THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

Jobs for the Regions: A report on the inquiry into regional employment and unemployment
CONTENT

CHAPTER 6

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

6.1 The Committee's visits to centres in both rural and metropolitan regions brought it face to face with expectations that governments have a responsibility to address the problems of regions in economic decline. While the Committee understands the sentiments expressed by people from regional areas affected by economic restructuring and the rationalisation of public sector services, it is equally aware of the limitations of government intervention in overcoming the difficulties faced in these areas. Some economic and social changes affecting regional areas are beyond the control of governments, and it is no longer possible to imagine governments of any political persuasion sanctioning artificial and ultimately futile measures to create jobs in industries which cannot operate viably in a market economy.

6.2 In the matter of realistic expectations of economic policy, however, there is always `the other hand'. The Committee takes the view that regional economic policy is not a matter of deciding whether or not to institute a Five Year Plan, or of putting the issue to one side in the hope that the political consequences of allowing the regions to `sort themselves out' will not be too severe. Regional policy involves more than `getting the fundamentals right'. It involves implementing effective and acceptable measures for amelioration of the effects of closures and retreats. It involves reassuring regional populations that coordinated government strategies will be implemented and may be relied upon for an extended period of time.

6.3 The Society of St Vincent De Paul might be expected to have a perspective on Australia's regional problems influenced by its essential work among victims of change and loss. Yet the Productivity Commission has stated similar views:

Government as indirect employer

6.4 The role and responsibility of governments to provide a large measure in employment security remains a vexed problem. All governments and parties accept this responsibility, notwithstanding the limitations on their ability to achieve acceptably low levels of unemployment. In practice, governments are unlikely to ever again put themselves in the role of direct employment for the purposes of reducing the numbers of unemployed. Evidence given to the Committee on such measures as `Work for the Dole' has been equivocal. As a measure for `work socialisation' it has its supporters, but its impact in the real world of work in regional areas was questioned by some witnesses. A strong submission addressing the role of the government as `indirect employer', presented by the Australian Catholic Social Welfare Commission, set out the responsibilities of governments in some detail, in particular their role in managing employment services, training, and in ensuring adequate measures to compensate for inequalities in the distribution of wealth and the maintenance of income support and other forms of social welfare. [3]

6.5 The present economic environment as experienced by unskilled, low-paid and unemployed workers in disadvantaged regions of Australia highlights the importance of the indirect employer preserving adequate market incomes and a robust system of income support and social wage provisions. The indirect employer's role of ensuring security in work and access to adequate rates of market income remains the primary means of preventing poverty and ensuring the dignity, cohesion and development of individuals, families and communities. [4]

6.6 More significantly, the submission points to the responsibility of governments to develop long-term strategic plans for economic development and to address the problems experienced by the states in dealing with their service obligations.

Doubtful past legacies in regional development

6.7 The first attempt at a federally coordinated approach to regional development was made at the Premiers' Conference in 1944 and was intended as an element of the post-war reconstruction effort. [5] No firm policies were ever arrived at as friction developed between the states and the Commonwealth over their respective roles. It is worth noting that submissions and testimony to the Committee did not indicate that any distinction was made in local communities between Commonwealth and state agencies. The withdrawal or down grading of services is evident in both spheres of government, and it is likely that the niceties of constitutional argument would be regarded with impatience in the regions.

6.8 Commonwealth government interest in regional economic policy in the past half century has been sporadic. This may be attributed in large measure to constitutional arrangements which give direct responsibility for regional matters to the states. Historically, Labor governments in power at the Commonwealth level have tended to favour more interventionist policies, reflecting a national or centralist approach to economic development. The Albury-Wodonga growth centre initiative in 1973 is an example of this approach, as is the Better Cities Program implemented nearly twenty years later.

6.9 The Albury-Wodonga experiment was described in a submission to the Committee as having a chequered history, giving `as clear a picture of the spectacular, often irrational and even unpredictable changes wrought by ideology and/or politics'. [6] The ambitious program was scaled back within two years of its inception, and now the Albury-Wodonga Development Corporation (AWDC) has been reduced to the status of land developer and a subsidiary of Investment Albury Wodonga. Interestingly, the submission also points out that in 1975 the AWDC was staffed by 105 public servants but by 1986 Albury-Wodonga had one of the lowest proportions of public (civilian) employment of any large regional centre in Australia. [7]

6.10 The first steps by the Hawke government into regional development policy were relatively modest. A number of initiatives commenced in the early 1990s. In addition to the Better Cities Program the government established a Regional Development Taskforce, commissioned an influential report on business investment in the non-metropolitan regions, established the Regional Development Program (RDP) and channelled funds to regional areas through the Working Nation program. Area Consultative Committees (ACCs) were also set up in 1994 through Working Nation, under the umbrella of the then Department of Employment, Education, and Training (DEET) to provide communication between Canberra and the regions. Under the current government the approach to regional development was restructured. As outlined in Chapter 2, the RDP was discontinued and with it funding for the Regional Economic Development Organisations (REDOs). In its place the Government implemented the Regional Assistance Program and expanded the role of the ACCs to cover those functions previously undertaken by REDOs.

6.11 The expert reports and policy experiences of the early 1990s cut new ground in that they recognised the need to take up the challenges of planning and investment at local levels. This was in contrast to the 'top down' approach of supporting regional development through the guiding hand of the Commonwealth.

Community expectations of government

6.12 There was overwhelming evidence given to the Committee through submissions and at public hearings that the most threatening and disheartening developments faced in regional areas, particularly in the smaller towns, was the withdrawal of government services of all kinds. Business decisions were one thing; government decisions to withdraw services was seen to indicate a lack of commitment to rural communities and sent unmistakable signals to the business sector that further investment in regional enterprises would not receive the support of governments.

6.13 DEETYA's submission to the inquiry, however, argued that:

6.14 DEETYA bases this opinion on research undertaken by McKinsey and Company in which it was found that only 3 per cent of businesses regarded poor infrastructure as a constraint on their investment, and the provision of other government services was not raised as a significant constraint on business. It could be argued that this provides only a partial picture as it ignores the indirect impact that the withdrawal of government services has on the population dynamics of a community. While it may be the case that the provision of government services in and of itself may not be an important determinant in the investment and locational decisions of business, the Committee heard on numerous occasions that population critical mass was a key determinant of business investment. When government services are withdrawn from a community this has a direct impact on the population level and aggregate income of the area. In turn this may lead, through a negative multiplier effect, to some businesses in the area becoming unviable, potentially leading to a further reduction in population and income. This situation is certainly not conducive to new business investment, not because public services were withdrawn but because investment is simply not profitable.

6.15 This view is supported in the submission from the South Metropolitan Perth Regional Development Organisation:

6.16 While it can be argued that the centralisation of government services in regional centres has some legitimacy, the Committee does not believe that governments in general have provided adequate transitional mechanisms to allow smaller regional areas to adjust.

6.17 Generally speaking, the benefits of economic rationalism have been bestowed unevenly across Australian society. Inevitably they have been of most benefit to the better educated workforce in service industries linked to new technology and with connections to international markets. Deregulation of financial services and telecommunications by successive governments since 1983, and the demise, through withdrawal of tariff protection, of industries which once offered mass employment to the unskilled, have accelerated this process.

6.18 The policy changes required to achieve micro-economic reform - a process which continues - may well have been necessary to ensure the economic health of the nation overall, but it comes at some cost to regions which see themselves as having become the sacrificial lambs on the altar of economic rationalism. Any claim of long-term advantage is small consolation to those who might well expect governments to frame deregulatory processes within a broad strategy which addresses the social consequences of economic change.

6.19 The conventional response has been: let the market determine. For those who miss out there is a safety net of social welfare, which is, according to submissions and evidence, either insufficient for those in genuine need or over-generous to those who might otherwise choose to work.

6.20 The Committee received a strong impression from submissions and witnesses that the role of government should extend beyond this. There was particular criticism that `government' was uncoordinated in its approach to regional matters; that policy vacuums existed because the buck could so easily be passed between three spheres of government. An impression was gained that of the three spheres of government, only local government had a determined interest – for obvious reasons – in regional development and employment, and that state and Commonwealth governments were equally responsible for cutbacks in the provision of services to regional areas as can be seen in the chart below.

Graph of change in Commonwealth and State Public sector Employment - 1991 to 1996

Source: Submission No. 166, Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs, vol. 7, p. 113

6.21 The Committee does not deny that such intervention presents difficulties. Evidence given to the Committee indicates a strong awareness of the futility of throwing taxpayers dollars at `make-work' projects in regions of high unemployment. [10] There is awareness of the need to provide prospective industries with a well-trained workforce. The Committee is certainly aware that investments are a matter for commercial judgements not necessarily influenced by local, state or Commonwealth incentives. The Committee does not, however, accept the view that market forces bear equally on the judgements that must be exercised by business on the one hand and by governments on the other. Governments make decisions on the basis of achieving social and economic goals for the common good. Governments must therefore ensure the conditions for maintaining the highest possible levels of social equity in the context of economic deregulation. The pursuit of increased efficiency and increased national wealth, essential to growth and social harmony, is not incompatible with planning and regulation of development to ensure that employment opportunities continue for those living in both metropolitan and country regions.

Historical tendencies toward centralism and uniformity

6.22 The political culture of Australia has been marked by a strong reliance upon government regulation and upon the expectation of a high level of government services. This has been part of the historical experience since the settlement of 1788, with impact on Australia's economic development. The apparatus of centralised decision making and administration began with colonial governments. Local government, on the North American pattern, had no chance to develop because of the sparse populations and the legacy of military government.

6.23 The centralising tendencies in Australian government over the past sixty years have been a continuation of this tradition. It is hard to believe that the delegates to the constitutional conventions just before federation would have anticipated such an evolution. This is most obviously seen in the dominance of the Commonwealth through its taxation monopoly, through the centralist policy initiating processes of major political parties, and in the majority of decisions of the High Court which have strengthened the legislative powers of the Commonwealth Parliament at the expense of the state parliaments. Thus, despite regional policy being regarded as the responsibility of the states under the provisions of the constitution, the Committee was confronted with a strong perception in regional areas that the Commonwealth should maintain an overarching role in coordinating and facilitating regional development policy.

6.24 The Australian economy has been described as a series of highly differentiated regional economies and neighbourhood labour markets, thus challenging assumptions of a national uniform approach to dealing with regional problems. An interesting point made to the Committee referred to the limitations posed by our determination to apply national solutions in an inappropriate way:

6.25 When asked why not, the witness replied that the reason was political and instanced the DEETYA – ABS evaluation of the Working Nation program:

6.26 This theme emerges also in the submission from the former Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs which noted the political difficulties of implementing regional policy at the Commonwealth level.

6.27 It has been argued that, in Canada, the political pressures on governments to get results in the provinces has resulted in frequent changes to the federal approach to regional development and not always for the better. In the 1960s and 1970s, regional policy was conducted under the auspices the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE). The primary instrument used to effect regional development policy were agreements signed between the federal government and individual provincial governments. The idea underlying the agreements was to promote joint federal-provincial economic development planning around the comparative advantages in those provinces. Costs were shared between the federal and provincial governments although the relative contributions varied depending on the fiscal capacity of the province in question and in the case of the poorest provinces the federal contribution was as high as 90 per cent. This approach was characterised by a high level of cooperation between ministers and bureaucrats at two levels of government.

6.28 Following criticism of the department, a decision was made in 1982 to abolish DREE. It was replaced with the Department of Regional Industrial Expansion (DRIE) which aimed to link regional development with the economic objectives of industry, trade and commerce. It has been argued that this reorganisation led to a reduction in federal commitment to regional development given the dual mandates of the department. [14] In addition, all other government departments also had to consider regional development issues, meaning that provincial governments now had to deal with a range of federal departments in negotiating agreements rather than just one, undermining the efficiency of federal-provincial cooperation that was attained under DREE. It also appears that under DRIE there was no longer a focus of regional policy on the most depressed areas, that is, the Atlantic Provinces.

6.29 Under public and political criticism that the government had abandoned the regions the Canadian government established the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency in the late 1980s to promote regional development in the four Atlantic Provinces. Under heavy lobbying from the other provinces, the government later set up agencies to cover the Western and Central Provinces and also Quebec. This approach was aimed at generating cooperation among the provinces in the region. It also had the added benefit that it provided a high profile for the federal government in the region. It has been argued, however, that such an approach has made it increasingly difficult to get national coordination in regional development policy and also that it resulted in harmful competition between the regions. [15] This would suggest that there is an important role for federal governments to play in coordinating a decentralised approach to regional development.

6.30 Unlike governments, private investors are under no such pressures. Government funding as equity in joint ventures with private investors would be under no such restraints either. If government is serious about encouraging local initiative and local entrepreneurial leadership it will be in no danger of disbursing its assistance too widely. Associate Professor Tony Sorensen suggested in his submission that an appropriate Commonwealth policy would be to provide financial incentives to promising projects that would enable and reward successful risk taking. [16] It is second nature for private investors to look to comparative advantage. The industry cluster idea for development (as described in Chapter 2) is based on the principle of comparative advantage yet governments appear reluctant to embrace any policy that suggests that they are `picking winners'. One witness before the Committee, when asked to suggest a process to assist the emergence of strong regional leadership, said: `…I would tend to run a model. I would pick two or three regions where you had confidence of there being players with some of the skills. Some regions do not have them.' [17]

6.31 Walmsley, writing in 1980 and in 1990 looked at the role of government in dealing with the stresses of economic and social change, differentiating between adaptive strategies and maladaptive strategies. Adaptive strategies stress decentralised systems of control, consultation processes and holistic rather than specialised or segmented perspectives. This has not been the approach taken by successive Australian governments. Walmsley saw the centralisation of control and decision-making – endemic to the weak federal system in Australia – as tending toward equating size with efficiency. Maintaining control of policy within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Treasury excluded many legitimate interests from the consultation processes. Another maladaptive process was that which encouraged a preoccupation with equating importance with measurable inputs and outcomes. Concepts like `well-being' are not easily measurable but are no less important for this. [18]

The State in retreat?

6.32 If one clear message came out of all the public hearings conducted by the Committee it was a cry of complaint about the withdrawal of government agencies and services from the regions. The reasons for this retreat have already been alluded to. Basically it reflects the way governments now do business with their `clients' in an age of austerity. Agencies are now providing services on a `corporate' model in order to reduce staff overhead costs. The `corporate' model allows a degree of devolution of authority from ministers and a corresponding degree of operational independence. It takes agencies `off budget' but puts more pressure on them to perform within budget. This trend began first with state governments faced with ever reducing amounts of Commonwealth disbursements to cover an increased level of demand for their services. Along with corporatisation went the wholescale rationalisation of staff in large departments like education where the reductions in areas like curriculum support were little short of drastic. This was particularly felt in Victoria and South Australia. In New South Wales a wholescale restructuring of regional offices of the Department of School Education caused particular pain in some centres. If the states were ever considered profligate in their provision of services, this is clearly not the case today.

6.33 As previously noted, submissions and evidence to the Committee has not made much distinction between Commonwealth and state provided services. State agencies noted for having reduced staff levels and therefore levels of service are the regional health services and the railways and regional offices of main roads departments and education departments. Apart from the regional health services it is the loss of income to regional centres which appears to have been more of a concern than the loss of services. Health services on the New South Wales north coast, which is a population growth area, particularly for low income retirees, are mentioned as being underfunded. [19]

6.34 A submission from the Temora Shire Council gives a stark representation of the decline of smaller towns as the agencies of the state in regional areas retreat to larger cities to consolidate their presence. [20] Temora is a wheat belt town in south west NSW with a population of nearly 6 000. Its losses are thus catalogued:

6.35 It is conservatively estimated that 130 state government positions have been lost in Temora in the past ten years, with a significant flow-on effect experienced by the whole community. It is typical of experiences in rural towns across Australia. [22]

6.36 This evidence is also useful because it draws attention to the trend of consolidating services and industries in regional centres. This has resulted in declining populations in smaller country towns which has resulted in some resentment. The submission from the Cootamundra Shire Council states that much of the funding for regional job creation ventures and business assistance has been in regional centres, where the responsible government agencies are located, not country areas. The submission asserts, without supporting evidence, that assistance targeted at smaller country centres would produce proportionally greater benefit than the same assistance provided for larger regional centres. [23] These views are echoed by the Nambucca Shire Council at Macksville, which submitted the following:

6.37 The Committee acknowledges that rural dwellers have an understandable desire to enjoy the same amenities and services taken for granted in metropolitan areas. Heading this list are the full range of retail outlets. While the Committee accepts the validity of arguments that locally owned retail outlets produce a higher proportion of return on earning to the local communities than do the large national chains, [25] local consumers see advantages to themselves and their communities in having access to the big brand stores. It provides some assurance of comparability with city branches in item choice and prices. Advertising makes national chains attractive to consumers. Thus inhabitants of small towns will do their convenience shopping locally but will save the serious shopping for the regional centre which may be within an hour's drive on a good road. This is a `lifestyle' issue which is complementary with the decisions of governments to rationalise regional services. As a submission from the La Trobe Shire Council pointed out:

6.38 It is not within the scope of this report to consider the rationalisation of state services according to some measure of administrative merit. The Committee was not in a position to make value judgements on whether the people in Temora or Nambucca Heads are disadvantaged by the withdrawal of railway staff, or whether the quality of schooling has diminished because there are fewer administrators in regional offices. State governments make decisions on the basis of cost effectiveness and believe that they have no other choice.

The role of state governments in regional development

6.39 Most states have policies and programs to promote growth in regional areas. Typically, they provide grants, information and some facilitation processes. There are, however, some differences in the roles adopted by state governments in regard to regional development. Regional development policy at the state level is well developed in Western Australia, South Australia and New South Wales with most structures being in place for a number of years. The Western Australian and South Australian governments are currently reviewing their regional development policies. The Queensland government has also been significantly involved in regional development, although the structures do not appear to be as well defined or comprehensive as in other states. In Victoria, the Kennett government devolved responsibility for regional development to the local government level and administers only high level policies at the state level. A summary of the role of these governments in regional development follows. It is worth noting that no formal processes of communication exist between the state organisations described here and Commonwealth agencies.

Western Australia

6.40 There has been a strong regional development focus by successive Western Australian governments. The current government is developing a statewide Regional Development Policy, the aim of which is to ensure a `whole of government' approach to planning and support, crucial to sustainable development.

6.41 The Department of Commerce and Trade (DCT) is the principal government department responsible for regional development in Western Australia. The department has a Regional Development Division that promotes and facilitates regional economic development through the provision of information, representation and assistance to communities, organisations and businesses. The Division administers a number of programs designed to assist economic development in regional areas.

6.42 The Committee heard from representatives of the Department of Commerce and Trade at its Kwinana hearings, specifically in regard to the $200 million Jervoise Bay project, a marine industrial complex proposed for construction between Kwinana and Fremantle. The facility aims at attracting, among other business, maintenance of oil rigs, barges and heavy lift vessels which are currently serviced in Asian ports. The Committee noted the arrangement whereby the Department of Commerce and Trade acts as the lead coordinator for state government involvement in the scheme, avoiding any likelihood of policy confusion. [27]

6.43 The Committee also heard from officers of the Department of Training which maintains a network of Regional Employment Development Officers (REDOs not to be confused with those mentioned earlier) in 13 regions covering the state. REDOs identify gaps in employment and market services. They establish links with industry and community groups and are represented on nearly 150 regional committees and organisations in the state. [28]

6.44 The Department of Transport also has a specific policy role in the area of regional development, through its Regional Transport program. The Department, in cooperation with Regional Development Commissions (described below), is introducing regional transport strategies for the coordination and provision of regional transport infrastructure. The Department is also aiming to ensure that regional areas' needs for access to efficient freight and passenger transport services are met. This includes the provision of subsidies where remote transport access is important and community service obligations are identified.

6.45 Regional Development Commissions are statutory bodies. Each commission has a board of management made up of community, local government and ministerial appointments. The objectives of the Commission are to; develop and broaden each region's economic base, identify infrastructure needs and business development.

6.46 The Regional Development Council is the peak advisory body to Western Australia's Minister for Regional Development on all regional development issues, consisting of the chairpersons of the nine Regional Development Commissions and a person appointed by the Minister.

South Australia

6.47 Under current arrangements regional development is the responsibility of the Department of Industry and Trade and delivered principally through The Business Centre, a division of the Department. The Business Centre works in partnership with fourteen Regional Development Boards (discussed below) and provides; advice and assistance to businesses and the fourteen Regional Development Boards, as well as providing assistance for strategic regional development projects such as the Regional Towns Program.

6.48 State and local governments jointly fund the Regional Development Boards. In South Australia, Regional Development Boards are facilitators of growth rather than active developers. This is achieved through the creation, implementation and updating of strategic plans; the development of industry networks; provision of a shopfront for business advisory services; and liaison and cooperation with other groups involved in regional development.

6.49 Regional development policy in South Australia is currently under review. The South Australian Regional Development Taskforce was established by the state government in August 1998 to review regional development policy. As part of the state government's response to the Interim Report (released in February 1999), the Premier announced the establishment of an Office of Regional Development, and a Regional Development Council.

New South Wales

6.50 Primary responsibility for regional development in New South Wales lies with the Department of State and Regional Development (DRSD). The Department offers a broad range of services and programs to assist enterprises establish or expand in regional NSW. The role of DRSD is to: identify and develop commercial opportunities; assist businesses relocation and expansion into new markets; assist industry diversification and help regional communities to recruit more industries; unite interest groups; and develop region-wide action plans.

6.51 The state government also supports the network of 13 Regional Development Boards, of which one covers Canberra. Regional Development Boards (RDBs) were established in 1990 and operate under the Minister for State and Regional Development. In conjunction with the Department, the RDBs act as an advisory body to the Government on regional development issues and initiatives and as a vehicle for implementing actions to further regional development.

6.52 Business Enterprise Centres also receive funding support from the state government. The Department contracts BECs to provide free and confidential advice and training to existing and potential small business owners and operators.

6.53 The submission to the Committee from the Wagga Wagga City Council made favourable reference to the work of DRSD, but in another part of the submission referred to an issue which frequently arises in New South Wales: the dominance of Sydney and the preoccupation of successive governments with metropolitan affairs. The submission noted the Country Mayors Association's contention that:

6.54 In its submission to the Committee the New South Wales government cited a number of successes in its regional initiatives. One of these was the establishment of a $125 million egg and chicken meat plant at Griffith. Bartters, the firm involved was persuaded to locate to Griffith rather than northern Victoria or the ACT as a result of a local road improvement measure costing $4.7 million. [30] This is an instructive case study in the use of incentives by state governments. It represents a tilting of the `playing field' in regional development and suggests the likelihood of problems arising in any future national agreements about regional development.

Queensland

6.55 The Office of Regional Development (ORD) is a division within the Department of State Development that has the primary responsibility for implementing regional development objectives. Its focus is to coordinate and facilitate regional economic development policy, programs and projects across the State. These include:

6.56 The Department of Communication and Information, Local Government and Planning also administers the Regional Communities Program which assists government to ensure its programs and services address regional needs. Under this program ministerial community forums are held quarterly in regions to identify priority issues, needs and problems.

6.57 Queensland claims to devote more that half of its capital works budget to projects outside Brisbane, in marked contrast to the heavy metropolitan expenditure in New South Wales. There is tangible evidence of this in at least one development: the realignment and electrification of country railway lines. Queensland is the only state to undertake track realignment on such a scale, with obvious benefit to industry [31] and travel time reduction between major centres of population as far north as Townsville.

Victoria

6.58 The framework for regional economic development has undergone significant change over recent time in Victoria. When the Kennett government came to power, much of the previous system of regional development was abandoned. Accompanying reform of local government the network of Regional Development Boards and Voluntary Regional Organisations of Councils were replaced by a structure in which local government assumed responsibility for development at the local level, including funding of economic development units.

6.59 Initiatives at the state government level are usually focused on rural areas, defined as the 47 Victorian municipalities outside the Melbourne Statistical Division. The Department of State Development has the role of encouraging economic development in Victoria.

6.60 The Partnerships for Growth Program is a four-pronged strategy. The first, investment attraction, provides financial assistance to attract footloose investment to rural Victoria particularly in industries in which the state has a competitive advantage such as food processing, forest products and natural fibres processing. The second strategy, expanding local business, provides existing business with access to a wide range of enterprise improvement programs. Strategy three, priority projects, works in partnership with local councils and communities to identify projects which will improve local infrastructure, and enhance the attractiveness of country areas as places to invest. The final component, the rural community development scheme, provides funding to build or improve community assets which are critical to revitalising local areas and enhancing their civic and commercial appeal. The program recognises that the quality of these assets often influences business investment decisions.

6.61 A recent initiative being implemented by the Premier's Department is the Rural and Regional Strategy. The Strategy aims to identify the aspirations of rural and regional communities. The state government sponsored five regional forums across Victoria with the purpose of developing short, practical action plans for each of the regions. The government now intends to develop a statewide policy framework to guide its activity in rural and regional Victoria beyond 2001.

Need for State – Commonwealth cooperation

6.62 The foregoing brief description of state policy making apparatus is, with the exception of Victoria, highly structured. In this respect it also differs from the Commonwealth model of loose portfolio based programs. It is noteworthy that the Western Australian structures are the most elaborate being defined by statute. The fact of Western Australia's geographic isolation is probably the root cause of proactive government policy in that state. Yet even Western Australia considers it desirable for the Commonwealth to cooperate with the states in many issues concerning regional development. [32]

6.63 The recent report of the South Australian Regional Development Task Force has also taken up the theme of state – Commonwealth cooperation.

The importance of local government

6.64 An underlying current of evidence given to the Committee is that regions and local communities remain the passive recipients of whatever measures governments choose which are aimed at ameliorating local job shortages and unemployment. Local governments' responsibilities are devolved to it and there are strict limits to the ability of local governments to initiate policy despite them being better able to appreciate local resources and opportunities (Victoria is exceptional in this regard as described in paragraph 6.57). There is a paradox here, as one submission pointed out:

6.65 The message to the Committee has been that assistance schemes should be devolved as far as possible to regional bodies, and even in some cases, local communities rather than be administered centrally by state and Commonwealth agencies. This requires a culture change in the way Australians view public administration. There is no tradition of local government exercising wide ranging responsibilities affecting employment, education and training. Local government is the `Cinderella' sphere of government. The subordinate status of local government in some states is exemplified by the existence of `rate-capping' for the purpose of serving the political agendas of state governments, rather than as a rational measure to advance the efficiency of local government finances. Yet it appears from the evidence given to the Committee that of the three spheres of government, it is local government authorities which are extending themselves to the utmost to assume the burdens of dealing with the problem despite their very limited resources. This observation appears to have support in a statement made in a report commissioned by the former Department of Housing and Regional Development, whose authors noted:

6.66 At the Committee's Canberra public hearing, Professor Rolf Gerritsen, Director, Australian Centre for Regional and Local Government Studies, described the tensions between levels of government in relation to program design and implementation. [36] He said that undoubtedly the best research showed that programs designed from the bottom up were more successful in the long run than programs designed from a state or Commonwealth level and that local government is the best agency for a region's development. However, he also pointed out that local governments in smaller regions, although in the best position to tackle development, were most limited financially and had often lost talented people as the `brightest and best' members of local communities moved to the city. He also emphasised that local councils in rural areas of economic decline, requiring funding for projects to reverse this decline, were most fiscally dependent upon other levels of government.

6.67 Local government also believes state and Commonwealth governments undervalue its expertise and experience. Local government is perceived to be a `policy free zone': an entirely `practical' sphere of government. Yet the same could be said – with equal injustice – about state governments. A number of local government witnesses appeared before the Committee to make comments similar to that made by Cr Sara Coward and Council CEO Vincent Ryan at the Melbourne hearing:

6.68 Local government, despite all its efforts, appears likely, under the current federal government, to retain its status as the `Cinderella' sphere of government in Australia. It is kept firmly in its place by state governments. The Australian Local Government Association (ALGA) has long argued for a direct relationship between the Commonwealth and local government. In its evidence given to the Committee, the ALGA complained:

6.69 In 1997 the Australian Local Government Association urged the Commonwealth to consider as a budget initiative a `regional Australia package' worth $200 million over four years. The ALGA urged the Commonwealth to note `a proliferation of sectorally driven and bureaucratic programs which have added to the confusion and frustration of regional practitioners.' The ALGA claimed that the regions had been `studied to death', with bookshelves full of regional strategies and relatively few opportunities for them to be implemented. The lack of coordinated effort resulted in the absence of a strategy for identifying and assessing the priority of funding for projects that would make a `real difference' to a region.

6.70 The ALGA concluded with advice that regional communities and leaders were looking for a clear indication that the Commonwealth would establish a formal mechanism to deal with regional concerns. This was necessary to overcome the regional sense of abandonment and isolation, and to support regions affected by the effects of global economic change. [39]

6.71 In light of this, the Committee believes it to be unlikely that the ALGA will be enthusiastic about the Government's statement on Regional Australia, issued in May 1999. There is a new program promised to fund local government contributions to economic development worth, in total, $7 million over two years 1999-2001. [40] The Government has also announced that there will be a Regional Australia Summit held in October 1999, and, while it must be assumed that local government will be represented, there is no suggestion that the Government is contemplating anything like a formal structure along the lines proposed by the ALGA.

6.72 Evidence presented during this inquiry would suggest there is much that can be done to improve the liaison between the spheres of governments and local stakeholders in the planning stages of programs and policies for regional development. Such cooperation would improve the flexibility of programs and increase the actual employment outcomes within the regions.

6.73 The Committee recommends that local government should play a pivotal role in any future structure to coordinate regional development policy.

What can governments do?

6.74 The most fundamental question faced by the Committee, as it must be by governments and voters, is what should be the extent of government intervention in revitalising regional economies. That is, should governments adopt a role which extends beyond that of providing basic infrastructure, education and some training, and a regulatory system benignly framed (all carrots, no sticks) to offer business investment inducements with minimal conditions.

6.75 This invites the question of how responsibility for regional development is to be exercised. The Committee sees no public gain from a wrangle about powers based on constitutional considerations. It acknowledges the `grass-root' interests of state and particularly local government in regional development and employment. It is also aware of the political dangers which arise from perceptions of regional favouritism, an issue which is difficult to manage at state and regional levels. The record of the states in taking a rational and long-term view of development issues has not been impressive. The Committee has been told of how states and local governments have involved themselves in bidding wars in order to attract investment at great cost to themselves and to taxpayers and ratepayers, for the benefit of shareholders in those firms whose directors would have been swayed by more substantial and purely business considerations.

6.76 Advocates of the proposition that market forces should determine the shape and distribution of business investment, argue the case for being unfettered by governments on the grounds that governments are unfitted to influence such matters. When they attempt to do so the results are often counter productive.

6.77 In its Research Report 56 of March 1994 the Bureau of Industry Economics had this to say about the role of government in regional development:

6.78 This advice on fundamentals was echoed in several submissions to the Committee, and in oral evidence. According to one witness:

6.79 The evidence continued:

6.80 Advice was also given to the Committee on the dangers associated with ill-considered reaction to regional economic crises. Some regional centres are in decline because the economic imperatives that originally drove them have disappeared. As one witness from South Metropolitan Regional Development Organisation in Perth, explained:

6.81 The Committee is aware of the need to make realistic recommendations for measures to improve the employment prospects for people in the regions – and by implication – the requirements for putting regional economies on a sounder footing. Past regional development measures in Australia have been directed to attracting industry away from metropolitan areas. The Committee notes advice that there is insufficient economic justification for such policies. [46]

6.82 The Commonwealth also needs to address the problem of coordinating regional policy. As previously noted, the constitutional arguments that complicate regional policy and responsibility for regional development appear to be lost on most regional interest groups. Their complaints of neglect and inaction are directed at governments both state and Commonwealth. The Committee is concerned that the raising of constitutional issues in this context (apart from discussions about resolving technical difficulties) may be seen in the regions as a convenient excuse for failure to develop national policy.

6.83 In other advanced countries with different population distributions and political cultures, the solutions to regional problems may be seen as the responsibility of the regions, their local authorities and their entrepreneurs. It is because many regions lack either economic strength, or dynamic leadership, or both, that government has a role to play in nurturing these developments. A Commonwealth lead is essential because only the Commonwealth has the economic levers to deal with issues of capital investment and the resources to fund large scale infrastructure projects.

6.84 In the recent report of the South Australian Regional Development Task Force it was stated that:

6.85 This is a view echoed by the Illawarra Area Consultative Committee in its submission to the inquiry:

What should the Commonwealth do about the regions?

6.86 Government policy is as much a matter of process as outcome. This is doubly true in relation to regional economic policy because of the diversity and interests of the stakeholders. It's a policy area which is strewn with political traps.

Outcomes

6.87 But if we consider outcomes first, it is the Committee's view that the only satisfactory outcome is the maximisation of the economic potential of regions, and that for some of these regions the potential for improvement or regeneration will be limited. Associate Professor Tony Sorensen noted in his submission `the considerable in-built redundancy in the current rural settlement system and the marginal nature of a lot of primary production. Given that no foreseeable Commonwealth or state policy is likely to turn this situation around, the courageous political response might be to walk away from the problem.' [50] Regions and regional centres with potential, however, should be supported by government backed investment finance in association with policies aimed at encouraging rural entrepreneurs. This was also a recommendation of McKinsey and Company. Australia does not use the variety of financial incentives which other OECD countries use to encourage industry.

Process

6.88 It is noteworthy that the Government's policy paper, Regional Australia: Meeting the Challenges, makes scarcely a mention of the states in its opening section on the Regional Australia Strategy, yet that connection will need to be made. It is certainly desired by the states. The Committee does not consider an effective regional development strategy will be feasible or credible without formal agreement with the states, and without a lay measure of the policy and administrations shared between the three spheres of government.

6.89 The role of the Commonwealth in this matter is paradoxical. On the one hand, the evidence given to the Committee overwhelmingly supports the pre-eminence of local initiative and community and business leadership. Most growth, as the Committee heard, is generated from local capital. Small business will only begin to make a difference when it becomes medium sized business. The growth of individual small business is crucial to national growth. This can only occur when a higher proportion of small business set out to become medium business, employing more people. The historical legacy and the current experience suggest that the influence and support from the Commonwealth is depended upon by businesses which will ultimately develop and redevelop the regions.

6.90 The Committee believes there is a need for the establishment of a mechanism for consultation and discussion of regional development issues. First, the Committee recommends that a forum, similar to the Regional Australia Summit, should be convened periodically. The programming and arrangements for these events should involve all levels of government. Secondly, the Committee recommends the establishment of a Ministerial Council on regional development involving all three spheres of government on the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) model. The Council should meet regularly to establish policy priorities for regional development and discuss policy impacts on regional Australia. The consultative forum would then report directly to the Ministerial Council.

 

Footnotes

[1] Society of St Vincent de Paul, A Country Crisis: A Report on Issues Confronting Rural Victoria, Melbourne, 1998, p.10

[2] Productivity Commission, Impact of Competition Policy Reforms on Rural and Regional Australia, Draft Report, May 1999, p. 327

[3] Submission No. 164, Australian Catholic Social Welfare Commission, vol. 7, pp. 17-20

[4] ibid., p.19

[5] Productivity Commission, Impact of Competition Policy Reforms on Rural and Regional Australia, Draft Report, May 1999, p. 318

[6] Submission No. 187, Albury-Wodonga Area Consultative Committee, vol. 8, p. 206

[7] ibid., pp. 208-10

[8] Submission No. 166, Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs, vol. 7, p. 127

[9] Submission No. 110, South Metropolitan Perth Regional Development Organisation, vol. 5, p. 47

[10] Submission No. 195, Brisbane South Area Consultative Committee, vol. 9, p. 31

[11] Professor Peter Kenyon, Hansard, Perth, 18 August 1998, p. 1418

[12] ibid.

[13] Submission No. 166, Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs, vol. 7, p. 152

[14] McGee, R. H., Getting it Right: Regional Development in Canada, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 1992, p. 127

[15] ibid., pp. 178-182

[16] Submission No. 72, Associate Professor Tony Sorensen, vol. 3, p. 290

[17] Mr Rod Brown, Hansard, Canberra, 18 December 1998, pp. 1571-2

[18] D. J. Walmsley, `Adaption to Change and Uncertainty: The Social Implications for Australia', in R. Hayter and P. D. Wilde (eds.), Industrial Transformation and Challenge in Australia and Canada, Carlton University Press, Ottawa 1990, pp. 136-7

[19] Submission No. 99, Mid North Coast Regional Council For Social Development Inc., vol. 4, p. 141 and Mr Paul Sefky, Hansard, Lismore, 21 July 1998, p. 883

[20] Submission No. 96, Temora Shire Council, vol. 4, p. 119

[21] ibid., p. 116

[22] ibid., p. 115-6

[23] Submission No. 19, Cootamundra Shire Council, vol. 1, p. 108

[24] Submission No. 100, Nambucca Shire Council, vol. 4, pp. 171-2

[25] Submission No. 181, Mr John Domelow, vol. 8, pp. 68-9

[26] Submission No. 77, La Trobe Shire Council, vol. 3, p. 338

[27] Mr Ross Marshall, Hansard, Kwinana, 17 August 1998, pp. 1366-79

[28] Submission No. 217, Department of Training (WA), vol. 10, p. 123

[29] Submission No. 185, Wagga Wagga City Council, vol. 8, p. 154

[30] Submission No. 213, New South Wales Government, vol. 10, p. 80

[31] Cr Alan Brown, Hansard, Rockhampton, 4 August 1998, p. 1188

[32] Submission No. 218, Western Australian Department of Commerce and Trade, vol. 10, pp. 131-3

[33] South Australian Regional Development Task Force – Final Report (1999), State Government of South Australia, p. 52

[34] Submission No. 72, Associate Professor Tony Sorensen, vol. 3, p. 290

[35] McKinsey & Company, Lead Local Compete Global: Unlocking the Growth Potential of Australia's Regions, Report for the Department of Industry, Transport and Regional Development, Canberra 1994.

[36] Professor Rolf Gerritsen, Hansard, Canberra, 18 December 1998, pp. 1509-25

[37] Mr Vincent Ryan, Hansard, Melbourne, 7 May 1998, pp. 446-7

[38] Mr John Pritchard, Hansard, Canberra, 18 December 1998, p. 1579

[39] Submission No. 97, Australian Local Government Association, Appendix

[40] Hon. John Anderson MP and Senator the Hon. Ian Macdonald, Regional Australia: Meeting the Challenge, 11 May 1999, p. 41

[41] Submission No. 218, WA Department of Commerce and Trade, vol. 10, p. 151

[42] Bureau of Industry Economics, Regional Development: Patterns and Policy Implications, Research Report 56, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1994, p. xiii

[43] Professor Peter Kenyon, Hansard, Perth, 18 August 1998, p. 1408

[44] ibid.

[45] Mr Michael Dockery, Hansard, Perth, 18 August 1998, p. 1409

[46] Submission No. 110, South Metropolitan Perth Regional Development Organisation, vol. 5, p. 56

[47] Vigar, S., `Federal Involvement in Regional Development Planning and Development: A Never Ending See-Saw', Regional Policy and Practice, Vol. 6, No.1, May 1997, p. 37

[48] South Australian Regional Development Task Force – Final Report (1999), State Government of South Australia, p. 130

[49] Submission No. 148, The Illawarra Area Consultative Committee, vol. 6, p. 217.

[50] Submission No. 72, Associate Professor Tony Sorensen, vol. 3, p. 290