Chapter 3 - Australian Democrats' Report
3.1
The Workplace Relations Amendment (Protecting
the Low Paid) Bill 2003 proposes to narrow the adjustment of the award
safety net to focus on the lowest paid. The Bill aims to compel the AIRC to give even greater consideration to:
- the needs of the low paid,
including their need for employment;
-
the employment prospects of the
unemployed; and
- the capacity of employers to meet
increased labour costs.
3.2
The Workplace Relations Act 1996
specifies the matters that may be included in over 2 000 federal awards.
Presently only about 20 per cent of employees rely on awards as their
pay-setting method.
3.3
The wage and salary rates in those awards
constitute the federal award safety net, designed to provide employees with
fair minimum wages and conditions, and it is the responsibility of the
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) to maintain that safety net.
3.4
In maintaining that safety net, Section 88B(2)
specifies that the AIRC must have regard to:
- the need to provide fair minimum
standards for employees in the context of living standards generally prevailing
in the Australian community;
- economic factors, including levels
of productivity and inflation, and the desirability of attaining a high level
of employment; and
- when adjusting the safety net, the
needs of the low paid.
3.5
Nevertheless, it is clear that the Government
prefers agreement making to safety net adjustments to awards as a more
sensitive market mechanism than the method the AIRC employs through setting
wage fixing principles under the Act.
3.6
The Government also has a desire to reduce costs
to employers by lowering the annual increase awarded by the AIRC.
3.7
Section 88B(2)(b) already factors in a
consideration of economic and employment considerations. The Bill goes further. The Bill sits on the premise that the
employment prospects of the unemployed are likely to be detrimentally affected
by upward adjustments of minimum award wages. With that in mind they wish to
constrain potential increases.
3.8
This sets up a potential clash between the Act’s
requirement that living standards of low wage earners be maintained or
improved, and a desire to reduce the cost of labour to maximise employment. If
you concentrate on the former the fear is that you can price labour too high,
and if you concentrate on the latter the fear is it will be a race to the
bottom and poverty.
3.9
The Democrats contend that because Section
88B(2)(a) requires adjustments in the context of living standards, living
standards have to be assessed against what a set wage or salary can actually
buy, and how that compares with living standards for the community generally,
and whether they are improving (or not).
3.10
Such an assessment can only be made in relation
to disposable income (not gross income), and to assess net income requires an
understanding of the effects of tax and welfare offsets or imposts at
particular income, familial, or demographic levels.
3.11
The Democrats have a very clear view.
Maintaining or raising living standards of low income wage earners, or moving
the unemployed from welfare into work can not be addressed principally through
the AIRC and cannot be done in isolation of tax and welfare policy.
3.12
While the Committee Majority report chose not to
address this issue at any length, it has to be addressed. The present system
has clear limitations.
3.13
Analysis of previous safety net decisions shows
that the AIRC have taken into account economic factors, including productivity
and employment, and the needs of the low paid.
3.14
Our concern, along with others[1], is that the AIRC will be
compelled to accept arguments it has previously rejected as without merit.
3.15
The AIRC do consider the employment prospects of
the unemployed when making their decision. The following statement demonstrates
this:
We accept that, whilst there is no automatic relationship
between the two, real wage growth can adversely affect aggregate employment
growth. The extent of such effect will depend upon the prevailing economic
circumstances and the extent of the real wage movement. The limited addition to
aggregate wages cost associated with our decision will not have a significant
real wages effect.[2]
3.16
The ACTU submission contends there has been no
increase in unemployment, in fact to the contrary, as a result of Safety Net
increases in 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002.
3.17
The argument to reform the intersection between
welfare and tax is in our view a more compelling case for improving prospects
for the unemployed.
3.18
In their submission to the Committee, the ACTU
showed that the ‘gap between the wage rates of award based employees and the
community generally, as measured by Average Weekly Ordinary Time Earnings
(AWOTE) has been increasing. The Minimum Wage (or C14, the lowest wage rate
payable under any award) has fallen below 50 per cent of AWOTE for the first
time’.[3]
3.19
I was surprised that one of the arguments put
forward against safety net increases across the board, was because a high
proportion of employers passed the Safety Net increase on to over award
employees, even though there was no obligation on them to do so. It is surely
not the fault of the AIRC that employers choose to do this, and perhaps it is
more indicative that employers recognise the need for wage increases that are
not tied to productivity to keep up with inflation and the cost of living.
3.20
The Democrats also see the merit of a Safety Net
in providing a ‘no disadvantage test’ as a base for enterprise bargaining.
3.21
The Government argues that by implementing the Bill and compelling the AIRC to adhere to
new guidelines that this will somehow strengthen its role in encouraging
bargaining at the workplace level. There is no evidence to suggest that this
would in fact be true, except for the Minister and the Department saying it
would be true.
3.22
Agreement making has significantly increased in
the seven years of the Act’s operation, and there is no evidence its growth has
been limited in the manner suggested.
3.23
One of the telling and valid criticisms of the
present system has been that it delivers relatively low net income increases to
wage earners and relatively high gross costs to employers.[4]
3.24
The Democrats are sympathetic to the argument
that the safety net raises the costs of a wide range of wage-related expenses
for employers including over-time payments, worker’s compensation, leave loadings,
penalty rates and superannuation. Evidence suggests that this can have adverse
effects on employers either resulting in increased cost to consumers or
adversely affecting hiring and investment decisions.
3.25
The Democrats have noted this in several media
releases and speeches in relation to minimum wage increases. While the capacity
to pay could be more easily absorbed by large business the Democrats are aware
that it is predominately small and medium sized business that rely upon awards
and are thereby more adversely affected by increase wage costs.
3.26
In my view there is not enough evidence to
demonstrate that the amendments proposed in this Bill will address the legitimate needs of all stakeholders – employees
who deserve a better deal, and employers who are squeezed by rising gross
costs.
3.27
While the Democrats support an industrial
relations system that maximises and balances productivity, jobs growth and job
security while ensuring fair and just pay conditions and treatment; and have
always supported the AIRC decisions to increase the wage safety net[5]; we believe that the living
standard/employment/costs conundrum can be more effectively dealt with through
the tax and welfare system.
3.28
The difficulty with living wage increases is
that they increase gross wages and add-on costs. For every living wage
increase, an employer is faced with additional superannuation contributions,
workers compensation payments and payroll tax.
3.29
The employee does not obtain any immediate
benefit from the employer’s on-costs. Instead they are also hit with additional
taxes, so, in cash terms, they may only end up with half of the real cost to
the employer.
3.30
For example, for the employer, the $17 increase
is compounded by higher payroll taxes, superannuation, worker's compensation
and other on-costs, resulting in an effective $20-$23 increase. For the
employee, for every dollar increase in wages, some low-income workers can lose
70 cents in welfare benefits. Since they have to pay 17 cents income tax as
well, this can lead to a crippling effective tax rate of 87 cents in the
dollar. So in their hands $17 may drop to $8-$10 net.
3.31
In the words of the submission by the Australian
Industry Group, ‘Safety net wage increases represent a very poor ‘bang for the
buck’ as far as low-income households are concerned’.[6]
3.32
What we need is a system that increases the real
disposable income of low-income employees.
3.33
The key area for the Government to be examining
is that the minimum living standards are met. Then, that income tests should
reward and acknowledge attempts to work and supplement income while, at the
same time being withdrawn at an appropriate rate as employment income
increases.
3.34
This is a complex issue. At the moment there are
17 different pensions and income support allowances. They all have different
income and asset tests. In some cases this is appropriate, as the Government
should be providing more incentive for someone on the Newstart Allowance to get
off welfare than an age pensioner.
3.35
The unemployed are in the unfortunate position
of knowing that if they get a job they may be only 13 cents in the dollar
better off for their efforts. After taking into account transport costs,
clothing and additional food expense, they may not be better off at all.
3.36
The National Centre for Social and Economic
Modelling analysis shows that 22 percent of the poorer half of the nation
face effective marginal tax rates of more than 60 percent. One in two working
sole parents face similarly high effective marginal tax rates. These statistics
do not include the high number of people that are discouraged from entering the
workforce by these poverty traps.
3.37
Minister Abbott amongst others has been rightly arguing for more effort to be made
in this policy field. While the most disadvantaged in our society have a right
to be given income support and treated with respect, our tax and welfare
systems need to be changed to interact in a way that encourages welfare to
work.
3.38
The Democrats are open-minded about considering
various options to achieve change.
3.39
One of the promising areas of reform is the
concept of the tax credit. Tax credits are designed to soften the impact of
high effective tax rates. We know that there are plenty of savings that can be
made. These could be redirected into a tax credit system to reduce the high
effective tax rates faced by a person moving from welfare to work.
3.40
It is clearly important to consider tax credits
as one way of getting more people off welfare. It is hard to believe that Prime Minister Howard has apparently already ruled out this idea, without suggesting an
alternative.
3.41
Proposals have been around for many years[7]. One of the so called ‘five
economists’ developed a specific tax credit proposal providing a tax-free tax
credit of the order of 2 per cent that would be paid as a supplement to the
wage of low wage earners in low-income families as an alternative to a living
wage increase.
3.42
There is an urgent and large need for a system
that delivers significant real disposable income increases for the low and
lower paid, to encourage a move from welfare to work, to deliver social equity,
and to give working people a chance to get off the floor and aspire to upward
mobility for their families.
3.43
The Democrats both before and after the budget
explained how the only fair way to provide equal tax cuts to all Australians
was to increase the tax-free threshold. This would go a small way to reducing
the high effective marginal tax rates.
3.44
Our preference for the recent tax cut would have
been to increase the tax-free threshold to $7,500. The Government’s tax cuts
kept the tax-free threshold at $6,000.
3.45
If, as a society, we decide that to have a bare
minimum existence costs, for example $12,000, why do our tax rules operate to
tax income earned over $6,000?
3.46
This approach has been supported by Dr Kayoko Tsumori[8]. He
states that all participants in Australia’s welfare debate, while disagreeing on many issues, agree on at
least three key objectives.
3.47
First, any policy aiming to alleviate poverty
‘should encourage employers to create jobs and jobless people to take them’
because the major cause of poverty is joblessness’.
3.48
Second, those in fulltime work ‘should take home
enough money at the end of the week to keep their heads above water’.
3.49
Thirdly, it is important to create and maintain
work incentives.
3.50
As stated above, a minimum wage increase may
have an adverse impact on employment. The earnings credit may have an adverse
effect on work incentives[9].
Dr Tsumori states that:
There is a third option that meet all three criteria: to raise
the personal tax-free threshold. The current tax-free threshold is set at
$6,000 per annum. By raising it from such a low level, returns to paid work
would be boosted. As a result, it would become less necessary to raise minimum
wages or to supplement wages with the earnings credit. A higher tax-free
threshold would neither affect job creation nor perpetuate poverty. Most of
all, it would not discourage personal initiative.
3.51
While some academics have debated the various
merits of earned tax credits and increasing thresholds, the Government has been
impotent. Content to allow the high effective tax rates to apply to low-income
earners moving off welfare, but remaining sympathetic to the interests of those
on over $60 000 faced with a marginal tax rate of 48.5%. As ACOSS[10] has recently pointed out,
their average tax rate, for someone earning $60 000 is only 26%.
3.52
By contrast a low wage earner on $20 000 has an
average tax rate of 12%. So if you triple your income your average tax rate
only doubles.
3.53
The tax and welfare system is unbalanced – too
heavy on lower income Australians and lighter on higher income Australians,
particularly when you take into account the effect of Tax Expenditures.
3.54
It seems that while the Government attempts to
cut tax for high-income earners by reducing capital gains tax and the
superannuation surcharge, and providing private health insurance rebates, they
are ignoring one of the most important issues facing our society.
3.55
Minister Abbott has himself come out in support of providing assistance to the low
paid by addressing poverty traps through the taxation system as an alternative
to wage increases.
3.56
Rather than initiate an inquiry to explore the
prospects he is instead pursuing an industrial relations avenue that is flawed.
3.57
The Democrats do not believe the Bill is adequate to address the legitimate
concerns of all stakeholders and call on the Government to instead focus their
energies on reforming the tax and welfare system.
Senator
Andrew Murray
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