2.1
The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) observed that projects under the Urban Congestion Fund (UCF) would be ‘identified and selected by the Australian Government’, and found that there was ministerial involvement in the selection of projects under the National Community Car Park Fund (CCPF).
2.2
This chapter explores these issues further, presenting evidence on the site selection process for CCPF projects, including the findings of the ANAO that suggests the selected projects were predominantly in Coalition-held seats, in Victoria.
2.3
This chapter also puts forward the views of the Department and the Government in response to the findings of the ANAO, including knowledge about the existence of a ‘top 20 marginals’ spreadsheet. This chapter also provides some detail on several abandoned and delayed projects under the CCPF and concludes with the committee’s views.
ANAO findings – CCPF distribution
2.4
In total, 47 CCPF projects were announced with funding of $660 million. The Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications (the Department) later confirmed that of these projects, ‘six were de-scoped’ (ceased) and the money reallocated to other UCF and CCPF projects. As of 25 October 2021, four of the CCPF projects were complete and five were under construction.
2.5
As part of its audit, the ANAO examined ‘whether an appropriate approach was taken to identifying and selecting’ CCPF projects for Commonwealth funding. In examining the Department’s approach, the ANAO took into consideration whether the approach was ‘designed to identify and select those projects likely to maximise the achievement of the policy objectives within the available funding’, and whether it ‘promoted open, transparent and equitable access to funding opportunities’.
Geographic and political profiles of CCPF sites
2.6
The ANAO found that the CCPF ‘project distribution reflected the geographic and political profile of those given the opportunity to identify candidate projects for funding consideration’. Project identification included ‘canvassing the Member of the House of Representatives for 23 electorates, as well as Coalition senators or candidates for six electorates then held by the Australian Labor Party or Centre Alliance’.
2.7
The ANAO found that, nationally, ’77 per cent of the commuter car park sites selected were in Coalition-held electorates and a further 10 per cent were in one of the six non‑Coalition electorates canvassed’. The ANAO further observed that:
64 per cent of projects were located in Melbourne, representing more than 2.5 times the number of projects located in Sydney notwithstanding that Infrastructure Australia has identified that the majority of the most congested roads in Australia are located in Sydney; and
the Melbourne projects were predominantly located towards the South-East, whereas data shows that Melbourne’s most congested roads in 2016, and as forecast [for] 2031, are predominantly in the North-West.
2.8
Overall, the majority (64 per cent) of CCPF projects were located in Victoria, the majority of which (83 per cent) were located in an electorate held by the Coalition at the time of selection. The most successful electorates selected for CCPF projects were all Coalition-held, as follows:
Goldstein – six projects;
Kooyong – four projects; and
2.9
The ANAO undertook an analysis of the distribution of projects and funding by state, and the location of the most congested roads. The ANAO found that ‘the majority of the most congested roads in Australia’ are located in Greater Sydney, and that ‘the proportion of the 10 most congested roads that are located in South East Queensland is forecast to exceed Greater Melbourne in 2031’.
ANAO findings
2.10
The committee presents below the findings of the ANAO in relation the distribution of candidate CCPF projects. By analysing the 47 car park sites, the ANAO found that:
36 sites were recorded as having been raised by ‘colleagues’, being Federal Members of Parliament, Federal Senators, candidates for a federal seat and/or their Offices. Five of these 36 sites also had other avenues recorded:
one site had been put forward by a NSW Minister;
for three sites the records stated ‘Committed to by Federal Labor’;
one site had been put forward by the NSW Minister and its records also stated ‘Committed to by Federal Labor’;
four sites were identified within the Australian Government but the means of identification were not apparent from the records examined. Of these four sites:
three sites comprised a single project (the ‘Commuter Car Park Upgrades — Northern Lines’ project in Victoria); and
one was the project at Mitcham;
seven sites were Coalition election commitments; and
none of the sites were identified by, or via, the Department of Infrastructure.
2.11
The ANAO continued that ‘the opportunity to identify UCF candidates was offered in relation to at least 29 Federal electorates’ and therefore the ‘distribution of projects selected for funding commitment reflect the geographic and political profile of those given the opportunity to identify candidates’. The ANAO then detailed the electorate profile of the 47 car park sites selected for funding, as follows:
•35 sites were located in 14 of the 29 Federal electorates canvassed;
two further sites located in neighbouring electorates were identified by the offices of the Federal Members holding two of the 29 Federal electorates canvassed;
six sites were put forward for funding consideration by the office of the Federal Member, without being canvassed. Specifically, records show that:
two sites were put forward by the office of the Federal Member for the Coalition-held electorate of Hume (the sites were located in a neighbouring electorate);
four sites were put forward by the office of the Federal Member for the Coalition-held electorate of Kooyong; and
the origins of the other four were not evident to the ANAO from the records examined (one was located in a Coalition-held electorate and three were in ALP-held electorates).
The ‘top 20 marginals’ spreadsheet
2.12
The ANAO went into detail about the information which was passed between the Department and the Minister’s office, in ‘informing the targeting of the initial $1 billion’ of the UCF. The following information is drawn from the ANAO report.
2.13
On 2 November 2018, the Department provided the Minister’s Office a draft list of 19 proposed UCF projects, across seven states/territories. The covering email stated:
Here is the list as it currently stands following analysis of the modelling and chats with all but one of the states. Don’t put too much stock in the actual profiles. They still need work and are purely indicative to show funding expended over the [Forward Estimates]. …
Happy to exchange lists when you’re ready.
2.14
Later on 2 November, the Department provided the Minister’s Office state‑by‑state spreadsheets, presenting data analysis against 25 projects that it had identified, including the 19 proposed in the email (see quote above). The ANAO detailed in its report that each project description was accompanied by information and analysis that included, but was not limited to, whether:
traffic was forecasted to ‘increase further above’, ‘increase towards’ or ‘increase but below’ the route’s capacity;
it was a major freight route and/or a major commuter corridor;
the project was on the Infrastructure Australia Priority List and, if so, was considered to be a: High Priority Project; Priority Project; High Priority Initiative; or Priority Initiative; and
there were planned, existing or prior funding commitments to the project made by state or Australian governments.
2.15
A week later, on 9 November 2018, the Department emailed a package of materials to the Minister's Office and the Deputy Prime Minister's Office, including its proposed list of 19 UCF projects, with the ANAO noting that ‘further work had been done on the project costs and forecasts, with the proposed UCF contribution totalling $1 billion’.
2.16
The ANAO detailed that the ‘package presented analysis and information in support of the department’s claims that the proposed projects would target both freight and commuter congestion in areas of high population growth.’ The ANAO then observed that, on 29 November 2018:
… the Minister’s Office requested the department incorporate in its 2 November state-by-state spreadsheets some potential projects the Minister’s Office had identified, ‘with another column added in to signify how the priority was identified’. The Minister’s Office advised that it would then go through the spreadsheets with the Prime Minister’s Office and the Deputy Prime Minister’s Office, ahead of a related meeting between the Minister for Urban Infrastructure and the Prime Minister.
2.17
Following this request, the Department emailed the Minister’s Office the requested spreadsheets on 30 November 2018. The spreadsheet now included 51 potential projects. According to the added column headed ‘Priority identified by’:
… 26 had been identified by the department (of which 12 were recorded as also being a priority of the state government); 24 had been identified by the Minister’s Office; and one by the NSW government.
Reflecting the limited information provided to the department and the one-day turnaround, the spreadsheets only contained analysis against two of the 24 projects identified by the Minister’s Office, as well as against the one project identified by the NSW government.
Following its consultations, the Minister’s Office provided a revised list of potential projects to the department in December 2018. A final list of 39 projects was selected by the Australian Government in January 2019 for allocation of the $1 billion. Nine of the 39 projects selected had been put forward by the department following its analysis.
2.18
The ANAO noted that funding for one of the nine projects selected by Department was ‘withdrawn following state government consultation, on the basis that there were no projects that could be reasonably undertaken along the selected road corridor within the funding proposed’. The remaining eight selected projects put forward by the Department ‘proceeded to inclusion on the Schedules to the National Partnership Agreement’.
2.19
The ANAO advised in its report that the Minister’s Office had requested the advice of the Department on 42 commuter car park sites that were candidates for selection. Of these, 37 were selected for funding by 31 March 2021 (88 per cent). The ANAO noted that ‘the records examined do not outline that departmental advice was sought on the other ten projects selected for funding commitment’. The ANAO found that:
The department did not provide advice on one of the 42 candidate projects, being a car park upgrade at the Berwick train station that was selected for funding. The advice had been requested in September 2018, prior to the UCF being used to fund such projects and prior to the National Commuter Car Park Fund being established.
2.20
The ANAO determined that the Department had given advice to the Minister via three briefing attachments. The first briefing included departmental comments on 12 CCPF projects, and the other two ‘contained related commentary in relation to 29 commuter car park projects that indicated insufficient information had been gathered at project identification stage and/or provided to the department to form its advice’.
2.21
In terms of approvals, the ANAO found incomplete records for the decisions made about the Gosford and Mitcham CCPF sites. In relation to Gosford, the ANAO provided the following timeline:
On 11 January 2019, the Prime Minister agreed to a list of projects proposed by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister for Urban Infrastructure which did not include Gosford.
In March 2019, the department asked the Minister’s Office about its reference to Gosford when requesting an amendment to a draft announcement package as the department did not have it listed as an approved project. The Minister’s Office responded that Gosford was one of the car park projects.
The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet subsequently asked the Department of Infrastructure on 14 March 2019 to confirm whether Gosford was part of the originally agreed package of projects, an addition to that package or a separate new addition. The department responded that ‘Gosford is part of the car park package’.
On 27 March 2019, the Prime Minister announced funding for commuter car parking at Gosford.
2.22
More alarmingly, the ANAO found that the authority for the Mitcham station was only a media statement by the Prime Minister. The ANAO detailed that ‘the Minister’s office emailed the Department on 31 January 2019’ advising that the PMO had given approval for the site.
2.23
When asked by the ANAO, in February 2021, for evidence of the authority to select this car park site, the Department provided a ‘copy of the joint media release by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Urban Infrastructure’ of 7 February 2019, which announced funding for six sites, including Mitcham. The Department argued that:
There is precedent established by the Department for the Prime Minister and Cabinet that a media announcement by the Prime Minister constitutes relevant authority to progress a project.
Advice provided by the Department
2.24
The ANAO concluded that Departmental analysis after these events was ‘limited largely to ad hoc advice on individual candidates by request’, and there were ‘two formal briefings during this period providing departmental advice on lists of potential UCF projects’.
2.25
The ANAO provided detail on these two briefings. For the first, which took place 26 March 2019, the Department had four days to prepare. For the second, on 5 April 2019, the Department only had two days. The ANAO documented the Department’s advice on each occasion, as follows:
In the briefing of 26 March 2019, the Department made clear that it was ‘not in a position to recommend allocating…funding…or provide detailed advice on the relative merits, scope or funding profiles, given the limited time and information available’. The Department instead provided high-level comments on the proposals, ‘based on existing information and transport modelling previously conducted’.
In the briefing of 5 April 2019, the Department again advised it was ‘not in a position to recommend funding the proposed projects or provide detailed advice on the relative merits, scope or costings of the potential projects, given the limited time and information available’. The Department again provided high-level comments on the proposals, ‘based on existing information, traffic modelling previously conducted and consideration the UCF principles’.
2.26
As part of the April 2019 briefing, the Department also stated that:
Commentary and analysis on the proposed projects for the CCF [commuter car park fund] are particularly general as the information provided was based on stations alone, with no further details as to current car parking or capacity upgrades envisaged. The Department does not currently have access to the detailed information on train station car parks.
2.27
The ANAO made the point that the advice did not include an assessment of the project, or advice on ‘project feasibility, cost, risks or value for money’ and ‘there was no information provided on the need for additional parking bays at the proposed sites’.
2.28
The ANAO made a number of pointed comments about the briefings provided by the Department, observing that they:
… did not suggest that the Minister (or the Australian Government) record the basis for selection decisions. Nor did the department assist the Minister to record an assessment of the merits of candidate projects against the UCF investment principles or policy objectives. For example, the department could have provided an assessment and/or selection template to complete so as to facilitate transparency and accountability in decision-making (as the department has done when administering other funding programs).
Evidence to the Senate
2.29
At a Budget Estimates hearing of the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee (RRAT committee) on 19 July 2021, the ANAO provided further information about how projects for the CCPF were canvassed. Mr Brian Boyd, an Executive Director at the ANAO, informed the RRAT committee that Minister Tudge and ‘two ministerial officers essentially handled the canvassing process’, which took place primarily between September 2018 and April 2019.
2.30
Mr Boyd continued that the best way to explain it was as a ‘to do list’, which started initially ‘as being top 20 marginals’. Mr Boyd elaborated that:
The key thing was to touch base with the top 20 marginals through either the member of the House of Representatives if it was an electorate held by the coalition or the relevant duty senator in four other electorates. It turned out to be endorsed candidates in two other electorates. It was to ask them, 'What projects in your electorate do you think are worthy of being put through this program?' That canvassing wasn't just car park projects; it was the broader UCF. In lieu of a public call for applications, where you've got a large number of competing applications to compare against, it was already a narrowed-down process of basically saying these—I said top 20 marginals; that's where it started.
It ended up being 23 coalition held plus six other electorates, so 29 electorates. It was either the member, the candidate, the duty officer or their officers that were asked, 'What would you like to put forward for consideration?' Not everything that came forward ended up being included on the list. As you can probably gather, though they started with the top 20 marginals, the field of electorates being canvassed widened a little bit over time but didn't extend to all 151 federal electorates, for example.
2.31
The committee has reproduced the evidence provided to the RRAT committee, given its importance to highlighting the issues with the administration of the CCPF:
Mr Boyd: The best way to explain it is as a to-do list: 'Here's what we have to do.' The key thing was within—
Senator GALLAGHER: From whose office, sorry?
Mr Boyd: Within Minister Tudge's office. One of the key tasks to be done was to canvass what was initially called the top 20 marginals as to what they would like to see funded through the Urban Congestion Fund. Separately, there is a tracking sheet by electorate, explaining where they got to in terms of getting a list put forward or making contact to eventually getting a list put forward.
Senator GALLAGHER: So the tracking sheet is separate to the spreadsheets that your audit talks about?
Mr Boyd: Yes. The spreadsheets we talk about in the audit report are state based spreadsheets, where at different points in time they would be saying, 'What are we looking at potentially funding at this point in time?' So they'd do a spreadsheet by state of individual projects. These other documents, if you like, were more overarching—who is in the field to be canvassed, and where are we up to with that canvassing?—if that makes sense.
Senator GALLAGHER: So Minister Tudge or his office led a process, called the top 20 marginals, that had a tracking sheet. Through that, the people in those marginal seats, which later got pushed out to 29 electorates, were invited to submit projects. This was shared with another couple of ministerial offices, did you say?
Mr Boyd: The audit report says there were two ministerial offices involved in the canvassing. Most of that was done out of Minister Tudge's office, touching base with either the elected member or their office, the duty centre or their office or the two candidates for Mayo and Macnamara.
Senator GALLAGHER: What were the other two offices?
Mr Boyd: The two offices were Minister Tudge's office, which did most of the canvassing—and some of the canvassing was done out of the PMO.
Senator GALLAGHER: That was done by a staff member, was it—a senior adviser? I'm not asking for a name.
Mr Boyd: That's correct, yes—in each of them.
Senator GALLAGHER: Just out of interest, was there a similar contact point to the community sport infrastructure grants?
Mr Boyd: The PMO one was the same person.
2.32
In terms of the Ministers involved, Mr Boyd advised that:
The office that was primarily leading the canvassing for UCF, and car parks in that, was Minister Tudge's office, not the PMO. The PMO was involved in it, but the office that had the lead on this was Minister Tudge's office. So it wasn't the PMO, but there was involvement.
… The evidence shows that, in some cases, it was the local member or duty senator who was actually engaging with the PMO, who would then pass that through to the minister's office, as well as obviously being involved in that process. 'Okay, which projects, based on the canvassing, are we going to propose that the Prime Minister agree to at this point in time?' There was involvement there as well.
2.33
Mr Boyd was of the view that to ‘some extent it appeared there was a menu; it would be $10 million or $15 million’ for each CCPF project—rather than a detailed analysis of the cost for each car park at each site over a certain period of time.
2.34
Mr Boyd also informed the RRAT committee that the ANAO looked broadly at the UCF and how the $1 billion allocated to the Fund at that time would be ‘divided up across the nation’. As part of the process, the ANAO observed a map which indicated party affiliation of the seats where the projects were located. These maps could have been developed by either the Department, or a Minister’s office.
2.35
Further, the ANAO made clear that in its view, the process of CCPF project selection had not properly examined where congestion was greatest and needed to be addressed; rather, ‘it was very much that approach of starting with the electorate’ instead.
2.36
A case study of how car parks were selected in the electorate of Deakin is in Box 2.1 below.
Box 2.1: Car parks in the electorate of Deakin, Victoria (Maroondah City Council)
Mr Stephen Lucas provided information on car parks announced for the electorate of Deakin, in Victoria. Mr Lucas advised that on 12 February 2019 and in the lead-up to the Federal election, Mr Michael Sukkar MP announced that work had commenced on the Croydon, Ringwood and Mitcham multi-level car parks, which were to be fully funded by the Commonwealth ($15 million each), with free parking when complete.
Mr Lucas observed that Mr Sukkar made announcements on 29 April 2019 in relation to two further car parks at Heathmont and Heatherdale.
Mr Lucas noted that of these five announced car parks, Croydon will be finished later in 2021; Ringwood, Heathmont and Heatherdale had not commenced; and Mitcham had been ‘scrapped’.
Mr Lucas said that the announcements about the car parks did ‘not read as election promises’, and ‘as an elector in Deakin’ he understood the announcements to mean that decisions had been made on or shortly before 29 April 2019—in breach of the caretaker conventions.
Mr Lucas questioned on what basis Mr Sukkar could announce (in February 2019) that the projects had ‘commenced’. Mr Lucas went on to state that:
The question must be asked: upon what was this based? If a process cannot be uncovered which complies with the [NLT Act], or at least attempts to do so, it is open to conclude that that Mr Sukkar’s announcements were for the purpose of securing a political advantage. It is difficult to see how any subsequent Ministerial approval would not be open to the charge it is merely a way of confirming a decision already made.
In appearing before the committee, Mr Lucas further explained that:
In terms of business cases, there's no evidence here that Maroondah had done any proper business planning. Another problem with the process is that an upfront payment of $42 million was made by the Commonwealth to Maroondah before any milestones were met. They were, in effect, given a bucket of money—$42 million, or 70 per cent of the total funding—before anything had been achieved. The Auditor-General queried that payment by the Commonwealth, but I say it's also a problem for Maroondah, because it puts them in a compromised position. What were they supposed to do at that point, bearing in mind that they had already bought car parks, a couple of sites? To me, they were in a hopelessly compromised position when it comes to considering the project in a rational and sensible way.
Mr Lucas surmised that the process of selecting the projects was ‘defective’, without proper approval or project scoping at either the local council or Commonwealth level, and with the Heathmont and Heatherdale car parks decided during caretaker period. Mr Lucas questioned whether the process was ethical within the meaning of the PGPA Act, or ‘otherwise a misuse of public money’.
Mr Lucas suggested a lack of proper process in the making of the decisions to provide funding to the car parks in the Deakin electorate and further, that there did not appear to have been any early scoping of the projects. Mr Lucas concluded that ‘many millions have been spent for a meagre result to date’ and that the ratepayers of the area have ‘never been informed’ of the impact of the four carparks on the Maroondah City Council budget.
Role of the Department
2.37
The ANAO made significant findings around the actions of the Department in administering the UCF, and specifically the administration and implementation of the CCPF program. The ANAO found the Department’s administration of CCPF projects was ‘not effective’, and also reported findings in relation to the actions of the Department and Ministers in allocating funding to numerous CCPF projects.
2.38
The committee received similar evidence highlighting concerns with the allocation of funding under the CCPF, with witnesses and submitters commenting on the lack of proper process and transparency around funding allocations, and also expressing alarm over the projected cost of some of the projects.
2.39
The ANAO made the following observations about the Department’s failings in regard to the identification and selection of CCPF projects, concluding that:
The department’s approach to identifying and selecting commuter car park projects for funding commitment was not appropriate. It was not designed to be open or transparent. The department did not engage with state governments and councils, which increased the risk that selected projects would not deliver the desired outcomes at the expected cost to the Australian Government. Departmental advice did not contain an assessment against the investment principles or policy objectives and it was not demonstrated that projects were selected on merit. The distribution of projects selected reflected the geographic and political profile of those given the opportunity by the government to identify candidates for funding consideration.
Government and Department response
Ministers
2.40
Following the release of the ANAO report, in August 2021 the Hon Alan Tudge MP, who during the CCPF selection process was Minister for Urban Infrastructure, was asked about the process for selecting car parks for funding under the UCF. The Minister stated that the ‘commuter car park sites were chosen on the basis of need’, and that the need was greatest in Melbourne. The Minister continued that:
… by far and away the greatest infrastructure funding that we’ve had, particularly in Melbourne which has been focus of this, has been in the west and the northwest of Melbourne. By far and away the three biggest mega projects that we’ve had were all in the west and the northwest of Melbourne through these Labor areas. They were chosen based on need as well.
2.41
Questions were put to the Minister as to whether decisions for the CCPF had been made for political reasons, rather than for infrastructure needs. Minister Tudge noted that the ANAO had found that all decisions had been made lawfully and when asked about the alleged ‘top 20 marginals’ seat spreadsheet, said he was ‘not aware of such a list’, and was not aware of any movement of such a spreadsheet between his office, and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO).
2.42
The Hon Paul Fletcher MP, current Minister for Urban Infrastructure has also defended the program, suggesting that the government has been ‘very transparent in relation to the car parks program’. The Minister also said that ‘Alan Tudge made the decisions he did based on the policy and commitment to reduce congestion’ and were therefore based on need.
2.43
As shown later in this chapter, Minister Fletcher has on several occasions refused to provide the relevant documents to the Senate to support these claims, instead making public interest immunity claims over the material.
Spreadsheets and maps
2.44
During the Budget Estimates hearing on 19 July 2021, the Department clarified that the ‘top 20 marginals’ spreadsheet was not a document held by the Department and it was ‘not formally’ on its systems, and provided the following information:
Ministerial staff have emails supported by departments;
the ANAO may have accessed the inboxes of ministerial staff, which the Department does not have access to; and
the Department, to the best of its knowledge, was not aware of ever having seen a ‘top 20 marginals’ spreadsheet, a map or similar documents including any ‘electorate targeting strategy’ and further, that it ‘wouldn’t deal with a document with that sort of a title’.
2.45
Following the hearing on 19 July 2021, the Department reiterated its position in response to question taken on notice, stating that ‘none of the spreadsheets’ referenced by the ANAO in its audit report ‘contained information regarding location of proposed [CCPF] projects by electorate’. The Department clarified that during the hearing on 19 July, when referring to spreadsheets, it was referring specifically to a column on the spreadsheet ‘identifying who had proposed the project’.
2.46
The Department also stated that spreadsheets that were provided to them by the Government included advice such as project name, general geographic area, a brief project description, information on any existing commitments, supporting information, funding and ‘information was added during the process to outline where the project had been identified’.
2.47
The Department has also said that it was ‘not aware of any map that outlined potential projects’ under the UCF, against ‘top 20 targets’. The Department continued that:
The package of materials provided by the Department to the Minister’s Office on 9 November 2018 … contained a series of draft maps of major capital cities and the locations of projects proposed under the initial commitment of $1 billion to the Urban Congestion Fund. … No electorate data was included in the project description and electorate boundaries were not marked on the map.
ANAO advice
2.48
The ANAO clarified, on notice, how it came to be aware of the spreadsheets and maps, in light of the claims of the Department that they had never seen them—or at least had not seen any spreadsheets relating to the ‘top 20 marginal’ electorate seats. The ANAO advised that as per its usual audit practice, the records it examined ‘included spreadsheets and other records saved in the department’s record management system, in SharePoint, in a system drive and in the Parliamentary Document Management System’. It continued that:
As is also common in ANAO performance audits, the records examined also included relevant email accounts provided by the Department of Infrastructure. The accounts examined were ‘infrastructure.gov.au’ email accounts of relevant officials and Ministerial Advisers … Within the Ministerial Advisor email accounts collected, the ANAO examined those email communications that were relevant to the design and administration of the Urban Congestion Fund, including of the Commuter Car Park Fund component.
2.49
The ANAO also advised that ‘some of the email communications transacted by Advisers using their “infrastructure.gov.au” account did not include departmental officials and, of these, some contained spreadsheets, tables or other attachments that had not been prepared by the department and were not subsequently sent to the department’.
2.50
At the RRAT hearing on 19 July, the committee also sought clarification on whether the Department had sought legal advice on the administration of the UCF and the CCPF and was informed that it:
… regularly seeks advice on the administration of programs. Advice relating to intermodals and carparks was provided to the Department on 28 August 2018, 23 May 2019, 28 May 2020, 16 June 2020, 27 August 2020 and 19 February 2021.
Production of documents to the Senate
2.51
Concurrent with this inquiry, numerous requests for documentation related to the selection of CCPF project sites, including the maps, spreadsheets and any legal advice relating to the CCPF program have been requested by the Senate.
2.52
The Department’s view was that its advice on program design and project identification was ‘subject to cabinet confidentiality, as deliberative advice informing cabinet deliberative processes’. Before the RRAT committee, the Department said it was not able to provide the spreadsheets as they constituted ‘deliberative advice from the Department into government decision‑making processes’.
2.53
The Department then gave somewhat contradictory evidence at the hearing on 19 July, noting both that they would refer the matter of providing documents to the Minister regarding a claim of public interest immunity (PII), and that they had already commenced this discussion with the Minister’s office during the week prior to the hearing.
Orders for the production of documents
2.54
Two Orders for the Production of Documents (OPDs) were passed by the Senate, on 23 August and 20 October 2021, for documents relating to the UCF and the CCPF. The OPDs requested:
The following documents discussed during a public hearing of the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee on 19 July 2021:
(a)
any email or document setting out the list of 'top twenty marginal seats' to be 'canvassed' for projects as part of the Urban Congestion Fund (UCF), as referred to by Mr Brian Boyd of the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) in the Committee Hansard;
(b)
any spreadsheets created by the Department of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development for the purpose of setting out proposed UCF projects, as referenced in paragraphs 2.30 to 2.32 of the ANAO's report, Administration of commuter car park projects within the UCF;
(c)
any spreadsheets created by, originating in, or shared between the Prime Minister's office and the offices of the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development, the Minister for Communications, Urban Infrastructure, Cities and the Arts, or any other minister, setting out proposed UCF projects, as referenced in paragraphs 2.30 to 2.32 of the ANAO's report, Administration of commuter car park projects within the UCF; and
(d)
any maps or attached schedules referred to by Mr Boyd of the ANAO in the Committee Hansard, setting out where the projected UCF expenditure would take place and the party affiliation of the seats in which that expenditure would occur.
2.55
In response, on 21 October 2021 the Hon Paul Fletcher MP, Minister for Urban Infrastructure, provided the following information:
neither Minister Fletcher or his office, or the Department had ‘seen any document matching the description of the Order’ (the ‘top twenty marginal seats’ spreadsheet), and without having any such document to hand could not consider a claim of public interest immunity;
neither Minister Fletcher or his office, or the Department had seen any document matching the description of ‘any maps or attached schedules’ referred to by the ANAO; and without having any such document to hand could not consider a claim of public interest immunity.
2.56
The Minister also drew attention to a PII claim he had made to the RRAT committee, dated 4 August 2021. That claim responded to requests for spreadsheets referred to in the ANAO audit report, and for legal advice received in relation to the treatment of car parks. Minister Fletcher made the argument in that PII claim that:
release of the spreadsheets referred to in the ANAO report (separate to the ‘top 20 marginals’ spreadsheet) would disclose the deliberations of Cabinet; and
release of the legal advice received in relation to the treatment of car parks would be exempt from production in legal proceedings based on legal professional privilege.
Views of submitters
2.57
A number of compelling observations and arguments were put forward by submitters and witnesses, about the role of the executive government and of the Department in selecting the sites for the CCPF.
2.58
For example, Mr Tony Harris, a former Auditor-General for NSW, concluded that it was ‘no accident’ that ‘ministerial and ministerial offices’ involvement in the Sports Infrastructure Program, as in this CCPP, involved the use of Coalition and marginal seat information to inform the disbursement of public funds’. He continued that:
It is no co-incidence that the Prime Minister’s Office was closely involved in the distribution of grants in the Sports infrastructure Program as it was in the proposed spending under the CCPP.
2.59
Mr Harris suggested that the most significant administrative error of the Department was its automatic response to recommend to ministers, the projects selected by the Minister, ‘notwithstanding the absence of merit or value for money’. Mr Harris suggested that if the selection occurred as a government decision ‘there has been a clear failure in process and law’ and that:
… minsters acted unlawfully because they had made decisions without obtaining reasonable reassurance that the spending was efficient, effective, economical, and ethical, as required by s71 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013.
….
In the selected cases decided before the caretaker period commenced there was no evidence and ministers made no reasonable inquiries.
2.60
Similar points were made by Mr Harris when he appeared before the committee. Mr Harris expressed his surprise ‘that the Prime Minister denied any involvement in the sports grants program’, and continued that:
… In the car parks … we saw that it was a press release that he issued that was apparently taken as authorisation for one project, even though it's not clear that the Prime Minister had the relevant delegation to make that decision. These little points about the Westminster system being ignored and a presidential system being established are very intriguing.
2.61
Mr Harris also voiced concerns about the ultimate sites selected for the CCPF projects, observing that:
… taxpayers' money was used like lollies in a lolly shop to try to entice voters to support them. So we have four car parks in Kooyong on the basis that that was the needs of the coalition party—not on the basis of public needs, because, in looking at public needs, you would look at relative public needs. Certainly Melbourne had the highest population growth; Kooyong actually had a decline in population. Sydney had more urban congestion than Melbourne. Brisbane had the highest relative population growth. If you want to dispense government moneys, you do it in a way that is proper, efficient, effective, economical and ethical, and there is no way that this program met any of those objectives.
2.62
Professor Richard Mulgan suggested that while most of the negative public commentary on the funding allocations focussed on the skewed allocation to Coalition electorates, it was ‘equally if not more important’ to consider the ‘major failure of administrative process in the Department … that led to this outcome’. Professor Mulgan was of the view that:
Administration of the program exhibits a breath-taking disregard for the standard government procedures expected when handling public funds. It represents a serious breach of the public service’s role as guardian of due process, which is required by the APS values and the Public Service Act.
2.63
Professor Mulgan made a distinction between the failure of administrative process, and the ‘bias revealed’ in the approved proposals but continued that both the Department and ministers ‘treated the funds as their own electoral war-chest to be spent as they saw fit for the government’s own political benefit’, with no concern for either public interest or accountability, or for proper process.
2.64
Professor Mulgan noted that the Department was responsible for developing the administrative framework for the program and seeking the approval of ministers, and the ministers were responsible for giving officials ‘sufficient time, resources and support to administer the framework as they processed ministerial recommendations’. Despite these responsibilities, the Professor argued that both the Department and ministers were ‘clearly negligent in their attention to process’, with no one in government yet claiming any responsibility for wrongdoing.
Committee views
2.65
The misallocation of funds under the CCPF reflects an endemic culture within the Government of using public money for political purposes, given its parallels to the Government’s administration of the Community Sport Infrastructure Grants Program which was mired in political interference and failures of governance. While the committee notes the CCPF was not a grant program, the politically motivated misallocation of infrastructure funding corrodes public trust in government spending decisions.
2.66
The committee notes with concern the involvement of the Prime Minister’s Office in canvassing for CCPF projects in marginal seats, and the highly unusual and unethical process of allocating funding under a $4.6 billion program essentially through ministerial offices and through the suggestions of Government members and candidates. The result has been the substantial misallocation of public funds.
2.67
Further, the geographic location of the selected CCPF projects confirms the exclusivity of the canvassing process—which resulted in the creation and use of the ‘top 20 marginals’ spreadsheet. It also resulted in the areas with the greatest need for reducing congestion received little to no funding. The focus on Victoria has left areas in New South Wales and Queensland ignored for the purposes of the UCF.
2.68
The disregard for proper executive decision‑making, governance and use of taxpayer’s money has been evident throughout the CCPF site selection process. Perhaps one of the most egregious aspects of CCPF site selection is the idea that a press release is considered sufficient authority by which to progress a project and allocate millions of dollars in funding, especially as the site had not yet been properly considered regarding its feasibility and necessity for a new commuter car park.
2.69
While the Department suggested that press releases had previously been used as an authority by the public service for an agreed decision, no satisfactory examples could be offered. The ANAO asked for evidence of any executive government decision about the Mitcham program, and none could be provided.
Role of the Prime Minister’s Office
2.70
The ANAO provided clear evidence during Budget Estimates that it was the same officer in the Prime Minister’s Office involved with both the selection of CCPF projects, and the Community Sport Infrastructure Grants Program. The findings of the ANAO also indicate that not only the CCPF but the entire UCF program is vulnerable to politically‑motivated misallocations of funding.
2.71
The committee is persuaded by the evidence that both the Prime Minister’s office and Minister Tudge’s office were central in the coordination of the exclusive canvassing of Coalition MPs and candidates, in marginal Coalition‑held seats and targeted Opposition‑held seats, and in the development of the ‘top 20 marginals’ spreadsheet.
2.72
In addition, the committee has formed the view that the evidence strongly points to the Prime Minister being aware of the canvassing process and that either he or his office approved all the car park projects within the scope of the ANAO audit.
2.73
The committee therefore calls for the Prime Minister to provide a full explanation to the Parliament about his involvement in decisions made about CCPF projects and funding, and anyone associated with the Prime Minister’s Office, the Deputy Prime Minister’s Office and any other Ministerial Offices in the allocation of funding under the CCPF.
2.74
The committee recommends that the Prime Minister table to the House of Representatives, no later than Friday 17 December 2021, a full explanation to the Parliament of the role that he, the Prime Minister’s Office, the then Deputy Prime Minister’s Office, and any other Ministerial Offices and staff played in the allocation of funding under the Commuter Car Park Fund.