Minority report
BY THE AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS and GREENS (WA)
1.1 The Australian Democrats and Senator Margetts do not believe the
privatisation of Telstra – the universal telecommunications service
provider – is in the public interest.
1.2 Before commenting on the provisions of the Bill, or the question
of the sale of the remaining two thirds of Telstra itself, it is necessary
to reflect on the timing of the Bill, and its fast tracking through the
Parliament. The pace at which the Government is forcing this Bill through
the Parliament appalls the Democrats. This pace does not provide adequate
time for reviewing Telstra's performance since the one-third sale, or
the universal service obligation and the customer service guarantee scheme
standards which have only been in place since deregulation less than one
year ago.
1.3 Even more importantly, the timing of the Telstra Bill and the way
in which the Committee hearings had to be conducted make a mockery of
the public consultation process. Senate Committees exist to allow the
Senate to fully investigate the implications of proposed legislative changes.
Forcing 65 witnesses to appear before the Committee in just three days
of public hearings simply does not provide sufficient time for the community
or the industry to comment on the long term implications of the legislation.
It is the Democrats' view that the Committee has not been able to adequately
cover the complex economic, social, consumer and political issues involved
in selling-off the remainder of Australia's most profitable and valuable
national asset.
1.4 Despite the many calls for the Minister to approve Telstra's universal
service plan well before the Bill's debate, the Minister only approved
the plan on 18 May 1998. This provides almost no time for the industry
and consumers to reflect on the provisions of the plan, or provide a critical
analysis of its content. The Universal Service Plan is fundamental to
the way in which Telstra operates and is a crucial component of Telstra's
accountability.
1.5 The Prime Minister announced the Government's intention to sell the
remaining two-thirds of Telstra on 15 March 1998. The Bill was introduced
into the House of Representatives on 30 March 1998. The Bill was sent
to the Environment, Recreation, Communications and the Arts Legislation
Committee on 1 April 1998, allowing time for only three public hearings,
in Sydney, Melbourne and Canberra. No hearings were held in rural or regional
areas, none in the north or the west of Australia.
1.6 The Australian Democrats believe Telstra must remain in the hands
of all Australians. The top 10 percent of wealthy “mums and dads”,
stockbrokers and/or large corporations should not be the only beneficiaries
from Telstra's huge profits. As taxpayers, Telstra currently belongs to
each and every Australian and we derive huge benefits from the income
stream Telstra returns to consolidated revenue on an annual basis. The
Government argues that Telstra should to be sold in order to
- increase competition in the telecommunications sector,
- to pay off public debt,
- fund special social programs through a `social bonus'.
1.7 We reject this proposition.
1.8 The Australian Democrats argue that
- under public ownership Telstra is already competitive. Efficiencies
and profitability are not automatically derived from the private sector,
but come from sound regulation, good policy and technological advances.
- privatisation will reduce net income. The sale of Telstra will lead
to an increased debt burden because of the loss of revenue stream that
is returned to the Commonwealth through paid dividends and annual tax
returns.
- social programs should be funded from recurrent expenditure. Funding
special programs from `left over' revenue after debt retirement is no
more than political pork barreling, designed to secure support for government
policies rather than a legitimate linkage between asset sales and levels
of current expenditure. It should be recognised as such. The Government
wants a one-off cash bonus to fund it's next round of election promises.
But at what cost? At the very least, the Government should provide details
of the `social bonus' to the electorate, including what programs they
intend funding, and the proportion of the proceeds to be used.
- having the Telstra (Transition to Full Private Ownership) Bill 1998
passed by this Parliament but not proclaimed until after the next election
places an unfair obligation on a future parliament, one in all likelihood
to be very different from the current Parliament. The Democrats support
the Labor Party's proposal to repeal the legislation, if passed, should
they win office.
1.9 The Democrats and other opposition parties in the Senate are supported
in their belief that the Government's decision to sell the remaining two-thirds
of Telstra is not good public policy. When asked “do you agree or
disagree with the Federal Coalition's proposal to sell-off the remaining
two-thirds of Telstra?” an overwhelming 62 percent of respondents
stated they disagreed. Only 26.9 percent of respondents thought the sale
was a good idea [1].
1.10 The Democrats therefore reject the Committee's assertion that “the
government's commitment to use the proceeds of the sale for the purposes
of retiring debt will ensure that the beneficial impact of the sale will
be felt through all areas of the Australian economy and benefit all Australians”
[2]. The Office of Asset Sales and Information
Technology Outsourcing (OASITO) was unable to provide the Committee with
an estimate of the exact effect on Commonwealth revenues from the sale
because OASITO claims there are too “many variables that need to
be assessed” [3]. This is simply not acceptable.
The Government is proposing to sell a key government asset and expect
the community to place their faith blindly in the Government's accounting,
with no commensurate public scrutiny.
1.11 The Preamble to the Telstra (Transition to Full Private Ownership)
Bill 1998, states that the Parliament of Australia considers that
Australians should be given the further opportunity to invest in Telstra.
In doing so, the Government has forced on the Australian people, the sale
of Telstra without their input or consent.
1.12 The Government does not have widespread support for the sale of
the remaining two thirds of Telstra. If the majority of submissions to
the Telstra inquiry bear this out, their decision to attempt to sell Telstra,
is merely a reflection of the Government's ideological position that government
ownership hampers industry. The Australian Democrats believe that the
greatest impediment to the telecommunications industry is a dysfunctional
regulatory environment.
1.13 We reject the blatant ideological approach of the Howard Government
which suggests that the private sector is inherently good (profit making
and efficient) and the public sector is inherently bad (inefficient).
The Democrats also reject the Government's assertion that the government
ownership of public enterprises places an undue burden on scarce public
resources. This is simply a false premise. Australians already derive
benefit from the public ownership of Telstra.
1.14 In the lead up to the 1996 federal election, one of the Coalition's
promises was to sell only one-third of Telstra. We reject the Government's
attempt to fix a `mandate' for the sale of Telstra by forcing the legislation
through the Parliament before the next election. Governments are voted
into office for a range of different reasons. Unless the Coalition campaigns
on Telstra and Telstra alone, their `mandate' to sell cannot be established,
regardless of the delayed date of proclamation.
1.15 The Australian Democrats believe it is essential for retention of
the remaining two-thirds of Telstra to be in public ownership. It is only
in full public ownership that Australians will receive:
- access to essential services at affordable and competitive prices
- social benefits deriving from Telstra's revenues to Government
- ongoing maintenance and extension of infrastructure to all Australians,
regardless of their income levels and location
- Ministerial powers to direct Telstra in instances of poor service
Universal Service Obligation
1.16 The existence of a universal service obligation is recognition that
a liberalised, privatised and deregulated telecommunications market will
not of itself, deliver adequate levels of service to all Australians.
1.17 It should be noted that the Minister has only just approved and
tabled Telstra's Universal Service Plan, as required under the Telecommunication
Act 1997. It is difficult to see how the Minister can guarantee such
service provision in a privatised environment, particularly when the Bill
removes the Minister's powers of direction and other administrative reporting
arrangements.
1.18 It should also be noted that the Preamble to the Bill omits the
third element of the legislative definition of universal service. The
definition of the universal service in the Telecommunications Act 1997
is an obligation to provide standard telephone services; payphones and
`prescribed carriage services'. The Minister failed to make mention of
“prescribed carriage services” in his second reading speech,
quite an important part of the universal service obligation, and an interesting
omission. The Preamble, at the very least, should reflect the full contents
of the universal service obligation.
Recommendation 1: that the Bill's Preamble reflects the three tiers
of the Universal Service Obligation.
Customer Service Guarantee
New Clause : 236A
1.19 The Democrats welcome the Government's resolve to strengthen the
Customer Service Guarantee through a new amendment in the Bill. The Clause
allows the Australian Communications Authority (ACA) to give written directions
to a carriage service provider. These directions allow the ACA:
- to take specific action to ensure the provider does not contravene
a CSG standard
- to take specific action to ensure compliance with the CSG standard
- states that the carriage service provider must not contravene a direction
made
1.20 The Government's intention is that customers will receive a rebate
for poor service. They also intend to give the ACA powers to direct a
carriage service provider to correct any systemic problems in meeting
agreed CSG performance standards. Failure of a carriage service provider
to comply with an ACA direction can result in penalties of up to $10 million.
In the Telecommunications Act 1997, the Minister, ACA or ACCC can
take a carrier to the Federal Court in instances where the carrier has
breached the CSG standard.
1.21 However, the Democrats are concerned that the Scheme has not been
able to ensure the maintenance of the existing quality levels provided
in legislation when the first third of Telstra was sold.
1.22 The ACA's latest Quality of Service Bulletin shows a significant
drop in the percentage of services connected on or before the agreed customer
date from 84% nationally in December 1996 to 74% in December 1997. In
rural and regional areas, the decrease in service was worse, falling from
82% in 1996 to 66% in 1997. The percentage of faults cleared within one
working day also dropped considerably, nationally from 73% in December
1996 to 64% in 1997, and in regional areas from 74% in 1996 to 61% in
1997 [4]. These figures include performance
before and after the standard was in place. The Standard should have given
Telstra an impetus to improve performance.
1.23 The fact that the standards appear to have had no effect on Telstra's
service levels does not instill confidence that a fully privatised Telstra
will deliver service levels in accordance with performance standards,
especially for rural and remote areas. The Democrats are of the opinion
that the drop in service standards reflects a change in corporate ethos
from a service provider, to a shareholder / profit oriented organisation.
After all, these are the customers whose infrastructure costs are high
and who in some cases receive cross-subsidised services. The ongoing provision
of such services is costly, and not profit making, and therefore unlikely
to be of primary concern to Telstra's shareholders. It may be less expensive
to award customers compensation, rather than comply with the Standard.
1.24 The Democrats have a number of concerns about the CSG scheme including
the services covered, those subject to performance standards, enforcement
provisions, and public information about the Scheme.
1.25 Currently, services covered by the scheme are defined by Ministerial
Direction (which the Government wishes to remove). The Direction applies
only to the standard telephone service and to enhanced call handling features.
The definition of a standard telephone service in the Direction is limiting.
Further, the ACA is currently unable to amend the definition of services
covered by the CSG scheme. The Democrats believe that because mobile telephony
and internet usage is increasingly popular, and there is likely to be
a burgeoning of alternative technologies able to offer services used by
the public, the definition of the standard telephone service and the corresponding
CSG should be broadened.
Recommendation 2: that the definition of the standard telephone service
be broadened to include mobile telephony and internet access
1.26 The Democrats endorse the Communications Law Centre's recommendation
that the ACA should be empowered to respond to public concerns about widely
used services, and amend CSG performance standards accordingly (in consultation
with the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman) without receiving Ministerial
Direction [5].
Recommendation 3: that the Australian Communication Authority be empowered
to amend CSG performance standards without receiving ministerial direction.
1.27 In relation to the payment of compensation, the Democrats believe
that service providers ought to automatically pay compensation to customers
in instances where the customer service guarantee standard has not been
met. It should not be up to customers to submit for compensation, especially
when service providers have not supplied adequate information on the compensation
scheme.
Recommendation 4: that service providers automatically pay compensation
to customers in instances of CSG breaches.
1.28 The Democrats note the Minister's announcement of a Digital Data
Review to be undertaken by the ACA and completed by 15 August 1998 [6]
and the review the ACA will be undertaking into the CSG standards to be
completed by 1 January 1999. However, we believe there is sufficient evidence
to suggest that the universal service obligation should be upgraded immediately
to include a digital data capability of 64 kilobits per second, as per
ISDN capacity [7]. Current legislation provides
that the introduction of ISDN should cover 96% of the population by 1
January 2000. ISDN calls will not be untimed and therefore the consumer
protections for untimed local calls (in the definition of standards telephone
services) will not apply. The provision of standard telephone services
at section 17 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 should be upgraded.
The price cap regime should apply equally to all new services where an
existing service is withdrawn, or technologically surpassed.
1.29 The ERCA Committee, in their review of the legislation covering
the sale of the first third of Telstra, also recommended regular reviews
of the Universal Service Obligation be guaranteed in legislation. The
Democrats consider this to be a crucial component of an ongoing and dynamic
customer service guarantee.
Recommendation 5: that regular reviews of the Universal Service Obligation
be guaranteed in legislation
1.30 It may be worthwhile giving consideration to the establishment of
a permanent panel of review, comprising industry, consumer, legal and
departmental representation. This panel would report to the Australian
Communications Authority on the working of the universal service obligation
and the customer service guarantee and standards. This would enable longitudinal
studies of systemic failures in telecommunications service provision by
Telstra and others. It would also make recommendations to the ACA on the
need to upgrade the USO and CSG as technological changes and the passage
of time require.
The Ministerial Direction
1.31 The Bill repeals the power of the Minister to direct the Telstra
Board in the public interest. This power is derived from Section 9 of
the Telstra Act. The Minister has never issued a section 9 direction,
but the Democrats are of the opinion that its very existence exerts an
important symbolic influence on the deliberations of the Telstra Board
to act within the `public interest'.
1.32 There is ongoing concern about the availability of information on
a range of Telstra's activities [8]. Since the
corporatisation of Telstra the corporation has been accountable to the
public through its submission of an annual report to Parliament and through
the Senate estimates committee process. A privatised Telstra will not
have these reporting requirements.
1.33 This Bill seeks to repeal both the Minister's power to direct and
the reporting requirements on Telstra which are imposed by Division 3
of Part 2 of the Telstra Corporation Act 1991. These provisions
relate to Telstra's reporting of financial statements, corporate plans
and the like.
1.34 The Government believes it is inappropriate to retain such a power
in a situation where the Commonwealth no longer holds a majority equity
interest in Telstra. The Government further considers that the public
interest is protected through the comprehensive community and regulatory
safeguards set out in the Telecommunications Act 1997, the Telstra
Corporations Act 1991 and the Trade Practices Act.
1.35 These protections, however, are mostly administrative. The Ministerial
direction applies to long term policy outcomes, and provides a framework
within which decisions on telecommunications are made. The Democrats do
not believe the Commonwealth should yield its power to direct the universal
service provider precisely because the provision of telecommunications
services is an essential service. Furthermore, the price cap regime in
Part 6 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (which applies only to
Telstra) continues to apply. While Telstra remains the universal service
provider, the Minister's power to direct should continue to apply.
1.36 The monopoly position currently enjoyed by Telstra, and the fact
that Telstra is the universal service provider makes this power all the
more important, not less important. Indeed, it was the Minister for Communications
who referred to Telstra as “the Australian equivalent of the 600
pound gorilla” [9]
Recommendation 6: that the ministerial power of direction be retained.
1.37 It should also be noted that the Auditor General ceases to be Telstra's
auditor. The Bill allows an alternative auditor to the Auditor General
to be appointed at the first Telstra annual general meeting after the
sale. Again, this reduces Telstra's public accountability requirements.
Financial Impact
1.38 There are significant economic and financial benefits from retaining
Telstra in majority public ownership. Expert evidence submitted to the
inquiry indicated that the proposed sale would significantly reduce the
new worth of the public sector. Further, the Government's notion that
there is a link between a change in ownership and efficiency gains cannot
be sustained. The Democrats believe that efficiency gains will flow from
ongoing technological advances, good management, effective regulation
and competition.
1.39 Indeed, Professor Quiggan concludes that the “privatisation
of Telstra will result in substantial losses of tax revenue as the use
of franking credits under the system of dividend imputation will effectively
eliminate revenue from company tax, at least on the 60 percent of income
paid out as dividends. The present value of revenue foregone over ten
years is estimated to be between $4 billion and $8 billion” [10]
1.40 The Government maintains that the costs and benefits from the sale
are hard to quantify. The Government received revenue of approximately
$14 billion from the sale of the first third of Telstra. They estimate
that the current market value of Telstra is approximately $40 billion.
1.41 However, the Democrats maintain that the privatisation of Telstra,
based on Telstra's 1996/97 profit performance, would cost Australia's
public sector approximately $560 million per annum. The loss arises because
the Budget savings from Telstra (reduced interest payments due to debt
retirement) are less than the Budget costs (loss of profit stream and
reduced income tax payments due to Telstra's franking credits).
1.42 The sale would result in an interest saving of $2 billion per annum.
But it would also result in a loss of profits ($1.7 billion) currently
paid to the Commonwealth or retained by Telstra, and a loss of income
tax of $860 million because private shareholders would be able to claim
tax rebates in respect of franking credits on Telstra dividends. Overall,
this represents a loss of approximately $560 million, rising to $1.8 billion
within three years, if Telstra's profits continue to grow at their current
rate [11].
1.43 The amount the Government expects to receive is a one off amount
from the sale of its most significant public asset. The Government will
never again receive the revenue stream from Telstra which contributes
significantly to consolidated revenue and provides government funding
for all budget appropriations – not just the “social programs”
apparently worthy of special funding.
1.44 The governments of the United Kingdom and New Zealand used privatisation
proceeds to finance large cuts in income taxes. In all cases, the result
was the same. Once the supply of assets for sale was exhausted, there
was no source of revenue to finance the increased expenditure or reduced
taxation. Not only were there no further privatisation proceeds, but the
flow of income formerly generated by the assets was lost. In both cases,
the initial privatisations contributed to the growth of intractable budget
deficits [12]. The same scenario can be expected
from the sale of Telstra in Australia, where the budget deficit is also
likely to be negatively effected by the Asian currency crisis.
1.45 It should be noted that the Office of Asset Sales has refused to
disclose to the Committee the estimated future dividend flows used to
determine the future profitability of the company. This information is
crucial in assisting the Parliament in determining the true value of Telstra,
and the impact the loss of dividend stream will have on consolidated revenue
– the very revenue the Government requires to fund social services
and maintain a healthy public sector. The Office of Asset Sales stated
that “it would not be in the financial interests of the Commonwealth
for it to disclose its estimates of [expected future cash flows, both
dividends and retained earnings of the company]. In any case, the Commonwealth's
analysis of the further sale of Telstra shares is presently based on the
market price of the traded equity rather than any specially commissioned
separate ab initio analysis” [13]
1.46 We note that the budget papers have deemed the proceeds from the
sale of Telstra as commercial-in-confidence and not for publication.
1.47 This is simply not good enough.
Services to Rural Areas
1.48 This paper has already commented on the declining service rural
and regional customers have experienced since the sale of the first third
of Telstra. The Democrats agree that access to affordable telecommunications
services is essential, regardless of geographical location. However, we
do not agree that rural and regional telecommunications services could
be enhanced if part of the sale proceeds were allocated to improvements
in rural and regional telecommunications infrastructure. Telecommunications
service providers are meant to supply these services regardless of the
sale of Telstra. This delivery of service is an obligation under the Universal
Service Obligation. Such services should not be linked to the sale of
Telstra.
1.49 The Committee recommends that a proportion of the sale proceeds
be used to upgrade existing infrastructure in rural areas [14].
But what proportion? Why upgrade existing infrastructure, why not recommend
that new infrastructure be developed? Again, this should not bel inked
to the proceeds of the sale, but be provided by the universal service
provider as required by law.
1.50 We also note that the Committee has recommended that penalties be
increased for failure to meet the customer service guarantee standard
in non-metropolitan areas. Customer service is important, but the only
way to ensure that the service provider complies with the standard, is
by have a tougher regulatory and enforcement regime, not merely increasing
the scale of charges. The scale of charges should reflect the lack of
service provided rather than geographical location.
1.51 The Democrats are of the opinion that this recommendation is no
more than a thinly veiled attempt by the Government to recapture their
regional constituencies.
Other regulatory issues
1.52 Other telephony service providers submitted that they were concerned
that the privatisation of Telstra would further entrench Telstra's dominance
of provision of services, paying particular regard to the `local loop'
– the network infrastructure between a customer's premises and the
local exchange [15]. Other issues relate to
local call costing, disclosure provisions, and other anti-competitive
measures.
1.53 There is no evidence to suggest that Telstra's market position is
likely to decrease in the near future, and estimates have placed Telstra's
existing market share at between 80 and 85 percent. [16]
1.54 The Democrats note that the most important recommendations relate
to the powers of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)
to extract pricing details from Telstra. These relate to the “costs
associated with Telstra's internal transfer prices” which are to
be published to allow other telecommunications service providers to negotiate
“cost based pricing of access to telecommunications infrastructure”
[17].
1.55 However, the Democrats reject the linking of a strengthened regulatory
regime with the sale of Telstra. It is not unexpected that Telstra's rivals
have no objection in principle to the sale providing the regulatory scheme
to promote competition, and to enable them greater market access. This
does not mean that as `expert witnesses' they approved of the sale. In
any case, the deregulation of the telecommunications industry should have
provided these measures. Industry regulation should not be linked to the
sale of government assets.
Inclusion of the proceeds of Telstra's sale in the 1998/99 budget papers.
1.56 The Australian Democrats are concerned that the Coalition Government
has already assumed the sale of Telstra (and indeed, an expected cash
flow) to underwrite its 1998/99 budget, and forward estimates for the
next four years.
1.57 It is from this assumption that the Treasurer, Peter Costello, was
able to make the brave statement on budget night that Australia would
be $2.7 billion in surplus and that public sector debt would be 1.5 percent
of GDP by the 2001/02 financial year. The estimates were based on the
proceeds of the Telstra sale, and money raised through the sale of other
government assets.
1.58 This paper has already made the point that linking the sale of Telstra
to debt retirement and a social bonus fund was merely pork barreling.
However, further linking the sale of Telstra to the entire budget process
for the next four year is an attempt to bribe the electorate and the Parliament
to pass the legislation to ensure such outcomes. The Government is not
being honest.
1.59 The Government should supply the electorate with a new set of budget
forecasts and appropriations for programs and services funded through
recurrent expenditure and not reliant on the sale's proceeds. Only that
way can we truly ascertain the net effect of the sale's budgetary impact.
Conclusion
1.60 The Australian Democrats oppose the sale of the remaining two thirds
of Telstra. The Democrats believe that government has a significant role
to play in the supply of telecommunications infrastructure because it
is an essential service. We do not see government ownership and regulation
of the industry as incompatible or illogical. The Parliament is the maker
of the laws and regulations under which the company operates not the Government
of the day. To suggest otherwise is either to underplay the power and
role of the Parliament, or overemphasize the government's regulatory functions.
1.61 The Democrats oppose the sale of the remaining two thirds of Telstra
because:
- it is policy driven by ideology rather than sound public sector outcomes.
- it will have negative consequences for public sector debt. The sale
means that only wealthy Australians and large businesses will enjoy
sharing in Telstra's profits, to the detriment of programs requiring
funding through recurrent expenditure.
- linking the proceeds of the sale of Telstra to the retirement of debt
and a `social bonus' is no more than political pork barreling designed
to secure support for the Government and its policies rather than a
legitimate linkage between the sale and levels of current expenditure.
The question of whether the retirement of debt and the funding of social
programs are desirable is independent of the sale of Telstra, and should
remain so.
1.62 The Democrats oppose the repeal of the minister's powers to direct
Telstra in the public interest. The repeal of the ministerial power is
contrary to the public interest. The minister's powers are important symbolically
and are likely to positively influence the Telstra Board to ensure they
act in the public interest. Indeed, the Democrats believe that in a fully
privatized monopolistic environment, ministerial direction is even more
important. The minister's powers in relation to price caps under Part
6 of the Telecommunications Act 1991 remain in force. The Democrats
do not therefore see this as inappropriate.
1.63 The Democrats wish to ensure that customer service guarantees are
strengthened in the Bill, including those which relate to the
- universal service obligation (including legislative reviews);
- power to make and enforce codes and standards;
- power to determine the level at which the standard telephone service
is set, and amended as required;
- protection of untimed local calls
- provision of payphones and free directory assistance
- universal service obligation waiver provisions
1.64 To this end, the Democrats and Senator Margetts make the following
recommendations:
- that Telstra remain in majority public ownership.
- that the Bill's Preamble contain reference to the three tiers of
the universal service obligation
- that the standard telephone service be immediately upgraded to
a 64 kilobits service and its definition be extended to include internet
and mobile telephony
- that the ACA be empowered to make changes to the universal service
obligation without the need for ministerial direction
- that customers receive automatic compensation in instances where
service providers have not met the CSG performance standards
- that regular reviews of the universal service obligation and the
customer service guarantees standard be guaranteed in legislation
- that if contrary to public opinion, the Senate passes the Bill,
then Section 9 of the Telecommunication Act 1998, the power of the minister
to direct the Telstra Board in the public interest, be retained.
Senator Vicki Bourne Democrat Spokesperson for Telecommunications
(NSW)
Senator Lyn Allison Democrat (VIC) Committee Member
Senator Dee Margetts Greens WA
Footnotes
[1] Morgan Poll No 1494, 18/19 March 1998.
[2] Environment, Recreation, Communications
and the Arts Legislation Committee. Report on the Telstra (Transition
to Full Private Ownership) Bill 1998.
[3] Environment, Recreation, Communications
and the Arts Legislation Committee. Report on the Telstra (Transition
to Full Private Ownership) Bill 1998, p7
[4] Australian Communications Authority. Telecommunications
Performance Monitoring Bulletin, for the period 1 December 1997 to 31
March 1998.
[5] Communications Law Centre. Submission to
the Senate Environment, Recreation, Communications and the Arts Committee,
5 May 1998.
[6] Minister for Communications, the Information
Economy and the Arts, media release Digital Data Review, 6 May 1998.
[7] Telstra, To sell or not to sell? The report
of the Environment, Recreation, Communications, and the Arts Committee
to the sale of the first third of Telstra. Recommendation 14 recommended
the standard telephone review group consider an immediate upgrade of the
standard telephone service to a 64 kbps service.
[8] Consumer Telecommunications Network, for
example.
[9] Senator the Hon, Richard Alston. Opening
address to the ATUG Conference of the Australian Telecommunications Users
Group, 30 April 1996.
[10] Quiggin, J. Proposed privatisation of
Telstra: an assessment. Submission to the Senate Environment, Recreation,
Communications and the Arts Committee, 13 April 1998.
[11] Australian Democrats. Repairing the Damage.
Budget priorities for 1998/99.
[12] Quiggin, J. Proposed privatisation of
Telstra: an assessment. Submission to the Senate Environment, Recreation,
Communications and the Arts Committee, 13 April 1998, p706.
[13] Office of Asset Sales. Reply to question
on notice from Senator Carr, 6 May 1998.
[14] Environment, Recreation, Communications
and the Arts Legislation Committee. Report on the Telstra (Transition
to Full Private Ownership) Bill 1998, p25.
[15] See especially Macquarie CorporateTelecommunications
Pty Ltd's submission to the Senate Environment, Recreation, Communications
and the Arts Committee, 24 April 1998. P449
[16] Telstra record their market share as 85%.
Answers to questions on notice from Senator Carr, 6 May 1998. The Department
of Communication and the Arts records 80%. Answers to questions on notice
dated 9 May 1998.
[17] Environment, Recreation, Communications
and the Arts Legislation Committee. Report on the Telstra (Transition
to Full Private Ownership) Bill 1998, p41