Coalition Senators' Minority
Report
Introduction & Summary of
Coalition Senators' Position
The Fair Work
Bill 2008 represents the latest iteration in a succession of evolutionary
changes to Australia's workplace environment. Though sharp distinctions are drawn by
the Rudd Government between this bill and the workplace relations legislation
of the Howard Government, in reality one draws heavily on the other, including
in particular the concept of a national industrial relations system.
This concept, hitherto so vigorously resisted by the union movement and state
Labor governments in the High Court, is now embraced as sound public policy by
both sides of politics.
The right of the Government to
abandon much of the WorkChoices architecture, based on its commitments
in the lead up to the 2007 Federal election, is clear and beyond challenge. Coalition
senators acknowledge that WorkChoices is dead; only the makeup of
its successor remains to be determined.
While acknowledging the Rudd
Government's mandate to determine that makeup, Coalition senators believe that
the universal verdict of witnesses that the Bill is flawed needs to be
responded to. To ignore these concerns, emanating from every corner of the
stakeholder community, would make a mockery of the Senate committee's inquiry.
Accordingly Coalition senators have
laid out in this report aspects of the legislation which appear to be unfair,
which may destroy jobs and which are at odds with the Rudd Government's
promises as to what the legislation would do.
We are also conscious that these
changes are under contemplation at a time of serious economic uncertainty.
These reforms must contribute to a stronger, more secure economic outlook.
Coalition senators affirm that the Bill must indeed fulfil the goals
it sets for itself of creating flexibility and certainty for the businesses on
whom Australians will depend for job creation.
Background
In April 2007, the Australian Labor Party
released “Forward with Fairness” representing the industrial relations policy
upon which it would contest the 2007 Federal election. This initial policy was
followed by a further document representing an ‘implementation plan’ released
in August 2007.
Further details about the proposed new system
were detailed after the election in two
speeches delivered by the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, Hon Julia Gillard, on 17 September 2008 and 14 November 2008, and via the release of
various fact sheets.
On 25 November 2008, the Minister
introduced the Fair
Work Bill
2008
into the House of Representatives. The Bill sought to represent the legislative
implementation of the commitments contained within Forward with Fairness.
When introducing the Fair Work Bill, the Minister stated:
The
bill being introduced today is based on the enduring principle of fairness
while meeting the needs of the modern age. It balances the interests of
employers and employees and balances the granting of rights with the imposition
of responsibilities. The bill delivers:
- a
fair and comprehensive safety net of minimum employment conditions that cannot
be stripped away;
- a
system that has at its heart bargaining in good faith at the enterprise level,
as this is essential to maximise workplace cooperation, improve productivity
and create rising national prosperity;
- protections
from unfair dismissal for all employees;
- protection
and hope for a better future for the low paid;
- a
balance between work and family life; and
- the
right to be represented in the workplace.
To achieve the above intentions, the Bill introduced a number of
key elements of the proposed new workplace relations system. These include:
- A
safety net of modern awards, National Employment Standards, and National
Minimum Wage orders;
- A
new industrial tribunal called Fair Work Australia and enforcement arm called
the Fair Work Ombudsman;
- The
positioning of enterprise collective bargaining as a central tenet underpinning
the operation of Bill;
- Frameworks
for dealing with transfer of business, general employee protections, limitations
on industrial action, unfair dismissal protections, and right of entry; and
- Various
compliance and enforcement provisions.
While the Bill represents a comprehensive overhaul of the
existing workplace relations system, it retains and builds upon a number of key
elements of the current Workplace Relations Act 1996. Such elements include a
continued reliance upon the Corporations power to sustain a
"national" industrial relations system (a
matter that Labor vigorously opposed), the establishment of key national
minimum conditions of employment, and the promotion of bargaining as an
alternative to the safety net.
Structure of the Bill
Coalition senators congratulate those who
drafted the Bill on both its layout and
clear nature. The Bill is easy to read and
understand, and uses language and terminology that is clear and simple. It is
envisaged that this will ultimately make the Bill more readily accessible and useful to those to
whom it applies, namely employers and employees within a workplace.
The Bill contains a framework usefully separated into
six chapters. These are:
Chapter One: Outlines the structure and aims of the Bill. It also contains a
dictionary of key definitions and phrases used throughout the Bill.
Chapter Two: Concerns terms and conditions of employment,
modern awards, National Employment Standards, bargaining architecture and
transmission of business.
Chapter Three: Deals with the rights and
responsibilities of employers, employers and organisations.
Chapter Four: Concerns compliance and enforcement
matters.
Chapter Five: Provides the basis for administrative
functions, such as the establishment of Fair Work Australia.
Chapter Six: Deals with miscellaneous issues.
A Mandate?
A key consideration for Coalition senators is
the extent to which the Government has a mandate to implement the changes
contained within the Fair
Work Bill.
When introducing the Bill, the Minister noted:
They [the voters]
chose to reject Work Choices and all it stood for, and to put in its place the
promises Labor made in its policy statement Forward with Fairness. They gave
the Rudd government the strongest possible popular mandate for the introduction
of this bill.[1]
The existence of a mandate and the extent to
which that mandate should be honoured was an issue that occupied much of the
Committee's attention. The issue was thrown into sharp relief by the fact that
all witnesses who appeared before the inquiry called for changes to the Bill. Many of these
witnesses were asked: what right does the Senate have to change a bill for
which the government of the day has a mandate? The responses varied. Mr Dave Oliver, from the AMWU, gave
the following evidence:
There are mandates
and there are mandates. I would simply say that if we went to the Australian
public now and said, ‘What was a clear mandate you had given the government
with regards to IR legislation?’ I do not think, with respect, that we would
have too many people in the general public rattling off about all the
specifics.[2]
Mr Joe de Bruyn from the SDA stated that:
The parliament is
master of its own situation. It is entitled to pass whatever legislation it
believes is appropriate, and it is not limited to what the government promised
prior to the election. If there are ways of improving the legislation, then the
parliament should do so.[3]
Mr Jeff Lawrence, Secretary of the ACTU, on the question of
mandate observed:
Well, I think it is
really a question of the major thrust of the legislation.[4]
If a consensus emerged, it was that a mandate
exists only with respect to the central elements or "major thrust" of
Forward with Fairness. The right of parliament to amend non-core provisions
that were flawed or unfair was acknowledged by several witnesses. Coalition
Senators concur with this view. A loose interpretation of the notion of a
mandate could undermine the architecture of the Government's Bill, while a strict or narrow
interpretation will unduly restrict the Parliament from responding to valid
concerns raised by the community during this inquiry. Accordingly, this
dissenting report accepts that the Government has a mandate to implement the
key elements of the Fair
Work Bill
consistent with the commitments laid out in Forward with Fairness.
Specifically, Coalition senators recognise the
Rudd Government's entitlement to dismantle the former government's WorkChoices
legislation of 2005 pursuant to this mandate.
There are several areas however where the Bill ought to be amended to
improve its operation, technical matters,
broker true or real fairness and ensure that the system so implemented is
appropriate for all economic conditions. There are many areas where the Bill seeks to implement
changes on which Forward with Fairness was silent. The areas of concern
Coalition senators identify in this report are, in our view, either consistent
with the broad mandate held by the Government or deal with matters on which Forward
with Fairness was silent.
Transfer of Business
The Bill contains substantially new provisions dealing
with what has traditionally been known as ‘transmission of business’. In the
industrial relations context, such provisions deal with employee entitlements
and employment generally when a business (or part thereof) is sold or
transferred to a differing legal entity. Commonly, this occurs in
circumstances involving a traditional business sale, however business
structures are becoming increasingly complex. High Court and other similar
authority exists and has kept pace with the changing business environment, most
notably in the PP Consultants[5]
and Gribbles[6]cases.
The Bill as drafted proposes a radical new approach to
established transmission of business principles. It replaces the accepted
approach of ‘asset transfer/business character’ with a broader concept of
‘transfer of work’. This has the practical effect of overturning the High Court
authorities noted above.
In addition, the Bill widens the circumstances in which an industrial
instrument transfers with the relevant employees affected by a business sale or
restructure. The potential also exists for such industrial instrument to form
the basis of employment for any new employee that commences after the business
has been transferred.
The reason for such a fundamental shift from
universally accepted and well settled principle is unclear. The proposed
clauses are (at best) problematic and economically restrictive, and (at worst)
a disincentive to achieve ongoing employment for affected employees. The
evidence of the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry was particularly
relevant in this regard:
I am talking about
models of organising a business. So if I take over a business that is uneconomic,
that is failing, I need to be able to go to that business’s business model and
all parts of it, renew them, replace them, take them over, and move them onto a
sound footing, onto my footing, as the incoming employer. And that is one of
the things we are very concerned about: stasis paralysis, or indeed—and a
number of witnesses have come before you to say this—a clear disincentive to
take over the new employees.[7]
The evidence of Australian Business Industrial
was:
In my career I have
been involved in the transfer of businesses, the acquisition of businesses,
both in a HR sense and as a line manager, and I can assure you that one of the
things that is always done as part of the due diligence is to look at the
consequences of bringing those people in. If the consequences of bringing those
people in strike at the heart or potentially undermine the business objective
that you are pursuing, then you would look for ways in which to make sure that
that did not happen. So I think the assertions that the bill as it stands will
act or could act as a disincentive in certain circumstances, in my experience,
will hold true. [8]
The Australian Industry Group was unequivocal
about the effect of the new provisions:
The provisions are
antiemployment and would create a huge incentive for companies not to employ
workers of businesses they take over.[9]
Evidence direct from business was:
The way the bill is
structured, what it fundamentally will do is put businesses such as ours in the
position that we will say that, unless there are very good, compelling reasons
to take on existing employees from the client, frankly we will not do that. It
will be less convoluted for us to simply employ fresh people and then not be
burdened with the transfer of business provisions. We say that is not good
public policy.[10]
It is clear that the proposed transfer of work
provisions create a disincentive for an incoming employer to retain employees
engaged within a business. Secondly, they encourage the retention of business
practices that may be uneconomic or failing.
The current challenging circumstances facing the
Australian economy are already manifesting themselves in many ways, most
relevantly in the form of increased levels of unemployment. The Government's
own predictions see this trend continuing. At this time, it is crucial to
ensure that every arm of government policy is aimed at ensuring that Australian
workers have a job. The proposed alterations to transfer of business do not
achieve this aim, and may in fact contribute to worsening unemployment levels.
The Coalition senators appreciate that the
transmission of business provisions are intended to be ‘anti-avoidance’ in
nature, and reflect evidence highlighting some inappropriate
practices of some businesses. However, such evidence must be balanced against a
need to ensure that workplace relations laws do not negatively impact upon a
normal business transactions or operate in a manner that costs jobs. The existence of expanded general
protections for employees, combined with a stronger safety net, expanded
enforcement powers and the removal of AWA/ITEA’s suggest that the incidence of and scope for inappropriate activities will be substantially
reduced, if not eliminated, by the Bill. The jettisoning of existing and well
settled transmission of business provisions do not, in our opinion, contribute
to addressing the type of inappropriate business practices given during
evidence.
The provisions of the existing Workplace
Relations Act 1996 strike an appropriate balance. Currently, when an employee
is transmitted with a business the underpinning instrument also transmits for a
12 month period. Within this period there exists scope for negotiation of a
new agreement and, if this does not occur, the instrument ceases and conditions
become set by an industrial award. The new ‘good faith’ bargaining provisions,
a strong safety net of awards, and other bolstered protections within the Bill will ensure appropriate
protections for transmitted employees whilst not impeding a business sale or costing
jobs.
To this end, Coalition Senators have grave and
serious concerns about both the rationale behind, and the effect of, the
proposed transfer of business provisions. They can only be considered as
unnecessary, unwarranted, and anti-jobs.
Right of Entry / Access to
Records
The issue of union right of entry and access to
records is important to both employers and unions. That so much of the evidence
before the Committee was on this point is testament to the importance it holds
for both employer and employee representatives. There is a universally
accepted right for a union to enter a workplace where
it has members; however there are also important historical limitations
and rules defining such a right.
Forward with Fairness contained an express
commitment to retain existing right of entry provisions. This
commitment was
unambiguous. In a speech delivered in April 2008, the Minister stated:
...the current
rules in relation to right of entry will remain. With the right to enter
another’s workplace comes the responsibility to ensure that it is done only in
accordance with the law.[11]
This could not be
clearer. Other examples of such intention follow:
We will make sure
that current right of entry provisions stay. We understand that entering
on the premises of an employer needs to happen in an orderly way. We will
keep the right of entry provisions.[12]
and
We promised to retain
the current right of entry framework and this promise too will be kept.[13](our emphasis)
Based on
these promises, it was rightly expected by all stakeholders that existing right
of entry provisions would be maintained. However this is simply not the case.
The overwhelming evidence confirms that there have been a number of breaches of
this unambiguous concept.
By and large,
such breaches arise from abandoning the concept of ‘parties’ to industrial
awards and instruments. The evidence of DEWR confirmed that
...the bill removes
the existing requirement for a union to be bound to an award or agreement
applying in the workplace as a condition of entry.[14]
This arises
as an outcome of the award modernisation process currently before the
Australian Industrial Relations Commission. The existing concepts have been
replaced with provisions that allow union entry based on union organisational
‘rules’ that determine what workplaces and what type of work a union can
‘cover’. It is clear that such an approach requires an employer to be familiar
with the ‘rules’ maintained by a particular union as opposed to simple
reference to an award. This can cause significant problems for an employer
faced with such a circumstance. Evidence before the Committee, from an
experienced industrial advocate, highlighted this point:
I am an industrial
relations practitioner, and I cannot look at a set of union rules and say,
‘Well, this type of employee is covered and this type is not.’—particularly our
small medium members, and we are predominantly an organisation of SMEs—they are
going to have no hope. Someone will say, ‘Look, I want to come in and meet with
your members.’ And they say, ‘Well, I don’t actually know if you have right of
entry.’ ‘Well, I have got a permit.’ ‘Well, I am not sure whether your
organisation laws would cover my staff.’[15]
The
provisions also give rise to the potential for demarcation disputes between
competing unions, described by some as ‘union turf wars’. This concern is due
to the proposed ability for a union to seek penetration within a workplace
where another union already has significant presence, flowing from the removal
of the traditional ‘party’ concept.
In
addition, there are a range of changes to the legislation which, on the face of
it, look to be very minor but when put together represent substantial changes
in focus. An example is the right of entry provisions. The government went to
the election saying that it would not change the right of entry provisions, but
the fact that it has stepped away from agreements and awards regulating right
of entry now means that in our sector there will be overlapping coverage
between unions. There will be unions who are not party to an agreement who will
now have a right of access, and those provisions have the potential to result
in union turf wars.[16]
Evidence
from the Australian Workers Union was:
“As you will
understand, the nature of union rules coverage is vastly different to the
nature of demarcated coverage. Under our rules, for example, we could argue
that we cover New South
Wales public firefighters,
security guards and the entirety of the coverage of the AMWU, for example, and
so on. There are other rules that are allowed for under our eligibility rules.
What we are concerned about is the potential for disputes to arise that have
never happened in the history of industrial relations in this country.” Mr
P Howes, Committee Hansard, 18 February 2009, p.16
and
later:
Senator ABETZ—I think that is a very good segue for me
to ask a bracket of questions in relation to the right of entry, because it
appears in the proposed legislation that right of entry will be provided to
permit holders of trade unions if the organisation has employees that are
eligible to be members of that particular union. Given the width of
particularly the AWU’s rules, we could have a situation where, should they so
desire, permit holders from the AWU could walk into a huge number of workplaces
in Australia. Indeed, we could have a situation where
one day the AMWU walks in for a suspected breach and the very next day, for
exactly the same suspected breach, the AWU could walk in. Isn’t that right?
Mr Herbert—In
many cases, yes, that is correct. There is a massive overlap in eligibility
rules throughout Australia, particularly as a result of the
amalgamation of unions that occurred 10 or 15 years ago. There is a very large
overlap, as Mr Howes has just pointed out.
Senator ABETZ—And in fact the rules of the various
unions as to eligibility are quite complex.
Mr Herbert—Yes, and, one would have to say, in many
cases beyond the wit and wisdom of a security guard at a gate who is being
confronted with a union official with a 27-page eligibility rule and an
explanation by the union official as to why it is they are entitled to be
there. The argument might be quite right, but—
Senator CAMERON—Security guards act much more decisively
now.
Mr Herbert—Security
guards do act decisively on occasions. Without being too flippant about it, I
have made a living out of the eligibility rules of unions for a number of
years, and they can be extremely complex. You are quite right about that.[17]
The Government promised
that:
Under Labor, all
workers will be free to decide whether or not to join and be represented by a
union, or participate in collective activities[18]
The proposed
provisions repudiate that promise. Employees at every workplace have to be
able to choose who represents them and the extent they want the involvement of
a union. Employees have a right to a genuine choice and their rights and
decisions should be respected.
In
addition, the Bill allows a union official who is a permit holder
to inspect the records of workers who are not members of a union in certain
circumstances. This is a significant deviation from the existing provisions
that, in the absence of authorisation from the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission, restrict access only to records of union members. This raises
significant concerns about the right to privacy for records involving non-union
members. Many witnesses appearing before the committee gave evidence on this
aspect of the proposed legislation.
...the bill
substantially increases union entry rights, giving each union access to a much
wider range of workplaces and giving union officials access to wage records of
non-union members. We believe that existing entry rights are appropriate and
should not be expanded.[19]
Evidence from the mining
sector was:
Our concern in
relation to the Fair Work
Bill is, firstly, that the
protections in relation to union access to employee information have been
removed. It is not just a question of unions being able to access non-member
records. Unions will be able to access any record of any employee in the
business, and all they have to do is put together an argument to say that that
is valid in respect of an alleged breach of the act or an industrial
instrument. There is no fetter on that access; there is no person in Fair Work
Australia checking that the access is reasonable. Once the access is given, it
includes everything that is contained in a personnel record. That may well be
your application for the position. It may well be the preliminary drug testing,
and that might show that at some point in time you had some drugs present in
your system. It may show the employee’s disciplinary outcomes or performance
outcomes. It could show that your wages have been garnisheed because you have
an outstanding obligation under family law or a taxation problem. There are
myriad issues which are unrelated to any breach of an award or industrial
instrument that could be accessed. The problem has arisen because the Fair Work Bill has removed the definition of record,
has expanded access to record keeping and has removed the protections. Whilst
there is a provision in there concerning the privacy laws, those privacy laws
essentially have an exemption for marketing purposes. We are aware that the ACTU and its affiliates have been using member information or
employee information for canvassing as part of their political processes.[20]
and
We are strongly
opposed to unions having the capacity to inspect nonmembers’ records under the
bill and propose that nonmembers’ consent be required as a condition of
inspection. Again, I make the point that union coverage amongst our private
sector workforce is very low, and it is our view that you are subjugating the
86 per cent of employees who are not union members to a level of intrusion on their
rights that is neither fair nor appropriate.
We also have
concerns that the proposed Fair Work Act significantly increases union rights
to bypass the law of trespass and get access to workplaces and private employee
information of nonmembers. This is, and represents, a significant change to the
status quo, which effectively, we believe, expands union rights in a way that
is not appropriate.[21]
There is no
“public good” policy reason for the shift in right of entry or access to
non-union member records. However, it is undeniably designed to increase union
power.
It is clear that there
are a number of concerns arising from proposed changes to right of entry. These
are:
- Significantly
increased potential for a return to disruptive union demarcation disputes;
- An
increase in complexity associated with determining who has entry rights arising
from the abandonment of the traditional ‘party’ concept; and
- The
widened access given to a permit holder to view non-union member records.
The express
and unequivocal commitments made by the now Deputy Prime Minister in 2007 (and
many times since) have been breached by the proposed changes.
All
employees have the right to privacy of information specific to them, such as
their own employee records. These records often contain personal and sensitive
information. Except where required by public authorities under statute, an
employee should give permission before their own records are divulged to a
third party. The Bill as proposed gives a right to a union boss to inspect employees’
personal records. Coalition senators see no basis for unions to be given such
huge and special powers. The appropriate checks and balances are absent in
this proposal.
Bargaining Architecture
The Bill creates a system that,
at its heart, relies heavily on the use and promotion of collective agreements
and enterprise bargaining. There are two aspects that feature within the
bargaining stream, being a new concept of ‘good faith’ bargaining and distinct
set of requirements for ‘low paid’ bargaining.
As these aspects are new
to the industrial relations framework in Australia, they were the subject of many submissions
before the Committee and unsurprisingly a number of concerns were identified
with this new approach to bargaining.
(a) Bargaining Orders
The legislation provides
Fair Work Australia with a suite of options that, upon application, can be
issued as orders to parties who are engaging within the bargaining process. In
general, these orders are designed to ensure that the bargaining parties engage
in a process that is genuine, efficient and free from capricious or unfair
conduct. However, there are a number of relevant concerns that arise from the
examination of bargaining orders on a practical level. In general terms, there
exists a concern that the orders may be used in a manner that was not intended,
or to achieve bargaining outcomes that are not genuinely negotiated. The ACCI
submission observes:
No longer
will it be possible for an employer or a small business to simply employ persons
in full compliance with the myriad of wages and employment conditions set out
by legislation and industrial awards applying in their industry, and get on
with business.
Each
employer will be exposed to a regulatory system which can, in one form or another
and subject to certain criteria, require that employer to answer to its
employees, a union or industrial regulator as to why the employer should not
pay more or provide different (higher) conditions of employment.[22]
It is well known that
the workplace relations history within Australia has generally relied upon a ‘safety net’ of
minimum conditions of employment, contained within industrial awards,
legislation, and various minimum standards. This safety net was important as,
for many employers and employees, it set a floor upon
or above which many employment relationships were based.
The move toward
enterprise bargaining arose from a recognition that the ‘one size fits all’
approach of the safety net was not appropriate for every business, in every location,
in every sector of the economy. Various systems have developed that allowed for flexibility by way of negotiation at the
enterprise level and were specific to the needs of a particular enterprise.
However, a feature of the move towards enterprise bargaining was the
‘voluntary’ nature thereof. In simple terms, employer and employees could
negotiate for an enterprise agreement of sorts knowing that if negotiations
failed and agreement could not be reached, the safety net existed as the fall
back position.
The Fair Work
Bill seeks to expand and strengthens the safety net within the
Australian workplace relations system. In general terms, the proposed system of
National Employment Standards and modernised awards is perhaps the strongest
safety net that has existed. It is with this in mind that concerns arise
regarding what is a significant watering down of the ‘voluntary’ aspect of
enterprise bargaining. Evidence before the Committee expressed significant
concerns about one party being forced to bargain with another and, potentially,
being the subject of orders that would forcibly implement terms and conditions
that extend beyond the safety net. In other words the vital ability of one
party or the other to ‘walk away’ from the negotiation process when agreement
cannot be found is removed.
(b) Low Paid
Bargaining Stream
The ‘low paid’ stream of
bargaining is one such example of this as it creates a system whereby orders
(in the form of ‘workplace determinations’) must be issued in certain
circumstances. These circumstances, in deviation from the general good faith
stream, allow for a workplace determination to be made where the parties are
simply unable to agree on a negotiated outcome. There are potentially serious
and negative consequences of such a system.
First, the ‘low paid’
stream is focussed on industries that have a lower incidence of workplace
bargaining and higher incidence of safety net reliance. This is often as a
result of limited economic capacity and marginal trading conditions, and where
labour costs form a high percentage of business expense. It is inappropriate
for this type of business to face a higher likelihood of arbitrated outcome
given the conditions within which they operate. This is particularly the case
given the current economic challenges and the reduced capacity for ‘low paid’
business to survive such circumstances.
Secondly, the Bill does not provide a
clear definition of who is considered to be within the ‘low paid’ stream. This
creates uncertainty for both employers and employees, and unnecessarily opens
the door for misleading or coercive conduct. Coalition senators believe the
inclusion of a succinct definition of 'low paid' will provide much needed
certainty to ensure that those who fall within that definition know within
which system of bargaining they operate.
Thirdly, the ‘low paid’
stream seems premised on an assumption that the safety net is not an
appropriate standard of employment conditions. Coalition senators question
this assumption. Those workplaces that abide by the law, providing the
conditions set out in the National Employment Standards and modern awards, are
effectively being sent a message that the minimum conditions safety net is not
sufficient and higher conditions should be imposed. This a perplexing position
given our previous comments about the strength of the safety net provided by
the Bill. The safety net should
not be considered a spring board. The evidence of the Australian Industry Group
supported this view:
...the low-paid
bargaining stream, in our view, would undermine Australia’s
enterprise bargaining system and add a further layer of arbitrated employment
conditions above the safety net. In our view, it should be scrapped.[23]
Fourthly, the ‘low paid’
stream opens the door for circumstances that are akin to pattern bargaining.
The Government has been very emphatic in its view that the Bill continues to prohibit
pattern bargaining, and in this respect relies upon the inability for protected
industrial action to occur in support thereof.[24]
However, the pursuit of industrial action is not the only major concern
associated with pattern bargaining – it is also the prospect of standardised
outcomes, lack of genuine ‘enterprise’ level discussion, and reduced (or no)
linkage to productivity gains. Such features of pattern bargaining are not
conducive to encouraging future enterprise agreement negotiations, and may have
the potential to cost jobs or lead to artificial wage outcomes. The spectre of
pattern bargaining, no matter how remote, exists under the guise of the ‘low
paid’ stream. Evidence of this was found in the comments of the LHMU who, on
the day the Bill was introduced, stated
that the ‘low paid’ stream would:
give us the facility to try to get some
sector-wide solutions...There is a very compelling logic as to why you want an
industry-wide settlement (in industries such as childcare, cleaning, hotels,
and security)[25].
Lastly, ‘low paid’
stream bargaining has the potential to reward a negotiation that is not genuine
or has been half-hearted. It is very easy to envisage circumstances where a
negotiation is one that simply ‘goes through the motions’ knowing that the
prospect of compulsory arbitration looms large should agreement not be reached
voluntarily.
Coalition Senators have
serious misgivings about the low paid steam of bargaining. While the stated
intention of this stream is commendable, in reality it is nothing more than a
covert attempt to promote pattern bargaining in
direct breach of numerous promises whilst hiding behind the rhetoric of
assisting low paid workers.
In addition, we see it
as a deliberate attempt to undermine the effectiveness and historical relevance
of the safety net, by seeking to alter the expectations of workers within the
low-wage sectors, those who are the most vulnerable.
There is absolutely no
evidence that the safety net, either proposed or current, is not an effective
provider of fair and reasonable conditions of employment.
(c) Good Faith
Bargaining
Although the prospect of
compulsory arbitration is reduced outside of the ‘low paid’ stream, the new
bargaining architecture nevertheless creates a number of circumstances where
parties to the bargaining process may experience the forced intervention of a
third party, being Fair Work Australia.
The existence of
majority support orders, scope orders and general good faith bargaining orders
all create circumstances where one party or another will be the subject of a
direction to bargain in a particular manner, provide particular information or
bargain with a particular set of employees. While the stated rationale behind
such orders is not without merit, it is feared that such intentions may be
statements of aspiration and that bargaining orders be used for other purposes
in real life bargaining situations. There are, therefore, a number of concerns
identified with the processes available to parties requiring them to bargain in
good faith.
(d) Majority Support
Determinations
The creation of
‘Majority Support Determinations’ is intended to provide an avenue where Fair
Work Australia can establish the extent of employee support to engage in
bargaining, in circumstances where that support is contested. However, the
discretion given to Fair Work Australia is broad and can contemplate matters
such as petitions or the outcome of a ‘show of hands’.
Such discretion has the
unintended consequence of opening the door for inappropriate workplace conduct
such as coercion or intimidation. Notwithstanding the protections against such
conduct elsewhere in the Bill, a better approach
would be to avoid the problem in the first instance by creating a method of
determining majority support that is democratic and genuine.
There are likely to be
very few circumstances where a business contests the legitimacy of its
employees desire to bargain. However, common sense also tells us that where
such a contest does arise, it would be for very good reason and in particular
circumstances. Therefore the need for a transparent and genuinely democratic
method of determining support is paramount, and preferable to the tabling of a
petition or an affidavit describing a show of hands.
(e) Default Bargaining
Agents
The Bill provides that where an employee is a member of
the union, their bargaining agent automatically becomes that particular
employee's union, unless that employee ‘opts out’ and elects an alternative
agent. This means that if a workplace of 1000 employees contains one union
member, then that union must be recognised as a bargaining representative
during enterprise bargaining. This is without any positive or proactive action
on the part of the single union member. There
is a requirement that, when bargaining commences, the employer must provide a
document to all employees giving them information about the right to be represented
by a bargaining agent and, if they are union members, that the bargaining agent
is automatically the union unless they ‘opt out’.
Such a provision will operate in practice to
limit an employee's choice of bargaining agent. It assumes, as a default, that
the union will be the agent and requires a positive step from an employee to
elect otherwise. Such an approach encourages laziness and mandates the
involvement of a union unless employees take positive steps to say otherwise.
It would be preferable to require a
union member to confirm in writing who their bargaining agent will be. This is an ‘opt in’
situation for union involvement. It gives employees the opportunity for
genuine choice as to need for, and nature of, representation during the bargaining
process. It would require an employee to genuinely think about the bargaining
process and the extent to which they require assistance.
(f) Voting on Agreements
The process of voting
for or against an agreement is also of concern. The Bill provides that an
agreement will be approved by employees when it is supported by the majority of
those who vote. Such a provision could result in a situation where a minority
of employees decide the outcome for the majority. For example, if an agreement
is to cover 100 employees, and only 50 of those employees are present to vote,
then only 26 people need to vote in favour of the agreement for it to be made.
In principle a binding agreement should be supported by a majority of those who
will be bound by it, not just by a majority of those who are present to vote.
(g) Better Off Overall
Test
The Bill creates an alternative
to the existing “no disadvantage” test in the form of a Better Off Overall Test
(or BOOT). The BOOT is conducted by Fair
Work Australia when approving an agreement that has been accepted by parties
within a particular workplace.
Certain evidence put to
the Committee expressed concern about the nature of the BOOT when compared to
existing tests. The BOOT appears to require that
every employee who would be covered by a proposed agreement (and
also future employees) must be ‘better off’ when compared to the terms of an
underpinning modern award. In contrast, existing tests appear to have been
more ‘global’ in nature, meaning that some employees may benefit and while
others may simply be no worse off.
The intended operation
of the BOOT was eventually
clarified during proceedings on 19 February where the following exchange
occurred:
Senator HUMPHRIES—Just to clarify how the test is applied,
assuming you have a benefit you can quantify and factor in, if there is a an
agreement that is offered which in a workplace of, say, 50 members makes 49 of
them better off but one employee is neither better nor worse off, does it
satisfy the BOOT test or not?
Ms James—Each
employee has to be better off overall. It can be a marginal better off but I
think the test would require that each employee be better off.
Senator HUMPHRIES—In that case, the agreement would fail
because one employee would not be better off? Is that a ‘yes’?
Mr Kovacic—That is certainly the way the Industrial
Relations Commission has previously applied the no disadvantage test.
Senator HUMPHRIES—So you are saying yes to that question?
Mr Kovacic—Yes.
Ms James—Yes.
CHAIR—Just to clarify, the test is against the
award only though, isn’t it? It is not against—
Mr Kovacic—And it also needs to comply with the
National Employment Standards once they come into effect as well.
CHAIR—That is right. So it is not better off
against an existing instrument.
Mr Kovacic—It is the award and the NES[26]
This exchange creates
two concerns for Coalition senators, being the practicability of compliance
with the BOOT and the potential for
its operation to act as a disincentive to voluntary collective bargaining.
It appears to be a
clearly more difficult exercise to ensure that an agreement provides conditions
that are “better” for each and every existing (and prospective) employee. In
the example above, an agreement that benefits 98% of a workforce and leaves 2%
on conditions that are no worse or unchanged, would fail. The bar set
for the BOOT is therefore higher
than the existing tests. While a higher bar may in one sense be appropriate,
such a bar should not act as a disincentive for parties to collectively bargain
and deliver benefits to the overwhelming majority of the workplace.
Coalition senators are
concerned that the proposed application of BOOT is inconsistent with the stated aim of the Bill, being the
encouragement of parties to collectively bargain.
(h) Greenfield Agreements
The conceptual retention
of Greenfield agreements is welcomed
by Coalition senators. It is recognised that such agreements are crucial to
the establishment of new workplaces, sites and projects.
A focus of concern to
many witnesses before the Committee is the new requirement obliging the maker
of a Greenfield agreement to notify
each relevant employee organisation of the intention to make such an
agreement. Further, there is a requirement that each relevant employee
organisation that will be covered by the agreement must execute the agreement
as a precondition of it being made. A relevant employee organisation is
defined as one that is entitled to represent the industrial interests of
employees whom the agreement will cover.
A number of problems
immediately arise, the first of which is the practical difficulty associated
with determining who is a relevant employee organisation. This question must
be determined by the maker of the agreement, the employer. Evidence before the
Committee suggested that answering this question is not easy, and has in fact
been significantly complicated by the abandonment of the traditional ‘party’
concept to industrial awards. CCI
WA, said
One of our concerns
is the process in terms of notifying all relevant unions, and committee members
will probably be aware of the complexity of union rules and constitutional
coverage, overlapping coverage, and what I would call blurry coverage,
particularly in the construction industry, so that you potentially have to
notify and negotiate with a large number of unions in a relatively short period
of time.[27]
This evidence was
further to other evidence given by experienced stakeholders highlighting the
difficulties in interpreting complex and unclear union coverage rules. [28] Evidence from the
mining sector was:
So you need to go
back to all of the union rules and take into account the demarcation decisions,
and you would probably have to look at the transitional provisions for state
unions that have come into the system. That would take me a few days, and I
have been in the game for 20 or 30 years. It would be difficult for an HR
manager in a construction company to do it and make sure that they got it
right.[29]
Concerns remain about
the capacity of a small or medium business to comply with the proposed
requirements.
A second problem arises in relation to the potential for conflict between
unions that may arise as a result of the mandatory notification provisions.
The evidence of Master Builders Australia conveyed concerns
raised by others:
Master Builders does not believe that unions, which have
traditionally been in bitter conflict, should be advised of the intention to
make a greenfields agreement with their rivals. In addition, the bill is
unclear concerning whether or not an employer is required to make a greenfields
agreement with all unions who are entitled to represent employees who will be
covered by the agreement or, as appears to be the government’s position,
whether making an agreement with one union is sufficient. Whilst we understood
that government policy is that greenfields agreements are able to be made only
with one union, we believe that this matter should be put beyond doubt and that
the bill be amended to make that point clear, as well as to change the
notification requirements, which could be like throwing petrol on fire.[30]
Mr Harnisch explained the actual
impact of the proposed provision on project costs:
A member, who wants
to remain anonymous, has informed us of their experience with making a current
union greenfields agreement. That company has informed us that making a
greenfields agreement with one union rather than with the union’s rival
organisation was estimated to have saved up to $80 million on one project and
around $15 million to $20 million on another project. If you were to
extrapolate that to the government’s proposed well-founded reinvestment in Australia’s infrastructure, you can see the economic and, obviously,
the budget consequences of escalating those costs. That member has indicated to
Master Builders that it would be prepared to provide
substantiating evidence to this committee, but only in camera. These are
savings which relate to infrastructure projects and moneys that are better
spent on that purpose than on escalating the cost of those projects. We cannot
emphasise enough that confidentiality in making a greenfields agreement with
one union is an outcome from the bill that would be a great boost to
productivity when compared with the proposed scheme— or, at least, the ambiguities
that we believe are the case.[31]
The close association of
this witness with the realities of the building and construction, and its use
of Greenfield agreements, makes this
evidence particularly compelling for Coalition senators.
A third problem arises
in relation to the potential delays to project commencement due to the new Greenfield notification
requirements. Evidence presented to the Committee express concern that a union
or unions may exploit notification requirements and associated good faith
bargaining requirements and deliberately delay the period it takes for
agreement to be reached. This was likened to a union being given the power of
‘veto’ over the timing or commencement of a new site or project. Evidence to
this effect was given by the Australian Industry Group:
...we regard the
greenfields agreement provisions of the bill as unworkable and likely to result
in substantial delays in the commencement of construction projects and
increased construction costs.[32]
The mining sector
described the situation as follows:
Essentially that
will ensure that any new project where an agreement cannot be reached will have
very little chance of proceeding. Nobody in their right mind will start a
significant investment infrastructure project without having agreements in
order to prevent industrial action occurring on site. So, out of that $67
billion worth of future agreements, I suspect that any single union which would
be covered by those agreements can essentially veto the project.[33]
The evidence of the
Western Australian experience from the WA Treasurer was:
Our view is that the
changes to greenfields agreements and the requirement now whereby employers
will be required to notify all relevant employee organisations has the capacity
to significantly—and I highlight significantly—frustrate negotiations where
unions have overlapping coverage of employees. Why is that particularly
important in Western
Australia? I talked about
our economic growth earlier and the stellar economic performance of our state’s
economy in this century—well, over the last seven or eight years. That has been
primarily driven by investment in capacity building in the resources sector; in
other words, by construction activity building capacity in the resources
sector. In our state, there is a well-documented history of issues dealing with
certain unions in the construction sector, and we do not want to allow a
situation to arise, for example, where unions like the CFMEU have the
opportunity to frustrate the development of projects which are of significance
to Western Australia. We will not sit by and let that pass
unchallenged because that particular organisation—and I most certainly do not
apply my views of that organisation across all industrial organisations; that
is not the case—has a particular history in this state, and we do not encourage
any changes to legislation which would let that organisation in particular
frustrate the economic development of Western Australia. So we are gravely
concerned about the encumbrance upon employers to have to notify all relevant
organisations; and that is based on memories which are not pleasant of having
to deal with certain unions in the construction sector in the past and given
the significance of the construction industry to this state. You have to
remember that large components of our economic growth are project based. These
are significant projects, often the type that fit the category of greenfields
agreements, and we are very concerned about the impacts on those.[34]
Whether or not the Bill adequately addresses
concerns about ‘union veto’ within the good faith bargaining requirements
remains to be seen. However, Coalition senators are concerned that this would
be akin to ‘letting the cat out of the bag' and then waiting to see if the
system hauled it back in. The problem that supposedly the Bill is designed to fix is
in fact created by that system and need not exist in the first instance.
There was minimal
evidence to suggest that unions had hitherto been excluded from negotiating Greenfield agreements when they
wanted involvement. There was significant evidence that employers in sectors
utilising Greenfield agreements normally
sought constructive negotiations with a union. This, combined with the higher
threshold required by the BOOT
and strengthened safety net of modern awards and NES, suggest there is little
or no reason to mandate the notification of a union or unions.
Unfair Dismissal
A common criticism of
amendments made to the Workplace Relations Act 1996 by the former
government related to the perceived removal of an employee's capacity to seek
legal recourse in the event of losing their job.
The Fair
Work Bill
proposes to address the perception that rights of redress for sacked employees
had been swept away by removing a number of current jurisdictional bars
preventing claims for alleged unfair dismissal. This includes reducing the
small business exemption figure from 100 to 15, and removing the notion of
‘genuine operational reasons’. Other substantive changes to alleged unfair dismissal
provisions include new procedural requirements to be followed by Fair Work
Australia and the development of the Fair Dismissal Code.
The evidence before the
Committee was that, in general terms, the alleged unfair dismissal provisions
within the Fair
Work Bill
are consistent with the policy thrust of Forward with Fairness. Although
certain organisations noted their disappointment with the removal of current
exemptions and expressed concern about the practical operation of the
provisions, general acceptance of the mandate to make these changes was
evident.
There are, however, a
number of matters that came to the attention of the Committee which warrant
comment.
(a) Right to Appear
The Bill provides an automatic
right for employees of particular organisations to appear before Fair Work
Australia without the need to seek leave or ‘permission’. Other types of
representatives, such as legal practitioners or agents, do not enjoy such a
right. They are required to obtain the leave of the tribunal before making an
appearance on behalf of a party involved in a proceeding.
Although the intention
of this provision is to replicate the existing provisions within the Workplace
Relations Act 1996, it appears that the bar has been raised. This was
confirmed during proceedings on 19 February where Departmental evidence was:
The drafting is a
little bit different and I think it is probably fair to say the thresholds are
a little bit higher in terms of having to demonstrate a need for legal
representation. So, again, a person may only be represented by a lawyer or paid
agent with permission of Fair Work Australia—we use the term ‘permission’
instead of ‘leave’. And, again, criteria apply, including criteria that relate
to the complexity of the matter, whether it would be unfair not to allow the
person to be represented because they are unable to represent themselves or
whether it would be unfair taking into account the relativities between the
parties. The framework then says that if you are being represented by an
employer or employee organisation you can be represented by their employee, and
it makes it clear that if an employee of your union or your employer
organisation happens to be legally qualified they do not need to meet those
criteria.[35]
The practical effect of
such a provision is that membership of an industrial organisation (employee and
employer) provides a right to representation not afforded to those who choose
not take up such a membership.
(b) Time Limit for
Making Applications
The Bill replicates the
commitments within Forward with Fairness by reducing the statutory time limit
for commencing proceedings for alleged unfair dismissal from the existing 21
days to a proposed 7 days. It is also noted that the statutory time period for
commencing an alleged unlawful dismissal has increased from the current 21 days
to 60 days.
Although witnesses
acknowledged that this time limit adjustment was consistent with Forward with
Fairness, there were strong arguments from both business and unions that the change
was inappropriate.
(c) Small Business
Exemption
The Bill recognises the long
accepted fact that termination of employment is a concept viewed differently
depending upon the size and nature of a business enterprise. The impact of a
financial penalty (in the form of compensation) and the potential ramifications
of a reinstatement order are more salient to many small business employers. In
this regard, it is generally accepted that
unfair dismissal laws are a disincentive to employment with the small business
sector.
The Bill's recognition of this
view manifests itself in specific provisions for small business, which are
defined as a business that engages 15 or fewer employees. These provisions
provide two key distinctions.
The first is an extended
period of ‘qualifying’ service that an employee of a small business must serve
before being eligible to bring a claim for alleged unfair dismissal. This
period is 12 months for an employee of a small business, whereas for all other
employees the period is 6 months. The second is the development of the ‘Fair
Dismissal Code’ for small business employers “which, if followed by a small
business, will ensure that a dismissal is not found to be unfair.”[36] These two
distinctions for small business employers are welcomed by Coalition senators.
Less reassuring is the
method by which the exemption applies. In simple terms, the 15 or less figure
is established with reference to a straight ‘head count’. The obvious problem
this presents is the potential for inequality when distinguishing between full
time, part time and casual employees.
A business may employ,
say, 15 full-time workers, representing a total of 570 hours worked in a one
week period. A comparable business may employ 25 workers, being 5 full-time
(38 hours), 5 part-time (15 hours) and 10 casuals (5 hours). This would
represent a total of 315 hours worked in a one week period. The second
business, notwithstanding it engages employees for slightly more than half the
number of hours when compared to the first business, is subject to claims for
alleged unfair dismissal. The first business is not. Such a circumstance has
the ability to result in perverse consequences,
as one witness observed:
... my understanding
of 15 is 15 bodies, not 15 FTEs, or full-time equivalents. I think that that
will act in a number of negative ways, and one of the most negative ways is
that I think it will discourage small medium employers or smaller employers
from engaging part-time staff with caring responsibilities because the difference
between a 14 and below and a 15 and above is a six-month or a 12-month
exemption. If a smaller employer employs staff for the available work, if you
have a choice between employing one full-time—dare I say it—male with no caring
responsibilities, as opposed to three part-time women with caring
responsibilities, then I think that the choice becomes a lot easier for that
employer to engage the fulltime male. And, as we know, we are in labour
shortages and skill shortages despite the economic downturn, and one of the few
available labour pools where we can increase employment is of women in
particular, and women with caring responsibilities, so I do see this as a
problem.[37]
Utilising the ‘head
count’ approach to the question of 15 or fewer employees creates circumstances
that, in our view, are unequal and open potential for unintended consequences.
To avoid such outcomes, an alternative measure should be considered.
There are many
alternative measures available, such as business turnover, profitability, and
the existence of a dedicated employee with the responsibility for human
resource management. However, these measures also have the potential for
unintended consequences and manipulation.
A logical, clear and
simple measure is that of full-time equivalency. This is an accepted practice
that is capable of being easily understood by all stakeholders subject to the
system. It represents a fair middle point between the need to provide fairness
for employees and the legislative recognition of circumstances facing small
business.
Superannuation as an allowable
matter
The
Fair
Work Bill
reinstates superannuation as an allowable matter in the award system.
In
parallel with this proposed legislative change, the Government has directed the
AIRC to develop a series of Modern Awards
with the aim of reducing the current 4300 awards to around 70. In the lead up
to the commencement of the Fair Work legislation, the AIRC has already released
a number of modern awards which specify particular industry funds as default
funds. For example, the new retail award specifies REST as the sole default
fund.
The
Committee received many submissions from industry associations [38] and financial
services companies [39]
flagging their concerns with both the reinstatement of superannuation as an
allowable matter and the AIRC decisions in relation to the modern awards.
IFSA,
in its submission, said that the combination of the reinstatement of
superannuation as an allowable matter with the decisions of the AIRC, which in
some cases specify only one industry fund as the default fund, would result in
reduced competition in the selection of superannuation default funds. IFSA
also argued there will be less flexibility for employers. It also argued that
the lessening of competition would result in higher fees. IFSA considered that
the Fair
Work Bill
should include a provision that gave guidance to the AIRC in relation to
default funds to enable competition.
The
Financial Planning Association (FPA) was similarly concerned about reduced competition
in the sector. In its submission it argued that the Modern Awards effectively
created mandated monopolies, duopolies or oligopolies for the default funds.
The FPA recommended that the AIRC should not specify default funds but rather
allow competition between funds. Submissions from individual companies
mirrored the concerns identified by the industry associations.
AMP
noted that the award modernisation process eliminated the flexibilities that
were present in many existing awards. An AMP analysis indicated that in around
30 per cent of existing awards funds that were not specifically included in the
awards had the capability of competing for business. AMP said that this
flexibility had been eliminated in the modern awards as well as removing the
ability of the employer to review the appropriateness of a fund to ensure it
matches the needs of its employees.
In
evidence given before the Committee, IFSA stated that the mandating of a few,
and in some cases, only one superannuation fund would have deleterious effects
for employers. IFSA also indicated that if an employer wished to align its
business philosophy with its default fund, for example, a church group might
wish to appoint a social responsible investment fund as the default fund, it would
be prevented from doing so in many situations under the new arrangements.
There
is little doubt that the new arrangements will reduce competition, which might
lead to an increase in fees and charges. There will be reduced flexibility for
employers and in many instances it might prohibit businesses from aligning
their default fund with the values of their business. This would be
particularly true of church/religious agencies, and those employed in the
environmental sector or social welfare agencies.
Coalition
senators note that far from enhancing flexibility (which is one of the key
objectives of the Bill), the Government’s decision to reinstate superannuation
as an allowable matter will limit flexibility, impede choice for employers and
in all likelihood increase in costs.
The
Fair
Work Bill
should be amended to mandate that ”any complying superannuation fund” be
included in all awards in addition to any specific funds specifically nominated
by the AIRC.
Conclusion
The issues
addressed above constitute significant and unresolved flaws in the framework of
the Fair Work Bill. Coalition
senators strongly urge the Government to embrace the constructive spirit in
which these issues were raised by witnesses before the inquiry, witnesses who
accept the tenor of the new workplace relations scenario but who are concerned
that their ability to sustain jobs in that scenario will be undermined without
some changes to the Bill.
Coalition
senators believe the Government should honour commitments made to Australian
business in Forward with Fairness.
Senator Gary Humphries
Deputy Chair
On behalf of
Senator the
Hon Eric Abetz
Senator Michaelia Cash
Senator Mary Jo Fisher
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