box 5.1: Electorate of Kooyong
SNELA drew attention to the carparks selected for the electorate of Kooyong, noting that four car parks in that electorate were put forward by its federal member, the Hon Josh Frydenberg MP. According to SNELA, on 1 May 2019 Mr Frydenberg ‘made an election promise to outlay $65 million to build car parks at Glenferrie, Camberwell, Canterbury and Surrey Hills railways stations’, located in the City of Boroondara. Mr Frydenberg’s announcement claimed that the car parks would deliver up to 2000 new car park spaces across Kooyong and would be ‘congestion busting’.
The ANAO confirmed during Budget Estimates that the Treasurer, Mr Frydenberg, had put forward the four sites in his electorate, ‘with budgets attached to them but without any cost analysis done’—there was not proper costings of the projects.
SNELA voiced concerns about whether the CCPF projects for the electorate would actually serve their intended purpose:
Remarkably, the Council has not commenced by positing the question: Would these car parks actually be “congestion busting,” and an effective approach for connecting more people to the heavy rail network at each of these four locations? It has instead quietly gone about assessing feasible locations where railway car parks might feasibly be built. The Council, according to its webpage, has received funding for this purpose.
SNELA instead argued that rather than being ‘congestion busting’, the car parks would draw additional road traffic into already congested parts of the road network, and ‘provide only a very modest increase, if any, in rail patronage at each of these stations’. Conversely, ‘significantly increasing the numbers of train patrons who connect by route bus or cycling would reduce the volumes of road traffic in and around the area’.
Further, additional railway car parking had not been identified by the Victorian government as a priority for the four Kooyong railway station car parks, as part of its Car Parks for Commuters Program.
A supplementary submission from SNELA advised that at a meeting of the Boroondara Council on 27 September 2021, the Council was ‘asked to clarify any council views or support for the proposal conveyed to Kooyong’ by Mr Frydenberg, prior to the election promise to fund the car parks in that electorate.
SNELA suggested that the Boroondara City Council provided only a ‘partial response’ to this question, drawing attention to the Council’s Integrated Transport Strategy and advised that feasibility studies for three of the four car parks were not yet completed. Further, SNELA said that the Council had not yet assessed the impact of increased motor vehicle traffic around the proposed carparks, nor consulted with constituents on the car park proposals.
SNELA concluded that there was ‘nothing to be said in favour of the four proposed railway car parks in the Division of Kooyong’, and that they would be ‘anything other than congestion busting’.
Project delivery and unreasonable project costs
5.27
As of 31 March 2021, five of the 47 commuter car parks initially announced had commenced construction, with two achieving practical completion—with the five commenced being existing state government projects.
5.28
Evidence to the inquiry questioned the costs associated with a number of the CCPF projects, suggested that the costs were far too high and might not even deliver against the intended aim of the UCF and the CCPF. In addition, the ANAO found that there were no clear delivery timelines and milestone payment schedules established at project approval stage.
Project delivery
5.29
The ANAO concluded as part of its audit that the Department had ‘not had sufficiently strong controls in place to establish, for each approved project, clear delivery timelines and links between payments and milestones.’ The Department advised the Minister that ‘it would establish these after the project was approved’. Despite this advice, the ANAO found that:
… 13 of the 33 approved projects did not have any milestones recorded or had incomplete milestones recorded, in part due to not yet having established the delivery timeline. Advanced payments increased project risk to the Australian Government. Monthly reporting obtained by the department from proponents on progress against milestones has not been to a consistent standard.
5.30
The ANAO also observed that the Department was recording milestones in a way that was ‘inconsistent with the administrative requirements set out in the Notes on Administration’.
Project costs
5.31
The Department advised that as of August 2021, the Australian Government was fully funding upgrades at 31 commuter car park sites.
5.32
The Public Transport Users Association (PTUA) observed that there were both direct and opportunity costs involved with parking projects. In considering new railway car parks in established suburbs, the PTUA said that:
… there is often significant established development using the land around the station. These established land uses can make land acquisition and preparation for parking an expensive and cost-ineffective proposition, as well as disruptive to existing land users. Land scarcity around established stations also increases the likelihood that multilevel parking will be required to provide a significant number of parking spaces. As a result of factors such as these, proposed park and ride facilities can have very high costs per space of up to $200,000 for each car compared to more typical costs in the range of $15,000 to $40,000 per car.
Applying benchmark costs (which may be optimistic for developed areas) to the number of additional spaces needed to accommodate current morning train capacity on just the Frankston and Sandringham lines would cost in the region of $1 billion while still failing to serve people who cannot drive or enhancing the network effect.
5.33
By way of comparison, the PTUA noted that for $65 million (the cost of the new Berwick railway station), 10 new electric busses and charging stations could be acquired, and cover driver wages for full-week services for 10 years. The PTUA noted that this alternative approach would ‘provide station access for train users well after station parking fills to capacity each morning, as well as mobility around the local area for people who are unable to drive’.
5.34
Parking Australia expressed concern over the ‘exorbitant’ costs associated with the car parks at Woy Woy, Panania and Berwick, as determined by the ANAO. Parking Australia suggested there was ‘no doubt that the use of the allocated funds by the program partners could have been better utilised’ and called for the further examination of the additional funding for some of the projects. Parking Australia continued that it agreed with the:
… benchmark construction costs for two of the three car park scenarios stated in the ANAO report. At-grade and multistorey car parks should be built within the ranges stated in the report. If a car park is outside of these ranges, then serious consideration should be taken as to why and whether there is any real cost benefit of the project.
5.35
SNELA said it was ‘questionable’ whether 2000 car parking spaces could be built in the Kooyong electorate with the funding promised. SNELA drew attention to public reporting suggesting that ‘in many cases local members of parliament made their own estimates of the cost of projects in their electorate’, including Mr Frydenberg. SNELA provided further detail on the likely costs and building requirements for the Kooyong car parks:
Two potential sites in Canterbury are underground. At Glenferrie, one identified site is underground and the other two are above ground and multi-storey, and at Camberwell at least one of the two identified sites is above-ground and multi-storey.
The maximum spending commitment for these projects which was announced in May 2019 was $65 million.
Based upon the assumption that each car parked requires 32 square metres of parking space, if all of the 2,000 spaces were to be undergrounded with minimal facilities, the aggregate construction cost may be in the order of $95.4 million to $102.8 million.
Carpark designs
5.36
Parking Australia’s view was that the ‘funding allocated to the program partners could deliver better results for the taxpayer and commuters’, as the ‘awarding of projects to builders, architects and consultants, that do not have experience in the design or delivery of projects is a major concern’—especially given the unique nature of the parking industry. Parking Australia provided the following examples:
In one instance, a council awarded the design of the car parks in the LGA to an architect that has not provided standalone multistorey car parks. In another instance, funding was provided to a builder who did undertake a tender process, but the project was awarded to another builder who wanted to charge more than three times what other submissions had quoted.
There are more examples of best practise not being followed and the allocating of funding by the project partners to organisations who have little, to no expertise, in delivering car parks.
While the Infrastructure Department are not totally responsible for the program partners, they should allocate funding outlining certain specifications, technology and timelines for completion. If the program partners could not deliver the project in line with the funding, then the funding should be reallocated to commuter car parks that could be delivered in other areas.
5.37
Parking Australia further observed that there were no requirements on CCPF delivery partners to incorporate best practice building technology (including sustainable building options), with ‘little to no thought given to innovation and environmental considerations, from a building or parking technology aspect’.
5.38
In addition, Parking Australia argued that ‘building a car park with little to no parking technology included in the project is just offering a half-baked solution’, calling for real-time reporting on car park capacities so that commuters did not ‘drive to a train station just to find that the car park is already full’, thus increasing congestion in and around a station.
5.39
Mr Stuart Norman, Chief Executive Officer of Parking Australia, elaborated on this point and told the committee that ‘the administration of the program has been poor at best’, and ‘included little to no technology’. Mr Norman continued that:
At a time when the government is promoting choice and technology, the commuter car park program is providing neither. As per the government's policies, they should be ensuring that technology is installed to provide the commuter with informed choice about their transport before they leave home, and such technology will reduce congestion and emissions.
5.40
Parking Australia told the committee that ‘building a car park is only part of the solution’, with informing motorists in real-time being key to reducing congestion—a point which the organisation made to Minister Tudge on 8 May 2019 and again on 12 June 2019.
5.41
However, Parking Australia noted that there was no need for the car parks to be part of a train station, pointing to studies which showed commuters normally park within 400 metres of their final destination; given that train stations are the final destination, Parking Australia called for the car parks to be within 400 metres of the train station.
5.42
SNELA also highlighted the issue of duplication and/or redundancy of projects arising from the lack of consultation between the state and federal government. SNELA advised the committee that the railway station at Surrey Hills was to be ‘rebuilt under the Victorian Government’s level crossing removal program’. SNELA submitted that:
Initial advice provided by the Level Crossing Removal Authority was that the number of car parking spaces at the new station at Surrey Hills would be no greater than that currently provided in aggregate at Surrey Hills and at Mont Albert, 380. In more recent advice, however, the Level Crossing Removal Authority admitted to being in consultation with the Commonwealth in relation to a car park at Surrey Hills.
Department’s views and responses
5.43
The Department submitted that if UCF and its CCPF projects were viewed in isolation, and not as part of the broader IIP program, then ‘other road and rail investments, state and territory investments and possible future investments are ignored’; the Department argued such an approach ‘fails to provide a fulsome picture of the investment pipeline’. The Department suggested that:
The UCF is just one program aimed at improving the lives of Australians and in talking congestion. As such, it is important that investments are considered in the context of the broader 10 year rolling pipeline through the IIP.
…
In relation to urban congestion, individual cities face different circumstances across each of those areas. Within a city, regions will have diverse pressure points across different modes of transport, requiring different solutions and levels of investment. It is difficult to meaningfully compare the circumstances of different regions or cities, without understanding the legacy infrastructure, mode and history.
5.44
The Department concluded that the UCF represents ‘a small percentage of the broader IIP, being $4.8 billion (4.3 per cent) of the $110 billion IIP pipeline’.
5.45
The Department also drew attention to the work of Infrastructure Australia (IA), and said that its work:
… indicates that it's really difficult for commuters to have access to public transport unless there are sufficient car parks and services around. What generally happens is that either people stay in their car or park on the streets, which adds to congestion. So there's evidence around that, which is public information on Infrastructure Australia's website. In dealing with looking at state car park programs, they've obviously got the same sort of philosophy around that to ensure that if you want to move people en masse, then you really need to provide suitable access as well as capacity on the railway lines.
5.46
Despite the Department drawing attention to the findings of IA, Dr Stone pointed out to the committee that the proponents of the CCPF projects had ‘cherrypicked’ the findings of the IA. Dr Stone noted that IA actually put forward that solutions to congestion involved ‘alternatives to driving where possible’ and improved public transport options in outer suburban areas.
5.47
The Department confirmed that it had not completed any detailed research beyond what was put forward by IA. Mr Phil Smith, First Assistant Secretary, told Budget Estimates: ‘Have we put out a [research] paper recently? No. The Department also undertook numerous bits of modelling on congestion—whilst that was not car parks, it was around that research side of it’.
ANAO recommendations
5.48
The ANAO noted that it had ‘very good’ cooperation with the Department throughout the audit process. While the ANAO flagged that the Department’s record keeping wasn’t ideal, it did note that the Department took these concerns seriously and has taken steps to improve its processes.
5.49
The ANAO made six recommendations addressing program design, record keeping, assessment of funding proposals and the establishment of delivery and payment milestones. The Department agreed to all six recommendations, listed below:
When establishing funding programs for the Infrastructure Investment Program (IIP), the Department develop an implementation plan, performance indicators and an evaluation strategy specific to the funding program.
The Department’s improvements to record keeping as part of the IIP include ensuring good quality business information that is fit for purpose is created (that is, detailed, accurate and efficient).
The Department document and apply assessment procedures that require it to undertake sufficient inquiries to demonstrate that candidates for funding under the NLT Act are eligible for approval, before it makes a funding recommendation to the Minister.
In designing programs for the delivery of funding under the NLT Act, the Department propose for Ministerial consideration merit criteria that will be used to assess whether projects represent an efficient, effective, economical and ethical use of public money.
When providing advice on whether funding should be approved for funding candidates under the NLT Act that have been identified by a non-competitive process, the Department identify relevant benchmarks against which to assess whether the proposal represents value for money and is appropriate for approval.
The Department strengthen its controls over the establishment of delivery and payment milestones, including by setting out in the Ministerial approval briefing the Department’s proposed milestones or the parameters for negotiating those milestones.
Response to the ANAO findings
5.50
The Department submitted to the inquiry that it had already put a number of improvements into place following the ANAO report. However, despite agreeing to all six recommendations of the ANAO the Department disagreed with it on ‘a number of conclusions and findings’ in the report, particularly around the initial design and project selection, and findings around eligibility.
5.51
The Department was of the view that the ANAO report ‘did not provide balanced analysis of the Department’s involvement in the selection process, or the fact that any commuter car park projects were election commitments made as part of an election campaign’. The Department also disagreed with the ANAO finding that its administration was not effective.
5.52
In response to a question taken on notice, the Department provided an update on its progress in implementing responses to the ANAO recommendations, as follows:
Recommendation 1: this is a future focused recommendation with the Department accepting that for new programs developed the existing tools and practices within the Infrastructure Investment Program will be reviewed and tailored implementation plans, performance indicators and an evaluation strategy developed where existing tools and practices are not appropriate.
Recommendation 2: during the course of the audit the Department immediately sought to make improvements to record keeping practices. The response to this recommendation incorporated into the Audit Report remains relevant at this time.
Recommendations 3 through 6: these recommendations will strengthen the Department’s management of the Infrastructure Investment Program. In December 2020, the Governance, Assurance, Performance and Reporting Committee was established with the Infrastructure Investment Division to support the First Assistant Secretary in their overarching responsibility to oversee and manage the Australian Government’s Infrastructure Investment Program. The Committee aims to achieve:
Increased performance and accountability in managing the Infrastructure Investment Program;
Greater consistency in the way the Division, and other divisions within the Department, approach project and program functions; and
Improved transparency on the policy, procedures, guidance and support for staff in their day-to-day role.
Committee views
5.53
Evidence to the inquiry has highlighted the fact that commuter car parks may not necessarily be suitable for inner and middle ring urban settings and therefore may not properly address urban congestion as anticipated under the aims of the UCF. Commuter car parks are instead better suited to outer urban and growth areas, where either walking or bus feeder services aren’t practicable or available.
5.54
In addition, poor consultation has resulted in a lack of co-contributions from states and territories and the Government having to fund projects in their entirety. This is despite the announcements of Minister Fletcher when the UCF commenced that ‘states and territories will be asked to match funding for projects on a 50:50 basis’ and that the ‘use of innovative funding and financing opportunities will also be encouraged’.
Congestion
5.55
Evidence to this inquiry has made clear that there was no analysis of the actual congestion reduction potential of commuter car parks in the locations chosen. The canvassing process which occurred within executive government ruled out any proper assessment which would have occurred if the projects had been subject to a normal process.
5.56
Such processes should have included potential delivery partners putting forward projects and potential sites, based on feasibility studies, costings and evidence of value for money, project delivery times and the effectiveness of the project in addressing congestion in urban areas. This should have been the process adopted.
5.57
Instead, the Minister made the decision to adopt the electorate canvassing process which was ultimately utilised. This was the key governance failure.
5.58
During hearings with the ANAO, some Government Senators tried to suggest that the CCPF was ‘making it easier for working Australians to get to work’. The evidence before the committee—and the ANAO—shows that this is demonstrably not the case when it comes to the CCPF, and as noted above, the government did not assure itself of this fact before rolling out the CCPF projects.
5.59
On this point, the committee is concerned with the evidence that the Department does not appear to have undertaken any research regarding congestion and car parks in urban areas, relying instead on the findings of Infrastructure Australia—which did not necessarily relate to inner urban areas.
5.60
The CCPF was announced in the 2019-20 Budget; it is troubling to think that the Department has been assessing CCPF projects, and UCF projects since 2018-19, without developing its own understanding of the issues around congestion.
5.61
The evidence provided to the committee by experts shows that more car parks in and around railway stations may not be the best way to address congestion, and could in fact make it worse.
5.62
The Department should assure itself that all projects approved under the UCF program will contribute to reducing urban congestion, and therefore represent an efficient and effective allocation of public funds. To this end, the committee recommends the Department undertake analysis as a matter of priority which would provide guidance on the best way to tackle urban congestion.
5.63
The committee recommends that the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications conduct an evidence-based, consultative analysis into how to best reduce outer urban congestion. The analysis should draw on research and expertise in the fields of urban geography, transport, demographics and related fields of expertise in order to establish the best approaches to reduce urban congestion.
5.64
The committee recommends that this analysis be made public once completed and be used to inform all future decision-making within the Urban Congestion Fund.
Transparency in project assessment
5.65
The evidence detailed throughout this report shows a distinct lack of transparency on the part of the Department in assessing projects and seeking appropriate Ministerial authority to progress project scoping and feasibility, and funding (as noted in the previous chapters). The Department needs to consider the PGPA Act and how UCF projects represent an efficient, effective, economical and ethical use of public money.
5.66
As noted in the previous chapter, it is of concern that the ANAO could find no clear records indicating how projects were selected against UCF investment principles and policy objectives. Further, there is no clear reason as to why the investment principles were never made public, and only came to light through the work of the ANAO.
5.67
While the committee welcomes the Department’s advice that it had already taken steps to improve some of its processes following the findings of the ANAO, the committee considers elements of the Department’s response to the ANAO recommendations severely lacking any sense of urgency—especially considering the CCPF is a $660 million program.
5.68
The Department calls Recommendation 1 of the ANAO, to develop an implementation plan and performance indicators as part of the Infrastructure Investment Program, a ‘future focussed recommendation’.
5.69
While certainly this approach should be adopted for all future projects, the committee is of the view that greater transparency and guidance around project assessment and funding eligibility should be implemented immediately for the CCPF. The lack of transparency to date has led to significant issues in program delivery and confusion for delivery partners and has allowed the government to act with impunity in the maladministration of public money.
5.70
The committee therefore recommends that the Department develop and publicly release the investment principles and policy objectives of the CCPF, and additional guidance around what is required from candidates to ensure their eligibility for funding under the NLT Act. Delivery partners should also be required to provide to the Department information on how suggested projects for the CCPF would meet the stated aims of the UCF and help to alleviate congestion in urban areas.
5.71
The committee echoes the recommendations of the ANAO and urges the Department to ensure it has robust internal reporting and recording mechanisms in place for all the projects considered and approved as part of the UCF program.
5.72
The committee recommends that the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications develop and publicly release by no later than 31 January 2022, the investment principles and policy objectives for both the Urban Congestion Fund (UCF) and the Commuter Car Park Fund (CCPF). The Department should also issue guidance to project delivery partners detailing:
eligibility requirements for funding under the National Land Transport Act 2014;
requirements for delivery partners to outline their proposed funding contribution to the project; and
any further information the Department considers necessary in order for it to make recommendations to the Minister around project eligibility.
5.73
The committee further recommends that delivery partners for the Commuter Car Park Fund (both confirmed and prospective) be required by the Department to provide information on how suggested projects under the CCPF will meet the stated aims of the Urban Congestion Fund.