Opposition Senators' Report
Conduct of the inquiry
1.1
Opposition senators begin this dissenting report into the
Work Choices Bill by taking exception to the Government's mishandling of this
inquiry. The decision to hold a one-week inquiry into a bill proposing the
biggest legislative change to the law regulating workplace relations in
Australia in over a century, is a subversion of the democratic process and
effective law making. It is outrageous that only one week was allowed for the
committee to receive submissions after the Work Choices Bill was introduced
into the House of Representatives on 2 November. To make matters worse,
hearings were scheduled in the week following the closing date for submissions,
which did not allow enough time for the committee to properly consider the more than 5000 submissions received. Opposition
senators were given only one hour on the last day of hearings to question
officers from the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR) about
the bill. This is totally unacceptable, given that the department had earlier confirmed
on the morning of the first hearing that the bill was different in many
respects from the Work Choices information booklet which came before it. At the
completion of the hearings the committee had only two working days to prepare and
finalise its report for tabling. Opposition senators agree with the concerns of
one academic who lamented: 'law-making under such-circumstances is a breach of
the principles of good government'.[70]
1.2
Opposition senators highlight circumstances surrounding
this inquiry which show how the Government has abused its Senate majority. Debate
on a Senate motion which proposed that the time for the inquiry be extended, unfair
dismissal be included in the inquiry's terms of reference, and the committee hold
hearings in each of the capital cities was gagged before the deputy chair of
the committee could even put on the public record the reasons behind the motion.
The reasonable proposal to include unfair dismissal in the inquiry's terms of
reference was inevitably rejected by Government senators. The Government did
not even bother to contribute to the debate, which shows its arrogance towards
this inquiry. Opposition senators believe it is an act of bad faith and
legislative folly for the Government to be rushing this bill through
Parliament. It is important to note in this context that in the 2004 Liberal Party election commitments,
there was no mention of abolishing the no-disadvantage test (removing
protection for penalty rates, overtime, leave loading and shift allowances);
removing the setting of a fair minimum wage from the Industrial Relations
Commission; or abolishing unfair dismissal protection from employees in
workplaces of up to and including 100 staff. The fact is that it was only after
the Government gained control of the Senate that the Prime Minister decided to
ram through the Government's 1252 pages of extreme industrial relations
legislation. Despite fighting the 2004 election on the economy, the Prime
Minister now argues that his industrial relations changes, which the Opposition
believes are extreme and divisive, are needed to maintain and build on Australia’s economic performance.
1.3
In placing an unreasonable limit on the time for this
inquiry, the Government has shown its disregard for the important scrutiny role
performed by the Senate and its committees. It has shown no interest in taking
this inquiry to the people and involving them in the work of the committee. The
Government has shown bias in its handling of the inquiry by holding private
briefings with peak employer organisations, to the exclusion of all other
stakeholders, before introducing its legislation in Parliament. At nearly 700
pages and explanatory memoranda of some 560 pages, the Work Choices Bill is the
largest amending bill ever considered by the Parliament. It is not only radical
and controversial legislation, it is complex and far-reaching the implications
of which will take many months if not years to fully grasp.
1.4
The approach of the Australian Chamber of Commerce and
Industry (ACCI) in its submission illustrated the extent to which the
Government and peak employer organisations have trampled on the concerns of
ordinary citizens during this inquiry. ACCI clamed that it is not accurate to
describe Work Choices 'in any way as rushed, or to claim that these
propositions have not been before the Australian community for some time'.[71] ACCI has demonstrated during this
inquiry that it is not to be taken seriously and that it behaves as an
apologist for this extreme Government. Work Choices is a radical piece of
legislation proposing historic and far-reaching changes. Employer
organisations, including ACCI, should take note of the thousands of submissions
which expressed anger, frustration and defiance at the scope of the inquiry and
the ridiculously short time-frame which the Government allowed for evidence to
be received and hearings conducted. Opposition senators fully support these
sentiments.
1.5
A joint submission from 151 Australian academics with
expertise in the field of industrial relations, labour markets and industrial
law argued that the changes being proposed in Work Choices are profound, and
are being introduced with untimely haste: 'They significantly rewrite the
constitutional basis of industrial regulation as well as the terms of the
century-old institutions like the...AIRC. They establish new institutions, remove
rights, and amend a very complex body of legislation'.[72]
1.6
The approach taken by the ACCI submission symbolises
the Government's disgraceful handling of the national debate on industrial
relations. The Government treats with contempt perspectives which are contrary
to its own. It frequently dismisses as wrong and irrelevant, or ignores
altogether, the views of professional academics, union and church leaders and
representatives of community organisations as if they had no respectable standing
in the community. Opposition senators regret the obvious disdain by Government
senators for the presence before the committee of Professor
David Peetz. It
demeans the Senate for its members to subject highly regarded scholars to
reflections on their personal integrity. It is interesting to speculate on
whether an academic witness expert in science, medicine or some esoteric branch
of learning would be treated with the same contempt. Apart from the show of disrespect
to Professor Peetz
which is on the public record, Government senators had no intention of asking serious
questions about the content of the joint
academic submission from 151 academics which Professor
Peetz submitted to this inquiry.
1.7
It is unacceptable for the Work Choices Bill to be
rushed through Parliament before the committee has had the opportunity to
properly examine its provisions. It is also unacceptable for employer groups to
suggest that people should take the Government at its word on industrial
relations reform. No one outside Government and some business circles is
convinced there is an economic imperative mandating the Government's new industrial
relations policy. It appears that the Work Choices Bill represents an article
of faith for the Liberal Party, which does not provide satisfactory grounds for
good law making. The Government is pushing ahead regardless of concerns that it
has turned a blind eye to community standards in the pursuit of economic
objectives, for which there is no evidence that they can or will be delivered.
The substantial evidence before the committee points in the other direction: that
the Government should be crafting innovative workplace changes that will
deliver on economic and social
outcomes. Opposition senators believe that the low-wage solution proposed by
Work Choices is a missed opportunity to address the serious economic problems
which lie ahead.
1.8
Government efforts to sell its Work Choices policy through
a $55 million taxpayer-funded advertising campaign, is no substitute for proper
parliamentary scrutiny and oversight. This bill should not have been before the
Parliament until the committee had conducted a full and proper inquiry with
hearings in capital cities and regional centres. Restricting hearings to Canberra
meant that regional and local opinions could not be heard. The committee received
a large number of submissions from small business and community organisations
and local government expressing serious concerns about the legislation. Yet it
was denied the opportunity to hear from them as well. The committee heard
evidence from the Australian Industry Group and the Master Builders
Association, but did not hear from the Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union
or the CFMEU, both of which made valuable submissions to the inquiry.
1.9
Opposition senators believe that the Government's
decision to rush the Work Choices Bill through the Parliament, conduct a short and
inadequate inquiry and restrict debate on the bill before it was passed in the
House of Representatives, was motivated entirely for political reasons. Public
disquiet over growing and new substantial evidence that workers' wages and
conditions would be hit hard by the legislation saw the Government scale-back
its advertising campaign soon after the bill was introduced in the Parliament. Opposition
senators are concerned by reports that of six million copies of a revised Work
Choices booklet which the Government had printed, costing taxpayers an
estimated two million dollars, only 178,000 have been distributed. The
remaining 5.8 million copies are gathering dust in a warehouse.[73] The Department also confirmed at an
estimates hearing on 3 November 2005
that in addition to the six million copies printed, 458,000 items, including an
unspecified number of booklets valued at $152,944, were pulped.[74]
Government interference with the
work of the committee
1.10
Opposition senators are particularly concerned that
decisions about the inquiry process, including possible terms of reference,
hearing schedules and witnesses, which are the committee's responsibility, were
dictated to the committee by the Government. Government senators were given
little room to act independently during this inquiry. Their majority status on
the committee was commandeered by the Minister, who appeared to be
orchestrating the inquiry from the beginning. An initial plan to conduct panel
discussions in Canberra over five
consecutive days on some of the major aspects of the legislation is an example
of the Government's attempt to interfere with the work of the committee. The original
idea to hold a series of panel discussions on discrete policy areas was not
only highly impractical: it was completely out of step with the committee's
normal practice in these matters. Had it been followed, it would have resulted
in a hearing format designed to pigeon-hole witnesses into two camps – either
supporters or critics of the legislation – and polarise debate. Consultation
with peak employer organisations about the Government's plan confirmed that it
would have been an inefficient and impractical format for this inquiry. The
hearings would probably have unravelled. It was clear that decisions about the
inquiry were made by those who were unfamiliar with the proper processes for
conducting a Senate committee inquiry.
Major provisions of the Work
Choices Bill were excluded from the inquiry
1.11
No satisfactory explanation was provided for the
Government's decision to restrict matters which the committee was permitted to inquire
into. The motion to refer the Work Choices Bill to the legislation committee stated
that the inquiry not consider those elements of the bill which reflect
government bills previously referred to, examined and reported on by the
committee. These matters relate to secret ballots, suspension or termination of
a bargaining period, pattern bargaining, cooling off periods, remedies for
unprotected industrial action, removal of section 166A of the WR Act, strike
pay, unfair dismissal laws, right of entry, award simplification, freedom of
association, amendments to section 299 of the WR Act and civil penalties for
officers of organisations regarding breaches.
1.12
Opposition senators are critical of the Government's
decision to exclude from the inquiry many controversial aspects of the bill,
especially regarding termination of employment and unfair dismissal. Provisions
of the bill relating to unfair dismissal under the completely new form in which
they appear in the bill have not been previously examined by any committee.
These include the exemption of businesses with up to and including 100
employees; exclusion of employees engaged on a seasonal basis; and giving the
AIRC power to dismiss applications without a hearing.[75] It is unacceptable that these issues
were removed from the inquiry's formal terms of reference. Union submissions
drew the committee's attention to the fact that under the unfair dismissal provisions
of the Work Choices Bill, large companies such as Patrick
and PBL will be able to lawfully avoid the new 100 employee threshold by moving
employees into entities employing fewer than 100 workers.[76] This could, over time, dramatically
increase the number of workers who have no protection from unfair dismissal.
The Government's position, as described by DEWR, is that it is unnecessary to
include a provision in the bill preventing large companies from restructuring
to avoid the 100 employee threshold because the significant transaction and
other costs involved in restructuring deter companies from doing this. Opposition
senators believe that instances of companies restructuring to avoid the unfair
dismissal provisions of the Workplace Relations Act have been brought to the
attention of the legislation committee in past inquiries into bills amending
the act. There is no reason to believe that this practice will not continue
into the future. Indeed, the bill will encourage them to do so.
1.13
A significant change brought about by Work Choices is
the capacity for employers to lawfully dismiss workers for 'operational reasons',
which are defined as economic, technological and structural in nature. It is
simply wrong for Minister Andrews
to have claimed that the Work Choices bill will 'retain the current law on this issue'.[77] Under current law, the AIRC, in
reaching a decision about whether a dismissal was harsh, unjust and
unreasonable, may take account of whether a dismissal was for genuine
operational reasons. This is very different from saying that a case is
automatically excluded if a broadly defined operational reason is only part of
the reason for the dismissal. Opposition senators are concerned that under Work
Choices it is possible for workers to be dismissed in harsh, unjust and unreasonable
circumstances, by a firm of any size,
if the firm successfully argues that the dismissal was partly for operational
reasons. The worker would be unable to lodge a complaint about unfair
dismissal.[78]
1.14
The farcical nature of this inquiry, and the
seriousness of the unfair dismissal issue, was illustrated during the public
hearing on 17 November when Government senators on the committee insisted on
asking questions of witnesses on matters which were ruled were out of order for
the inquiry. It is instructive that Senator Guy
Barnett asked Professor
David Peetz a
question about comments he had made in a radio interview on 3 November about
there being nothing in the Work Choices Bill which would prevent an employee
being dismissed for 'chewing gum'. It is instructive not only because the
Government unilaterally declared the issue of unfair dismissal as 'out of
bounds', but also because the correct answer given by Professor Peetz to
Senator Barnett's question highlighted why unfair dismissal is a sensitive issue
for the Government and why further public debate about the proposed changes would
more than likely harm the Government's case for reform. The answer given by Professor
Peetz was not what Senator Barnett
expected, as the following extract from the Hansard record clearly
demonstrates:
Senator Barnett—You
say there is a provision that says that, for employers of any size, if you are
dismissed and part of the reason for your dismissal is to do with operational
reasons...or to do with the structure or technical requirements...of the
organisation, then you can be dismissed. You can be targeted for dismissal
because the boss does not like the way you chew gum or whatever. You have no
recourse for unfair dismissal. You then went on to say that you cannot even
lodge a claim. I put it you that that is entirely incorrect. With respect to
chewing gum, I am not sure if it was a joke—or do you wish to withdraw that
statement.
...
Professor Peetz—If
you are a firm with fewer than 100 employees, then you can be sacked for any
reason whatsoever unless it is an unlawful termination. Unlawful termination
relates to discrimination...Chewing gum is not a discriminatory reason covered by
the unlawful termination provisions. Therefore, if you are in a firm with fewer
than 100 employees, you could be sacked for chewing gum. I am not saying that
an employer would sack you for chewing gum; I am saying what is possible. In
firms with more than 100 employees—where operational reasons apply—if you are
precluded from making a claim because of what the bill defines as operational
reasons, then it does not matter what other aspects of your dismissal were
relevant to your dismissal. You cannot make a claim. So if the employer is able
to create a situation in which you are covered by economic, structural,
technical or similar reasons for dismissal as part of the reason for dismissal,
then you can be dismissed.
...
Senator Barnett—I
hope you know that what you are saying is wrong, and that you have recourse to
the Australian industrial Relations Commission.[79]
1.15
Opposition senators note that during the public hearing
on 18 November, officers from DEWR confirmed that Professor
Peetz's assessment was right and Senator
Barnett's wrong.[80] Workers can be dismissed for chewing
gum or for any other reason concocted by an employer that does not meet the
narrow test of unlawfulness. It is a major concern that Government senators on
the committee have not been able to grasp the impact of the Work Choices Bill
and have wilfully misrepresented key provisions which have the potential to affect
hundreds of thousands of workers.
1.16
Earlier that day, the chair of the committee, Senator
Judith Troeth, responded to a claim by Mr Linton Duffin, a legal officer
representing the Transport Workers Union, that workers with families can be
sacked for not being able to work extra shifts at short notice, by drawing
attention to the unlawful termination provisions of the Workplace Relations Act,
which are carried over to the Work Choices Bill. The chair, who pointed out
that employers who terminate an employee for unlawful reasons are liable for
fines, penalties and compensation under the act, asked Mr Duffin to acknowledge
that the wording of the act provides a truthful recognition of the Government's
intentions. The response from Mr Duffin
illustrates, yet again, the complexity of provisions relating to unfair and
unlawful dismissal and the extent of the gap between what is stipulated in the
act and what actually happens in workplaces across many industries, including in
the transport sector:
There's many a slip betwixt cup and lip, with all due respect,
Senator. What may be an unlawful termination is very easily characterised—and
is almost invariably characterised—as being something entirely different in
practical terms. If the Senate, and indeed the government, really believes that
the unlawful termination jurisdiction is likely to resolve these issues with a
speedy, cost-effective mechanism, then perhaps it ought to go back and have a
look at Federal Court decisions and cases over the past decade. Even putting
the most 'good faith' hat on that I can, which is that the government truly
believes this, it can only truly believe this if it has not actually looked at
the material.[81]
1.17
Opposition senators believe that the committee should
have had the opportunity to reconsider a number of contentious issues,
including unfair dismissal, in light of the Government's new Work Choices
policy and to examine the interaction, and likely effect, of the bill's provisions
which relate to them. The ACTU submission pointed out that a number of issues
which have been debated before are presented differently in the Work Choices
Bill, with nuances that have effects across the bill and in relation to how
they intersect with other laws.[82] Opposition
senators believe that the committee should have examined the bill in its
entirety.
Work Choices: flawed policy, flawed legislation
1.18
This section revisits and expands upon the critique of
the Government's approach to industrial relations reform contained in the
majority report of the references committee's inquiry into workplace
agreements. That inquiry focused in part on the economic and social effects of the
system of agreement-making contained in the Workplace Relations Act. It looked
in particular at the practical effect of AWAs on the wages and conditions of
workers.
1.19
The Government's industrial relations policies,
including Work Choices, are the focus of eleven papers by seventeen academic
researchers, which were published in June 2005 as a 'report card' on the effect
on workers and workplaces of polices introduced by the Coalition Government
since 1996. In their collective view, Government policies have undermined
employee rights; specifically, the narrowing of awards and collective
agreements and the promotion of individual contracts have significantly
enhanced managerial prerogatives, diminished the independence and choice
available to employees and denied them access to collective agreements.[83] A coordinator of the 'report card', Professor
Bradon Ellem,
expressed the view that the narrowing of awards and promotion of individual
contracts has enhanced managerial prerogatives – that is, the right of
management to unilaterally determine the pay, working hours, duties and
employment conditions of workers. This is a view supported by a number of
studies.[84] Employees on individual
contracts have an inherently weaker bargaining position, and inherently weaker
power, than employees under collective agreements.[85] This is one of the largest differences
between individual and collective agreements, a point which was driven home in
evidence to this inquiry by the Finance Sector Union.[86] Opposition senators take this argument
one step further by noting that under the Work Choices Bill the primacy of
managerial prerogative will be restored in all matters pertaining to the
employer-employee relationship.
1.20
Coalition governments have a history of intense
interventionism in employment relations. Far from pursuing a policy of
deregulation, the general thrust of the industrial relations policies of the
Howard Government, especially its promotion of AWAs, has been to re-regulate
the labour market to enhance managerial regulation of the workplace, known as
'command and control'. This has involved a significant power shift away from
external regulation by third parties, particularly the industrial relations
commissions, towards the internal regulation of organisations by management.[87] It is essentially a process which
encourages employee commitment to one kind of collective, namely the
corporation, while reducing the role of other collectives, namely unions. This
trend is set to continue under the Work Choices Bill which will involve
profound state intervention mandating a very particular vision of working life.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the unprecedented power which the minister will
have to step into any workplace and strike down an agreement under the
'prohibited content' provisions of the bill.
1.21
Opposition senators want to make it clear that the
Government is not planning to deregulate the labour market to allow employers
and employees to negotiate mutually beneficial terms and conditions, so much as
re-regulate it with an overlay of complicated rules and regulations which are
likely to be costly.[88] One
conservative economic commentator sympathetic to the legislation described Work
Choices as having been drafted to try and cover every contingency and to regulate
in the smallest detail every possible decision-making process.[89] Opposition senators agree with the
view of Professor Andrew
Stewart that the claim that the new federal
system will operate in a simpler fashion can only be maintained by someone who
has either not read the bill or is peddling misinformation:
The Bill would create a system
that is a mish-mash of the old and new, overlaid by heavy-handed and partisan
intervention that at every turn authorises the government to step in and
prevent parties from conducting their relations in ways of which the government
disapproves.[90]
1.22
Opposition senators are extremely concerned about the
effects of the Government's proposed changes on the ability of workers to
negotiate and bargain, both individually and collectively, with employers. The
Work Choices Bill gives employers almost unlimited scope to impose on workers
individual agreements, even in workplaces where collective agreements exist and
the majority of employees elect to bargain collectively. The bill undermines internationally
accepted practices which are designed to protect workers from exploitation and
to ensure that labour market competition occurs above a platform of basic
rights. It appears that Work Choices represents an historic and radical shift
in the balance of labour regulation to the employer. The range of concerns held
by Opposition senators about the power shift to employers is captured in the
joint submission from 151 academics:
Individual contracts such as AWAs represent a weakening of the
bargaining power of employees and those with little bargaining power have
difficulty in integrating work and family responsibilities. This applies
particularly to women in part-time and casual work, and adversely affects equal
pay.
The individualisation of industrial relations has implications
for equity and equality. Where an industrial relations system fails to address
bargaining power for workers, through the primacy of collective bargaining,
equality in treatment of employees and equity of outcomes are necessarily
compromised.[91]
1.23
Consideration of the Work Choices Bill inevitably centres
on the contentious issue of AWAs. Few would dispute that the main purpose of
AWAs is to individualise the process of agreement making between employers and
employees, rather than the outcome of negotiations. This is why AWAs operate
increasingly as pattern agreements which are offered to workers in the same
classification across like industries. A number of case studies have confirmed
the use of standardised or pattern AWAs. Opposition senators believe that the
essential aim of Work Choices is to allow businesses to unilaterally determine
the pay and employment conditions of workers, free of interference from unions,
collective bargaining, awards, industrial tribunals and workers themselves.
1.24
The issue of workers under collective agreements
experiencing duress and being forced on to an AWA was raised in evidence on a
number of occasions during the inquiry. Opposition senators believe that DEWR was
unable to properly answer questions on this issue at a public hearing. The
drafting of section 104(6) enables an employer to require new and existing employees to make AWAs a
condition employment without this being termed duress under the legislation.
Duress includes bullying, brow beating, intimidation, coercion, or forcing a
person to enter into agreement against his or her will. Even DEWR acknowledged
on 18 November that section 104(6) was ambiguous in this respect.[92]
1.25
Opposition senators also note that there is a large
difference between the intention behind section 104(6) and what actually occurs
to many employees in the workplace. What is being proposed in the Work Choices
Bill misses the important point: it is not difficult for employers to develop
ways and means of applying pressure on current employees who are reluctant to
sign an AWA, without being in technical breach of the legislation. This is the
stark reality of the employment relationship where bargaining power is heavily
on the employer's side. An obvious situation would apply to casual workers or
people who want a promotion or a wage rise. It would be easy for an employer to
say: 'if you want a promotion or a wage rise, here is the instrument you have
to sign'. Obvious problems arise with the processes involved in making and
approving AWAs. Critics of AWAs raised a number of concerns, including the
capacity for AWAs to provide a standard for setting wages and employment
conditions which is lower than the award system, and the ability of employers
to offer AWAs on a 'take it or leave it' basis.
1.26
Opposition senators believe that workplace collective
bargaining should be promoted and underpinned by a safety net of fair and
relevant minimum standards of pay and employment conditions. A legislative
framework for agreement-making should ensure fairness, flexibility and job
security; provide an arbitral role for the Industrial Relations Commission to
ensure that parties to a dispute enter negotiations in a reasonable and proper
way; and require employers and employees to bargain in good faith. The Work
Choices Bill does not meet any of these basic requirements. Opposition senators
are concerned that the bill:
-
denies workers the right to collective
bargaining and to join and be represented by a union;
-
does not provide for an effective set of minimum
wages and conditions of employment to ensure that workers who are unable to
bargain do not fall behind community standards;
-
denies workers access to a fair and effective
review mechanism for employer decisions that are unfair and unjust, including
access to conciliation and arbitration for the purpose of dispute resolution;
-
does not promote secure, safe and healthy
workplaces that are free of discrimination or harassment. Instead, it fosters
working arrangements that jeopardise the ability of workers to live secure and
balanced lives;
-
does not protect the right of workers to be
consulted and informed of business decisions that affect them in their work;
and
-
severely retards the employees' ability to take
industrial action and severely increases the penalties for doing so.[93]
Poor legislative drafting has put
vulnerable workers at risk
1.27
At the beginning of this report, Opposition senators
expressed concern that the Government has denied Parliament the opportunity to
examine and improve the Work Choices Bill. It is inevitable that legislation of
this magnitude will contain provisions with consequences, both intended and
unintended, which will be realised only in the years ahead. Opposition senators
are concerned that written submissions and witnesses who appeared before the
committee identified provisions which will have unexpected consequences for
many individuals and families, especially low-paid and low-skilled workers.
1.28
The committee heard alarming evidence from FairWear
about the confusing and contradictory nature of provisions in the Work Choices
Bill which will have an adverse effect on the employment conditions of outworkers.
The submission from DEWR stated that under section 116(1)(m) of schedule 1 of
the bill, outworker conditions will continue to be allowable in awards and
agreements. However, section 116B(1)(g), entitled 'Matters that are not
allowable award matters', states that 'restrictions on the engagement of
independent contractors and requirements relating to the conditions of their
engagement' cannot be an allowable award matter. Opposition senators are
concerned that a large number of category 2 regulatory protections for
outworkers fall within this section.
1.29
A member of FairWear, Ms
Kathryn Fawcett,
told the committee that the current protections for outworkers, which are provided
by both wages and conditions and the regulation of supply chains, will be
dismantled if the Work Choices Bill is passed in its current form. Opposition
senators appreciate that an essential part of protecting outworkers from
exploitation is monitoring and regulating the supply chain. State and federals
awards and a voluntary industry code ensure access to work records and supply
chain lists through the contracting chain. Ms
Fawcett explained how state and federal
awards underpin the monitoring and regulation of the supply chain:
...an employer has to register if it is going to give out work; an
employer has to provide lists of who work get given out to; and an employer has
to keep detailed work records, give them to the worker and have them available
for inspection. They provide that a contract cannot be made below the
conditions under which an outworker should be paid. They provide for a facility
for outworkers to claim unpaid wages up the contracting chain, not just from
the party they are directly employed with or related to.[94]
1.30
It appears that Work Choices will comprehensively
dismantle the suite of state and federal laws which underpin protected award
conditions for outworkers in the clothing industry.[95] It will no longer be possible to
effectively monitor the supply chain, opening the door to further exploitation.
The submission from the TCFUA recommended that a new provision be created to
provide certainty for outworkers and maintain their current protections under
both state and federal laws. The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity (HREOC)
submission argued that the Work Choices bill does not go far enough in
providing protections for outworkers. Specifically, it proposed that further
provisions be developed which allow deeming of outworkers as employees, provide
right of entry for unions in the textile, clothing and footwear industry,
restrict the use of AWAs for outworkers and provide mechanisms for recovery of
unpaid wages up the supply chain to assist in preventing false contractual
arrangements.[96]
1.31
Opposition senators believe that while the Work Choices
Bill is too flawed a piece of legislation for it to be considered by
Parliament, were it to be passed and enacted the most vulnerable and disadvantaged
workers should be offered protection. The bill therefore should be amended to reflect
the principles raised in evidence by FairWear, the TCFUA and HREOC. These
principles are included in Appendix 1. While Opposition senators were heartened
by the positive response from the department at a public hearing regarding
possible amendments, they await the outcome of this development when amendments
to the bill to protect outworkers are debated in the Senate.
1.32
Other submissions identified clauses in the bill which
do not reflect the Government's stated intentions; for example, those relating
to the definition of 'operational grounds' in the termination of employment
section of the bill. It is likely that many other drafting anomalies are buried
in the legislation and will remain concealed until after the bill has been
passed into law. This is an unsatisfactory situation, the responsibility of which
rests with the Government.
1.33
Opposition senators believe that more time is required
to seek clarification from the Government about the effects of the legislation,
and identify and have drafting errors removed by amendment. This process
requires an extensive period of debate and scrutiny in the Senate chamber,
which the Government is unlikely to consider. There is no reason why the Work
Choices Bill has to be passed before the end of the December sittings. It is
not time-sensitive legislation. Officials from DEWR told the committee at an
estimates hearing that it is unlikely the legislation, once passed into law,
will come into effect before March or April next year. Regulations which will
accompany the act have not even been drafted, and these also are expected to
run to many hundreds of pages. A more sensible date for reporting would have
been February or March 2006, at the earliest.
Productivity growth, economic
performance and profits
1.34
A central justification for the Government's Work
Choices legislation is that it is necessary to boost productivity and make Australia's
economy internationally competitive. The Government and employer groups claim
that only through further industrial relations reform will the economy grow and
employment rates increase. The Work Choices Bill states that its first
objective is to encourage the pursuit of high employment, improved living standards,
low inflation and international competitiveness through higher productivity and
a flexible and fair labour market. The Prime Minister acknowledged during an
ABC Four Corners interview on 26 September 2005 that increasing the spread of
individual contracts across workplaces, more than any other Government policy
for IR reform, will generate the 'biggest single productivity boost' to the
economy.[97]
1.35
Opposition senators repeat the finding of the majority
report of the references committee's inquiry into workplace agreements:
economic evidence to support the Government's assertion linking individual
contracts to productivity does not exist. The research by Professor
David Peetz
is important in this regard. He rejects the Government's argument and bases his
critique essentially on a comparison of labour productivity over the various
productivity cycles since 1964-65 and the various institutional arrangements
that applied at the time. The analysis shows that under the award system that
operated before the prices and incomes accord of the 1980s, productivity growth
was between 2.4 and 2.9 per cent per annum. It fell to 0.8 per cent following
the introduction of a centralised accord. With the shift to enterprise
bargaining in the mid-1990s, productivity growth peaked at 3.2 per cent. The
current productivity cycle, which commenced in 1999-2000, has seen a fall in
annual productivity growth to just 2.3 per cent per annum. According to Peetz:
'this is even below the rate of labour productivity growth that applied during
the traditional award period. It is despite the fact that average union
density, at 53 per cent, was over twice the rate of union density that has
applied in the current cycle'.[98]
1.36
The figures on multi-factor productivity tell a similar
story.[99] They show that during the
most recent cycle, which has taken place under the Workplace Relations Act, the
rates of multi-factor productivity growth have been below the average that
applied during the traditional award period.
1.37
Opposition senators find it difficult to align the goal
of productivity growth to the Government's Work Choices policy because
productivity is a function of many factors such as enhanced skills and
technical progress. It is not a product of workplace flexibility and labour re-regulation.[100] According to Peetz, the rate of
technical production won't come to a halt because a system of individual
contracting has not been introduced or unfair dismissal laws for workers in
firms with less than 100 employees have not been abolished.
1.38
The Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU) submission
challenged the Government's claim that the most dynamic and productive
economies in the world are the most deregulated. The Government stakes its
claim to the economic performance of countries such as the United
States, the United
Kingdom and New
Zealand. The AMWU submission referred to
OECD data which shows productivity levels in Belgium,
Ireland, France,
Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and
Norway higher
than in the Unites States. Countries which are criticised for being
over-regulated and union-dominated, including Germany,
Japan, Belgium
and France, also
have productivity levels which are above the OECD average.[101]
1.39
Opposition senators believe that the Government's
proposals are designed to increase short-term profitability rather than
productivity, principally by driving down the cost of labour. It is true that
profits can be increased by gains in productivity, as ACCI pointed out, but it
is easier for firms to increase their profits by cutting employees' wages by reducing
or abolishing penalty and overtime rates, which is already a common feature of
AWAs. The committee notes that a reduction in employee entitlements is often
dressed up as productivity. Employers in the hospitality industry, for example,
may claim that abolishing penalty rates for night or weekend work increases
labour productivity. But it does not. All that happens is that the wage cost
per meal is reduced while profits increase. Productivity, however, is
unchanged.[102] The same would apply to
waiters in cafes and restaurants. Cutting their penalty rates would not result
in more plates being carried out per hour, but in a reduction in pay. Peetz
concluded his study by stressing that productivity is not what corporations
seek: 'it is profitability they seek'.[103]
1.40
The other avenue open to firms to increase profits is
to increase the hours of work, which is a central feature of many AWAs. Two of
the biggest changes that have taken place in the services sector and in
manufacturing are an increase in the number of employees on 12 hour shifts and
an increase in the length of their working day to 12 hours. Changing the hours
of work is not a measure of productivity but a way for companies to increase
profits by getting more value for labour than was previously the case, and
without any long-term strategic planning to improve the nature of the
organisation. Research by Professor Richard
Mitchell shows that much of the productivity
growth of the past decade is because people are working harder, their employment
puts working lives under more pressure and there is greater employer control
over people's working lives and people are doing more tasks.[104]
The economic assumptions behind the
bill are unsound
1.41
It is remarkable that the weight of empirical evidence
is solidly against the arguments in favour of the bill. There is evidence which
suggests that the states are experiencing an increase in the number of
collective agreements, and an aversion to individual agreements. Opposition
senators agree with evidence from the Western Australian Government that three
critical ingredients are driving workplace productivity and industry
productivity: workplace reform, technological change and skills development.
The experience of Western Australia
confirms what most academic experts have also found: that there is no evidence
that individual contracts are better at driving workplace productivity than are
collective agreements.
1.42
Opposition senators note that the critique presented by
Peetz in his submission to the workplace agreements inquiry is endorsed by 151
academics in a joint submission to this inquiry. The joint submission states
categorically:
The justification for Work Choices rests in part on claims that
it will lift productivity. How this is supposed to happen has never been
explained; it has merely been asserted. There is no persuasive evidence
systematically linking industrial relations systems and industrial relations
changes to productivity improvement. There are many reasons why productivity
grows but industrial relations legislative changes are not generally a source of productivity growth across OECD
countries.[105]
Given the tenuous link between bargaining forms and workplace
productivity it is unlikely that the proposed legislation will generate further
productivity growth. On the contrary, the legislation is likely to see an
increased casualisation and increased turnover and a corresponding decline in
employer support training.[106]
1.43
Opposition senator's rejection of the Government's
primary economic justification of its Work Choices policy would be incomplete
without a response being provided to the ACCI submission. Under a heading
entitled 'there is an economic case in favour of workplace reform', ACCI
provided selective quotes from domestic and international sources and referred
to many dozens of research papers, most of which are published abroad. However,
no attempt was made by ACCI to synthesis and analyse the material referred to
in the submission and argue a case. Nor was there an attempt to address
criticisms that Professor Peetz
and others have made of Government policies. The so-called 'evidence' was
simply lumped together under the banner of economic reform. Opposition senators
are unable to accept as anything other than a baseless assertion ACCI's claim
that there is an unambiguous case in favour of the workplace reforms outlined
in the Work Choices Bill. Again, ACCI has demonstrated that it is not to be
taken seriously and that it behaves as nothing more than a cheer squad for the Government
on industrial relations.
1.44
Most of the works referred to in the ACCI submission
fit the mould of the neo-liberal orthodoxy which holds that deregulated labour
markets improve economic performance. It is hardly surprising that this is the
economic raison d'etre of
organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank. Opposition senators are more
cautious in how they approach debates on macro-economic policy. There is a
growing body of research which has challenged the evidentiary base on which the
new neo-liberal orthodoxy rests. A recent paper by Harvard University
Professor, Richard Freeman, for example, described as 'non-robust and ill
specified; and as 'more sawdust than hardwood' the belief that deregulating
labour markets and weakening trade unions will cure employment and spur
economic growth.[107]
1.45
At the committee's hearing on 17 November, Professor
Peetz gave a detailed rebuttal to ACCI's
submission, drawing particular attention to the various works cited in the
submission which support the assertion made by employer organisations that a strong
empirical economic case exists for Work Choices. He questioned the relevance of
many of the works referred to in the submission, including those by Access
Economics, the Business Council of Australia, the IMF, the OECD and the Reserve
Bank. The following comments give the flavour of what Professor
Peetz said about the ACCI submission's
attempt to support its assertions with empirical evidence:
When you look at those studies that are referred to by ACCI,
very few of them actually refer specifically to the sorts of things that are
directly related to the impact of the bill upon productivity. In particular,
the most important aspect of the bill is the promotion of individual
contracting at the expense of other methods of wage determination. A lot of the
studies that are referred to are not about productivity at all.[108]
1.46
An economic case for the Work Choices Bill has not been
made. The Government has failed to make the case that the proposed laws will
create jobs, lift productivity or improve living standards. It has not even
done any economic modelling to underpin the contents of the bill. It is
significant that all of Australia's
leading academic researchers of industrial relations who gave evidence to the
inquiry do not accept the economic assertions by either the Government or
employer organisations.
Employment outcomes
1.47
Another of the Government's economic justifications for
introducing this legislation is that by lowering the floor of minimum wages and
conditions, more people will be able to enter the labour market. As with
productivity gains, the link between the changes proposed in Work Choices and
employment are asserted, not demonstrated. The joint submission from 151
academics notes that the link between real wage cuts and employment is
contested, especially regarding the size of the cuts required to be effective.[109] Opposition senators agree with this
assessment, but take the issue one step further. Economists who support the
Government's policies rarely admit that the minimum wage might have to fall by
a significant amount before any effect on employment is felt. According to one
assessment, 'we don't know how much the many people already on the minimum wage
would have to lose in wages to permit more people to get jobs'.[110]
1.48
The assumption behind the Government' assertion is that
low paid and award-reliant workers already receive wages which are too high by
international standards, which has the effect of pricing too many people out of
the labour market. The objective of the Government's proposal to abolish the no
disadvantage test and establish a much lower benchmark of wages and conditions
through the Fair Pay and Conditions Standard appears to be a reduction in the
wages of low-income and women workers, and poor and disadvantaged people. An
official from DEWR told the committee: 'The overriding objective, certainly
from this government's perspective, is to maintain competitiveness for
employees and for young people generally'.[111]
This is bureaucratic code for reduced wages and conditions. It is the main
reason why the Government and employer organisations have consistently argued
for no wage increases, or for increases below the CPI, for low paid and most
award workers. The lowest paid employees would have been at least $50 a week
worse off had the AIRC accepted the Government's position since the Government
came to office. Opposition senators are philosophically opposed to any policy which
attempts to generate employment by slashing the wages and conditions of the
most vulnerable workers.
1.49
The Government's claim that its workplace reforms will
lift the employment rate has been brought into question by independent
researchers. It has been pointed out that under the Work Choices Bill, the
Government is only guaranteeing that the nominal value of the last adult safety
net wage increases given by the Commission will be preserved. Yet there is no
proposed indexation of the present minimum wage to ensure that its real value
is maintained. It is the Government's belief that this new 'Fair Pay'
Commission is necessary to create more jobs. Yet, Opposition senators believe
that the scope for increasing employment by reducing the minimum wage will be
limited. This is because, as one commentator put it: 'the more wages are cut,
the closer they come to bumping up against welfare benefits and the less
incentive people have to take jobs'.[112]
This is a conclusion shared by Professor
Peetz. He told the committee:
If your strategy to increase employment is to reduce real wages,
then you pretty soon run into labour supply problems. If you reduce wages too
much, then there is no incentive at all for people to enter the labour market,
because they receive in effect a subsistence income from unemployment benefits
and with the high effective marginal tax rates on unemployment benefits then it
is not worth doing. So if that were your strategy, then you would in turn have
to lower unemployment benefits in order to create the incentives for people to
move into employment.[113]
1.50
The ACTU submission criticised the Government for
characterising low paid workers as the 'undeserving not so poor'. Opposition
senators reject the Government's proposition, which is contradicted by recent
experience. The evidence shows that moderate increases in minimum wages do not
price award workers and other low skilled workers out of the workforce.
Increases made to award rates have coincided with a fall in unemployment and
higher workforce participation rates. There is no empirical economic evidence from
Australia or
abroad to support the assertion that increases in minimum wages costs jobs. The
ACTU submission made the valid point that the effect of minimum wages on
employment levels is ambiguous and cannot be deduced from theoretical first
principles:
Employer groups and the Government constantly rely on the theory
espoused by a small group of conservative economists and the unsupported
assertions of the IMF and the OECD who in turn rely on the work of the
conservative economists. None of these "expert" predictions, provided
with high degrees of certainty and probability, that wage increases will result
in job losses each year, have proved correct.[114]
1.51
The other side to the Government's claim about jobs
growth hinges on the current unfair dismissal laws and their presumed
impediment to employment in small and medium sized businesses. One of the
Government's more contentious claims is that removing the existing provisions
for unfair dismissal from businesses which employ up to and including 100
employees will generate up to 77,000 jobs, especially in the small business
sector. Opposition senators refer to the findings of the references committee
majority report into unfair dismissal and small business employment, which was
tabled in June 2005. It found that there is no empirical evidence or research
to support the Government's claim. The Government's proposition is breathtaking
for its lack of logic and empirical support. The report showed conclusively
that claims by the Government and employer groups are based on wishful thinking
and fuelled by misinformation instead of objective appraisal of the facts.
1.52
Opposition senators also take issue with the provisions
of the bill at section 96D, entitled 'Employer Greenfield agreements', where
employers in effect can make an agreement with themselves in company time as
part of the agreement-making process. Opposition senators find this one of the
more absurd provisions of the bill. It is likely that under any such
agreements, employees would be provided with only the basic minimum
entitlements leaving them much worse off than if they were employed by that
employer under the terms of the award. It is also ridiculous that the
Government is considering extending the life of employer Greenfield
agreements to a maximum of five years.[115]
Wages and conditions of employment
1.53
Evidence to this inquiry supports the findings of the
majority report of the references committee inquiry into workplace agreements,
which tabled its report in October 2005. The report found that claims by the
Government, DEWR, employer groups and the office of the Employment Advocate that
workers on AWAs received wages which are on average 13 per cent higher than
workers under collective agreements is not supported by any evidence. Figures sourced
from the Australian Bureau of Statistics show that wage increases for
non-managerial workers since 1998 are concentrated in the top 10 per cent
earnings percentile (see Table 1). The figures demonstrate the extent to which
the Government has been dishonest in its representation of the figures on wages
outcomes. Studies by Professor David
Peetz and others have
identified serious flaws with the OEA's research findings. The workplace
agreements report found that unions and union-based collective bargaining
create higher wages and better employment conditions for workers. Australian
Workplace Agreements create poorer pay and conditions, especially for low-paid and
low-skilled workers in a weak bargaining position in the workplace.
Table 1:
Increases in full-time AWE of non-managerial by distribution of earnings,
1998–2004[116]
Earnings percentile |
Real % change
1998-2004 |
10 |
1.2% |
20 |
1.2% |
25 |
2.0% |
30 |
2.3% |
40 |
3.1% |
50 |
2.6% |
60 |
1.9% |
70 |
2.3% |
75 |
3.2% |
80 |
4.8% |
90 |
13.8% |
AWE |
3.6% |
1.54
Opposition senators stress that under the Workplace
Relations Act there is no limit to the capacity for workers to negotiate higher
pay with employers. The only constraint is not being able to negotiate below
minimum standards of wages and working conditions under the global no
disadvantage test. The assumption behind the Work Choices Bill is that it will
lead to wages growth resulting from higher productivity. Opposition senators
believe that the legislation will have the opposite effect. It will certainly
lead to lower take-home pay for many vulnerable workers with limited bargaining
capacity. The Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard will reduce the
enforceable minimum conditions of workers.
1.55
The committee heard evidence from academics and unions
that the Work Choices bill will probably result in an immediate reduction in
the terms and conditions of employment, especially for award-reliant employees
and those in competitive industries, such as contract cleaning, hospitality, and
retail, where there is a high degree of labour cost competition between
employers. This will have a particularly detrimental effect on workers in the transport
industry. Opposition senators are concerned by evidence which shows how
competitive pressures in the transport industry lead to fatalities on the road.
It is likely that any downward pressure on wages and conditions in the
transport industry resulting from this legislation will seriously compromise
the health and safety of workers in the industry. A representative of the
Transport Workers Union told the committee:
This legislation will allow employers to deregulate wages, allow
them to pay less. In 2000 a House of Representatives parliamentary inquiry
report...showed there is a link between what you pay people and the level of
safety in road. As I say, two people a week currently are killed. If that was
in a trade in the building industry, electricians perhaps, there would be an
inquiry into why people were being electrocuted on the job. In our industry, it
is called a road accident. Those people are at work. It is a workplace injury
and it is a death.[117]
1.56
Opposition senators note evidence from Restaurant and
Catering Australia and the Council of Small Business Organisations of Australia
which confirms that many employer organisations believe that the level of wages
is currently too high and that the Work Choices Bill will enable them to
flatten out wages and remove some loadings such as penalty rates. The argument
is that for many small businesses to survive in this so-called '24/7' world,
there needs to be an opportunity to flatten wages across the week and allow
small businesses to offer services at any time to meet customer demand.[118] This is a frank admission that many
employers are waiting for the opportunity provided in this legislation to
provide wages and conditions which are below the award rate.
1.57
Another underhand provision of the bill which will leave
many casual and part-time workers in a vulnerable situation is that which
relates to maximum ordinary hours of work. Subdivision B provides for a maximum
of 38 hours per week to be averaged over an employees' applicable averaging
period, which can be up to an including 12 months. This can result in employees
being required to work longer hours during peak periods, such as Christmas and
Easter, and shorter hours during quiet periods. The committee heard evidence
from the National Secretary of the Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees'
Association, Mr Joseph
de Bruyn, about one large hardware chain,
Bunnings, which had already averaged the hours of its employees over a 12 month
period. According to Mr de Bruyn:
...the employees found this to be one of the most awful of their
whole rostering arrangements because the individual employees quickly in any
12-month period lost track of where the hours were that they owed the company
or the company owed to them compared with a standard 38 hours. When they got to
a quiet time they were given time off. The tendency of the company was to give
them, say a one- or two-hour later start on a day or a one- or two-hour earlier
finish on a day, rather than giving them the time off in useable amounts such
as whole days off. There was also no regard by the company as to when the
employee might like to take the time off in the quiet times. The company simply
dictated when it suited them, and that would not necessarily suit the
employees.[119]
1.58
The submission from Dr
Jill Murray, Law
School, La Trobe University, argued
that the system designed by Work Choices, where an as yet unknown number of
workers will be covered only by legal minimum entitlements, creates a 'worst
job standards'.[120] This is because
Work Choices strips away all legally mandated substantive employment rights,
except for those which workers are able to bargain for. A 'worst job' under
these conditions will be characterised by no minimum or maximum weekly hours,
no entitlements to a stable income each week, no meaningful entitlement to
overtime payments, no entitlement to higher rates of pay for unsociable hours,
no legal entitlement under the bill's terms to certainty of scheduling, no
right to collective bargaining and little or no job security. The submission
from Dr Murray
questioned whether any civilised society should be lowering the floor of minimum
legally regulated working conditions to the extent proposed by Work Choices:
In any civilised society, it is a proper function of the law to
ensure that at an absolute minimum, the worse jobs are ones which we are not
ashamed to have in Australia.
These should be jobs that we are comfortable seeing our fellow Australians
doing and, if it comes to that, doing ourselves.[121]
1.59
A report prepared by Dr
Barbara Pocock
for the Victorian Government on the impact of the Work Choices on working
families is critical of the Government's proposals for reasons similar to those
outlined by Dr Jill
Murray.[122]
The report concludes that AWAs on the whole are not family friendly and their
promotion by the Government is a retrograde step for workers and their families.
Women, part-time and casual workers fare especially badly under AWAs. Dr
Pocock's research shows that only 12 per
cent of AWAs registered between 1995 and 2000 have any work and family
provisions, 25 per cent have family or carers leave and only eight per cent
have paid maternity leave. To make matters worse, some 58 per cent of workers
on AWAs are denied long service leave and the majority of AWAs lack penalty
rates. Opposition senators are concerned by these figures, which are supported
by evidence received by the committee from a number of people employed on a
casual and part-time basis in the retail and hospitality industries.
1.60
There does not appear to be any mechanism in the Bill
for low paid women to pursue equal pay for work of equal value. The Industrial relations Commission is denied
the capacity to award increases in women's wages if the rate under review has
been set by the Fair Pay Commission, or the result of the review would be to
disturb a determination of the Fair Pay Commission. The Fair Pay Commission is
not obliged to consider special cases for a review of wages. It is also hard
to see how an organisation representing a female dominated occupation could
bargain for improved wages based on the undervaluation of work, as they are
prohibited form seeking a common claim across two or more workplaces by the
prohibition on pattern bargaining.
1.61
An important contribution to this debate was made by
the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission submission. It raised a
number of significant concerns with Work Choices Bill, including that it
significantly undermines the capacity of many employees to balance their work
and family responsibilities, and fails to ensure equal pay for equal work of
value. The Commission is particularly concerned that the bill fails to protect
vulnerable employees with little individual bargaining power, particularly
those with a disability, indigenous people and people moving from welfare
dependency.[123]
The risk of social and economic dislocation
1.62
The committee believes that the Government is moving
into uncharted waters with its new Work Choices Bill. It has not satisfactorily
explained how it will address the social consequences of radical change and the
slowdown in productivity. Nor has it explained how it will create more jobs,
alleviate the labour and skills shortage, ease work-family tensions and address
the growth of low-paid and precarious employment. The committee is not even
sure that employers and business are convinced of the Government's rhetoric
that the industrial relations system is so outdated that a complete re-write of
the WR Act is needed.
1.63
Nowhere is uncertainty over the consequences of the
Government's proposals clearer than on the issue of skills shortages. The
Government is now arguing that individual contracts will help repair the
current shortage of skilled labour. The argument appears to be that individual
contracts offer workers more flexible working hours which will encourage people,
especially women, back in to the workforce. It is a view which Opposition
senators do not support. Individual agreements will more than likely make
labour shortages worse, at least in the short term. Lower wages under AWAs will
mean fewer people will want to enter the workforce. Women in particular will
not think it worthwhile to get a job when minimum wages under Work Choices fall
steadily behind the current award rate.
1.64
The Government has failed to come up with solutions to
the significant labour market and workplace challenges which lie ahead. Dr
Ron Callus
and Dr John
Buchanan from ACIRRT have argued that a new
approach is needed to remedy major problems affecting an increasing number of
workers: 'More than a third of part-timers want more hours of work. More than
half of those working more than 50 hours a week want to work less'.[124] In Dr
Buchanan's view, WorkChoices has failed the
challenge. It is a policy that will deepen rather than solve the major problems
facing workers:
Problems in work-life balance, skills shortages and productivity
growth are real. They require the creative blending of standards for
flexibility, not an erosion of standards in the name of flexibility. The
changes proposed by WorkChoices will become part of the problem, not part of the
solution.[125]
1.65
The debate over whether AWAs are necessary for
productivity growth leads the committee to speculate on the relationship
between enterprise bargaining and factors external to the workplace, such as
the effect of a strong economy, low unemployment and demographic change on the
demand for skilled and unskilled labour. The committee is particularly
concerned by forecasts that Government policy is taking Australia
down the New Zealand
path of low skills and low wages, which will see the terrible social and
economic consequences of its failed deregulation policies revisited across the Tasman.
It is clear that this Government has abandoned the high skills and high wages
route to economic success and improved productivity. Opposition senators fear
that this will result in higher levels of poverty and economic deprivation with
corresponding threats to social cohesion. Isolated pockets of skilled labour
surrounded by unskilled and low-paid workers comprising women, young and casual
workers and persons from non-English speaking backgrounds will be created. One
commentator has argued that many of the harsher provisions of Work Choices will
come into play in a recession, especially for new employees. In this scenario,
employers will be laying-off workers or threatening to do so unless employees
agree to cut back on their conditions.[126]
There is also a risk that consumer confidence will slide as a result of penalty
rates being stripped away without the protection of awards.
Work Choices: A view from the state and territory governments
1.66
The committee received a 'joint governments' submission
on behalf of all the states and territories, with the exception of the Victoria
Government which made its own submission to the inquiry.[127] Opposition senators believe that the
states, especially Victoria and Western
Australia, and the territories, are well placed to
comment on the effect of a highly deregulated labour market on the wages and
conditions of workers. The 'joint governments' submission strongly opposed the
Work Choices Bill on the basis that the principles underpinning it are
fundamentally flawed. It recommended that the Senate reject the bill in its
entirety and called for a 'sensible and genuine debate' about how to achieve
better industrial relations outcomes at the national level. It argued that the
Government has failed to provide a case for change, there is no robust evidence
that economic or social benefits will result from the proposed changes, and the
bill will not make the current industrial relations arrangements more efficient
or effective. Instead, the bill will remove the rights and protections of
employers and employees, especially operators of small business in rural areas,
increase cost and complexity for employers, reduce the pay and conditions of
workers and their families and cause irreparable harm to employment and family
relationships. Opposition senators believe the 'joint governments' submission
is an important contribution to the inquiry because the states are united in
their opposition to the Work Choices Bill.
1.67
Opposition senators note a report by the Australian
Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Training (ACIRRT) into the
Government's Work Choices Bill which identifies a significant body of
experience with labour market deregulation in award systems. The report refers
specifically to the award systems in Victoria, Western
Australia and New
Zealand which were replaced with bargaining
systems underpinned by statutory minimum standards. The report found that the
outcomes across these deregulated award systems have been remarkably
consistent. The overwhelmingly majority of individual agreements were narrowly
focused on changes to earnings and working hours; large groups of employees
lost penalty rates, overtime rates, shift penalties and other allowances; and
labour market deregulation was associated with the growth of low-wage jobs,
especially in regional areas and particular sectors including hospitality,
recreation and personal services and mining and construction.[128] Some of these issues are considered
in more detail in the sections which follow.
Lessons from Victoria
1.68
The deregulation of the Victorian labour market during
the 1990s under the Kennett Government saw the comprehensive system of state
awards abolished and the state's industrial relations powers referred to the
Commonwealth in 1996. Victoria
remains the only state covered entirely by the federal jurisdiction. Under this
process of deregulation, some 356,000 (or schedule 1A) workers who were not
covered by federal awards and agreements were left with five minimum
conditions. Workplace bargaining did not occur for these workers due to their
poor bargaining position, resulting in their pay and conditions falling further
behind workers covered by the award safety net who were in a much stronger
bargaining position. Opposition senators believe that the lessons of the
Kennett Government's industrial relations policies are important to this
inquiry because workers in that state experienced the realities of living under
the microscope of policies which closely resemble Work Choices.[129]
1.69
In Victoria,
awards were replaced by five minimum conditions of employment which are similar
to those included in Work Choices legislation. They comprised the minimum
hourly wage rates and casual rates for each industry sector, four weeks annual
leave, one week sick leave, unpaid parental leave and notice upon termination
of employment.[130] The Kennett
Government promoted a deregulated market to encourage individual
agreement-making. All of these changes were justified on the basis that
employers and employees would be free to negotiate agreements that meet their
individual needs.
1.70
The industrial relations minister for Victoria,
Hon Rob Hulls MLA, told the committee:
...the Kennett Government deregulated the Victorian industrial
relations system in ways that are eerily similar to the current coalition
proposals. Victorian workers and their families were indeed the guinea pigs for
what many would describe as a cruel and indecent industrial relations model.
Their experiences are evidence of what will no doubt occur under the federal
coalition's proposals. On behalf of Victorians, I can tell you that the happy
ending of employers and employees sitting down together and agreeing on fair
wages and conditions was nothing more than a cruel hoax.[131]
1.71
The evidence before the committee shows that the
changes implemented in Victoria
during the 1990s resulted in a two-tiered system of wages and conditions: award
employees protected by a decent safety net and schedule 1A workers with only minimum
statutory protections. This resulted in an underclass of low-paid jobs which
had a particularly adverse effect on regional Victoria.
Schedule 1A workers were nearly twice as likely to be low paid compared to
employees on awards; 75 per cent were not paid penalty rates for working
weekends, 65 per cent were not paid annual leave loadings and only six per cent
were paid shift allowances.
1.72
The Industrial Relations Taskforce established by the
Bracks Government provides a snapshot of working conditions for schedule 1A
workers under the five legislated minima. It found a disproportionately large
low wage sector concentrated in small workplaces, especially in regional Victoria.
According to the Victorian Government submission, the Taskforce also found
there had been no significant increase in jobs growth compared with the
national average.[132]
Lessons from Western
Australia
1.73
Evidence to the committee from the Parliamentary
Secretary for Agriculture and Forestry in Western
Australia, Mr Anthony McRae MLA, reinforced the
message that proposals contained in the Work Choices Bill will result in lower
wages and conditions of employment for many workers. Mr
McRae told the committee that the Work
Choices Bill is not a new experiment because Western
Australia, like Victoria,
also provides a stark example of a failed attempt to deregulate a labour market
and introduce individual contracts. A system of registered individual workplace
agreements (IWAs), introduced in 1993 under the Workplace Agreements Act 1993, were not used to facilitate mutually
rewarding workplaces. They were used instead to strip awards and drive down
wages and employment conditions. This caused industrial unrest and social
dislocation, and began a process of inter-generational disadvantage. Mr
McRae described the effect of the 1990s
reforms on the industrial relations scene in Western
Australia:
There is very clear research based evidence that will show and
demonstrate...that the process of establishing individual workplace contracts,
with the removal of awards as an underpinning basis for fairness and standards
across industry, creates circumstances in which there becomes a downward
bidding in economic terms amongst enterprises and amongst employees. That is
the inevitable and guaranteed outcome of what the national parliament is
considering...and you have Western Australia
as a stark and failed example of that.[133]
1.74
Reports prepared by ACIRRT in 1996, 1999 and 2002 on
the effects of IWAs provided concrete evidence that the system which promoted
individual contracts over collective agreements did not provide a fair and
equitable safety net of wages and conditions. The first two reports were
commissioned by the then Trades and Labour Council of Western Australia
(UnionsWA).The reports found that most individual workplace agreements did not
provide penalty rates for weekend, holiday or overtime work, discouraged the
formal pursuit of grievances and were used by employers to pursue pattern
bargaining.[134] The 1996 report
concluded that 'deregulation may simply result in reduced accountability in the
settlement of wages and working conditions and not the development of dynamic,
innovative agreements that meet the particular needs of the individual parties
involved'.[135]
1.75
The 2002 ACIRRT report prepared for the Commissioner of
Workplace Agreements compared employment conditions in 200 IWAs across four
industries against the relevant state award. The report overall found that
workers were generally worse off under IWAs than under the comparable award.[136] It concluded that IWAs were basic
documents adopting a 'bare bones' approach to hours of work and hourly rates of
pay. The agreements invariably provided open-ended hours of work under the
guise of flexibility, with management and business needs being the key drivers
determining hours of work. A common approach was to expand the ordinary working
time arrangements and thereby reduce penalty costs that would have previously
been paid for working outside ordinary hours.[137]
The report found that while it appeared that workers on IWAs received a
significantly higher rate of pay relative to the award, a closer analysis found
that the 'loaded hourly rate' which absorbed entitlements such as leave and
penalty payments did no make up for the increasingly open and flexible hours of
work.[138]
New Zealand
under the Employment Contracts Act
1.76
During the hearings for this inquiry, a number of
witnesses drew comparisons between New Zealand's
failed experiment with individual contracts under the Employment Contract Act
(ECA) of 1991, and the proposals contained in the Work Choices Bill. Opposition
senators believe the New Zealand
experience provides salutary lessons which the Government has chosen to ignore.
The ECA removed all state support for collective bargaining by abolishing the
system of awards and making individual contracts the main way of setting wages
and conditions. Assessments of the effect of the ECA show that many individual
contracts did not included overtime and penalty rates, and were presented to
workers on a 'take it or leave it' basis. Wages also fell for many workers. A
study of supermarket workers found that earnings (including overtime) fell by
almost 12 per cent in real terms between 1991 and 1997. According to one
submission, studies show that by the end of the 1990s New Zealand was a less
equal society in terms of income distribution, had a lower full-time
participate rate, lower real wages, flat productivity and a diaspora of up to a
quarter of the population, many of them in Australia earning considerably
higher rates of pay than they could at home.[139]
In summary, the ECA's industrial relations experiment was a disaster for jobs,
wages and productivity growth, which dramatically increased the numbers of
'working poor' as many jobs were casualised, reduced to part-time hours or were
contracted out.
1.77
The committee heard compelling evidence from Mr
Andrew Casidy,
General Secretary of FinSec, New
Zealand's equivalent of the Financial
Services Union in Australia,
about the effect of the ECA on workers in the finance sector:
What we saw in the finance sector in the 1990s was...fear. It was
a race to the bottom...largely prompted by the competitive fear that employers in
the finance sector have of each other. We saw across workers...significant
attacks on overtime and penalty rate payments. We saw significant attacks on
pay systems and a movement towards performance or sales target incentive type
pay systems. We saw significant attacks on redundancy provisions...We saw a
concerted attack on workers' conditions and a spiralling downwards in
employment conditions.[140]
1.78
Mr Casidy
also addressed some of the long-term social effects of New
Zealand's failed experiment under the ECA.
He lamented, for example, a situation where high school children are entering
the workforce with no understanding of the concept of collectivism, as it
applies either in the workforce, in churches or in sports clubs. The ECA
succeeded to the extent that an ethos of collectivism has been replaced by a
cult of collectivism.
Work Choices Bill: some areas of concern
1.79
In this section of the report, Opposition senators take
issue with provisions of the Work Choices Bill which have will have the
greatest detrimental effect on the wages and conditions of workers and on the
ability of workers to choose and negotiate the form of agreement-making which best
suits their needs. When the Prime Minister announced the Government's agenda
for workplace relations reform in the Parliament on 26 May 2005, high on the list of proposals was a
simplified process for agreement-making. Among the key principles underpinning
the reforms were greater freedom and flexibility to employers and employees to
negotiate at the workplace level, and providing people with the 'choice' of
remaining under the existing award system or entering into workplace
agreements. It was claimed that the current process of agreement-making is long
and frustrating for employers and employees, preventing them from making their
own arrangements at the workplace. The Prime Minister indicated that a
'streamlined, simpler and less costly agreement-making process' would be
introduced where all collective and individual agreements will be approved on
lodgement with the OEA.[141]
1.80
The submission from DEWR stated that the central
objective of the Work Choices bill is to encourage the further spread of
workplace agreement in order to lift productivity and the living standards of
workers. It is the Government's belief that the current system imposes a costly
regulatory burden on employers and employees, inhibiting both productivity performance
and employment opportunities.[142] The
centrepiece of the Work Choices Bill is the creation of a national industrial
relations system, a new wage setting body, a new safety net comprising five
minimum conditions of employment and a simpler agreement-making system. Opposition
senators focus on the following controversial proposals contained in the Work
Choices Bill:
-
creation of a national industrial relations
systems using the corporations head of power provided in the Constitution;
-
creation of a new wage setting body, the
Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC), whose main task will be to set and
adjust a single minimum wage, minimum award classification rates of pay, and
minimum wages for juniors, trainees and employees with disabilities;
-
abolition of the 'no-disadvantage test' and creation
of a new minimum legislative standard – the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions
Standard – comprising five conditions including annual leave, personal/carer's
leave (including sick leave), parental leave (including maternity leave) and
maximum ordinary hours of work of 38 hours per week;
-
creation of a so-called 'simplified'
agreement-making system, which will substantially change existing processes for
the lodgement, variation and termination of agreements; and
-
provision for the minister to prohibit from
agreements matters which will be specified by regulation only.
1.81
Most of the evidence to this inquiry argued that there
is no evidence that the Work Choices legislation will meet any of bill's stated
objectives. Submissions from unions, academic experts and state and territory
governments argued that the bill will not simplify the current system but will
create more uncertainty and instability especially for small business. It was
argued that the bill will not lead to better pay, promote genuine workplace
bargaining or encourage employers and employees to settle disputes. Instead,
the legislation will lead to a reduction in the real value of minimum wages for
low paid workers, promote the unilateral determination of wages and conditions
by employers, and encourage employers to refuse to participate in procedures to
resolve workplace disputes.[143]
1.82
A number of academics challenged the philosophical
basis of the Work Choices Bill and, for this reason, recommended that the bill
should not proceed through Parliament in its current form. At the committee's
hearing on 17 November, witnesses representing the submission from 151
academics argued that the Work Choices Bill consists of a rushed and
fundamentally flawed package of reforms. However, given that it was likely the
bill would be passed through Parliament in roughly its current form, the
witnesses tabled a list of possible amendments to the bill which highlighted
some of the more important defects of the bill. The five areas covered by these
proposed amendments are listed at Appendix 2.
1.83
A large number of submissions and expert commentary
raised concerns about three proposals contained in the legislation which will
radically change agreement-making between employers and employees: abolishing
the no disadvantage test and replacing it with a fair pay and conditions
standard; having individual and collective agreements take effect from the date
they are lodged with the OEA; and enabling employees to bargain away a range of
award conditions when new workplace agreements are 'negotiated', including
penalty rates, shift/overtime loadings, allowances, public holidays, meal
breaks, annual leave loadings, incentive-based payments and bonuses.
A unitary system
1.84
The constitutional issues surrounding the Government's
proposal to use the corporations head of power under the Constitution to
introduce a national industrial relations system are complex. The Government's
legislation seeks to compulsorily move all constitutional corporations into the
new federal system, and end the operation of state industrial laws to the
extent that they are binding on any such constitutional corporations. Evidence
before the committee has questioned the Government's repeated assurances that
its Work Choices Bill is constitutional. Commentary on the constitutional basis
of a national industrial relations system has identified several negative
consequences. These include that many employers and employees will be excluded
from the coverage of the new system; the states system are only partially
displaced and to an uncertain extent; and many provisions are complex and
difficult to understand.[144]
1.85
The evidence from the National Farmer's Federation
(NFF) provided an illustration of this complexity. The Government's proposed
five-year transition period will provide access for farmers – primarily
unincorporated partnerships or sole traders – to the federal system. However,
at the end of this period farmers will either have to incorporate or return to
the state industrial relations system. The NFF indicated to the committee that
it will advise larger farms to consider partial incorporation to enable access
to the federal industrial relations system, whilst retaining access to tax
benefits such as Farm Management Deposits.
1.86
The 'Joint Governments' submission from state and
territory governments argued that Work Choices represents a revolutionary shift
in the constitutional basis of Australian industrial law which will result in
the corporatisation of labour law to the detriment of workers. Laws made on the
basis of this power will inevitably focus on the needs and attributes of
corporations, not on the nature of the interaction between employers and
employees at the level of the workplace: 'The Joint Governments are of the view
that the Bill represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the federal compact
and is an inappropriate use of constitutional power'.[145] The submission indicated that a
number of state and territory governments are in the process of identifying
grounds for a constitutional challenge, and will be parties in that challenge.
1.87
The committee received compelling evidence from
academic experts and state and territory ministers that the Work Choices Bill
will not create a truly national and simplified industrial relations system.[146] It also adopts the wrong approach in
moving towards this objective.[147] It
is estimated that between 20 and 25 per cent of all employees will fall outside
the proposed legislation, increasing to 40 per cent in some states. The extent
to which the state systems will continue to operate is indicated by the
estimate that 43 per cent of workers from Western
Australia and 42 per cent of workers from Queensland
will continue be covered by state industrial relations laws. The Minister for
Industrial Relations in New South Wales,
Hon John Della Bosca MLC, told the committee that the Government's first
objective with Work Choices – achieving a unitary system – will fail because it
cannot be achieved:
In terms of employment relations, at least two million employees
in Australia,
perhaps more, will still be outside the ambit of this bill. They will include,
to the best of my advice, all crown employees of the various state governments,
arguably many municipal employees and all of those people employed by
partnerships and unincorporated associations and, very dangerously for the
National Party's own constituency, those employed by trusts.[148]
1.88
Three other areas of concern were raised in evidence
about the Government's proposal for a unitary industrial relations system.
First, it was argued that the bill will create confusion for employers and
employers, instability at the workplace and dislocation in the labour market.
The Minister for Industrial relations in Queensland,
Hon Thomas Barton MLA, expressed his concern that the legislation will create
confusion for small businesses which will need to hire industrial relations
consultants to negotiate their AWAs, at a considerable cost. This is in
contrast to the current situation in Queensland
where the award system provides certainty to small business operators because
they know that their competitors offer the same wages and conditions as they
do.[149]
1.89
The ACTU submission supports this line of argument,
noting that the changes proposed under Work Choices will:
...only exacerbate the difficulties encountered by employer and
employees and will result in further unintended confusion. The haste with which
the legislation is being dealt...and the uncertainty regarding the scope of
application of the legislation will inevitably result in inefficiencies in the
labour market.
The transitional provisions for pre-reform State award and
agreements are complex, and most employers and employees will be uncertain as
to which industrial instrument applies, which jurisdiction they operate in and
their industrial rights and responsibilities.[150]
1.90
Second, the state and territory ministers made the
valid point that there is no evidence that the state industrial relations
systems are failing to work properly or are impeding workplace innovation and
reform. Opposition senators believe that the state systems are accessible,
inexpensive and responsive to the needs of employers and employees, and take a
practical approach to dispute resolution. It is not surprising that the states
have been angered by the Government's attempt at a hostile takeover of their
industrial relations powers, without the Minister for Employment and Workplace
Relations, Hon Kevin Andrews MP, consulting with his state and territory
counterparts about the need for change.
1.91
Third, the Work Choices Bill is a highly prescriptive
piece of legislation that attempts to regulate every aspect of the
employer–employee relationship. Opposition senators agree with the view that
this bill is the culmination of Government efforts to re-regulate the
industrial landscape. All the rhetoric about cutting red tape and simplifying
agreement making conceals the effect that this legislation will have. It will
add more layers of regulation and complicate national industrial relations law.
Academic experts believe the legislation will complicate workplace life and
foster industrial litigation. Opposition senators agree that the arrangements
provided for in the bill are more complex, not less; and there is more
regulation, not less.[151]
Australian Fair Pay Commission
1.92
The transfer of responsibility for wage setting from
the Australian Industrial Relations Commission to the new Australian Fair Pay
Commission (AFPC) will lead to a reduction in the real value of minimum wages
for low paid workers. Opposition senators have a number of concerns about the
role and function of the AFPC. Under the terms of the Work Choices Bill:
-
the AFPC will determine minimum wages with the
objective of promoting 'the economic prosperity of the people of Australia'.
However, it will not determine minimum conditions of employment or have regard
to living standards which exist in the community;
-
there is no requirement for the AFPC to have
regard to 'fairness' in providing a safety net for the low paid, either
fairness in meeting needs or fairness in the context of community standards;
-
there is no obligation for the AFPC to conduct
its hearings in public, and it is unlikely that employees and the wider
community will play a role. The newly appointed chair, Professor Ian Harper,
has stated publicly that private and confidential discussions will form part of
the process;
-
the AFPC will not be subject to judicial review.[152]
1.93
The committee received evidence that the bill will
adversely affect ethnic workers and new migrants, many of whom are employed in
low-skilled, low-paid jobs or receive Government welfare payments. Many people
from non-English speaking backgrounds are entirely dependent upon basic awards
conditions, such as public holidays, rest breaks, penalty rates and overtime
loadings. There is concern that the AFPC will not provide these workers with
the minimum wages necessary to maintain a reasonable standard of living. The
only conclusion that Opposition senators are left with is that the AFPC is
being established to deliver wage outcomes which are below the current wage outcomes
set by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission. There can be no other
logical reason for the Government's decision to take away this wage-setting
power from the Commission.
1.94
Opposition senators note that the widespread public
discussion on the role of the Fair Pay Commission, and speculation about its
stance on protecting the interests of the lowly paid, has attracted the
attention of church organisations. There is much in the Work Choices Bill to
alarm advocates of social justice and family-friendly conditions of work within
mainstream denominations.
1.95
Advocates for the bill have not been impressed by these
concerns. The views of Opposition senators may reflect a degree of irritation
with comments made by Professor Harper,
the prospective Fair Pay Commissioner, who is reported to have stated that he
would be praying for divine guidance. While it may be agreed that in doing so Dr
Harper will be following a practice common among privately devout holders of
public office, such public comment is always ill-considered in relation to
public policy. What is so gauche about this statement is its suggestion that
decisions in relation to Fair Pay issues may be based as much on divine
inspiration as on interpretation of legislative instruments and sound public
policy processes. As the committee heard from Uniting
Church leaders:
I would actually prefer that the guidelines of the Fair Pay
Commission gave him quite explicit directions. Is it appropriate that, in fact,
a Christian is actually calling upon God in a multicultural and multifaith
society? I think that raises more questions than it answers.[153]
1.96
The point was clarified by another Uniting Church
witness who confirmed that Minister Andrews had told her that he and the Fair
Pay Commissioner designate had an 'understanding' in relation to awarding a minimum wage increase:
It was along the lines that, yes, there would be a review next
year. I cannot remember the date. It does not seem to me to be my role to
describe undertakings of the minister and the chair. Our concern is that the
fact that he relied on the concept of there being a private undertaking seemed
to us to be very poor public policy. I think that is also the point that Dr
Drayton is trying to make about a
chairperson relying on prayer. We would endorse everyone praying. That is not a
problem. The problem is when it becomes the basis for making a decision as the
head of a statutory authority. Prayer cannot be a substitute for putting things
in the legislation that clarify that whoever is in that position, whether a person
of faith or not, has certain responsibilities. Similarly, when the reviews take
place ought to be in the legislation and not a matter of private
understandings, given that politics involves change and ministers come and go
from particular portfolios. Public policy cannot rely on those sorts of
understandings. It needs to be clear in the legislation what the public policy
is.[154]
1.97
Opposition senators point out that two issues are
involved here. The main issue, to be dealt with later in this section of the report,
is the extraordinary discretionary power of the Minister. The interesting point
that remains is the curious intrusion into the workplace relations debate of
such comment from a leading participant in the process of minimum wage setting.
The parading of populist American-style evangelism in relation to what is
essentially a challenge for secular policy-making, is stretching tolerance too
far. It is the context, and not the belief, that would make such a statement
ring strangely, even to the ears of the devout.
Abolishing the no disadvantage test
1.98
The Work Choices Bill will abolish the no disadvantage
test and replace it with a new Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard
(AFPCS). This is one of the most controversial changes included in bill. Under
the no disadvantage test, employees could expect that workplace agreements
would be compared with the totality of award pay and conditions, including
penalty rates, overtime provisions and allowances. Under the AFPCS, agreements
will be measured only against a minimum ordinary pay rate and a few leave
provisions. The new minimum standard will comprise the relevant award wages and
four other legislated entitlements including annual leave, personal/carer's
leave (including sick leave), parental leave (including maternity leave) and maximum
ordinary hours of work.
1.99
A major consequence of this new standard is that there
will be widespread potential for reductions in employees' weekly pay as it will
be easier for employers to reduce or cut penalty rates, overtime rates, leave
loading, shift allowances and all other items of remuneration not covered by
the 'fair' standard. The Government appears to have responded to this criticism
by including in the bill a requirement that while these conditions can be the
subject of bargaining, they can only be modified or removed by specific
provision in an agreement approved by the employee. The Work Choices policy booklet
states: 'If these conditions are not mentioned in the new agreement under Work Choices
these award conditions [penalty rates, overtime rates and so on] will continue
to apply'.[155] Section 101B of the
bill states that the protected award conditions are taken to be included in a
workplace agreement: '...subject to any terms of the [the agreement] that
expressly exclude or modify all or part of them'. This begs the question: what
do the words 'expressly exclude or modify' mean in practice? Opposition
senators sought to clarify this issue with officers from DEWR and the Office of
the Employment Advocate at an estimates hearing in November 2005, without much
success. It appears that an agreement which included the five minimum standards
and which stated that these are the only terms and conditions of employment
that apply, would be consistent with the wording of section 101B.
1.100
Opposition senators believe that the provision enabling
employees to agree to trade away their entitlements is a smoke screen to give
the appearance that an employee will actually have a direct say in the wording
of an AWA. To argue that award conditions are 'protected by law', as Government
advertising has made out, is a deception. The idea that employees will either
be able or willing to negotiate away entitlements defies the reality of AWAs,
most of which are offered on a 'take it or leave it' basis. The Ethnic
Communities' Council of NSW submissions stated: 'While the laws may require
employers to lay down on the negotiating table the award conditions that will
be stripped away, this will make little difference in reality'.[156] It is a ridiculous proposition to
suggest that employees, especially those with no bargaining power, will have
any say in this, let alone be aware of what they are signing up to.
1.101
Abolishing the no disadvantage test is a cruel and retrograde
step which will result in many new AWAs being registered even where they push
total earnings below award levels. Many submissions expressed concern that the
AFPSC represents the most significant weakening of protective regulation in the
system of decentralised bargaining.[157]
Lodgement, enforcement and
termination of agreements
1.102
Under Work Choices, all agreements will commence on
lodgement with the OEA. The Employment Advocate has confirmed that the Work
Choices Bill establishes a lodgement-only process for AWAs and certified
agreements. The onus is placed on the employer to attach to each AWA a
statutory declaration attesting that all the legal requirements for the
negotiation, lodgement and content of the agreement have been met, including
that an employee has genuinely consented to the agreement. The role of the OEA
will be to confirm that, when AWAs and collective agreements are lodged, the
declaration has been made correctly and is attached to the agreements as
lodged. It will not check that employees have consented to an agreement, nor
will it check for duress after agreements are lodged. Opposition senators are
concerned that this lodgement-only process provides workers with no guarantee
that an agreement is lawful. The OEA is under no obligation to check statutory
declarations to ensure that workplace agreements comply with the law. It is
possible that many unlawful AWAs which have been lodged with the OEA will
remain undetected. This is an unsatisfactory situation which places many
workers, especially those who are pressured into signing an AWA, at a serious
disadvantage.
1.103
To make matters worse, under the Work Choices Bill the
OEA will have no role to play regarding the enforcement of compliance. The
OEA's current enforcement responsibilities will be handed over to the Office of
Workplace Services (OWS). This raises a number of areas of concern. There is no
evidence that the current enforcement policy and practice of the OWS will be
revised to ensure that employers comply with the law, or that it will not adopt
the OEA's current practice of ignoring employers who break the law.[158] Opposition senators believe that the
enforcement provisions of the bill will cause further injustice and harm to
employees.
1.104
Opposition senators have serious reservations about provisions
relating to the termination of agreements. It will be possible for employers to
terminate a workplace agreement unilaterally after the nominal expiry date of
the agreement. Employees covered by that agreement will then revert to the
minimum standard. The provision which states that employment conditions revert
to the minimum allowable 90 days after the expiry of a certified agreement,
will encourage employers to engage in stalling tactics so that workers' wages
and conditions will revert to the fair pay and conditions standard. The
provision will effectively allow the conditions of a certified agreement to
lapse by simply refusing to negotiate.[159]
This will provide employers with leverage over the terms and conditions of any
new agreement. Opposition senators believe that even best practice employers
will be tempted to introduce new terms and conditions below the standard of the
terminated agreement. The legislation should not provide employers with
incentives to refuse to negotiate or draw up new agreements which contain below
award conditions.
Ministerial powers and prohibited
content
1.105
Another controversial aspect of the bill concerns the
powers which the bill gives the workplace relations minister to prescribe by
regulation matters that are prohibited content. The ACTU believes that section
101E confers on the minister the power to invalidate part or all of an
agreement, including agreements which are currently in force.[160] Opposition senators believe that
these are unprecedented powers contrary to the stated objective of the bill,
which is to devolve responsibility for agreement-making to the parties at the
workplace. A representative of the Transport Workers Union told the committee:
'the idea that a minister can say what parties can even discuss, let alone put
into an agreement, is to our way of thinking the most perverse and
micromanaging form of government involvement in what was supposed to be
agreement making between the parties'.[161]
The powers make a mockery of the Government's claim that the best workplace
relations are those that operate directly between employees and employers. It
is unacceptable to have employers and employees to enter into a workplace
agreement when the Government has the capacity to impose terms by removing a
matter the parties have agreed to. In practice, this will mean that the
goal-posts of agreement-making are constantly shifting as the parties entering
into negotiations do not know in advance the rule under which they are
participating. Unions are particularly concerned by the on-sided nature of
these powers. It will be possible for the business community to analyse the
content of agreements and lobby the minister to strike out matters they do not
like the look of.
1.106
Neither the bill nor the explanatory memorandum
describe what matters will be prohibited. Yet the Government's information
booklet referred to trade union training, paid union meetings, anti-AWA
clauses, clauses relating to the agreements of a successor collective
agreement, and unfair dismissal clauses. At the committee's public hearing on
16 November, ACTU President, Ms Sharan
Burrow, summarised the concerns with these
powers, which are shared by Opposition senators:
We find this an incredible situation. It is not only a serious
conflict in terms of the separation of powers; it is actually the most
authoritarian act I have seen anywhere in the world—anywhere. What it is really
saying is that you can cut a deal...and two things can happen: one is that, first
and foremost, the provisions mean that the deal is not necessarily a deal
anyway, something that employers would never put up with in contract law. An
employer can simply entice people out of a collective agreement either by the
use of individual contracts with the bribery of higher rates or better
conditions or indeed by intimidation...and secondly...the Minister can decide that
he does not like something in the deal and simply say, 'No, we're not having
that'.[162]
Conclusion and recommendation
1.107
Opposition senators believe that the Government is
taking an unnecessary risk with the economy with its Work Choices Bill. It has
failed to make an empirical economic case for its industrial relations reforms.
It has failed to explain why a large unprotected underclass of workers and a
widening gap between skilled and unskilled labour must be the price for its
narrowly conceived vision of improved economic performance. The committee is
concerned by the prospect that Work Choices will be a blueprint for undoing the
economic gains made over the last 15 years and will seriously threaten the
quality of life and Australian society.
1.108
The focus of this report is the Government's so-called
policy justification for Work Choices and some of the main contentious
provisions of the bill. Earlier sections of the report emphasised that the
time-frame for this inquiry left no time for the committee to canvass a wide
range of views. The debate on industrial relations reform so far has been
narrowly conceived and couched almost exclusively in economic terms. The
Government has failed to provide a convincing economic case for its proposed
policy. There is no compelling economic evidence to show that the proposed laws
will create jobs, lift productivity or improve living standards. There is no
evidence that the industrial relations system has hindered national economic
performance either. Opposition senators note that there has been sustained
productivity and employment growth for the better part of a decade, industrial
disputes are at an historic low, and the profit share of the economy is at a
record high. The hearings for this inquiry gave an insight in to the social
costs for low-paid workers that will inevitably follow after the Work Choices
bill becomes law. The experiences of Western Australia,
Victoria and New
Zealand under highly deregulated industrial
relations environments provide practical examples of what is currently being
proposed in Work Choices.
1.109
Opposition senators believe that the Government's Work
Choices Bill is a wasted opportunity to address economic priorities such as
investment in education and skills, research and development, leadership in
social and economic infrastructure investment, the need to reduce dependence on
domestic debt and consumption as drivers of growth, and the importance of
savings.[163]
1.110
Much of the rhetoric used to promote the bill, such as
'choice', 'flexibility', and a 'simpler' industrial relations system is couched
in Orwellian language which disguises the real intent and effect of what is
being proposed. During the references committee's inquiry into workplace
agreements, a representative from the Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees'
Association made the perceptive observation that the industrial relations
system operating under the WR Act does everything opposite to what it says it
will do:
I quibble with the fact that the current system does everything
opposite to what it says it will do – it is not fair, it is not free, it is not
effective bargaining, there is no employee choice and everything is done in
secret. People only do evil things in secret. If people do good things, they
want to boast about it from the rooftops; if you want to do something evil, you
go and hide.[164]
1.111
Opposition senators agree, and believe that the
Orwellian language of the Work Choices Bill masks a range of nasty intended and
unintended consequences for workers. Although Opposition senators were given
only one week to consider this legislation, the evidence to the inquiry from a
range of stakeholders raised many areas of concern. To conclude this report, Opposition
senators find that:
-
the purpose of the Australian Fair Pay
Commission is to reduce real minimum rates of pay over time;
-
the bill is going to enshrine unfairness by
shifting power overwhelmingly to employers;
-
employers can concoct any reason to dismiss
workers. The practical application of the bill means that the Government's
assurance that workers will be protected by unlawful termination provisions and
from duress is a hollow promise. Workers can be sacked for 'chewing gum' or any
similar reason, and they will be denied the option of workplace collective
bargaining;
-
paid public holidays are not protected under the
new minimum Fair Pay and Conditions Standard;
-
the bill does not contain any family-friendly
provisions. On the contrary, a range of entitlements currently protected by
awards, such as penalty rates and maternity leave, will not be protected in the
bill;
-
any gradual real reduction in minimum wages will
have an adverse effect on the rate of the pension;
-
the bill is clearly designed to take unions out
of the workplace and reduce workers' bargaining power; and
-
no empirical evidence has been provided by the
Government and employer groups in support of the bill.
1.112
The overwhelming evidence to this inquiry suggests that
the Work Choices policy will have the opposite effect to the objectives which
are stated at the front of the bill. Is it any wonder the Government insisted
on holding only a one week inquiry which prevented the legislation committee
from properly examining this far-reaching piece of industrial relations
legislation.
Recommendation
The Work Choices Bill is
so fundamentally flawed that any number of amendments will only marginally
mitigate the intended and unintended consequences. Therefore, Opposition
senators recommend that the bill be rejected in its entirety.
Senator Gavin Marshall
Deputy Chair
Appendix 1
Principles underpinning
proposed amendments to the Workplace Relations (Work Choices) Bill 2005 to
protect outworkers
- A separate Part should
be included in the bill to deal with the regulation of outwork in the clothing
industry. This part should override any conflicting provisions in the remainder
of the bill.
The objects of the
part should include:
- The elimination of exploitation of outworkers in
the clothing industry;
- To provide protection for what has universally
been recognised as a class of extremely vulnerable workers;
- To provide for uniform rights for outworkers as
employees and obligations upon those who engage outworkers, irrespective of the “label” given to the particular contractual arrangement of an outworker;
- To provide for the continuation of regulation,
inspection and enforcement of the provisions through right of entry powers and
prosecution rights for the TCFUA; and
- To prevent the avoidance of obligations through
sham contractual arrangements by making provision for outworkers to recover
unpaid monies from parties further up the contractual chain.
The new Outwork Part should contain
the following:
- Provide a
definition of outworker involving the performance of clothing work in a private
residence or other non-commercial premises, and which does not contain a
requirement that an outworker be an employee, and which does not require that a
person perform work for someone else’s business as part of the definition. For
example:
“Outworker” means a person engaged, in or about a private
residence or other premises that are not necessarily business or commercial
premises, to perform clothing work.
Definitions will also be required for “clothing work”,
“employer” and other terms.
- Deem all
outworkers to be employees for the purpose of the Bill
and other Federal and State laws.
- Incorporate
the existing Federal Award provisions and ensure that they apply to all persons
in the clothing industry who directly or indirectly engage people to perform
clothing work. The Part should provide that there is no capacity for a person
to contract out of these provisions, and no other industrial instrument, either
during its life or upon its expiry or termination, can diminish these
provisions.
- Include
existing TCFUA rights of entry and inspection
in relation to outworkers under existing federal and state laws and awards.
- Preclude
entering into an AWA with an outworker.
- Provide that
outworkers’ terms and conditions of employment are no less favourable than
those currently contained in the Federal Clothing Trades Award, including any
improvements in wages and conditions granted through the Australian Fair Pay
and Condition Standard.
This includes maintaining the no-disadvantage test for any
collective workplace agreement covering an outworker, along with a transparent
process of scrutiny prior to the collective workplace agreement coming into
effect.
- Include
provisions like those in Victoria,
NSW, Queensland and South
Australia providing for recovery of unpaid monies up
the contracting chain, and providing for the monitoring of the industry by an
Ethical Clothing Council, and providing for the development and implementation
of a mandatory industry code of practice.
- Explicitly
preserve state laws relating to outworkers and provide that the federal laws
are complimentary.
Appendix 2
Possible Amendments
to the Work Choices Bill suggested by Barbara Pocock, David Peetz, Robyn May and
Andrew Stewart
- Incorporated
businesses should not be forcibly transferred into federal system, hence giving
employers more choice and avoiding the need for complex and burdensome
transitional provisions.
- The
minimum standards in the AFPCS should be strengthened by:
- making
the working hours standard subject to an overriding requirement for the
employer not to require or request unreasonable hours;
- incorporating
the AIRC’s decision in the Work and Family Test Case.
- The
integrity of the award system as a “safety net” should be preserved by:
- ensuring
that workers presently covered by State awards remain covered by awards if they
choose not to make workplace agreements;
- removing
the provision for employer greenfields “agreements”;
- retaining
the existing rules on the application of awards in the event of a transmission
of business;
- providing
that awards “revive” if a workplace agreement is terminated.
- Ensure
the integrity of genuinely negotiated agreements, by:
- making
collective agreements genuinely binding on employers, by preventing them
offering individual agreements on less favourable terms;
- specifying
“prohibited content” in the Act rather than in regulations, and confining it to
provisions which would breach laws on discrimination or freedom of association.
- If there
are to be exemptions from unfair dismissal laws:
- the
exemption should be confined to small businesses;
- related
corporations should be counted as a single business;
- the
overly-broad “operational reasons” exemption should be deleted.
Navigation: Previous Page | Contents | Next Page