Chapter 3 - Issues of contention
3.1
In May 2005 the Prime Minister and Minister for
Workplace Relations announced that the Government intended to introduce further
workplace relations reform. A large-scale public misinformation campaign was
initiated by opponents of workplace relations reform. The claims about Work
Choices made in Parliament and the media, particularly those made by some
members of the Opposition and union representatives, have been baseless
attempts at scaremongering.
3.2
This chapter identifies the main areas of the
government's policy which have come under fire
from opponents, and addresses the criticisms in turn. It corrects much of the
misinformation which has surrounded debate on Work Choices, and places the
policy in a realistic and factual context.
Background to the legislation
3.3
The Work Choices Bill has not materialised quickly.
Since the passage of the Workplace Relations Act in 1996, the Coalition has
attempted follow-up legislative reform through a series of amendments
necessitated by experience in the 'bedding down' of the WR Act. It has had
limited success. The extensive omnibus amendment bill introduced in 1999, the
Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (More Jobs Better Pay) Bill
1999, well-known by its shorthand title, MOJO, was the first attempt. This bill
was eventually laid aside in the Senate and in later years was broken up into
constituent areas of policy to be legislated for separately. A descriptive
listing of bills submitted in this way is to be found in Appendix 5 of this report.
3.4
While the size and scope of the Work Choices Bill has
provoked comment and criticism from a number of quarters, it should be
recognised that the bill contains, among other provisions, the consolidation of
nine years of previously debated legislation.
3.5
It is not therefore true that the provisions of the
bill have been subject to restricted debate. While some provisions of the bill
may be relatively new, the Government has previously introduced various bills
into Parliament that dealt with many of the matters covered by the Work Choices
Bill. There is no basis upon which to claim that most of the important reforms
contained in Work Choices are a surprise. Those elements of the Work Choices
Bill not the subject of this inquiry have been previously examined (at least
once) by 14 separate Senate inquiries.
In addition the Government has attempted to change the unfair dismissal
laws in the WR Act at least 41 times since 1996.
3.6
Two elements of the legislation not previously seen are
the provisions establishing the Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC) and
changing the scope of operation of the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission (AIRC). Yet the Government's view of the need to revise the role of
the AIRC, in relation to the setting of minimum and award classification wages,
has been known for years. The establishment of the AFPC, loosely based on the
UK Low Pay Commission (established in 1997), was first announced on 26 May 2005.
3.7
The most important element in the Work Choices Bill,
and the most complex, is the set of provisions that create a national workplace
relations regime, in place of six different state and federal regimes. The
current federal system rests primarily on the concurrent powers in the
Constitution in section 51 (xxxv), known as the conciliation and arbitration
power. The basis for the national scheme rests on section 51 (xx), known as the
corporations power. This change alone makes it the most important bill in the
field of industrial relations since the passage of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904. As responsibility for
national economic policy is obviously a matter for the Commonwealth, it follows
that labour policy, which is inextricably linked to economic policy, should be
a matter which is regulated at a national level.
3.8
The committee concurs with the Australian Industry
Group's views that while workplace reforms are
necessary, they do not assume more importance than global economic trends in
determining economic success. But there is strong evidence that productivity
improvements come from workplace relations reform and deregulation.
International bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have linked
increased labour market flexibility to productivity growth.[35] This has been the commonly shared
experience of OECD countries. The OECD commented that the Government's
structural economic policy reforms in the last decade 'conferred
an enviable degree of resilience and flexibility on the Australian economy'
and resulted in a prolonged period of good economic performance.[36] Evidence from the Productivity
Commission and a number of independent academic researchers also shows that the
adoption of flexible workplace relations arrangements through previous reforms
has led to improved productivity.[37]
3.9
Despite the incontrovertible evidence that the labour
market reforms implemented from the mid-1990s to the present have improved
economic performance and resulted in higher real wages, some commentators
continue to assert that further labour market reforms are unnecessary. Nor,
they argue, will it lift productivity and hence the living standards of working
people. The Government continues to take the view that further reform will
produce worthwhile increases in efficiency, competitiveness, and living
standards. It is clear to the Government, as it is to the committee majority,
that there is more work to be done if Australia
is to continue its enviable economic record.
3.10
A concern often cited by opponents of reform is that
the workplace relations changes implemented over the last decade have led to
wider income disparity, and that the reforms in the Work Choices Bill will
further increase inequality. In fact, the Household Income and Income
Distribution report, released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) on 4 August 2005, shows that there was no
significant change in income inequality between 1994 and 2003-04.[38]
3.11
Furthermore, the OECD's
Innovations in Labour Market Policies –
the Australian Way also noted that during the 1980s (before the
introduction of enterprise bargaining), real wages fell, particularly in the
case of low-wage workers; while after workplace relations reform was started in
the 1990s, real wages increased across the earnings distribution. There now
exists an immediate need for further workplace relations reform in order to
ensure that both corporate productivity and individual wealth can continue to
expand into the future.
The economic imperative and the need for further reform
3.12
Although previous reforms produced significant
improvements in economic indicators, Australia
is beginning to fall behind in international productivity levels. In its 2004
economic survey of Australia,
the OECD commented that productivity levels were well below those recorded in
other OECD countries, as were participation rates among some working-age
population groups.[39] In addition, data
from the ABS show that productivity rates fell during the 2004-05 financial
year for the first time in a decade.[40]
In October 2005, labour force participation rates declined and unemployment
increased. The productivity lag and looming demographic challenge must be
addressed by more extensive labour market reform.
3.13
The OECD recommended that further reform was needed to
make the labour market function more effectively. It recommended promoting the
negotiation of wages and conditions at the enterprise and individual levels and
removing disincentives to hiring, particularly of low skilled workers. Other
recommendations included improving education and training, and creating
stronger incentives for workforce participation, particularly for older
workers.[41]
3.14
Along with the OECD and the IMF, many other groups and
commentators support further reform of the workplace relations system,
including the Business Council of Australia, the Australian Industry Group
(AiG) and the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI).[42] ACCI's
submission to this inquiry provides a comprehensive discussion of the economic
evidence of the benefits of previous reforms and the case for further reform.
ACCI cites 54 examples of Australian and international economic studies and
commentaries supporting the type of reform proposed by the Work Choices Bill.[43]
3.15
A recent report produced by Access Economics for the
Business Council of Australia entitled Locking in or
Losing Prosperity: Australia’s Choice, concludes that each
Australian could be $70,000 wealthier if further change to workplace
participation rates and economic change, including workplace relations reform,
is undertaken.
3.16
The report argues that without previous reforms to the
workplace relations system, unemployment would have averaged 8.1 per cent in
2003-04 rather than 5.8 per cent, and an extra 315,000 people would have been
out of work. The report concludes that Australia
faces the choice of being a low growth (2.4 per cent annually) or high growth
(4 per cent) country.
3.17
Achieving 4 per cent 'would not require a program of
radical reform', according to BCA chair Hugh
Morgan. It would merely require an 'extension'
of changes already put in place over the past 20 years.[44]
3.18
The Australian Industry Group provided evidence to the
committee that the current framework is overly prescriptive and that changes
are necessary 'to align the workplace
relations system with the circumstances of modern industry'.[45] The AiG conducted a survey in mid-2005
regarding workplace relations reform. Of the more than 700 employers who
responded, 68 per cent said that the existing system had no effect on their
ability to improve productivity, 13 per cent said it had a negative effect and
only 19 per cent said it had a positive effect on their ability to improve
productivity.[46] These results
highlight the need for reforms that allow agreement making to drive
productivity.
3.19
International authorities have also supported the need
for further workplace relations reform. The Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) recently concluded that:
Further unfinished business includes
harmonisation of federal and state industrial relations and the streamlining of
regulations which minimise the incidence of unlawful industrial action.
Finally, the cost of dismissal procedures, including for employees who
have been with firms for only a short period, is often cited by small
businesses as a disincentive to hiring. The Government is now in a
position to address these issues and should proceed as soon as
practicable. [47]
3.20
Further reform is also needed to address ageing-related
constraints on the future labour supply by removing barriers to greater
participation in the workforce. Higher participation rates among people of
working age will become more important as the population ages and the fertility
rate remains below replacement levels. While there are currently about five
times as many people of traditional working age as there are those over 65,
projections indicated that in 40 years, there will be 40 people over 65 for
every 100 people of traditional working age.[48]
3.21
It is clear that Australia needs a national workplace relations system which enables
companies to remain highly adaptable and flexible to meet demographic
challenges and remain competitive in the global economy.
Changed role of the AIRC
3.22
Under the Work Choices Bill, the AIRC will have
responsibility for simplifying awards, regulating industrial action, registered
organisations and right of entry, and a continuing role in relation to
termination of employment. The AIRC will continue to resolve disputes and will
have specific powers relating to that function. The Australian Fair Pay
Commission, which is discussed below, will take on the AIRC's wage setting
role.
3.23
The WR Act maintained the role of the AIRC which it
inherited from the old Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, even though the
Government at the time believed it was no longer appropriate to invest a
dispute resolving body with wage fixing powers.
3.24
Critics have interpreted the reduced role of the AIRC
as an attack on the maintenance of award and minimum wages. But the
establishment of the Fair Pay Commission and the changed role of the AIRC are
designed to address problems with the current system. Witnesses from ACCI
elucidated some of the shortcomings of the AIRC wage case process from an
employers' perspective. The ACCI argued that the legalism and the adversarial
characteristics of the quasi court case process of the AIRC is directly
damaging to the outcomes for the individuals who are covered by minimum wages,
those out of work, for the employers and for the economy generally.[49]
3.25
ACCI went on to say that the current system provides
for legal arbitration, rather than economic analysis. ACCI's chief executive
couched the situation in terms of conflict:
Unfortunately, it is [a situation] where you have one group
saying, 'The minimum wage should be over here,' and another groups saying, 'It
needs to be there,' because the actual way that they make their decisions is by
splitting the difference somewhere in the middle ... With the Work Choices bill
we are seeing a proposal which we have now been promoting for a number of
years: we should have an economic analysis that takes into account, for
example, the plight of the unemployed – some half a million or more people in
this country who do not get a look in the minimum wage cases as they are run
today.[50]
3.26
The National Farmers' Federation agreed, saying that:
It is really two third parties that impact on how we operate on
the farms. It is not only the AWU but, more importantly, it is the Australian
Industrial Relations Commission. Particularly through national test cases they
prescribe prescriptive provisions within all awards to make employers undertake
certain work practices regardless of the needs of the individual workplace.[51]
3.27
The details of the Government's proposal demonstrate
that the fears of critics are unfounded, as discussed below in relation to the
Australian Fair Pay Commission. It is not the proper role of the AIRC to
involve itself with wage fixation and awards, but rather to concentrate on its
original purpose: solving industrial disputes.
The Australian Fair Pay Commission
3.28
The role of the AIRC in wage setting will be
transferred to the Australian Fair Pay Commission. It will have responsibility
for determining changes to the new Federal Minimum Wage (FMW) and award
classification wages.
3.29
The objectives of the Fair Pay Commission will be to
promote the economic prosperity of the people of Australia,
having regard to a number of considerations laid down in the legislation. The
first of these considerations is the capacity for the unemployed and low paid
to obtain and retain employment. The Fair Pay Commission will ensure that the
unemployed and low paid are not priced out of the labour market. This
recognises the importance of being employed and of gaining experience and
making progress in the labour market. To this end, the Fair Pay Commission will
also be responsible for encouraging employment and competitiveness across the
economy.
3.30
The Fair Pay Commission's central role will be the
maintenance of a 'safety net'
in the form of a set of minimum wages, not simply for the low paid, but for
young workers, workers with a disability, and workers for whom training
provisions apply.
3.31
These provisions are grounded in economic necessity.
Employers are forced to compete against both domestic and international
competitors, and operate in fluctuating markets. This means that, while
recognising the critical importance of retaining a realistic set of minimum
wages and conditions, consideration must also be given to maintaining the
competitiveness of the variety of workers in the labour market and encouraging
more unemployed people to join the workforce. This bill seeks to bring about
measured change. It will establish a balance between ensuring that there exists
the required flexibility and competitiveness within the labour market, while at
the same time shielding those workers who require protection.
3.32
An important feature of the Fair Pay Commission, which
distinguishes it from the AIRC is its method of inquiry. The practices of the
Fair Pay Commission will enable a more consultative approach to pay setting in Australia.
Wage reviews will be an inclusive process, and the Fair Pay Commission will be
able to consult any interested stakeholders (for instance, the unemployed)
rather than just those industrial players with a direct stake in the outcome.
Importantly, the Fair Pay Commission will be able to undertake and commission
research, and monitor and evaluate the outcome of its decisions. Adversarial
quasi-judicial processes will disappear. Decisions will depend on the weight of
evidence following pro-active investigation by the Fair Pay Commission, and
reflect a more constructive evidence based approach to the determination of
safety net wages and conditions.
3.33
The Fair Pay Commission will be an independent
statutory body, and will not submit recommendations to government. It will set
wages and conditions independent of the views of the government.
An enhanced agreement making framework
3.34
One of the primary intentions of the bill is the
simplification of agreement making between employers and employees, by moving
to a lodgement based system and removing procedural barriers to agreement
making.[52] This will encourage parties
to negotiate the best and most efficient employment relationship possible in
their individual circumstances.
3.35
In addition to federal awards the Work Choices Bill
provides for six types of individual or collective agreements: employee
collective agreements; union collective agreements; Australian Workplace
Agreements; union greenfields agreements; employer greenfields agreements and
multiple business agreements. It will be up to employers and employees to
determine which of the six types of agreements best suits their circumstances.
3.36
A great deal of the committee's time has been taken up
with questioning about agreement processes. There has been much vilification of
the concept of Australian Workplace Agreements, even though this instrument is
in ever-increasing use across a wide range of jobs, from the most basic casual
position to senior executives. Further, it is the view of Coalition Senators
that well after the bill is passed, the predominant form of workplace agreement
will remain union collective agreements.
3.37
Critics have complained that the new lodgement process,
whereby agreements will take affect on lodgement with the Office of the
Employment Advocate (OEA), will lead to agreements being made which contain
terms lower than those in awards or which are not agreed to by employees.. To
ensure the veracity of the agreement, a statutory declaration will be required
to be lodged with it attesting that the agreement was negotiated in compliance
with the law. The statutory declaration will replace the current slow, complex
and legalistic certification and approval process. It will be an offence to
provide false or misleading information in the declaration and significant
penalties will apply. Changes contained in the Work Choices Bill will make the
current process-driven system of agreement making far easier for all
participants, while ensuring that agreements are genuine and accord with the
legislation.
3.38
The process for varying or terminating agreements will
be similar to that for lodging new agreements. Agreements will be able to be
extended (up to a maximum of five years), varied or terminated where agreed
between the employer and employee. A penalty regime will apply where agreements
are varied or terminated without the consent of employees.
3.39
Agreements made under Work Choices that have passed
their nominal expiry date may be terminated by any party to the agreement
giving 90 days' written notice lodged with the
OEA. If an employer terminates the agreement by 90 days'
written notice, they can provide voluntary undertakings to their employees
about the terms and conditions of employment above the Fair Pay and Conditions
Standard that will apply when the agreement is terminated. Such undertakings
will need to be in writing and lodged with the OEA. The voluntary undertakings
will be enforceable by the Office of Workplace Services.
3.40
When an agreement made under the current system is
terminated, the minimum terms and conditions of employment will be those of the
Fair Pay and Conditions Standard and the relevant award, which will continue to
protect employees. Agreements made under the current legislation can only be
terminated using the current rules for terminating agreements.
3.41
Claims have been made by the Opposition in Parliament
and in the ACTU's media campaign that the Work
Choices Bill will allow employers to force existing workers to sign Australian
Workplace Agreements. This is not the case. The Department submitted that:
...in respect of the negotiation of AWAs for existing employees,
it is against the law for an employer to force an employee to sign an AWA.
Those protections that are in the current legislation remain in the bill. It is
also against the law for an employee to be dismissed for refusing to negotiate
or to sign an AWA.[53]
3.42
In evidence to the committee, Mr
Scott Barklamb
of the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry articulated his
understanding of the legislated protections:
...employees will be protected from coercion. It is patently
untrue to claim that employees will be coerced into signing workplace
agreements under Work Choices. Protections will be retained and enforced by
enhanced advisory and enforcement bodies.[54]
3.43
Despite claims made by some commentators, the committee
majority emphasises that certain award conditions will be protected when new
agreements are being negotiated. These protected award conditions, which can be
the subject of bargaining by the employee/s and employer, are:
-
public holidays;
-
rest breaks (including meal breaks);
-
incentive-based payments and bonuses;
-
annual leave loadings;
-
allowances;
-
penalty rates; and
-
shift/overtime loadings.
3.44
These award conditions can only be modified or removed
by specific provisions in the new agreement. If these award conditions are not
specifically referred to in the new agreement, these awards will continue to
apply, and will not be lost to the employee. If employees and employers are satisfied
with the relevant award conditions relating, for example, to public holidays
and meal breaks and if they do not want to change these arrangements in the
agreement they negotiate, the agreements would not include clauses on public
holidays and meal breaks and would not contain a clause to say that the
agreement expressly excludes or modifies the conditions from the award.
Conversely, agreements that want to exclude or change these protected award
conditions must expressly state that the agreement intends to modify or exclude
the relevant award conditions dealing with those matters.
3.45
States
will continue to declare public holidays. In addition, the provisions in the bill
reflect the Government’s public comments that public holidays are ssacrosanct'.
In addition, there are specific provisions of the bill (subsection 90G(2)) which provide that if employees would have worked on a particular day, had that day not
been a public holiday, they must be paid at least the relevant rate of pay for
each hour they would have worked. This will underpin workplace agreements and
apply to all employees. Further all employees covered by new agreements will
receive ward penalty rates for working public holidays unless the agreement
explicitly modifies or removes them.
The rights of vulnerable workers
3.46
According to opponents of workplace reform, vast
numbers of employees stand to receive lower wages and entitlements as a result
of the Work Choices changes. Government party senators believe, on the basis of
a reading of the legislation, that these assertions are baseless and that
clarification is required of the many protections for vulnerable workers that
are included in the Work Choices Bill.
3.47
Much criticism of the Work Choices Bill is based on the
premise that employees are unable to negotiate effectively for themselves and
that vulnerable groups of workers such as outworkers or young people will be at
risk of exploitation. These criticisms are based on the false assumption that
the majority of employers are oblivious to the needs of their employees, whose
satisfaction is crucial to the success of a business.
3.48
The ability for workers to negotiate satisfactory wages
and conditions is bolstered by the strong demand for labour which has
characterised the economy since 1996. The committee heard from a number of
employer groups that they were unable to locate sufficient employees to meet
demand. For instance, Mr Christopher
Platt of the Australian Mines and Metals
Association (AMMA) had this to say to the committee in regard to circumstances
in his industry:
I have not seen any evidence whatsoever of competition driving
wages down. In fact, I was on a workplace earlier this year—it was a
construction site—where the peggy, who is responsible for keeping the sheds
clean, making sandwiches and basically just keeping the guys happy, was on
$100,000 a year. I was in Newman some months ago and there was
an advert for a boilermaker at $38.50 an hour. I have not seen competition in
the mining industry drive wages down. In fact, it is the reverse. We have
difficulties in getting enough skilled employees and it is a worker’s market.
If you are not rewarding your employees and providing them with an appropriate
environment, they will be gone.
3.49
Mr Corish
from the National Farmers Federation also made the following point:
Senator Joyce – Do you pay any of your
employees the award or do you pay them all above the award?
Mr Corish – In our own case, under our AWA
system, they are all paid above the award.
Senator Joyce – Do you
think you would have any chance of employing someone if you offered them the
award? I know that around St George
you would not have a hope.
Mr Corish – I can assure you that
the chances of employing someone based on the award or at the award would be
very slim, because there are opportunities for them elsewhere to get above the
award.
3.50
The committee acknowledges that supply and demand
factors in the labour market affect each industry differently, but the
principles apply equally. It is in no employer's interest to neglect the work
satisfaction levels of employees in the kind of labour market that exists now,
and into the future.
3.51
This strong labour demand coupled with short supply can
only result in higher wages and growth in workforce participation, which is
promising for those seeking work, as well as for those seeking an improvement
in their pay and conditions. It also renders improbable the danger to workers
put about by opponents of the bill. As the AMMA told the committee in an
earlier inquiry into workplace agreements:
It is all well and good to say that the employer has the
capacity to dictate in the same way that you have the capacity to do that for a
new employee with an AWA but, if you do not pitch your job offer correctly,
no-one is going to take it.[55]
3.52
As the SDA told the committee:
Senator
Joyce—Thank
you very much for coming in today and for your submission. You have a very strong
union. What do you see as your role after this legislation goes through? What
do you see would be the role of the union then?
Mr de Bruyn – I
think the union will continue what it has always done—that is, to negotiate
with employers for the wages, working conditions and job security of employees
and get as many agreements as we can; to represent employees at the workplace in
terms of any grievances, issues or questions they put to us; and to go out
there and invite employees of a company to join the union and then invite the
employees to elect the delegates and then train the delegates—do all the things
we are doing now.
3.53
Nonetheless, the committee recognises that the ability
to bargain effectively is not shared by every employee. Workers will be able to
appoint a bargaining agent to negotiate on their behalf. This agent could be a
friend, a relative, a union representative or a professional bargaining agent.
It should not be for the committee majority to suggest that unions have an
important role to play in representation of employees in negotiations of AWAs.
The rights of unions are guaranteed by legislation and it is up to them to work
for the recruitment and trust of employees they consider most vulnerable in
making workplace agreements.
3.54
The Work Choices Bill also provides a comprehensive set
of terms and conditions for those workers who find themselves, for whatever
reason, unable to strike a suitable bargain with their employer. The Australian
Fair Pay and Conditions Standard guarantees a floor under which wages and
conditions of every employee covered by the federal system (whether by award or
agreement) must not fall. Many such workers will be employed under an award
classification, which will usually offer significant improvements on the pay
and conditions under the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard, and which
will be streamlined to bring about easier access and understanding for
employers and employees.
3.55
Importantly, the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions
Standard is an objective test; it refers to a quantifiable wage, and actual
leave and other conditions. While opponents of the Work Choices Bill have
criticised the removal of the 'no disadvantage'
test which currently forms part of the industrial system, they fail to
acknowledge the shortcomings which are inherent in the subjective, complex,
legalistic and arbitrary 'no disadvantage'
approach. These include significant difficulties for parties to the agreement,
as well as the AIRC, in determining whether an agreement passes the test. While
in some cases, conditions agreed to by parties are clearly superior to those
offered by the relevant award, many other cases involving trade-offs of differing
conditions, are not as clear-cut. This leads to administrative delay in
implementing agreements which is associated with uncertainty and lack of focus
in the workplace on the outcomes sought by the employer.
3.56
The ineffectiveness of the no-disadvantage test is also
evident in situations where a bargained agreement reflects all parties'
desire to substitute certain award entitlements with greater benefits in other
award or non-award areas, such as, flexible working arrangements. The
application of an inherently subjective test can bring about real disadvantage
for some employees, in derogation of its core purpose.
3.57
Specific safeguards exist for the protection of
employees who may be vulnerable due to their level of negotiating ability and
market demand for their skills. These include, for example:
-
The requirement that employers provide a consideration period of at least seven days before
seeking employees' approval of an agreement.
-
The
requirement that employers provide an information statement from the Office of
the Employment Advocate (OEA), ensuring that employees have information about
the agreement making process and stipulating employee rights in relation to
advice and assistance about agreement making from the OEA. It will include the
date and method of the vote for an employee or union collective agreement.
-
Financial
penalties on those who don't
meet the procedural requirements for agreement making. A broader range of
remedies will be available against any employer who lodges an agreement without
obtaining employee approval, and against anyone who engages in false or
misleading conduct, coercion or duress during the agreement making process. The
sanctions will include compensation, financial penalties and injunctive relief.
-
The
availability of the OEA to provide advice to both employers and employees on
agreement making. This service will be free and is similar to its current
functions of providing advice and assistance to employers and employees on
their rights and obligations. Appropriate advice will be provided to young
people, and those from a non-English speaking background. Advice from the OEA
would not replace or prevent employees and employers seeking their own legal
advice and assistance.
-
Employees
retaining access to their union representative and to the right to appoint and
consult with a bargaining agent. The bargaining agent will be able to assist in
the negotiation process and act on the employee's behalf in relation to an AWA or a
collective agreement.
-
Employees
under 18 who enter into an AWA will require the approval of a parent or
guardian before the agreement can be lodged. It will be unlawful to dismiss a
young person for refusing to consent to an AWA.
-
Claims
against anyone who breaches the requirements above will be able to be lodged with
the Office of Workplace Services (OWS).
The OWS will investigate the complaint, and if it believes the complaint
is genuine, the OWS will prosecute for a breach of the Act.
-
The Office of Workplace Services will increase
the number of workplace inspectors from 90 to 200 who will work as both
inspectors and also as advisors to employees and employers on their rights and
obligations. The Office of Workplace Services will be a 'one stop shop' to
ensure employees and employers know their rights and obligations and that these
are fairly enforced.
3.58
These
protections aim to ensure that employees' approval of the agreement is genuine. There
will also be protections in the agreement making process to ensure that
complaints are genuine.
3.59
The bill also prescribes a maximum number of 38
ordinary hours which may be contained in agreements, and awards after the
transitional period. While employees are expected to work reasonable additional
hours, under the Fair Pay and Conditions Standard, employees can refuse where
to do so would be dangerous, or where the employee's
personal circumstances would not allow it.
Implications for the
work-life balance
3.60
The suggestion that the Work Choices Bill changes would
see employees compulsorily lose recreation time with their families and friends
is wrong. The bill actually seeks to improve on the very marginal gains made by
awards and collective agreements in achieving a work-life balance. Attempts in
awards and collective agreements to rectify the imbalance were described by the
EWRE references committee in its Workplace Agreements inquiry as being a 'relative
failure'.[56]
3.61
The Work Choices Bill offers employers and employees
many of the opportunities needed to strike a better balance between work and
family. The increased use of AWAs allows employers and employees to negotiate
face to face on their respective needs, and to arrive at a mutually beneficial
arrangement which is unavailable through most collective agreements and awards.
For instance, it may provide for working mothers to take time off during school
holidays, or for parents sharing care of their children to more effectively
juggle time. Indeed, it might be argued that attempts to build flexibilities
into many awards have resulted in the overly elaborate system with which parties
are currently faced. Such complexities usually result from having to have such
flexible arrangements approved by way of complicated processes.
3.62
Further, claims that the bill will widen the wages gap
between men and women have no foundation, particularly as the bill includes
provisions to ensure women are protected from pay discrimination and receive
equal remuneration for work of equal value.
3.63
The Fair Pay and Conditions Standard provides full time
employees with comprehensive leave entitlements, including paid personal, carer's,
and compassionate leave, as well as up to one year's
leave after the birth or adoption of a child. New parents may return to the
same job, or one with identical terms and conditions. A new entitlement of two
days unpaid leave for unforseen circumstances is available to employees.
3.64
Importantly, an entitlement to four weeks of annual
leave remains. It has been claimed by some opponents to reform that employers
will force employees to 'cash out'
half of the annual entitlement, leaving employees with only two weeks leave.
Such claims conveniently ignore the fact that workers are already entitled to
cash out their annual leave in its entirety if they so desire.[57] Critics also ignore express provisions
in the bill which allow cashing out of leave solely at the request of the
employee, and prohibit coercion by employers to do so.
3.65
The provisions of the Fair Pay and Conditions Standard
are based on current entitlements in the WR Act and cannot be bargained away
during negotiations. Many awards will already contain more generous
entitlements than those contained in the Fair Pay and Conditions Standard, and
these will be carried over to the new system. Parties seeking a workplace
agreement are also at liberty to agree on additional entitlements.
3.66
Baseless scaremongering campaigns have also implied
that workers will risk losing their jobs if they are unable to accept extra
shifts at short notice. This is a fallacy, as a representative of the
Department of Education and Workplace Relations demonstrated:
There are presently provisions in the Workplace Relations Act
which make it unlawful to terminate someone’s employment on the basis of family
responsibilities. Those provisions will remain in the act. They are untouched
by this bill.[58]
Implications for training
3.67
Some critics have made claims that the provisions of
the Work Choices Bill will have negative effects on training and
apprenticeships. This is not the case. Rather, the ability of the Fair Pay
Commission to set trainee and apprenticeship rates where there is no current
classification under an award will remove barriers to implementing new types of
apprenticeships and attracting more apprentices to areas of skills shortage. At
present, award classifications and payments for new types of apprenticeships
must be set through an application to an Industrial Relations Commission. If a
union does not agree to the type of apprenticeship being offered, they can
oppose the application. This delays, and in some cases prevents, the ready
supply of skilled labour, and inhibits the healthy growth of industry.
3.68
Government party senators believe that decisions about
training apprentices should not be based on industrial considerations, but
rather on training considerations. The residential and commercial construction
sector, for instance, have a skills shortage, and retention of apprentices is
difficult. In a time of skills shortage, it is absurd that industrial awards
should continue to contemplate placing quantitative restrictions on the number
of building apprentices who can be employed. Apprentices are often trained in a
way which is not relevant to the jobs they do. An apprentice, not wanting to be
bound to training for a fixed four-year period irrespective of the level of
competency that they have achieved, is less likely to complete the term of the
apprenticeship. Unions have used the current system to prevent wage structures
which facilitate more flexible training arrangements.
3.69
The Housing Industry Association submitted its support
for the reforms:
The Work Choices reforms will assist in the skilling of young
Australians. HIA is strongly supportive of the shift for setting trainee and
apprentice wages and wages in the awards from the Australian Industrial
Relations Commission to the Fair Pay Commission. Training should be unshackled
from the industrial relations laws. It should suit the needs of those who are
to be trained and those who are seeking to employ the trained worker. Training
should not be blocked or impeded by industrial disputation through the AIRC to
prevent the setting of appropriate classifications.[59]
3.70
The need for shorter, more flexible, and more
accessible training has been recognised by the Western Australian Government.
The Queensland Government has also recognised the need to move to competency-based
training. The reforms contained in Work Choices will provide more flexibility
for trainees and apprentices by making restrictions on the range and duration
of training arrangements disallowable matters in awards. The legislation also
recognises the major gaps which exist for trainees and apprentices under
federal and state awards, and the limitation this places on the take-up of
training opportunities. In lieu of in-adequate award coverage, the Fair Pay
Commission, and other provisions in the legislation, will ensure that model
award provisions apply to those undertaking new traineeships and
apprenticeships.[60] These reforms will
lead to easier access to skills-based training for those entering the labour
market, and will provide a platform for easing the skills shortages which
currently restrain growth in a wide variety of industries.
Will employees be worse off?
3.71
Myths and legends that workers will be worse off under
Work Choices abound. Government party senators believe it is worth reiterating the
falsity of many of the allegations that arose in the course of the inquiry
process.
3.72
The inquiry was conducted in an environment in
which highly hysterical and implausible claims
were continually being made by opponents of the bill. There would be insufficient
space in this report to do justice to the fully range of extreme claims being
made by bill’s opponents, however, the following were some of the more absurd
that have been made:
3.73
The Leader of the Opposition, Mr
Kim Beazley MP,
argued that the enactment of the bill would increase the divorce rate:
It is not good for the economy for workers to be unable to
afford their holidays, their relaxation or a decent family life. Divorce is not
good for the economy. Divorce is patently bad for the economy.[61]
3.74
A Victorian state Labor MP argued that the bill would provoke
circumstances in which women and children could be murdered on picket lines:
The history books show what happened in America. People on picket lines were murdered. Women
and children were killed, and that is the road this Prime Minister wants to take
us down. It is a disgrace. [62]
3.75
The Transport Workers Union claimed in a radio
interview that the bill would increase the road toll:
Truckies have staged a mock crash at the front of Federal
Parliament to highlight their concerns about the IR changes. They fear drivers
will be forced to work longer hours to make ends meet. Truck driver Tony
Upton is worried the added pressures could
see lives lost on the roads.[63]
3.76
The News South Wales Industrial Relations Minister, Mr
Della Bosca,
claimed in evidence to the committee that the bill contained elements of
fascism:
while the rhetoric of the Commonwealth—both the Prime Minister
and the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations—has been around the
issue of taking third parties out of industrial relations and out of the
workplace, they have in fact inserted a third party with almost fascistic
powers, and that will be the way in which a Commonwealth, as a state, will
operate within the system...
Senator Joyce – Mr Della
Bosca, you just said fascistic powers. You
honestly believe that there is a comparison between this and fascism. I think
that is an emotive statement and ridiculous.
Mr Della
Bosca – I think this is emotional
territory, Senator, and I hope you apply your emotions and sense of decency to
the way you consider this in the immediate future. I am saying that the
Commonwealth is attempting to insert itself into the employment relationship in
a way which has not been seen in this country before. We have always taken the
approach that there is free bargaining between employers and employees, either
collectively or individually, and we have always taken the approach that the
state, whether it be at a state level or at a Commonwealth level, provides a
judicial or arbitral umpire. The Commonwealth is now completely rejecting that
approach. It is one that has stood us in very good stead for 105 years, and
yes, Senator, it is very close to fascism.[64]
3.77
These claims have formed part of a highly
political campaign being run by opponents of the bill, in which factual
information has been discarded in favour of political scaremongering designed
to frighten voters into voting against the Government. The Secretary of the
ACTU admitted as much in the week he announced its campaign when questioned about its objectives:
Interviewer:
To bring down the Government?
Greg Combet: Well, the longer term position for
working people to have decent rights in this country, means that we need a
change of Government. And we need to change these laws. Now, we've
confronted that position in the past
in our history. We're confronting it again now, and we'll work very hard to
bring that change about.[65]
3.78
Witnesses have falsely submitted that sick and carer's
leave is threatened by the legislation. In fact, a minimum of ten days paid
personal or carer's leave is provided under the Fair Pay and Conditions
Standard, and unlike now, cannot be cashed out or traded off in an agreement. It
was also alleged that employees would be required to submit medical certificates
every time they are away from work, even for a short-term illness. The
Department has responded that, as is the case currently, there is no universal
standard, and that the new provisions were modelled on what currently exists in
many federal awards and under Schedule 1A of the WR Act. These came under no
criticism from witnesses.[66]
3.79
Witnesses repeatedly alleged that employees would be
put under duress by employers wanting them to sign an AWA. Officers from the
Department reminded the committee that section 104(5) specifically prohibits
duress being applied in connection with an AWA[67]
3.80
It was also alleged that employees will be forced to
'cash out' their annual leave, or at least part of it, and that work-life
balance will suffer as a result. In fact, this bill allows for 2 weeks annual
leave to be cashed out, but only when the employee instigates the request, and
the employer agrees. Currently, the WR Act places no restrictions on leave
being cashed out, and parties are free to cash out annual leave in its
entirety. This bill actually requires the preservation of at least half of an
employee’s annual leave entitlements.
3.81
It was alleged that those seeking to include
disallowable matters in their agreements would be sent to jail. The Department
was able to clarify this point, too:
No, it is not correct. The bill provides a prohibition on anyone
seeking to include prohibited content in an agreement. That is at section 101M.
That section provides that it is a civil remedy provision. If you turn to
section 105D, it provides penalties for breach of a civil penalty provision.
The breach of that particular provision attracts a civil penalty of 60 penalty
units for a natural person or five times that amount for a body corporate.
There is nothing in this bill that provides for the jailing of a person for
breaching that section.[68]
3.82
The evidence presented to the committee by the ACTU was
instructive of the highly misleading arguments being advanced by unions in
relation to this issue:
Senator Nash – Being a working mother, I am very
well aware of needing to spend time with family. I want to revisit the annual
leave part of this. Currently we can cash out four weeks annual leave and under
the Work Choices bill we can only cash out two. Isn’t that an improvement?
Ms Bowtell – The union movement has never
supported the cashing out of leave. It is true that there is no limit under
the current provisions on the cashing out of leave, but if you look at the
collective agreements compared to AWAs, the cashing out of annual leave is not
common in collective agreements. The only arrangements in relation to cashing
out that are common in collective agreements are cashing out of excess accrual.
In fact, the union movement was involved in a significant case back in the
nineties involving a company called Arrowcrest, where we opposed the capacity
to cash out annual leave, and we opposed it on public interest grounds. That
has always been our view. We were rolled in that case. That has continued to be
available, but for additional compensation. But it is not something that unions
go out and negotiate. You see it in AWAs
but you do not see it in collective agreements.[69]
3.83
The evidence advanced by the ACTU omits any reference
to numerous collective agreements currently in force which have been negotiated
by unions and contain specific provisions to allow annual leave to be cashed
out. For example, the Wespine Industries Pty Ltd CEPU (Dardanup
Site) Enterprise
Bargaining Agreement 2004 (AG934958) contains the following
provision:
17. CASHING OUT
OF ANNUAL LEAVE
17.1 It is the intent of the parties that all employees should be
encouraged to take their normal annual leave entitlement on an annual basis.
17.2 Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-clause 17.1, where it is
agreed by both parties and where an employee has an accrued annual leave
entitlement of four (4) weeks or greater, the employee may apply to take up to
two (2) weeks of the accrued annual leave as a cash payment per year in lieu of
taking the equivalent time off.
17.3 An application for cashing out of annual leave must be made and
agreed to in writing.
17.4 Where an employee has
'cashed out" a portion of his/her accrued annual leave he/she is not then
entitled to have the cashed out portion as time off at a later date.
3.84
The ACTU’s evidence also overlooks the Western
Australian industrial relations system, as amended by the Gallop Labor
Government, which allows for the ‘cashing out’ of a portion of annual leave. Section
8 of the WA Minimum Conditions of Employment Act states:
8. Limited
contracting out of annual leave conditions
An employer and employee may agree
that the employee may forgo up to 50% of his or her entitlement to annual leave
under Division 3 of Part 4 if –
the employee is given an equivalent
benefit in lieu of the entitlement; and
the agreement is in writing.
An agreement referred to in subsection
(1) is of no effect6 if the employer’s offer of employment was made on the
condition that the employee would be required to enter into an the agreement.
3.85
Parental leave was another area prone to
misinformation. The bill preserves parental leave, and adds extra protections.
Up to fifty two weeks parental leave, shared between the parents, the right to
return to a job with the same terms and conditions, and the extension of benefits
to casual workers, are all included in the bill.
3.86
There is a general tendency amongst critics to see
employers as inherently untrustworthy and employees as inherently vulnerable.
Yet demand for labour is strong, real wages continue to grow, and the changes
in the Work Choices Bill will enable productivity increases that will continue
to raise the standard of living of employees. Employees are currently in a strong
position to negotiate the wages and conditions that best suit them. This
position arises from labour shortages at nearly all levels, including unskilled
workers. For instance, the National Farmers Federation gave evidence to the
committee that due to the shortage of workers in rural areas, many farmers
negotiate employment packages with their workers that are well above award
rates and provide many extra conditions not accommodated under the award
system.
3.87
This situation is common through many industries in
many parts of the country. Work Choices will allow more flexibility to
incorporate those benefits that the employee wants and the employer wants to
provide.
3.88
The interaction between agreements, award rates and the
Australian Fair Pay Commission will also ensure that an effective safety net is
in place. No employee will have a rate of pay that is lower than a rate they
currently enjoy under an award. The large number of workers not covered by
awards will also be protected by the provision that ensures the minimum
classification wages will never fall below the level set by the Safety Net
Review 2005. There is every reason to conclude that workers will enjoy the
ability to negotiate improvements to their pay and conditions.
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