Chapter 3 - Faults and maintenance
3.1
In the previous chapter the Committee examined the
capacity of the network to deliver services and some of the impediments to the
delivery of services which result from the design of the network and the
equipment used in the network. In this
chapter the Committee examines network faults and maintenance issues which
impact on the ability of the network to provide reliable services. Customers whose services are affected by
faults are covered by the Customer Service Guarantee which is discussed in
Chapter 5.
Network faults
3.2
The Committee received considerable evidence about
outages due to decay in the network and poor service in repairing faults.[221] One of the issues identified related to the
time taken to repair faults in rural areas.
Customers in these areas felt that it took too long to have faults
repaired and that the time taken to repair faults in rural areas compared
unfavourably with the time required in urban areas. For example:
Telstra service calls take an average of 2 weeks. Is this the same delay as experienced in
urban areas?[222]
3.3
The reason for these delays was often felt to be
related to the reduction in the level of staffing
in rural areas and the consequent need for service staff
to travel hundreds of kilometres to repair faults. This was described as being both inefficient
and time consuming:
. With the partial sale of Telstra, there was a concomitant
reduction in the level of staffing, and
therefore service to that infrastructure.
By this I refer to the reduction in local service staff
to attend to problems. There have been
many instances where servicemen have been sent from hundreds of kilometres away
to service customers, resulting in delays due to distance travelled, and lack
of knowledge of localities. This is not
only inefficient, but unsatisfactory to customers.[223]
Residents of Hay are also faced with delays in having new phones
connected or other service changes with contractors having to come to Hay from
other regional centres.[224]
3.4
The standard of repairs was also criticised by many
witnesses. Ms Jill
White, for example, related that after the
1998 flood in the Katherine area:
During the flood the phone system of course failed. Soon after the flood when the service was
restored the Telstra joint was removed from the pit at the front of our house
and hung on the fence. It is still
there.[225]
3.5
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Ms
White went on to relate that the service
has an intermittent fault which is worse during wet weather.[226] Other submissions also referred to repaired
wires being left hanging on fences.[227]
3.6
Submissions from the various branches of the CEPU
referred to cables with large numbers of faulty pairs and temporary repairs,
and to the reduction in staff numbers by
Telstra.[228] One particular concern related to the
failure to follow up temporary repairs with permanent repair work:
As the union is advised, there are countless instances where
first in cable repairs have not been followed up by properly engineered
permanent remedial action. We are
regaled by accounts of cable joints in plastic bags often for months if not
years. We are told of temporary cabling,
above the ground which has been in place for extended periods of time without
any likelihood of replacement or planned upgrade.[229]
3.7
In relation to the use of plastic bags, Telstra advised
the Committee that:
From time to time technicians revert to unorthodox practices to
protect and restore services as a temporary measure. However, Telstra firmly believes that this
practice is not widespread as it is not standard company practice and staff
have been instructed not to use these items.
Telstra does not encourage the use of non-standard
materials. However Telstras field staff
are focussed on doing the job as quickly and as completely as
possible. It is therefore possible that
if a field service person does not have appropriate equipment available to them
they may use other materials at hand as a temporary measure.
Telstra field staff regularly
update their equipment via depot visits.
If the use of a plastic bag or similar temporary material is identified
a permanent fix is completed as soon as practical.[230]
3.8
Telstra also denied assertions that it has been
concentrating on temporary repairs to keep services operating in the short term
rather than fully fixing faults:
I would certainly refute that claim. A clear policy of ours is: fix it first time,
fix it in a quality way and fix it once so that it stays fixed. Prior to the network reliability framework we
had a lot of our own internal measures which our field staff,
team leaders and managers were accountable for in relation to rereported
faults.[231]
3.9
The Boulding case discussed in Chapter 2 and Appendix 5
also highlighted deficiencies in Telstras fault management processes. In its report the ACA found that:
-
information
sharing between Telstras customer management and fault management systems is
deficient;
-
important fault diagnosis information
that was available was either not appreciated or not effectively used by
technical staff at the time of the first fault
repair;
-
the failure to identify and record the root
cause of the first fault extended the period of restoration of the Boulding
familys telephone services;
-
the absence of system information
about key CAN components extended fault repair activity related to the second
fault;
-
the multiple faults on the services over 26
January to 7 February 2002, although recorded in Telstras systems, did not
accelerate repairs to these services; and
-
technical information
for this CAN suggests that there is a need for Telstra to ensure that its CAN
enhancement program target areas where network performance is low.[232]
3.10
In response to an internally commissioned report into
the Boulding case, Telstra announced a number of responses which would affect
its overall fault management system.
These included improving the availability of information
to relevant staff, bringing forward
improvements to the rural network, and establishing a system for ensuring that
longstanding and complete fault repair work is reviewed daily by designated
senior managers.[233]
3.11
The deterioration in the Telstra network has been
blamed for major disruptions to services.
In its submission the Tasmanian Communications Branch of the CEPU stated
that on one occasion a rainfall of only 3.2 millimetres in Hobart
led to water damage which resulted in 300 to 400 customers losing their
telephone services.[234]
3.12
Some witnesses to the Committees inquiry acknowledged
that improvements have been made in service levels, particularly since Telstra
Country Wide was established.[235]
Recent initiatives in the provision of services in the
telecommunications network by both Telstra and the federal government are to be
commended. There has been a noticeable
improvement in the level of response to requests for services since the
establishment of Telstra Countrywide.[236]
Telstra staff cuts
3.13
In evidence to the Committee the CEPU raised concerns
about a number of specific issues which it considered were contributing to the
deterioration of the Telsta CAN. One reason given by the CEPU for the deterioration
of the network was the relentless reduction in the number of technical and line
staff over recent years:
The levels of field staff in
Brisbane Metro have been reduced by 400 over the last five years from almost
1200 Technical and Lines staff to just over
700 currently, a drop of 40%. The
Country staff has been downsized by similar
numbers.
Telstra is currently going through a redundancy program and
reducing by up to 10% in the rural, regional and remote areas of Qld and are
planning to reduce by some 150 staff in the
Brisbane area, two or three years worth in one chop!!.
Field staff currently and for
some time, have been working record amounts of overtime on weekends and after
normal hours and contractors are being given work in increasing levels, why
then are redundancy numbers so high when the work is obviously still there to
do? (NB. All figures used have been checked as closely as possible but should
only be used as an approximation.)[237]
3.14
During public hearings by the Environment,
Communications, Information Technology and the Arts Legislation Committee in
relation to the Telstra (Transition to Full Private Ownership) Bill 2003 the
NSW branch of the CEPU was asked to provide further information
about employment levels in the telecommunications industry:
The Table below represents the CEPUs best estimation of staff
numbers in the major carriers at three points of time:
1. Prior to the
introduction of (limited) carrier competition
2. Prior to the
commencement of the job reduction programme that accompanied partial
privatisation of Telstra and prior to full market liberalisation
3. At June 2003[238]
Company
|
Staff 1990
|
Staff 1996
|
Staff 2003
|
Telstra
|
86,728
|
76,522
|
37,169
|
OTC
|
3,000 (est)
|
n/a
|
n/a
|
Optus
|
n/a
|
4,500 (est)
|
8,609
|
Vodafone
|
n/a
|
1,000 (est)
|
1,742
|
TCNZ/AAPT
|
n/a
|
400 (est)
|
1,650
|
Hutchison
|
n/a
|
n/a
|
1500 (est)
|
Other carriers
|
n/a
|
n/a
|
3,000 (est)
|
TOTAL
|
89,782
|
82,422
|
53,670
|
3.15
The CEPU noted that the fall in staff
numbers has been accompanied by growth in contractor employment but estimated
that the current number of staff still falls
below the 1990 and 1996 figures. While
improved efficiency in the industry could be expected to lead to a fall in the
number of staff employed, it might have been
expected that the growth of the industry over the same period would have
largely counterbalanced that effect. The
evidence presented by the CEPU suggests that staff
numbers have been reduced to the point where there may be insufficient staff
to properly maintain the network.
Seal the CAN
3.16
Another area of concern raised by the CEPU related to
possible deterioration of cables in the Telstra network as a result of an
unsuccessful program to seal these cables from moisture damage. The CEPU outlined this issue in its
submission:
In the mid-1990s Telstra embarked on a programme to seal the
Customer Access Network i.e. to surround joints with a (supposedly) protective
gel
a) to help prevent
moisture entering the network at these points
b) to prevent both
the need for and adverse consequences of constant intervention in the network
at these same points.
The initiative was intended to reduce the fault rate and hence
allow ongoing labour shedding without jeopardising network reliability. The
effect has been the opposite.
It has now become apparent that the gel used by Telstra reacts
with moisture to break down cable insulation. Moisture is always likely to be
present in underground cable to some degree, as over time even modern sheathing
is permeable. Moreover the older the cable, the more likelihood there is of
leaks occurring along it (i.e. at places other than the joints). This will
result in increased fault levels not only at the joints but at other points of
the network as the gel seeps along the cables and encounters moisture further
along the cable run. The problem is being exacerbated by the air pressure
maintenance difficulties discussed below.
Use of the product has been discontinued, but large amounts of
cable are now being exposed to corrosion as a result of the programme.
Diagnosis of the resulting faults is complicated by the facts that
(a) they are not necessarily at the joints and
(b) as the fault arises from a chemical reaction rather than a
mechanical fault/failure, its location may not be easily identifiable.
The union believes that problems arising from the Seal the CAN
project are widespread. However they are particularly likely to affect country
areas as these were targeted by the programme to address higher rural fault
rates. [239]
3.17
During the Committees public hearings, witnesses
elaborated on the effects of this situation on the reliability of the CAN. The Committee heard evidence that faults
ascribed by Telstra to storm damage can often be traced to this problem:
One of the things that the management of Telstra are pushing
quite strongly is that the problems were caused purely by lightning. It is the view of my members, and the union,
that the major cause of the problems was not the lightning but the state of the
network in particular, the problems that have been caused by the so-called
Seal the CAN process that Telstra went through some years ago. The minute that there is a bit of rain or bad
weather the faults come in thick and fast. The management of Telstra will indicate that
they have never seen storms like it or so many faults come in and that it was
because the storm was so severe. It is
my belief and the belief of my members who were out there fixing these faults
that, although the storm was a fairly significant one, the root cause behind
the numbers of faults that they got which were record levels, and there are no
records in the past that go anywhere near them was the lack of upkeep of the
network and the problems caused by the flawed Seal the CAN episode.[240]
It is not always easy to find the fault in these circumstances. In fact, it is quite a worry in Northern
Australia where you have, obviously, wet and dry seasons. The fear is that in the wet the potential for
a large number of faults to occur is extremely high. We are particularly lucky, in my view, that we
are currently undergoing a drought. It is hard to estimate what the long-term
effect of the gel might be. I think that is a suck it and see, to be quite
frank. I know Telstra has put a bright
light on it and suggested that all is well, but our members have a great deal
of fear about the long-term impacts of seal the CAN.
Certainly, it is unfortunate that the
whole process was not further researched before it was rolled out and people
were forced to seal every joint they opened. There are even suggestions from some circles
that some of the contractors that sealed the CAN actually watered down the gel.[241]
3.18
Telstra responded to these concerns during questioning
by the Committee. It outlined the steps
it had taken to remedy problems arising from the seal the CAN program:
With regards to seal the CAN, prior to May 2003, during the
2002-03 financial year there was a centrally managed project, managing and
monitoring a portion of the total gel remediation work, which we have talked
about at length at other hearings. This
project reported approximately $4.6 million of expenditure on gel remediation. That in itself does not tell the whole
picture, because that is the centrally managed and maintained project. As part of the work of technical servicemen
and women on a daily basis, they will be remediating joints and cable joints
where they see fit, to provide the quality of service that is required. That is not necessarily part of this program
but it goes on continually. Under the
rehabilitation program, gel joints are fixed as part of the network plant
project and we are targeting fixing poorly performing plant, the focus being
providing maximum customer benefit for that investment.[242]
We also have stopped the process of sealing joints with the use
of gel, and there is no plan to replace the gel joints across the country. As the problems are identified reactively and
proactively, so we selectively replace these joints when they come up and we
believe that they will become customer affecting.[243]
3.19
Telstra also indicated that it is continually looking
to improve work practices and technologies in relation to the sealing of joints
in cables. [244] In response to one claim made by a CEPU
witness, Telstra said that it had no evidence that some contractors had watered
down the gel.
3.20
The number of cables in the Telstra network which had
been sealed with gel is not clear although one witness suggested that 100,000
joints are affected. The number of these
joints which represent a problem in the Telstra network was the subject of some
disagreement between the witnesses. The
Committee notes that in the Estens report Telstra was reported as having
advised that in almost all joints where it had been used, the gel continued to
be an effective sealant.[245] When questioned about this issue during
estimates hearings, and by this Committee during its hearings, Telstra
maintained that:
We understand - this will not be exact - that in about 97 per
cent of cases that is true. But clearly
there are some areas, particularly where there are high levels of humidity,
where there are some concerns about it. [246]
The vast majority of cases where the gel joints are in place
continue to work well. Telstra still
estimates that this problem contributes to approximately three per cent of all
faults in the network, and that is based on the fault codes that we receive. [247]
3.21
Evidence from the CEPU suggested that the problems are
much more widespread:
I am sure that Telstra are being optimistic. One would expect them to apply a bit of
optimism to the problem. The problem is
that this is not a short-term thing. This will go on in their network, potentially,
while any of those gel-filled joints exist. It is not a simple case of identifying these
joints to repair and fix; they essentially tried to seal 100 per cent of their CAN.
It is almost impossible to quantify. It will take time to get a better assessment
of what the long-term impacts are likely to be, in my view. In fact, they are lucky at this point in time
that it has been a very dry season. It
is hard to base your assessment on this year, to be quite frank. The real worry is that the fault in these
types of joints is not obvious. You can
go to a joint and not see a problem, because you do not actually see the
physical corrosion straightaway. You
will find the problems more through customer reports than through any other
mechanism. It is very hard to quantify what the long-term impacts might be, as
I said.[248]
The union believes there are over 100,000 joints in this country
that have sealant gel in them. Most of
these, once they have water in them, are breaking down and affecting the
customer, and massive amounts of work are there to be done.[249]
Air pressure maintenance
3.22
Another method which is used to protect copper
telecommunications cabling from the effects of moisture is the use of air under
pressure. Concerns have also been raised
about the maintenance of these cables.
The CEPU outlined its concerns on this issue in its submission:
The CEPU estimates that some 70-80% of main cables are
air-filled.
The air for the cables comes from a compressor in the exchange
and/or compressed air bottles which can be deployed locally (e.g. in a manhole)
in the event of a leak. (Use of bottles
should be a short-term remedial action only.) A system of alarms is designed to alert staff
to any fall in cable air pressure.
The maintenance of cable air pressure is central to the
protection of cables that are not jelly-filled. It also serves a diagnostic purpose, as a fall
in air pressure may indicate a leak at a joint or a hole/break in the cable.
The maintenance of air pressure was until recently a specialised
function within Telstra (Telecom/PMG). However, the section responsible for
responding to air pressure alarms (the Cable Pressure Alarms Systems [CPAS]
group) was disbanded in 2000-2001 and the function contracted to Network Design
and Construction (NDC), Telstras stand-alone construction wing. Little encouragement was given to the skill
base to transfer to NDC a fact which, in the CEPUs view, reflected an
underestimation of the importance of the cable protection function. NDC has
itself been downsized since that time.
The CEPU believes that cable pressure maintenance is now
seriously under-resourced and poorly co-ordinated with other diagnostic and
maintenance functions. For instance,
since December 2001, after hours and weekend compressor maintenance has been
abandoned. Alarms that occur during
these periods are simply not attended to until normal working hours have begun,
so that a faulty cable could be losing pressure for two days without the
problem being addressed.
Moreover, it is increasingly the case that staff
allocated to attend to air pressure problems will be required to provide a
quick fix (in the form of a gas bottle), without the underlying cable fault
being addressed. Even if staff
had the time and authority to deal with the cable repair job, they may lack the
specialist knowledge to do so (e.g. jointing skills).
The impacts of these air pressure maintenance problems are
widespread. The Union
believes, for instance, that one in five main cables in Sydney
are without proper air pressure.[250]
3.23
Union representatives expanded on the nature and extent
of this problem during the Committees hearings:
I am aware that there is quite a lot of usage of dry air bottles
along cables to try and maintain the pressure along the cable lengths. That is an indication that not enough has been
spent to make sure that the main cables are adequately sealed. It is a short-term measure to overcome the
sealing of the main cables.[251]
I have here a document which is obviously from the Network
Design and Construction Business Unit, which is a company within Telstra, which
has now gone in-house. This report
clearly identifies how many bottles right throughout New
South Wales are being used on main cables, where they
are not sending staff out. If a problem such as a leak in their main
network were identified, the normal process would be to send out a staff
member to put a bottle on it to keep the air pressure up and keep the water
out.
What occurred in the past, and when I say the past I mean
probably pre- 1997, is Telstra had a program to find and fix leaks. They therefore removed the bottles, and the
compressor at the exchange took over. What is occurring now, and again this is
through lack of money for capital expenditure and investment, is bottles and
bottles and bottles sitting across all parts of the network, propping it up,
and Telstra are not going back and fixing the network. In our view, once it does rain, Telstra
customers throughout rural and regional Australia
will experience a massive amount of outages where they will not have phone
services. I will give you an example. I
cannot quote exactly how many main cables are in Dubbo, but in my report here
there are 15 cables that are not up to the prescribed Telstra standard in Dubbo
alone.
No program is in place to rectify the
problem. The CEPUs major concern is
that, if that is the state the main cables are in now with no money being spent
on fixing problems with them since 1997, what will happen to them once Telstra
is fully privatised?[252]
3.24
The evidence received by the Committee also directly
linked the failure to maintain air pressure in cables with the declaration of
MSDs:
We have got some print-outs here of the Albion
Park cables, for example, regarding
the mass service disruption. When those
400 customers lost service in February, it was because the main cable went
down. It did not have enough air
pressure in it and the water got in, and that is the reason it went down. Since Ms
George has been raising the issue at Albion
Park, NDC have had four people
working to try and repair the holes in the Albion
Park cables. Telstra have said to the contracting company,
NDC, that they wish to have at least 40 kilopascals of air in each main cable. The print-outs that we have got in front of us
indicate there are still not many cables in Albion Park that have over 40 pound
of air pressure in them as we speak. Cable 3 in Albion
Park has got 12 kilopascals of
pressure in it. If you look through the
data we only received it yesterday it shows that the standard right across
Australia, where there are 18,000 of these cables under pressure, means that
there could be up to one in five that are flat and have not got enough pressure
in them.[253]
Carrier performance statistics
3.25
This anecdotally based evidence about problems in the
Telstra network should be viewed in the context of Telstra's overall
performance. The ACA reports regularly
upon the performance of Telstra under the Network Reliability Framework. In its June 2003 report on carrier
performance the ACA reported that:
Telstras performance shows that on average 99.06 per cent per
cent of all Telstras telephone services did not experience a fault from
January to August 2003. Performance was
slightly better in capital city areas (99.20 per cent) compared with non-city
areas (98.99 per cent).[254]
3.26
At first glance these figures appear to be reasonably
acceptable. They appear to suggest that
over the eight month period canvassed, less than one per cent of all telephone
services experienced a fault. However, a
closer examination of the report shows that this is an average of the monthly
fault rates. To determine the percentage
of faults over a twelve month period would require aggregating the total number
of faults over that period from the monthly statistics.
3.27
During questioning by the ECITA
Legislation Committee, the ACA agreed that this was the correct way of
interpreting the figures and suggested that:
If these were different services that had a fault each month
then you could add them up and, at the end of the year, you would have roughly
12 times the number of faults of any one month. That is fine. There is nothing wrong with that deduction.[255]
3.28
In a subsequent submission to that Committee, the ACA
clarified this issue further:
Figures published in a table in the most recent Bulletin
(on page 29) included the national average for services without a fault for May
(98.97 per cent), June (99.18 per cent) and July
(99.12 per cent). This gave a
year-to-date monthly average of 99.06 percent.
The heading of the column where this figure appears in 2003 average,
which has been interpreted by some readers as a yearly average rather than a
year-to-date monthly average. This
heading will be changed in future Bulletins to
avoid the possibility of confusion.
While the recently published fault performance figure of 99.06
per cent is a year-to-date monthly average, it obviously implies a lower annual
performance figure. However, it will not
be possible for an actual figure to be reported until the figures for the full
12 months are available.[256]
3.29
Under level 2 of the Network Reliability Framework the
ACA also monitors performance in Telstra exchange service areas (ESAs). Telstra is required to report to the ACA
every month on ESAs where the number of faults has exceeded a threshold
level. The ACA has reported that on
average less than 3.5% of Telstra's ESAs have reached the threshold for
reporting to the ACA in each period. To
date the ACA has received 1571 reports on 902 different ESAs and has conducted
further investigation and analysis on 77 ESAs based on these reports.[257] The ACA has said that:
The ACA's analysis has shown that generally, Telstra has
implemented appropriate processes and actions in order to identify the causes of
service difficulties and minimise recurrence.[258]
3.30
In its Performance Monitoring Bulletin
for the December quarter of 2003 the ACA reported that an average of around
99.1 percent or services had not experienced a fault in each month over the
last year.[259] In its September Bulletin
the ACA noted that an annual figure cannot be derived from this data because
some services may have experienced a fault in more than one calendar month.[260] However, in the December Bulletin
the ACA provided an estimate that 89.73 per cent of services did not experience
a fault in 2003.[261]
3.31
The Performance Monitoring Bulletin
also showed considerable variations between different areas. The ACA estimated that annual fault free
performance ranges from a low 78.9 per cent in the Northern Territory Top End
area up to 97.5 per cent in the Brisbane
City and Technology area.[262] Although the ACA did not publish annual
estimates for each region, the monthly figures show that most of the best
performing areas are urban while the worst performing areas are in regional New
South Wales, Western Australia
and Queensland.[263]
3.32
Another picture of the state of the Telstra network is
presented in internal Telstra documents which were tabled in the House of
Representatives on 10 March 2003. This document showed that annual fault rates
in the customer access network began rising sharply during the first half of
2002 and had reached a ten year peak of approximately 12.8% by December
2003. The document went on to say that:
-
Without adequate investment in rehabilitation,
the CAN Fault Rate will continue to increase incurring additional operating
expense and increasing the risk of NRF breaches requiring mandatory
rehabilitation action
-
Since 2002/03 a prime objective, as agreed with
capital sponsors, has been to keep the fault rate constant. Funding levels have not supported this.[264]
3.33
In summarising the fault related performance of the CAN
Telstra's internal documents said, in part, that:
-
Fault rate growth appears to be due to general
network deterioration rather than a specific exceptional cause
-
The current accelerating fault rate can be
attributed to reduced rehabilitation activity in the recent past coupled with
an intensive focus on providing quick fault restoration driven by performance
imperatives and OPEX budget constraints
-
Well targeted, large scope, mainly CAPEX based,
rehabilitation projects will address chronic fault tails[265]
3.34
The Committee also noted that the ACAs Performance
Monitoring Bulletins have shown a consistent
increase in the percentage of faults not repaired by Telstra within the CSG
timeframes:
Percentage of faults not repaired by Telstra within CSG timeframes[266]
Category
|
June 01
|
Dec 01
|
June 02
|
Dec 02
|
June 03
|
Urban areas
|
8
|
11
|
14
|
11
|
18
|
Rural areas
|
5
|
6
|
7
|
6
|
8
|
Remote areas
|
13
|
6
|
3
|
6
|
6
|
National
|
7
|
9
|
12
|
9
|
14
|
(Source: ACA Telecommunications Performance
Monitoring Bulletin)
3.35
The ACA's figures for the June
quarter of 2003[267]
showed that Telstra failed to rectify 14 per cent of faults within the
timeframe set out in the Customer Service Guarantee; and failed to make nine
per cent of new connections within the CSG timeframe. In response to questions from the Committee
the ACA agreed that these levels were of concern:
We indicated in the last two reports that we were concerned
about the level of performance in relation to urban faults, which you also in
part referred to. We have addressed
those issues with Telstra and sought assurances from them that they will take
the necessary steps to raise the level of performance.[268]
3.36
The more recent ACA bulletins showed an improvement in
the results for the September quarter followed by a decline in the December
quarter when 91 per cent of connection requests were completed within the CSG
timeframe and 91 per cent of faults rectified within the CSG timeframe.[269] While the Committee is pleased to note that
there has been some improvement in Telstra's fault rectification performance, it
continues to be concerned about both the high levels of failure to meet the CSG
timeframes and the direction of the ongoing trend. The September ACA bulletin showed a declining
trend for annual performance for new service connections in major rural areas,
minor rural areas and remote areas, and for fault clearance.[270]
Payphones
3.37
The ACA also monitors the performance of Telstra in
meeting its service standard targets for payphones under its USO standard
marketing plan. The targets state that
payphones in urban areas should be repaired by the end of one full working day
after Telstra is notified of the fault; by the end of two full working days in
rural areas; and by the end of three full working days in remote areas. In the September 2003 quarter Telstra
repaired 86 per cent of faults in urban areas, 82 per cent in rural areas, and
only 59 percent of payphones in remote areas within the specified timeframes.[271] The figures reported in the following
quarter's ACA bulletin appear to show a significant improvement to 90.5 per
cent of faults in urban areas, 86.9 per cent of faults in rural areas and 72.9
per cent of faults in remote areas.[272] However, it is unclear whether there has been
any actual improvement because:
Telstra has advised the ACA that its reporting measures for
payphone fault repairs have changed for the December 2003 quarter as a result
of monitoring system upgrades, making it difficult to draw comparisons against
previous quarters. The ACA will require Telstra to use a consistent measurement
method for future quarterly reports.[273]
3.38
In March 2004 the ACA published a review of payphone
policy. In its report, the ACA expressed
concern about the reliability of Telstra's payphones:
the overall reliability of Telstras
payphones and its fault repair performance is poor in remote Australia,
especially but not only in remote Indigenous communities. There are steps that Telstra
can and should undertake to improve the reliability of its payphones. The ACA
will undertake closer monitoring of USO performance by Telstra in these target
areas.[274]
Conclusion
3.39
The Telstra fixed line network remains the main
backbone of the Australian telecommunications network. Any unreliability or deterioration in the
network has the potential to seriously impact both the affected individuals and
the overall economy. In light of this
the Committee is concerned about the current level of faults and the frequent
failure of Telstra to meet the timeframes set out in the CSG.
3.40
Telstra's own internal documents support the claims
that fault rates are rising as a result of general network deterioration, a
focus on providing quick fixes, and inadequate CAPEX expenditure.
3.41
The evidence the Committee has received about the
standard of maintenance of the network is of considerable concern. If Telstras fixed line network is allowed to
deteriorate as a result of stop gap repairs and inadequate maintenance the
subsequent problems may not become immediately apparent, but are likely to show
up in the future:
You can save money in the short term. As we all know, it is like a motor vehicle. You can go on driving it and it will cause you
no problem, but finally lack of maintenance will catch up with it. Unfortunately, over the last few years,
maintaining returns to shareholders, et cetera, has been at the cost of the
maintenance and infrastructure bill.[275]
3.42
The Committee is concerned that, should Telstra be
fully privatised, its board and management will be exposed to increased
pressure to bolster its short term profitability to the detriment of the long
term reliability of the network. The
current measures in place to monitor the reliability of the network only
measure current fault rates. They do not
examine the state of the infrastructure and are unable to identify and rectify
the long term problems which have been brought to the Committees attention.