Chapter 2
Issues
Importance of the sector
2.1
There is no argument from the committee majority about the importance of
the building and construction industry to the economy and employment. In
2007-08 construction accounted for about 7.9 per cent of Australia's GDP or around
$82 billion[1]
and employed 985,000 people.[2]
In addition, the government recognises that delivering the $22 billion Nation
Building for the Future package depends on a safe, productive and harmonious
construction industry.[3]
Productivity attributed to the BCII
Act and ABCC
2.2
The committee majority notes that employer groups continue to link the
productivity of the sector to the existence of the BCII Act and the ABCC,
almost to the exclusion of any other factors. They point to reports produced by
Econtech which outline the productivity gains in the sector attributable to the
BCII Act and the ABCC. What has been omitted are independent assessments of the
data used in the Econtech reports from 2007 which found major problems with the
reports.[4]
2.3
After assessing the evidence, these flaws were recognised by Mr Wilcox
who concluded:
The 2007 Econtech report is deeply flawed. It ought to be
totally disregarded.[5]
2.4
Despite these findings, in May 2009 Econtech produced another report for
Master Builders Australia. Again a figure of 9.4 per cent is claimed as the
productivity gain from the BCII Act and the ABCC. In assessing these findings
Professor David Peetz found that:
Nowhere in the 2009 report is there any number, or
mathematical combination of numbers, that produces a 9.4 per cent productivity
gain. Instead, the 9.4 per cent is simply recycled again from the 2007 report
which Justice Wilcox said should be 'totally disregarded'.[6]
2.5
Regarding the Econtech findings, Professor David Peetz concluded:
...The boost to GDP, savings to the CPI and national welfare
gains in each of the Econtech reports, estimated as they were ‘from the recent
closing of the cost gap between commercial building and domestic housing’, have
lost their basis in the ‘closing of the cost gap’. If there are any economic
effects from the operation of the ABCC, they are more likely to be increasing
profits than increasing productivity. The literature suggests that the
unionised building and construction industry would benefit from more cooperative
union-management relations. The role of the ABCC has been to penalise
cooperative relations, and so it should come as no surprise that previous
policy makers’ productivity expectations have not been met.[7]
Industrial action
2.6
In addition, employer groups point to the trend of reduced industrial
action in the sector and attribute this to the BCII Act and ABCC. However, they
overlook ABS data which shows that over recent years there has been a
significant reduction in time lost due to industrial action in all industries,
not just building and construction.
Committee comment
2.7
The committee majority does not deny that some productivity gains have
been made in the sector but it is clear that the figures offered in the
Econtech reports are questionable at best and should be disregarded. It also emphasises
that productivity gains cannot be attributed only to the existence of the BCII
Act and ABCC. Witnesses before the committee emphasised the need for
collaborative relationships to address issues such as productivity, OH&S
and skills development.[8]
The committee majority believes that the abolition of the ABCC, the work of the
new Building Inspectorate and refocusing of resources will take the industry in
a more cooperative direction.
Separate legislation for the
industry remains
2.8
The industry remains subject to industry specific legislation. Schedule
1 amends the title of the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act
2005 to become the Fair Work (Building Industry) Act 2009. This
operates alongside the general framework for workplace relations regulations
under the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act).
2.9
While the ACTU saw a role for some industry specialisation within the
Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO), it submitted this should be undertaken
administratively rather than by statute to ensure the best use of resources.[9]
Ms Cath Bowtell detailed this point of view to the committee:
The Fair Work Ombudsman, as I understand it, has established
some specialisation within his organisation—for example, a discrimination unit
that is looking at discrimination matters, a new area for the Fair Work
Ombudsman to deal with. In oc[cupational] health and safety inspectorates, you
often find industry specialists who have an understanding of particular
machinery or whatever, and that is useful in that it builds up detailed
knowledge of the likely compliance issues in an industry. But because it is
integrated into the whole you can maintain a culture across the whole
organisation. You can rotate people so that skills are spread across an
organisation and you can direct taxpayers’ resources to areas of most need. So
if compliance issues arose in an alternative industry or in an alternative
geographic area, such as the Northern Territory, where the current Fair Work
Ombudsman has found significant areas of breach, you would be able to easily
move your resources to those areas of most need. The problem with having a
statutorily separate organisation is that you cannot readily shift resources to
areas of most need and so, whilst specialisation is useful in a compliance
agency, having it within a broad agency so that you can shift resources to
address the need is our preferred model. We think it is useful and you can
understand in depth the likely compliance issues in an industry. There might be
certain industries that are vulnerable and that need overlap with the migration
authorities—for example, the horticultural industry. Those specialisations are
useful but, within a context that the overarching compliance agency can
allocate its resources to the areas of most need, we think that is a good piece
of public policy.[10]
2.10
The Combined Construction Unions (CCU) took the view that the FW Act
provides a comprehensive and detailed system of regulation which includes
'effective remedies against all parties for breaches of the law'. It submitted
that the construction industry should fall under the general laws which apply
to the rest of the workforce. In support of this argument it pointed out that
the bill does not, and has never, dealt with criminal conduct. The target is
industrial conduct. It emphasised that this lack of understanding is widespread
in the community and explained:
This is not a semantic distinction. It goes to the heart of
the debate about the justifications which have been used to underpin violence
or threats of violence, criminal damage to property, extortion and the like are
not only misplaced but have the effect of distorting the policy debate and the
public perception of what the laws are designed to achieve.[11]
2.11
This view was supported by the ACTU[12]
and emphasised by George Williams and Nicola McGarrity:
The ABCC is primarily responsible for monitoring and
enforcing civil law, or more specifically, federal industrial law like the BCII
Act and industry awards and agreements... Such powers should never be bestowed
on a body dealing with contraventions of the civil law and potentially minor
breaches of industrial instruments.[13]
2.12
The committee majority was pleased to note that employer groups
recognised that the matters investigated by the ABCC are 'not inherently of the
criminal magnitude and threat to the state that police corruption would be'.[14]
Committee comment
2.13
The committee majority understands that the target of the BCII Act and
the ABCC has always been unlawful industrial conduct in an industrial context. The
legislation does not deal with criminal behaviour. It is disappointing that
this distinction is sometimes blurred by those who seek to retain the ABCC. As
noted in previous inquiries, the committee majority does not agree with
industry specific legislation in principle. Workers in the building and
construction sector being regulated under the FW Act is the ultimate goal. The
committee majority recognises that this legislation is the next step in that
process.
Objects, definitions and scope of
the Act
Object
2.14
The object of the Act in section 3 is to be amended to provide a
balanced framework for cooperative, productive and harmonious workplace
relations in the building industry. The ACTU welcomed the revised object of the
Act but proposed some minor amendments consistent with the legislative intent.[15]
Definition of 'building work'
2.15
Schedule 1, item 48, subparagraph 5(1)(d)(iv) amends the current
definition of 'building work' to exclude off-site prefabrication. This is to
focus the scope of operations on work on-site. Employers groups expressed some
concern about the change in definition and suggested that any industrial action
taken off-site may have the potential to affect on-site work.[16]
However, the ACTU supported the exclusion of off-site pre-fabrication from the
definition and indicated that it will clarify the scope of the Act. It
suggested, however, that the exclusions be clarified in the bill. It also
suggested that as the definition of 'office' is already in the Fair Work Act, section
6 of the Principal Act could be repealed.[17]
2.16
The committee majority notes that the Explanatory Memorandum (EM) clarifies
that pre-fabrication of building components that takes place on auxiliary or
holding sites separate from the primary construction site(s) will remain
covered by the definition of building work.[18]
Establishment of the Fair Work
Building Industry Inspectorate
2.17
Item 49 repeals Chapter 2 of the BCII Act and replaces it with a new
Chapter 2 containing proposed sections 9 to 26M. This abolishes the Office
of the ABCC and establishes the Office of the Fair Work Building Industry
Inspectorate. Section 26K provides that the Director and the staff of the office
constitute a statutory agency for the purposes of the Public Service Act
1999.
2.18
The ABCC has been often criticised for what is perceived to be a
one-sided approach where the focus of compliance is on employees and unions and
not employers. Ms Cath Bowtell, ACTU, provided detail:
I am not aware of any investigations or prosecutions by the
ABCC of breaches of industrial instruments—so breach of award or of industrial
agreement. If you look at other industries where the Fair Work Ombudsman does
compliance work, we have non-compliance in the order of 40, 50, 60 and 70 per
cent, and in some industries 80 or 90 per cent non-compliance, you would expect
to find non-compliance of that order in the construction industry as well.
Certainly our affiliates in that industry tell us there is non-compliance by
employers of that order. Yet the ABCC has not conducted any activities in
relation to compliance by employers in relation to awards, agreements and
minimum standards as far as we are aware.[19]
2.19
The current arrangements regarding employer contraventions were
explained by Ms Bowtell:
...in operation under the current regime the ABCC and the Fair
Work Ombudsman have had an operational arrangement where breaches of industrial
instruments, non-payment of awards, et cetera, would be dealt with by the Fair
Work Ombudsman and the ABCC would only deal with matters relating to alleged
contraventions by unions and their officials. So while the ABCC has had a
statutory authority to use its coercive powers in pursuit of employers who have
breached their industrial obligations, the operational arrangements that have
been put in place have meant that it has not conducted investigations or
inspections of breaches of industrial instruments by employers and has left
that work to the Fair Work Ombudsman, who of course has a different set of
enforcement and compliance powers.[20]
2.20
Employer groups are satisfied with this artificial demarcation. It
preserves the notion of an ABCC devoted to protecting its interests. The ABC
Commissioner told the committee that the arrangements continue:
The Workplace Ombudsman and I exchanged a letter. We made a
conscious decision not to enter into a formal memorandum of understanding. We
did not need to do that as we were two agencies within the portfolio. We
exchanged a letter that we would refer matters back and forth basically. That
has worked well. There has been no new letter signed, but given the normal
machinery of government arrangements, the arrangements continue, so we do refer
matters to the Fair Work Ombudsman as they arise.[21]
2.21
It is important to note that the Building Inspectorate will ensure
compliance with workplace relations laws by all building industry participants
and this will include the underpayment of employee entitlements such as wages.[22]
This is contained in proposed section 10 which requires the Director to inquire
into, investigate and commence proceedings in relation to safety net
contractual entitlements as they relate to building industry participants.
2.22
Employer groups were concerned that this section will divert resources
from policing the obligation to act lawfully and argued that this function is
best addressed by the FWO where the skills reside.[23]
The Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) did not
agree with this view:
The ABCC currently has these powers but has chosen to refer
them to the Workplace Ombudsman. Similarly, some of the witnesses today have
spoken about the need for a differing skill set when dealing with employers,
unions and employees. The department does not agree with this position. It is
evident from the Fair Work Ombudsman and, previously, the Workplace Ombudsman,
who deal with all three already, that a differing skill set is not required.[24]
Committee comment
2.23
The committee majority has concerns regarding the anomalous situation of
the ABCC retaining the statutory authority to use its powers to pursue breaches
of industrial obligations by employers but referring cases to the FWO. This
means employers are subject to a different set of rules and leaves the ABCC
open to allegations of bias. The committee majority also notes advice from the
ABC Commissioner that the ABCC has underspent by $5 million for the past two financial
years.[25]
In the committee's view this could have been used to deal with complaints against
employers. As noted earlier, the ABCC will not fulfil its goal of achieving
cultural change in the industry so long as it is regarded solely as an agency
which acts on behalf of employers. The committee majority therefore supports
the function in section 10 which reinforces the requirement for the Director to
inquire into, investigate and commence proceedings in relation to safety net
contractual entitlements and notes advice from DEEWR that rejects an ABCC
argument that a different skill set is required to carry out these duties.
Director
2.24
Proposed section 9 establishes the statutory office of the Director of
the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate who will be appointed by the
Minister by written instrument for a period of up to five years. The Director
will manage the operations of the Building Inspectorate and will not be subject
to oversight or control by other statutory office holders. The government
considered that this model gives best effect to Mr Wilcox's recommendation that
the Director have 'operational autonomy' and reflects stakeholder consultation
on this point.[26]
Advisory board
2.25
Proposed sections 23 to 26H would establish the Fair Work Building
Industry Advisory Board. It will make recommendations to the Director on the
policies and priorities of the Building Inspectorate. While the Advisory Board
will not determine the Inspectorate's policies and priorities, the Director
will consider its recommendations when determining them. It will consist of the
Director, the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO), one building industry employee
representative, one building industry employer representative and no more than
three other members. Section 26G provides that the chair of the Advisory Board
is to convene at least two meetings in each financial year.
2.26
Some submissions pointed to the divergence from the Wilcox
recommendation that the board 'determine' the policies, programs and priorities
of the Inspectorate. DEEWR explained that the board will have a strategic
advisory role only and that:
This departure from the Wilcox Report recommendations ensures
the operational autonomy of the Building Inspectorate is not compromised
through scenarios such as the 'determinative' Advisory Board being unable to
reach agreement on the policies, programs and priorities of the Building
Inspectorate.[27]
2.27
The ACTU supported the establishment of an Advisory Board and suggested
this model could be applied more broadly to the Office of the FWO. It advocated
changing the composition to increase industry representation and changing the
quorum requirements to include a two-third majority vote. It recommended that proposed
section 26G(2) be amended as:
It is inappropriate to specify that a decision of the board
cannot be taken unless each of the Chair, the Director and the Fair Work
Ombudsman is present, This would mean that any one of these people has a veto
over decisions.[28]
2.28
In addition, the ACTU submitted that the bill does not give effect to
the statement in the second reading speech by the Minister that 'the director
will consider their recommendations when determining the polices and priorities
of the building inspectorate'. It recommended that the Director be required to
report to the Advisory Board on how recommendations have been implemented or
why they have not.[29]
Committee comment
2.29
The committee majority agrees that in the interests of transparency
there should be a process for the Director to notify the Advisory Board which
of its recommendations are being acted on.
Recommendation 1
2.30 The committee majority recommends that a mechanism be developed for the
Director to notify the Advisory Board which of its recommendations have been
implemented or why they have not.
Comparison of BCII Act and FW Act
2.31
Item 51 removes Chapters 5 and 6 of the BCII Act to give effect to the
recommendation by Mr Wilcox to repeal the provisions dealing with unlawful
industrial action, coercion and the associated civil penalties that are
specific to the building industry. Mr Wilcox identified three significant difference
between the rules for building workers under the BCII Act and those for other
workers under the (then) Workplace Relations Act:
- the wider circumstances under which industrial action attracts
penalties under the BCII Act;
- the exposure of building workers to statutory compensation
orders; and
- higher penalties are available under the BCII Act.[30]
Industrial action
2.32
The bill removes the broader circumstances under which industrial action
attracts penalties in relation to the building industry and would apply the
industrial action control and penalty regime introduced by the FW Act. Employer
groups submitted that section 38 of the BCII Act has been particularly
effective in limiting wildcat, unprotected and unlawful industrial action and
argued for its retention, believing there are important differences between the
BCII Act and the FW Act on this issue.[31]
2.33
In comparing these areas under the BCII Act and the FW Act, Mr Wilcox noted
'...during most of the time, in almost all Federal workplaces, either an
enterprise agreement or a workplace determination will be in operation, with
the result that any industrial action will be unlawful'. He understood the main
concern of employers to be wildcat stoppages which often cause considerable
disruption. Regarding this area, Mr Wilcox explained:
The effect of clause 417 of the Fair Work Bill is that, if an
enterprise agreement or workplace determination is then in place, those
involved in such a stoppage or ban will be exposed to both penalty and
compensation orders. If the stoppage or ban caused significant loss to the
employer, a large compensation payment may be ordered.[32]
2.34
Mr Wilcox also noted clause 474, which prohibits the employer paying the
employee for the period of the industrial action, with a minimum deduction of
four hours wages and that this may be expected to affect the attitude of
employees to wildcat action. He concluded:
Although there is clearly a technical difference between the
circumstances under which industrial action is unlawful under the BCII Act (not
'protected action') and the Fair Work Bill (during the operation of an enterprise
agreement or workplace determination), I found it difficult to find a scenario
under which this would make a practical difference. Accordingly, at each of the
forums, I invited the help of the employers' representatives who were present.
They each undertook to consult with others and let me know if they could
imagine such a scenario. None of them have done so. This confirms my view that
the difference has no practical importance.[33]
2.35
Regarding industrial action and compensation, Mr Wilcox concluded that
no reasoned case was put to him for retaining the difference in rules applying
to building workers, adding that differences would only serve to complicate the
law.[34]
2.36
The ACTU agreed and argued that the FW Act narrowly confines the ability
of employees to take protected industrial action and that it 'provides a myriad
of opportunities for employers to obtain relief against action taken outside
these narrow confines'.[35]
2.37
On this issue, DEEWR responded that:
The general industrial action provisions in the Fair Work Act
are clear, tough and provide workable options for employers and employees to
respond to industrial action. The provisions ensure that industrial action is
only protected when taken during genuine bargaining and subject to strict
requirements.[36]
Penalties
2.38
As recommended by Mr Wilcox the bill removes higher penalties for
building industry participants for breaches of industrial law. The bill would
reduce the maximum penalties for unions from $110,000 to $33,000 and for an
individual from $22,000 to $6,000.
2.39
Employer groups opposed the decision to reduce the penalties to bring
the industry in line with other industries and argued that the level of the
penalties provides an effective deterrent to unlawful industrial action.[37]
Employer groups also warned that the industry is particularly vulnerable to
industrial action.[38]
This argument was not accepted by Mr Wilcox who stated:
...it is necessary to remember there are many other industries
in which industrial action may cause great loss to an employer, and even the
national economy, and/or considerable public inconvenience. One has only to
think of our major export industries, most components of the transport
industry, the gas and electricity industries, the telecommunication industry
and emergency services such as police, ambulances and hospitals. There is no
less need to regulate industrial action in those industries than in the
building and construction industry.[39]
2.40
Mr Wilcox explained that the FW Act recognises the serious consequences
of industrial action and contains constraints upon its occurrence by the
following provisions:
Clause 418 requires FWA to make a termination order in
relation to any non-protected industrial action that comes to its notice,
whether or not an affected person has applied for an order. Clause 419 makes a
similar provision in relation to industrial action by non-national system employees
(or employers) if the action will, or would, be likely to have the effect of
'causing substantial loss of damage' to a constitutional corporation...Clause 421
subjects contravention of an order under clause 418 or clause 419 to a civil
penalty and, importantly, exposes those responsible for the contravention to a
compensation order under clause 545 of the Fair Work Bill. It should also be
noted that Division 6 of Part 3-3 empowers FWA to make an order, in a variety
of circumstances, for suspension or termination of even protected industrial
action.[40]
2.41
Persons suffering damage because of a contravention can seek
compensation. Section 545 of the FW Act provides an opportunity for affected
persons to recover losses and Mr Wilcox noted this would be a significant
deterrent to unlawful conduct.[41]
2.42
In relation to the level of penalties, Mr Wilcox concluded:
The history of the building and construction industry may
provide a case for the retention of special investigative measures, to increase
the chance of a contravener in that industry being brought to justice. However,
I do not see how it can justify that contravener then being subjected to a
maximum penalty greater than would be faced by a person in another industry,
who contravened the same provision and happened to be brought to justice. To do
that would be to depart from the principle, mentioned by ACTU, of equality
before the law...[42]
2.43
The CCU told the committee that Mr Wilcox's report adequately addresses employer
arguments to retain higher penalty provisions and it agreed that each is dealt
with in the FW Act.[43]
The ACTU also agreed with this conclusion and noted that the level of penalties
contained in the BCII Act is out of all proportion to the public harm, if any,
that may occur as a result of unprotected industrial action.[44]
Responding to concerns voiced by employer groups, DEEWR made a number of points.
First, there is nothing in the bill which would reduce the capacity of the Building
Inspectorate to respond quickly to stakeholder concerns. Second, it noted that
more than half of the court cases in which the ABCC successfully obtained
penalties were brought under the WR Act alone and the maximum penalty rates
available under the BCII Act were irrelevant. In addition:
...where parties consistently refuse to comply with the
industrial law, the courts retain the ability to impose strong penalties for
non-compliance with any court orders and penalties, under the general contempt
jurisdiction.[45]
2.44
DEEWR indicated that this had recently occurred by the Federal Court in
Bovis Lend Lease Pty Ltd v CFMEU.[46]
The committee majority agrees that industrial action and penalties are
adequately covered in the FW Act.
Coercive interrogation powers
2.45
Section 52 of the BCII Act provides the power to compel a person to
provide information or produce documents if the ABC Commissioner believes on
reasonable grounds that the person has information or documents relevant to an
investigation and is capable of giving evidence. Mr Wilcox found the need to
retain the existing coercive interrogation powers. He described reaching this
conclusion as follows:
It is understandable that workers in the building industry
resent being subject to an interrogation process that does not apply to other
workers, designed to extract from them information for use in penalty
proceedings against their workmates and/or union. I sympathise with that
feeling and would gladly recommend against grant of the power. However, that
would not be a responsible course. I am satisfied there is still such a level
of industrial unlawfulness in the building and construction industry,
especially in Victoria and Western Australia, that it would be inadvisable not
to empower the BCD to undertake compulsory interrogation. The reality is that,
without such a power, some types of contravention would be almost impossible to
prove.[47]
...I have reached the opinion that it would be unwise not to
endow BCD (at least for now) with a coercive interrogation power. Although
conduct in the industry has improved in recent years, I believe the job is not
yet done...[48]
2.46
Mr Wilcox mentioned the still significant degree of contravention of
industrial laws, particularly in Victoria and Western Australia and that the
rate of commencement of proceedings is not declining.[49]
The Wilcox report recommended that the power be retained and then reviewed
after five years. This recommendation was supported by the current ABC
Commissioner.[50]
2.47
The committee received a number of submissions which argued against the
retention of the coercive powers. While supporting the proposed safeguards
(detailed below) as important improvements to the primary Act, Professor George
Williams and Ms Nicola McGarrity argued that the coercive powers are not
justified in this industrial setting as:
The safeguards do not, for example, overcome the fact that
the coercive powers can be used in an overly-broad set of circumstances, such
as in regard to non-suspects and children in the investigation of minor or
petty breaches of industrial law and industrial instruments.[51]
2.48
Instead, Professor Williams and Ms McGarrity recommended a strong and
effective enforcement and investigation regime that applies across all
industries[52]
and stated:
The introduction of safeguards on the investigatory powers of
the ABCC by legislation or ministerial direction would be a step forward, but
not an adequate answer to the many problems with the powers...and the problems
with the powers cannot be remedied merely by greater checks and executive or judicial
oversight. The ABCC's investigatory powers simply have no place in a modern,
fair system of industrial relations, let alone one of a nation that pries
itself on political and industrial freedoms.[53]
2.49
Unions have criticised the retention of the coercive powers which they
claim discriminates against building workers and breaches their civil rights. They
argued that all workers should be equal under the law. The ACTU expressed its
opposition to the use of coercive information gathering powers in the enforcement
of workplace laws.[54]
It reminded the committee that the powers:
- are used only to investigate breaches of some civil penalty
offences under the FW Act. They have no connection with breaches of criminal
law as allegations of violence or criminal damage will be investigated by the
police;
- are aimed not at those suspected of wrongdoing but their
associates such as colleagues, spouses, other family members or professional
advisors and also bystanders; and
- override the ordinary protection of private and confidential
information.[55]
2.50
The ACTU submitted that though it was opposed to the coercive powers,
the proposed safeguards represent an improvement on the exiting provisions.
However, it recommended that the person seeking to use them should be required
to demonstrate the overwhelming public interest that justifies their use.[56]
2.51
The CCU also argued that coercive powers have no place in industrial law
and told the committee:
We have one worker at the moment who faces imprisonment
because he is accused of attending a safety meeting and refusing to talk to the
ABCC about becoming an informant against his workmates. He is not accused of
thuggery and violence and corruption and those sorts of things that we hear
bandied around by people who appear before this committee; he is accused of
attending a safety meeting on a site which was deemed unsafe by the regulator.
That is in an industry that on average loses one worker every week with a
safety record that has worsened under these laws.[57]
2.52
The CCU also addressed the issue of witnesses wanting to provide
information but being fearful of the consequences of being seen to cooperate
and stated:
...there would be nothing to stop somebody from taking
information to a regulatory authority on a confidential basis if no coercive
powers existed. Many agencies, including the FWO, operate in this way.[58]
2.53
In addition, the CCU noted that around one-quarter of all compulsory
examinations are finalised without any court proceedings being taken. Therefore
the question of whether someone has volunteered information does not arise as
the issue does not reach the public domain. It also noted that:
Where no coercive powers exist and proceedings have been
commenced, it would still be open to a prosecuting authority to 'protect' a
witness who wants to give (and/or has already given) evidence voluntarily but
not be seen to be doing so (and whose evidence is essential to the prosecutor's
case), by subpoenaing that person as a witness in the proceedings. To any outside
observer the person giving evidence under subpoena is in no different position
to someone who has been compelled to do so as part of a coercive interview.
They are obliged to testify and required to do so truthfully.[59]
2.54
On the other hand, retention of the coercive powers was strongly
supported by employer groups. They warned that the new safeguards will weaken
the coercive powers and lead to a resurgence of industrial disputes in the
construction sector.
2.55
Professor Breen Creighton warned that employer fears about the watering
down of the coercive powers should be treated with caution. He explained that
the introduction of safeguards mean that the powers are likely to be used only
in extreme circumstances. The procedures to obtain exemptions are quite complicated
so few 'interested persons' are likely to use them, particularly as the
application would have a realistic prospect of success only where the project
concerned was so peaceful that it was unlikely that the interrogation power
would be invoked in the first place. He concluded that it is unlikely that the
rule of law in the building industry will be seriously compromised by the
availability of the exemption procedure or by anything else in the bill.[60]
2.56
The Minister has acknowledged the discontent caused by the retention of
the coercive powers and expressed her disappointment that there are elements in
the industry which believe they are above the law, and where people engage in
intimidation and violence. As she explained:
Ultimately, whether or not the powers are used is in the
hands of all building industry participants themselves. If the law is abided by
then the powers will not be used.[61]
Safeguards
2.57
As noted above, while the coercive powers will be retained, they will be
tempered by new safeguards regarding external oversight. The new safeguards include
the following:
- section 47 provides that each use of the powers is dependent upon
a presidential member of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) being
satisfied a case has been made for their use;
- subsection 51(3) provides that the person being examined will be
entitled to be represented at the examination by a lawyer of the person's
choice and their rights to refuse to disclose information on the grounds of
legal professional privilege and public interest immunity will be recognised
(52(2));
- section 58 provides that people required to attend an interview will
be reimbursed for their reasonable expenses, such as travel and accommodation
as well as legal expenses;
- all examinations will be videotaped (subsection 54A(1)) and undertaken
by the Director (51(2)) or an SES officer (13(3));
- section 54A provides that the Commonwealth Ombudsman will monitor
and review all examinations and provide reports to the Parliament on the
exercise of this power; and
- section 46 makes the powers subject to a five year sunset clause
and it is intended that before the end of that period, the government would
undertake a review to determine whether these powers continue to be required.
2.58
The committee received comment on the following safeguards.
Criteria to be used to determine
whether to issue an examination notice
2.59
Under proposed subsection 47(1), the nominated AAT presidential member
to whom an application for an examination notice has been made is required to
only issue the examination notice if the presidential member is satisfied of
the following:
(a) that the Director has commenced the investigation (or investigations) to
which the application relates;
(b)
that the investigation (or investigations) are not connected with a
building project in relation to which a determination under subsection 39(1) is
in force;
(c) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person to whom the
application relates has information or documents, or is capable of giving
evidence relevant to the investigation (or investigations);
(d) that any other method of obtaining the information, documents or
evidence:
(i) has been attempted and has been unsuccessful; or
(ii) is not appropriate;
(e) that the information, documents or evidence would be likely to be of
assistance in the investigation (or investigations);
(f) that, having regard to all the circumstances, it would be appropriate to
issue the examination notice;
(g) any other matter prescribed by the regulations.
2.60
The ACTU noted the lack of a process to ensure the AAT member is made
aware of issues such as the person claiming the information is protected by
privilege or provided in confidence or is claiming a public interest immunity.
It pointed out that:
As currently drafted the Director is not under any obligation
to advise the AAT member that the subject of the notice is, for example, the
spouse of a person suspected of breaching a law or is a minor. Nor is the
Director required to disclose to the AAT member the reasons that a person may
have for refusing to participate in an interview under the general powers of
investigation...[62]
2.61
The ACTU suggested that to address this, either the Director could be
required to disclose all relevant circumstances or the AAT member could hear
from the person who is the subject of the application.[63]
The CCU also suggested that the person issued with an examination notice should
have the opportunity to be heard by the AAT member on whether the requirements
for the notice have been satisfied. It argued that this may bring to light that
other methods of obtaining the information have not been exhausted and
establish that their knowledge or events is important to the investigation.[64]
2.62
The ACTU also pointed out that proposed subparagraph 47(1)(e) requires
the information is 'likely to be of assistance' whereas Mr Wilcox recommended
the notice be issued where it is likely to be important to the progress of the
investigation. It recommended that the bill be amended to reflect this higher
threshold.[65]
This was supported by the CCU.[66]
2.63
The EM indicated that the coercive powers would not be used except where
the AAT member is satisfied that 'all other methods of obtaining the material
or evidence have been tried or were not appropriate'.[67]
The ACTU pointed out that this is not guaranteed in the bill and recommended an
amendment to require the Director to have exhausted the ordinary powers before
making an application.[68]
The CCU also urged that it must be clear that examination notices are only to
be issued as a last resort.[69]
2.64
The ACTU submitted that there is no requirement that the examination
notice specify the type of document to be produced.[70]
The CCU also argued that there should be a reasonable degree of specificity
regarding any documents sought to ensure the process does not turn into a 'fishing
expedition'.[71]
Committee comment
2.65
The committee majority agrees that safeguards, while an improvement, do
not resolve the issues raised by the use of coercive powers in an industrial
relations setting. As already stated, the committee majority wishes to see all
workers regulated by the FW Act and this is the ultimate goal. However, the
committee would like to see the following issues regarding safeguards addressed.
2.66
The committee majority agrees with the findings of Mr Wilcox that requiring
the recipient of the examination notice to attend before the AAT member would
in effect be requiring them to attend for interrogation.[72]
While it should be expected to occur anyway, the committee majority believes
there should be a clear requirement for the Director to disclose all relevant details
to the AAT member. The ability for the AAT member to seek addition information
should remain (subsection 45(6)).
Recommendation 2
2.67 The committee majority recommends that the requirement for the Director
to disclose all relevant circumstances to the AAT member be included in subsection
45(5).
2.68
The committee majority is mindful of additional layers of bureaucracy
but agrees that to guard against 'fishing expeditions', the examination notice
should specify the type of documents to be produced.
Recommendation 3
2.69 The committee majority recommends that an examination notice be required
to specify the type of documents to be produced.
2.70
Subparagraph 47(1)(g) requires the AAT member to consider additional
criteria prescribed by the regulations. The Minister informed the committee
that the government intends the regulations to prescribe that the nominated AAT
presidential member must also consider additional criteria relating to the nature
and likely seriousness of the suspected contravention and the likely effect on the
person subject to the notice.[73]
2.71
The EM refers to consideration of addition criteria such as whether
complying with the notice would have an undue effect on a person. A number of
submissions pointed out the difficulty for a presidential member to be
satisfied of the likely effect on the person.[74]
The committee agrees this suggestion has far too subjective an element.
Recommendation 4
2.72 The committee majority recommends that should the likely effect on a
person be included as a criteria for the powers then the words 'in so far as it
is known' be added.
Payment of reasonable expenses
2.73
Section 58 provides for the payment of expenses incurred in attending an
examination. This was supported by the CCU.[75]
The Law Institute of Victoria pointed out that the EM defines reasonable
expenses to include travel, legal and accommodation expenses but there is no
reference to the loss of wages or ordinary income of a witness.[76]
Mr Chris Molnar explained:
It would be normal in a court situation, if a person is
compulsorily required to attend a court room under subpoena, for that person’s
expenses to be covered. We do not see this situation as being any different to
that. If you are compulsorily required to attend an examination, your travel
expenses, your legal expenses and any loss of wages or income, subject to a
reasonableness test, ought to be paid. It is a compulsory process and we should
not undergo these compulsory processes, which in the industrial law area are
relatively unusual, without the individual who is subject to that process being
compensated, subject to the reasonableness test.[77]
2.74
The committee majority notes recommendation five of Mr Wilcox where he
argued that the bill should make provision for loss of wages as well as travel
and accommodation expenses and concluded:
Moreover, the party issuing the subpoena is responsible, at
least in the first instance, for the person's other reasonable expenses,
including loss of wages. It is unconscionable to put people in the position of
being required, under threat of imprisonment, to attend a hearing as a witness,
at their own expense.[78]
Committee comment
2.75
The committee majority agrees with the recommendation of Mr Wilcox that
loss of wages or ordinary income be included. Although the DEEWR submission
appears to indicate that this is included,[79]
the committee majority believes that this should be made clear in the bill.
Recommendation 5
2.76 The committee majority recommends that in Schedule 1, section 58,
'reasonable expenses' be clarified to include the loss of wages or ordinary
income.
Role of the Commonwealth Ombudsman
2.77
Mr Wilcox recommended that the function of oversight be given to the
Commonwealth Ombudsman:
The CO's [Commonwealth Ombudsman's] office is well-respected
in the community. It is readily accessible with a call-centre and offices in
every State and Territory. It is staffed by people who are experienced in
monitoring the performance of sensitive duties by public officials.[80]
2.78
The Commonwealth Ombudsman noted that the existing role fits very well
with the function proposed under the bill. However, he noted it is important
that the scope of the function is properly understood and detailed the expected
functions:
- review each application made by the Building Inspectorate to the
AAT;
- track the status of each notice of examination, variation to
notice, conduct of examination, record of examination and report of
examination;
- review each examination to ensure that:
- the form of the examination satisfies the requirements of the
Act;
- the examination is held for a relevant purpose;
- the questions asked during the examination are relevant to that
purpose;
- any requirement to produce documents or anything else at an
examination is reasonable;
- any objections on the basis of relevance by the examinee or his
or her legal representative are properly dealt with;
- any claims of privilege made by the examinee or his or her legal
representative are properly dealt with;
- any submissions made by the examinee or his or her legal
representative at the conclusion of an examination are properly dealt with;
- investigate and resolve (where possible) complaints relating to
the conduct of examinations and other actions of the Building Inspectorate; and
-
report to Parliament at least once each year on the conduct of
examinations under the Act.[81]
2.79
Based on the Special Investigations Monitor (SIM) of Victoria, which has
a similar role, the Commonwealth Ombudsman indicated that the new function
cannot be performed without adequate resources.[82]
Recommendation 6
2.80 The committee majority recommends that the scope of the Commonwealth
Ombudsman function be clearly defined and that the government ensure appropriate
resources be made available to undertake the function.
2.81
Employer groups expressed concern that the new safeguards to use the
coercive powers will be overly bureaucratic and result in delays. In response government
senators note the view expressed by Mr Wilcox that:
...I am confident the safeguards I have recommended, if
implemented, will minimise the unnecessary use, and potential misuse of the
power; without impeding, or significantly delaying investigations...[83]
2.82
In relation to these claims DEEWR noted that the compulsory examination
powers are a last resort and are not intended as the primary or first process
in an investigation. The safeguards relate only to the use of the compulsory
examination powers and will have no effect on the conduct of the majority of
investigations. DEEWR indicated furthermore that during 2007-08 less than nine
per cent of the ABCC's investigations included the use of the compulsory
examination powers. DEEWR emphasised that the safeguards will not impose a
significant number of new administrative obstacles and will not constrain the
capacity of the Building Inspectorate to respond quickly to matters.[84]
DEEWR stated:
It is important to note the safeguards contained in the bill
do not apply to or affect the inspectorate’s capacity to exercise its other
powers, nor do they affect the speed with which those powers can be exercised.[85]
Committee comment
2.83
The committee majority supports the introduction of these safeguards. It
notes that the government attempted to impose similar safeguards on the ABCC
from 3 August until it is due to be replaced in January 2010. Under
section 11 of the BCII Act 2005, on 17 June 2009, the Minister for Workplace
Relations issued a ministerial direction in the form of a letter to the Hon.
John Lloyd, the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner. The
direction, which is a disallowable instrument, was disallowed in the Senate on
25 June 2009. The government is now prevented from reintroducing the direction
for six months. The committee majority notes this disappointing outcome which
prevented the early introduction of the safeguards.
Independent assessor
2.84
In response to the observation by Mr Wilcox that parts of the building
and construction industry have increased compliance problems, the legislation
is aimed at driving cultural change and will focus compliance where it is most
needed. Proposed section 36B creates the statutory office of the Independent
Assessor–Special Building Industry Powers (Independent Assessor) who will be
appointed by the Governor-General providing the Minister is satisfied that the
person has suitable qualifications and is of good character. Under section 39
the Independent Assessor, on application from an 'interested person', may make
a determination that the examination notice powers will not apply to particular
building projects.
2.85
The Minister has advised the committee that the regulations prescribe
that the Independent Assessor must be satisfied that those engaged in a building
project have a demonstrated record of compliance with workplace relations laws,
including court or tribunal orders; and that the views of other interested
persons connected to the project have been considered.[86]
2.86
Proposed section 38 details that such determinations can only be made in
relation to building projects that begin on or after commencement of these
provisions which is expected to be 1 February 2010. All projects that commenced
prior to 1 February 2010 will remain covered by the coercive powers. All
projects that commence on or after 1 February 2010 will start with the coercive
powers switched on.
2.87
The exemption can apply to multiple building sites and be approved
before a project starts. The Independent Assessor can only make a determination
if there has been an application in accordance with proposed section
40 which means there is no capacity for the Independent Assessor to act
alone. Under section 43, the powers can be switched back on if there is any
outbreak of compliance issues on the site.
2.88
In the second reading speech, the Minister explained:
In the event that a project where the coercive powers have
been switched off experienced industrial unlawfulness the Independent Assessor
may rescind or revoke the original decision, thereby switching the powers back
on. Additionally, the Director of the Building Inspectorate may request the
Independent Assessor reconsider the decision at any time based on changes in
circumstances on a specific project.[87]
2.89
The Law Institute of Victoria pointed out that exempting particular
projects from the powers in the bill would be inconsistent with the object and
purpose of the bill which is to ensure compliance with workplace relations laws
by 'all' building industry participants. It added that:
...it may provide those projects and persons with immunity from
the reach of investigation powers before the project has even begun.[88]
2.90
The CCU considered that the rules around switching off the powers are
unworkable and unfair. As an example, large projects commencing just prior to
these amendments with a life of many years cannot be excluded even where the
record of compliance is exemplary. The CCU also pointed out the definition of
when a project began may open up an area of dispute.[89]
2.91
In opposing the coercive powers, the CCU pointed to the conclusions of
the Wilcox report that the construction industry is generally free of major industrial
misconduct. It suggested that it would be more logical for the coercive powers
to be the exception rather than the rule.[90]
2.92
The ACTU argued that if the coercive powers are to remain they should be
available only where there is a compelling public interest justification. This
could be achieved by having projects start with the coercive powers switched off,
but allowing applications to have them switched on. This would be consistent
with the approach outlined by the Minister to focus compliance activities where
they are most needed. The ACTU also noted the difficulties that may be faced
when determining the commencement of the project and suggested it would be
simpler for the new regime to apply to all building projects regardless of the
stage of the project from 1 February 2010.[91]
2.93
Commentators questioned the value of an Independent Assessor being able
to 'switch off' the coercive powers for particular projects. The procedures to
obtain an exemption have been described as 'elaborate'. In addition, they have
pointed out that such applications seem likely to succeed where a project is so
peaceful that there should not be a need to use the powers anyway.[92]
The Law Institute of Victoria agreed, and explained that as the ability to
switch off the powers will only apply to sites with a demonstrated record of
compliance, it is unlikely that the coercive powers would be used on these
sites. The Institute questioned the purpose of exempting those sites from the
legislation and noted that it may remove the motivation to comply with the
relevant laws. The Institute considered that the safeguards proposed by the
bill are more appropriate protections.[93]
2.94
The Minister informed the committee that the Independent Assessor may
rescind or revoke a determination to 'switch off' the availability of coercive
powers to a project where the project experiences industrial unlawfulness. The
Minister also informed the committee that if a determination were made and
subsequently rescinded, the subsequent use of coercive powers may apply to
events which occurred during the period the availability of the powers had been
switched off.[94]
2.95
DEEWR clarified that:
The capacity for interested persons to apply to have the
availability of the inspectorate’s coercive powers switched off on a specified
project appears to have been misunderstood and/or misrepresented by some
commentators. The switch off powers of the independent assessor relate only to
the inspectorate’s use of coercive powers on a specified project. They do not
affect the other compliance powers the building industry inspectorate will
have. Determinations made by the independent assessor do not affect the
inspectorate’s capacity to monitor, investigate and enforce general workplace
relations matters in the building and construction industry...[95]
Committee comment
2.96
The committee majority notes Mr Wilcox's conclusion of the need to
retain the coercive powers based on recent examples of inappropriate behaviour.
The committee is disappointed that the inappropriate actions of a few tarnish
the reputation of the industry as a whole. These provisions will serve to
further encourage cultural change and reward good behaviour by providing the
industry with the opportunity to demonstrate that a lawful culture is in place.
As the Minister pointed out, if a project is peaceful then the stakeholders
have nothing to fear from the powers as they will not be invoked. The committee
majority notes that the establishment of the Office of the Independent Assessor
will facilitate the objective of focusing the powers where they are most needed
to encourage lawful behaviour and a change in the industry's culture.
Definition of 'interested person'
2.97
Section 40 provides for an 'interested person' (defined in subsection 36(2))
to apply for a determination that the coercive interrogation powers not apply
for a specified project. The Minister informed the committee of the government's
intention that regulations prescribe all 'building industry participants', as
defined by the current Act, in relation to the project to which the application
relates, to be 'interested persons'. This means all project employers,
employees, their respective associations and the client(s), would be able to
make an application to the Independent Assessor.[96]
2.98
The ACTU suggested that peak councils and state ministers should also be
able to make applications. While not opposing a means to dispose of frivolous
applications, it opposed the suggestion by employer groups that a person could
be disqualified from making an application based on their record of compliance.[97]
Definition of existing project
2.99
Proposed section 38 details that the capacity to make application to the
Independent Assessor would not apply to projects that commenced prior to 1
February 2010. The Minister advised the committee that the subdivision will
commence on 1 February 2010 thereby excluding all current projects. The effect
of this provision with the definition of building work as defined in section 5
of the current BCII Act, means that an 'existing project' would be one which
has had on-site activity commence prior to 1 February 2010.[98]
Criteria to be used by the
Independent Assessor
2.100
The committee majority notes that regulations detailing the factors that
the Independent Assessor must take into account when deciding whether to switch
off the coercive powers are yet to be released.
2.101
Proposed Subsection 39(3) does not allow the Independent Assessor to
make a determination in relation to a particular building project unless they
are satisfied, in relation to that building project, that:
(a)
it would be appropriate to make the determination, having regard to:
(i) the object of this Act; and
(ii) any matters prescribed by the regulations; and
(b) it would not be contrary to the public interest to make the
determination.
2.102
These criteria are consistent with:
- the object of the Act, which includes '(a) ensuring compliance
with workplace relations laws by all building industry participants';
- the Explanatory Memorandum (paragraph 92) which states, in part, 'Matters
prescribed by the regulations might include, for example, a demonstrated record
of compliance with workplace relations laws, including court or tribunal
orders, in connection with the building project'; and
-
administrative law principles which provide affected persons the
opportunity to have their views considered.[99]
2.103
The Minister informed the committee of the government's intention for regulations
to prescribe that the Independent Assessor must be satisfied that the building industry
participants in a building project have a demonstrated record of compliance
with workplace relations laws, including court or tribunal orders; and that the
views of other interested persons in relation to the project have been
considered.[100]
2.104
DEEWR indicated that the bill does not prescribe the process the Independent
Assessor must use to be satisfied that the views of other interested person
have been considered as this may vary for each case.[101]
2.105
The ACTU submitted that the bill does not provide sufficient guidance to
the Independent Assessor about the process to be applied in making a
determination. It suggested the inclusion of the following:
- an obligation for the Independent Assessor to be satisfied that
evidence put to them about the prior conduct of a building industry participant
is reliable;
- a requirement for the Independent Assessor to publish reasons for
their decision;[102]
and
- where an application under proposed section 43 to reconsider a
decision of the Independent Assessor is made, that the applicant be advised and
given an opportunity to be heard.[103]
2.106
Regarding the last point, the CCU noted that the Director may apply to
the Independent Assessor for a reconsideration of their determination. However,
the original 'interested person' who made the application will have no part in
this process. The CCU pointed out that as the interests of the original
applicant are potentially affected by any reconsideration by the Independent
Assessor, as a matter of natural justice, they should be provided with the
opportunity to make submissions.[104]
2.107
On this issue DEEWR pointed out that the Independent Assessor must be
satisfied that the views of interested persons have been considered before
making a determination. It also drew attention to Note 2 under section 39 which
states:
A determination can be varied or revoked on application by an
interested person (see subsection 33(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901)
or on request by the Director (see section 43 of this Act).
2.108
The committee majority notes that under proposed section 42 a determination
must be published in the gazette and will take effect from the date of
publication.
The office of the federal safety
commissioner
2.109
The bill retains the provisions of the BCII Act that relates to the
Office of the Federal Safety Commissioner (OFSC) and its related OHS
Accreditation Scheme. This was supported in the evidence provided to the
committee. In particular, DEEWR noted that currently about 150 companies are
accredited under the scheme which covers about 50 per cent of construction
employees and:
Their statistics indicate that fatality incident rates for
these companies are nearly half those of other construction industry companies
and workers compensation claims for accredited companies are also significantly
lower than the industry norms. So there have been some very strong positives
coming out of the creation of the OFSC.[105]
International Labour Organisation
2.110
The ACTU expressed concern that the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
is likely to remain critical of the legislation as the bill may breach the
Labour Inspection Convention and the Freedom of Association Convention.[106]
The committee majority notes advice from DEEWR that a report to the ILO on the
legislation is being prepared.[107]
Conclusion
2.111
The committee majority acknowledges that Mr Wilcox has found that despite
improvements, the culture of the building and construction industry has yet to
be fully transformed. The legislation is aimed at driving this cultural change
in the industry through rewarding good behaviour and focusing compliance measures
where these are most needed.
2.112
Although it retains the coercive powers, the legislation puts in place a
number of safeguards for their use. Conditions must be met before the building
inspectorate can proceed with a compulsory interrogation. The committee
majority notes that this was recommended by the committee in its last report on
the industry in 2008. The committee is pleased to see additional safeguards in this
legislation but disappointed that they could not have been introduced sooner.
2.113
The committee majority is opposed to industry specific legislation in
principle. The most desirable outcome is an eventual inclusion of workers in
the building and construction sector under the provisions of the Fair Work Act alone.
The committee majority trusts that legislation providing for this will be the next
step in that process.
Recommendation 7
2.114 The committee majority recommends that the bill be passed after
government consideration of the committee majority recommendations.
Senator Gavin Marshall
Chair
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